Contents.

Introduction. 3

Literature review. 4-6

Impacts on the industry. 7-8

Conclusion. 8

Bibliography and Appendices. 9

Introduction

Ayn Rand (1995) a Russian-born writer understood and wrote that "You can avoid reality, but you cannot avoid the consequences of avoiding reality." One reality that Event Managers must understand is there are certain risks when organising and operating an event that event managers are required to consider in order to successfully reduce risks and ensure safety at events.
There are a large list of set laws and regulations of which event managers by law need to satisfy when staging an event, Bowdin et.al (2006 :342) teaches that depending on the stature or scales of event the larger the amount of regulations. These set of laws or rules are named Legislations which Worthington & Britton, (2000) state occupy a substantial proportion of current law including those that govern the operations of business such as sporting events. A vast majority of legislations emanates from previous event disasters such as the Bradford city fire.
When a event disaster occurs and live are lost in the cases of the Ibrox, Hillsborough, Heysel and Bradford City football disasters inquiries are launched and investigations are conducted, after which recommendations on how safety could have been improved to potentially avoid the same hazards in future events.
Within this portfolio you will find information on the Bradford City Fire and how such a disaster such as that can impact the event industry through new regulations or legislation.

1. Literature review and history.

On the 11th May 1985 the sporting world was shocked by a drastic tragedy which took place in Bradford as 56 people died and over 270 others were injured in a stand fire which BBC News reported, ‘ripped through the main stand at Valley Parade, Bradford city football club’. On reviewing literature reports, documents and other articles of the tragedy it shows many small errors and choices led to a catastrophic disaster.
1983 saw Bradford City fall into receivership and was bought by two business men to become Bradford City Association Football Club. Whilst the club had a new chairman and board of directors they retained the same stadium also the ‘Company Secretary’ according to the HSE Operational Circular (1987) (refer to appendix E). Figure 1. (top of p.5) shows the stadium as it was in 1985, information given within the civil proceedings HSE, Operational Circular (1987) informs that no work or upgrading was done to the stadium or grounds since Bradford City Football Club took the stadium over in 1983.
The HSE Operational Circular (1987) also informs that the stand in question was over 300 ft long and was constructed of wood and supported a closed boarded roof which covered the entire stand (see Figure 1.2 top of p.5). In 1984 a member of the county councils safety team working on behalf of the ‘Fire and Public Protection Committee’ responsible for checking sports grounds under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act (1975) inspected the ground especially the main stand. Sir Oliver Popplewell the judge responsible for conducting the inquiry into the disaster reports, reported in his inquiry named The Popplewell Inquiry(1985) (refer to appendix A) during the course of the safety teams visit ‘litter and rubbish was noticed lying in the void beneath the stand seats’. Following the visit two letters from the county council are reported by Popplewell to have been sent to the club, firstly about roof repairs, and secondly to draw the clubs attention to the massive fire hazard the litter and materials in the ‘void beneath the seats’ imposes. The second letter reported in the HSE Operational Circular (1987), was also copied and given to the Chief Fire Officer, however, no action was taken.

Figure1 http://bradford.bravehost.com/history.html Figure 1.2
The old main stand before the fire

The new Bradford City Association Football Club saw immediate success and by 1985 it is reported by The Sunday Times newspaper that they had one promotion from the third division. May 11th 1985 was their last game of the season, after-which the main stand was to be pulled down and replaced according to Sir Oliver Popplewell reporting in The Sunday Times newspaper (2005) (refer to appendix C). It is reported the stand had no more than 45 minutes usage left before it was no longer needed. During the game eye witnesses reported seeing smoke arise from the Valley Parade main stand. Many sources including BBC News, the Popplewell inquiry-report, HSE circular (all found in appendices) and many others cannot confirm the exact cause of the blaze, but it is reported a lit cigarette or match dropped through the stands onto the accumulated rubbish beneath. The wooden stand then sparked a blaze and within 4 minutes fire consumed the entire main stand, and claimed 56 lives.
Andy Harrison, a survivor of the disaster reported to BBC News on the 25th anniversary of the fire (refer to appendix D), ‘The heat intensified more and more, supporters were jumping over the wall. The pitch was full with people running. All of a sudden a fire ball raced along the stand under the roof towards us. We made our way down the stairwell to the back of the terrace where the exit doors were locked’. Chris Spence who was 15 at the time also reported to BBC news that as he got to the back, the gate was locked and he was pushed out of the way by bigger men who kicked the gate until it gave way. He also stated ‘We saw people with scorched clothes and blackened faces’. Paul Firth reported in the BBC news that it was the ‘worst place to be’, behind him were turn stiles which let fans in to the stadium but not out; he also reported a number of locked doors.
Following this horrific event Sir Oliver Popplewell was given the task of compiling and conducting the inquiry into and report on the disaster. His findings are found in the Popplewell Inquiry and Popplewell Report (refer to appendix A,B). In 2005 Sir Oliver Popplewell wrote an article for the Sunday Times in which he stated a number of amateur and risky organisation plans. The first he states the football ground was run in an ‘amateur way’ afterwards stating stewards who had the responsibility of helping the smooth running and ensuring safety at events were not clearly posted ‘often elderly long time members of the club, with no training in safety procedures’. Sir Popplewell also mentions in the 2005 article the “Green Code” which involves pointing out the risks involved in rubbish accumulation, that ‘no authority seemed to have responsibility for the safety of this particular ground’. The Guardian also reported that the police officer responsible for searching the debris after the fire told Sir Popplewell he found litter that was years old, including ‘a 1968 copy of the local newspaper’. The same article by The Guardian newspaper gave exact quotation of the letter which was sent in 1984 saying, ‘the timber construction is a fire hazard, and in particular there is a build up of combustible materials in the void beneath the seats. A carelessly discarded cigarette could give rise to a fire risk’. All the signs were given in advance and indicated the likelihood of such a disaster.
Bantamspast.co.uk (2009) sums up the history and disturbing facts of this whole disaster by saying, ‘The cruel and terrible irony of the fire disaster was that the steel to replace the wooden stand was lying in the car park ready for erection on the following Monday’. If any action was taken through this ordeal it was always too late.

2. Impacts on the Industry
As previously mentioned an inquiry into the disaster was undertaken by Sir Oliver Popplewell, and is now compiled in the Popplewell Inquiry (1985). The enquiry led Sir Popplewell to recommend a number of very important changes to improve the standard of safety whilst at a sporting ground. This led to changes in the Safety of Sports Ground Act (1975). 2.1 SSGA
As Popplewell recommended, the reach of the Safety of Sports Ground Act should be larger, applying to many/ if not all sports. These recommendations have been adopted which means many authorities now work together in order for a sports ground to have a safety certificate. 2.2 Stewards
Also recommended by Sir Popplewell in his enquiry is that stewards at sporting events should be properly trained. This has been adopted and is now universal. 2.3 Exit Gates
Exit gates should always be manned and clearly marked; this too has been taken into practise throughout the sporting event industry, as a result of the Popplewell Inquiry. 2.4 Wooden Stands
Wooden stands were clearly problematic, and following the Popplewell enquiry they are now only in use if governed by a recommended certificate and also a no smoking rule was recommended. 2.5 CCTV
Sir Oliver Popplewell states in his enquiry that the most important of his recommendations was the introduction of close circuit television with ‘experienced police officers in charge’. 2.6 The ‘Green Guide’
The Green Guide was revised after consultation with various governing bodies and published before the 1986/1987 football season. 2.7 Distinction
Home Office Circular (1986) (refer to appendix f) informs the distinction made between sports grounds and sports stadia were abolished. 2.8 Indoor Facilities
Home Office Circular (1986) informs that a change was made to certificate indoor sports facilities. If an accommodation of 500 spectators is allowed a fire certificate must be awarded, under the Fire Precautions Act (1971), also revision were made to the act giving authority to officers of the Fire Authority to issue a probation notice.

3.Conclusion.
From the information gathered and presented within this portfolio, it has led to the conclusion that within sporting events there is no room for bone-idleness, laziness or even hope. Action and plans are the best defence any organisation has against risks. 56 lives were lost as a result of poor management and even cleanliness. Tragedy, disaster, shocking, and absurd are just a few words used but individuals who were there at Valley Parade Stadium to describe what they saw on that day. Neglect, negligence and irresponsible are other words used by the judges and others who investigated the disaster afterwards. The only faint light that comes from such a disaster are the recommendations and adjustments brought about to ensure better safety at future events. But as Sir Oliver Popplewell states in his 20th anniversary address in the Sunday Times (2005) that, ‘the disaster at Bradford undoubtedly led to significant improvement in the standard of safety at sports grounds, but Hillsborough showed there can be no guarantee of perfect safety. You cannot legislate for human error’.

Bibliography and Appendices. Bantamspast n.d http://bantamspast.co.uk/may111985/may11_1985.html n.d, (15.11.2010)
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8675297.stm 11.5.2010, (15.11.2010)
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/bradford/hi/people_and_places/history/newsid_8659000/8659492.stm 11.5.2010, (15.11.2010)
BBC News(2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8668479.stm 11.5.2010, (15.11.2010) Bowdin G, Allen J, O’Toole W, Harris R, Mcdonnell I (2002). Events Management. England: Second Edition
David Conn (2010) http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/david-conn-inside-sport-blog/2010/may/12/bradford-fire-david-conn 12.5.2010 ,( 15.11.2010)
Health and Safety Executive (1987) http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/fod/oc/200-299/217_3.pdf n.d (15.11.2010)
Home Office (1986) http://www.flaweb.org.uk/pdfs/circulars/5-1986.pdf 20.1.1986, (15.11.2010)
Sir Oliver Popplewell (1986) http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1986/jan/16/sports-grounds-popplewell-report 24.7.1986, (15.11.2010) Sir Oliver Popplewell (1985) http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1985/jul/24/the-popplewell-inquiry 24.7.1985 , (15.11.2010)
Sir Oliver Popplewell (2005) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/article520905.ece 11.5.2005, (15.11.2010) Worthington I & Britton C (2000) The Business Environment. England