Introduction
Following the Cold War and after nearly two decades of single-minded focus on the fight against global terrorism, the United States now finds itself in a new and challenging security environment based upon changes in the character of war and in the operational environment. More so than at any other time in our nation's history, rival nation states can now compete against the United States in multi-domain conflicts. They have demonstrated not only the capability, but also the will to challenge the United States using hybrid warfare in an environment just short of open conflict in the pursuit of their own national interests. These changes in the character of war and in the operational environment necessitate the Department of …show more content…
The United States is the world's lone superpower and rightfully classified as the Goliath force, in reference to the Biblical story of the young, small shepherd named David that represented the Israelites in battle versus the giant Philistine warrior named Goliath. Goliath challenged the Israelites for forty days standing clad with bronze armor and armed with a sword and spear. Prior to the battle, David realized he could not fight as Goliath, only to shed heavy armor and lay down a shield and sword provided by the king. He took only five stones and a sling in the fight against the physically superior giant and defeated Goliath with precision that was unanticipated. In the same light as Goliath, the United States does not enter the battlefield with the mindset of a smaller force, a force that must seek to employ alternative tactics to survive. The changing character of war and the changes in the operating environment means that the United States must be willing to think and act like David. This drives the DOD toward developing new and unique warfighting capabilities, and how to employ those capabilities, in support of our own instruments of power to be best postured for all …show more content…
These countries focus on establishing an anti-access, area denial environment to provide an asymmetric advantage. In other words, build a barrier too large and too costly for a near-peer adversary to overcome. To counter this advantage, the Joint Force and more broadly, the U.S. government, must integrate non-kinetic warfare to confuse, overwhelm, or influence a near-peer adversary's decision cycle. This paper contests non-kinetic warfare and its inherent capabilities are vitally important in contemporary military operations to win in conflict. This requires improved collaboration between DOD and whole-of-government at the strategic level and an understanding that the military instrument of national power is key to the employment of non-kinetic warfare in a supporting role to a broader non-kinetic strategy. The DOD is operating in a fiscally constrained environment and is constantly prioritizing resources; therefore civilian leaders must understand the capability or capacity of operating in a non-kinetic environment. Overall, the DOD must improve supporting capabilities and the connectivity to a whole-of-government approach if experiences in the first two decades of the 21st-century are indicative of future