IMO Policy on Repressing of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Horn of Africa region) Foreword: piracy in the Horn of Africa The United Nations (UN) and in particular the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have assertively tackled piracy since 2006.1 This effort is a response to the escalation of violence and the expansion of Somali piracy in the Horn of Africa, where, since 2004, ships, seafarers and property are constantly threatened by acts of piracy. Pirates are menacing shipping traffic close to vital choke points (Suez Canal, Hormuz Strait), disrupting freedom of navigation and the free movement of goods by sea, as well as jeopardizing regional stability. There is a strong body of evidence that Somali piracy is a tangible threat to the maritime community as a whole: however, IMO response (as a part of International Community action) has been seen as insufficient in order to efficiently fight pirates. This paper underlines positive and negative aspects of IMO counter-piracy policy, drawing the conclusion that despite substantial flaws and lack of pragmatism IMO action provides an essential catalyst able to orchestrate an international, comprehensive response against Horn of Africa piracy. Policy identification and implementation Current IMO counter-piracy policy is underpinned by an articulated set of papers, recommendations and agreements, which has been developed since 1998 and whose roots are even deeper. Actually, the legal framework at the basis of IMO approach is already recognizable in the UNCLOS 82 Convention, which clearly defines and condemns piracy and related acts. Also the 2002 ISPS code contains recommendations on safety of ships while underway, even though the Code is more counter-terrorism oriented rather than counter-piracy focused. However, it is from 2009 that IMO concretized its effort and focused on tackling pirates, mainly due to the worsening security situation in the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Aden, where pirates were infesting vital sea lines of communications. As a result, a robust package of recommendations, “best practice management” rules (BMPs), guidance and regulations followed (see Bibliography and Reference, as well as appendix 2), in order to strengthen and coordinate maritime and international community reaction against Somali pirates. Furthermore, during the last decade, a number of regional roundtables and meetings (attended especially by Horn of Africa countries representatives) have been organized by IMO, with the purpose of nurturing a common awareness of the problem of piracy. In the meanwhile, several IMO missions into Horn of Africa countries contributed to, assessed and evaluated local counter-piracy capabilities. Through this “capacity building” effort, IMO has aimed at putting into practice the signature of local agreements concerning the establishment of counter-piracy procedures. In particular, in January 2009, regional States under IMO guidance have signed a significant agreement. The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is aimed at overcoming the growing phenomena of Somali piracy in the Horn of Africa. The parties agreed on collaborating to the maximum extent within the current framework of international laws, aiming at eradicating piracy from the region. Furthermore, within the wider international and maritime arena, IMO policy effort is focused on encouraging Governments to increment their contribution in term of military
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The first UN SC Resolution against Somali piracy has been the UN SC Res.1816 (2008).

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assets to be deployed against piracy, whilst pressure is also brought to bear on the shipping industry in order to be fully compliant with BMPs. Overall IMO policy implementation timeline is detailed in appendix 1. Rationales IMO counter-piracy policy is underpinned by an articulated set of rationales: two stands apart for their significance. In primis, Somali piracy is posing a threat to seafarers. The human cost of piracy, in term of physical and psychological arms to kidnapped seafarers, is impressive. Episodes of violence against seafarers, not only during attacks but also during detention, are more and more frequent: brutalization of hostages is also becoming a routine. Therefore, IMO policy is aiming at reducing the success rate of pirate attacks, thus the number of hostages kidnapped, through the wider implementation by shipping industry of self defense measures and BMPs, which would increment the safety of seafarers sailing the Horn of Africa seas. Secondly, IMO policy is aimed at safeguarding the freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce in the Horn of Africa. Developing regional agreements on implementation of counter-piracy measures and underpinning the establishment of a more robust legal basis for prosecuting pirates (both at an international and domestic level), IMO policy aims at containing piracy and safeguarding sea lines of communications in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean. Policy safety objectives2 ! Increase pressure at the political level to secure the release of all hostages being held by pirates; • ! Review and improve the IMO guidelines to Administrations and seafarers and promote compliance with industry BMPs and the recommended preventive, evasive and defensive measures ships should follow; • ! Promote greater levels of support from, and coordination with, navies; • ! Promote anti-piracy coordination and co-operation procedures between and among States, regions, organizations and industry; • ! Assist States to build capacity in piracy-infested regions of the world, and elsewhere, to deter, interdict and bring to justice those who commit acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships; • ! Provide care for those attacked or hijacked by pirates and their families. Controversy IMO policy’s approach is surrounded by bitter controversy, being claimed to be too soft and not enough pragmatic. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) on behalf of shipping companies is asking governments and international organizations such as IMO for a more robust action both on the field (augmented naval presence) and ashore (effective legislation for prosecuting pirates). Moreover, IMO action is seen by shipping community as insufficient to orchestrate counter piracy reaction successfully: such as an example, accordingly to ICS opinion, the BMPs should encapsulate guidance on the use of armed guard onboard merchant vessels transiting hot areas. Finally, accordingly to industry, IMO and thus UN counter-piracy policy should be more military-oriented and less prone to diplomacy and tolerance. In few words, less papers and more action would be strongly welcomed by seafarers.
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IMO Circular letter No.3164, 14 February 2011

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Objectives achieved/not achieved IMO policy is a diplomatic compromise, which tries to avoid violence escalation: therefore, only some security objectives have been met. Seafarers’ safety is more safeguarded thanks to BMPs adoption and a higher level of coordination among navies, International Organizations and regional actors has been reached. However, as far as the others objectives are concerned, few results have been obtained: hundreds of hostages are still detained by pirates, due to the political and technical difficulties of hostage release operations. Furthermore, regional capacity building is still far from developing a credible counter piracy capability, due to a mixed lack of willingness and competence of regional actors. Finally, the objective of prosecuting pirates is still unaccomplished, mainly due to inappropriate international and domestic legislation. Side effects Pirates are expanding their hunting ground, taking advantage of the soft approach of UN policy: the whole Indian Ocean is a hot area, where seafarers are increasingly less willing to sail. Insurance cost for vessels transiting Horn of Africa waters are increasing, and shipping costs are boosted also by private security companies’ fees. Therefore, temptation of by-passing the Gulf of Aden in favor of the Cape Route is becoming more and more appealing: the main, geo-economic side-effect of IMO policy (or, even better, of its overall ineffectiveness) could be seen as a reduction of Suez Canal shipping traffic (see appendix 2). Company impact The impact on companies is indirect, has a microeconomic connotation, and it is related to the already mentioned partial success of IMO policy. The freedom of movement granted to pirates by the lack of pragmatism leaves room for several hijacking of ships and crews, pushing companies to take own security measures such as route diverting, contracting private armed security teams, and/or implementing passive protecting measures. These measures are effective, but they come to a significant cost, which is to be added to the already mentioned insurance expenses. Moreover, in case of ship’s hijacking, companies have to face part of the costs of ransoms, as well as income reductions due to hijacked ships’ missing revenue. Arguably, the overall cost has a considerable impact on companies: during 2010, companies’ burden has been estimated to be close to $ 9 billion. Economic costs of piracy are detailed in appendix 3.3 Conclusions Only few safety objectives have been reached by IMO policy, while a storm of controversy is still raging: seafarers’ safety and freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa are only partially safeguarded, whilst pirates are still enjoying an unacceptable freedom of maneuver. However, despite its lack of pragmatism, after years of political and legal battles, IMO policy has significantly contributed to the containment of Somali piracy below an acceptable level of violence. Military action and private security company could provide only a short term, violent and expensive placebo, which must be underpinned by a coordinated response of the whole maritime community in order to be really effective. Only IMO overarching policy has been and will be able to orchestrate international community response towards a long lasting, ultimate solution, although Horn of Africa’s endemic instability will inexorably dictate policy’s costs and timeline.
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