Of all the options, the rescue mission was the riskiest that “could be taken militarily without engaging in an outright act of war.” Although this option had a low probability of success like sanctions, the retrieval of hostages was considered “paramount for personal, political, and international reasons.” At the time, those close to Carter perceived the mission as “more easily containable and less prone to uncontrollable escalation” than mining the harbors or conducting military strikes. The Carter Administration thus evaluated the mission as the only option with both the perfect balance of minimal political and military risks as well as the only option that would allow Carter to recover his losses and make additional gains. If successful, the hostages would return home, Carter’s approval ratings would improve in time for reelection, and America’s international prestige and the status quo would be restored. If unsuccessful, tensions would escalate with Iran and potentially place the lives of the hostages at risk. It was also possible that Carter’s image would be tainted internationally and he would lose the election. Using prospect theory, it is important to note that Carter advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who strongly supported the mission, framed the decision based on his notion of the importance of the hostages’ safety in addition to preserving America’s national power and prestige. Unlike Vance, …show more content…
Carter and Brzezinski were operating in a domain of losses, unlike Vance who operated in a domain of gains. Prospect theory demonstrates that the rescue mission was the only option that offered Carter the opportunity to recuperate all of his losses and still make gains at the same time. Even though Carter was aware of the consequences, he placed his confidence in the mission because “of the possibility, however small, that this prospect might restore status quo