INDIA’S REGIONAL DIPLOMACY: NEW IMPERATIVES

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions.”
-Winston Churchill

Introduction

1. India's regional policy, like its economic and international policies, has been facing continuous adverse criticism. Without well-defined and transparent national interests, a national aim and a proper doctrine to support these, it has ended up with vague and blurred goals. Besides, it has remained geared to the doctrine of nonalignment- a philosophy based on wishful thinking, self righteousness, a convenient substitute for hard thinking and decisions. 2. The old order based on a bipolar world achieved the objective of peace, or limiting the extent of conflicts after the Second World War. However, justice and prosperity eluded the old order because of international interests of superpowers. Presently, the world is experiencing transition to a New World Order, with no super power as the centre of the power hub. What then will the new order seek, now that ‘geo-economics’ has overtaken geo-politics. It is therefore imperative for us to know as to what is the role of India in Asian context, and how India’s regional diplomacy will affect the overall politico-military role of the country.
Background
3. India being the largest democracy and the second most populous nation in the world deserves a pivotal position and role in the Asia-Pacific Region. Its strategic location on the Indian Ocean, its growing economy, its fast paced reforms in the service sector, its advances in space and nuclear technology, its armed forces and above all its people and rich culture endow it with enough fire power to affect Asia-Pacific affairs. 4. Unfortunately, the country has had ineffective leadership, a generally directionless foreign policy and unstable governments with limited vision which have not been upto the tasks at hand insofar as keeping the nation in a position of strength.
5. In the past, India's foreign relations and dealings have suffered from a personality fixation along with habitual secrecy, with the result that 80% of India's population was unaware of what the countries foreign policy was or should be and what objectives it was trying to, or try to achieve. In contrast, India's main adversary, China, has a foreign policy which is based on hard realism, with strong military backing and a long-term vision, whereas up to 1961, Nehru’s idealism and personality dominated India's foreign policy. And as stated before, India's China policy had no military backing worth the name.
6. Another important failing which needs to be rectified is that the Armed Forces must know about those foreign policy objectives for which the nation will be willing to make a military commitment. Further, to avoid past mistakes, it is essential to debate whether a nation should alter its philosophy and goals or change its methods.

Genesis Of The Problem

7. Considering the global and South Asian security environment today, and the strategic and foreign policy options available to India in this light, non-alignment is not a very viable option on several counts. To this end, measures like stringent economic restraint in the military sphere and fence sitting on matters of India's strategic and foreign policy objectives do not augur well for the nation in the new world order. India's strategic and regional policies hence need a major directional change.

Organisation Of The Synopsis
8. It is proposed to study the subject in the following manner:- a) PART-I. India’s concerns and their impact on the existing policy. b) PART-II. Future imperatives and internal and external national strategies to meet them.

PART-I

India’s Concerns and their Impact on Existing Policy
9. Two developments in the sub continent since the mid-Seventies affected Indian scenario. First was the increase in size of Pakistan’s armed forces, modernisation of its weapon systems, increase in its indigenous defence production capabilities, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile strike capacities. Secondly, Pakistan took advantage of internal cracks in Indian polity and actively encouraged separatist movements and inter-communal tensions in India.
10. India’s space explorer activities and technologies have been viewed with suspicion and reservation. India reached levels of self reliance and self-sufficiency in these technologies by the early 90s, which generated both commercial and security apprehensions among India’s Western partners.
11. Linked with this is the continuing pressure on India to adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, or to accept the discriminatory nonproliferation arrangements inherent in this treaty by some other arrangement. The context in which this decision is being made to India is worth noting: (a) China, an immediate neighbour, is a nuclear weapon power with IRBM and ICBM capabilities. (b) Pakistan has nuclear weapons capacity, has tactical delivery systems abilities and what is more alarming, and frequently threatens nuclear war against India. (c) There is equal uncertainty about the location of tactical nuclear weapons in the Central Asian Republics, with whom Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia are trying to establish closer relations.
12. Since 1991, India has been adjusting to the rapidly changing regional and internal security environment, the main elements of which are:- (a) Pakistan remains a primary force of threat, with its nuclear weapons capacities. (b) Pakistan projecting its claims on Kashmir under the plausible logic of human rights. (c) China's nuclear weapons capabilities, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Tibet, the still unresolved boundary dispute, and Sino- Pakistani defence cooperation are a matter of concern to India. (d) Chinese military doctrines, force deployment postures, economy interests in the South Eastern Asian region are a matter of interest to India. (e) Though the root cause of problem has been identified and dealt with, however, there still remains continuing ethnic conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka which poses dangers to India. (f) Bangladesh remains a critical factor affecting Indian security in the North-East and in the Bay of Bengal. (g) Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are being used as sanctuaries by Indian militancy groups and terrorists.

PART-II

Future Imperatives and Internal and External National Strategies to meet them.
13. As far as external strategies are concerned, defence policies and foreign diplomacy are two sides of the same coin. Assumptions regarding India's aims that would have a direct bearing on threat perceptions are:- (a) India does not intend to liberate the areas of its territory that it considers wrongly occupied by China. It will decide to settle the question by the process of 'give and take'. (b) India believes that a loose South Asian Confederation of at least Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is a viable entity by 2025. (c) India does not rule out solutions of the Kashmir problem that accept its autonomy if it is a part of a South Asian Confederation. (d) India does not intend to militarily liberate the so called ‘Azad Kashmir’, currently occupied by Pakistan.

14. Regional Policy Goals. External goals are the essence of any nation's regional diplomacy. India's foreign policy has centered around four goals since independence: the quest for security, diplomacy for development, regional primacy and the search for an international role. As regards economy, India has now shifted its thrust from an inward looking, import substitute economy to an outward looking, export oriented economy. As regards regional dominance, India is one country that is either contiguous to or which has a large coastline with all the states of South Asia. Here India has an advantage over its northern neighbour, China, in that it does not have the type of difficulties and obstacles which China has in interacting with these countries. Therefore, geographically, no nation beyond the frontiers of Indian region can equal the advantages which India has. This leverage at least theoretically, that India has over other countries of the region is therefore exceptionally powerful. It is therefore with great deliberation, that we need to foresee and review own policies for various neighbouring countries, depending on the threat perception, both politically and militarily. (a) China. A number of defence agreements have been signed between the Russian and Chinese Presidents for arms and technology sales to Beijing and joint ventures which have serious security implications for India. Also, China has been giving a great deal of military assistance to Pakistan. In fact, to put it bluntly, China has been and is trying to make Pakistan powerful enough to stand up to India, so that the latter is not in a position to adopt any aggressive posture towards China. The recent cases of ingression by Chinese troops in Leh and Arunachal Pradesh, are self explanatory as to what is the threat perception of India from the Chinese point of view. (b) Tibet. China is of course, quite clear on its policy on Tibet, while New Delhi's policy is ambivalent and vague and depends on the likely reaction from Beijing. India does not recognise the Tibetan government in exile and yet it has given all necessary facilities to this 'government' to function effectively. The Dalai Lama has been wanting to follow a middle path. He does not want total independence, but would be happy with an autonomous status within China. He has been asking for US help. Further, he is of the opinion that a process of democratisation in China will open up that country and encourage its support for Tibet. (c) Pakistan. India has to take note of what happens in Pakistan- there is no alternative to it. Should Islamabad enter into any alliance with any country, it has to be analysed seriously in New Delhi. Pakistan's threats can disappear, only if India's leadership is more cohesive and competent. Pakistan will avoid war as an option if it gets a clear message as regards the consequences of such a war which could be as grave as the Bangladesh one. One way for India is to prepare to use its military option to take back PoK while the initiative to launch an all-out offensive against India is left to Pakistan of which it is incapable today. Meanwhile, the support being provided by Pakistan in Kashmir should be dealt with by strong diplomatic and military pro-action. Pakistan is not in a position to launch an offensive against India without US support. To neutralize this, Indian diplomacy must activate itself. (d) Bangladesh. There should be no doubt that besides India, a large number of other countries are interested in Bangladesh for various reasons. In the past, insurgent movements in India’s northeast have used basis inside Bangladesh for the purposes of logistics support and training. Accordingly, India needs a special relationship with Bangladesh. Its absence is a sad commentary on the handling of relations with Dhaka in the past. It is time our politicians clearly formulated their views on the exact policy to be followed with Bangladesh. If there are no regional ambitions and the status quo is to be maintained, then Bangladesh must be reassured accordingly. But if there are security considerations, then too the country must be told accordingly in no uncertain terms. The Teesta River water sharing agreement is held up for want of approval by Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal while the land boundary agreement due to resistance by the main opposition party the BJP. The general impression in Dhaka is that while the Sheikh Haseena government has delivered on its promises including evicting terrorist leaders of the North East harboured in that country and the all important transit treaty, New Delhi has failed to deliver. Such instances send out a negative message to the neighbouring country. (e) Sri Lanka. It needs to be noted that when the Indian troops withdrew from Sri Lanka and arrived back on the Indian soil at Chennai, their reception was cool and not even lukewarm. The Indian foreign policy makers have therefore landed the country in a situation where it cannot take any initiatives on Sri Lanka, but can only wait and watch. If India has washed it hands off Sri Lanka, it does not mean that all the problems are over. At the moment, Sri Lanka stands on the threshold of a possible historic change. It is an area of strategic interest to the US, China and many other Western powers vying with one another to get a foothold. India just cannot afford to ignore the changes next door and remain a mere onlooker, as it has done in the case of Myanmar. (f) Bhutan. The situation in Bhutan has a direct influence on India's security, historical and geographical fact which it just cannot wish away. It needs to be noted that the Chinese have all along been insisting with direct talks with Thimphu and not through India or in the presence of an Indian representative. And they have had their way. Also, they want diplomatic relations to be established with Bhutan. The pending border dispute and Bhutan’s difficult position fit in well with China's strategic designs, should they at some stage decide to opt for a drive towards Bangladesh or to make for the Brahmaputra. India of course cannot afford to be bypassed through Bhutan without serious consequences. And that is why Bhutan is so important, both to Beijing and New Delhi. (g) Nepal. Nepal has been in an anti-India mood many times. Although Nepal is not a threat by itself, India cannot avoid facing crucial challenges from the Nepalese soil, should Nepal continue its political instability. A distinct tilt towards China and even Pakistan, and its emergence as a major base for terrorist activities against India in the North-East, are some of the issues which can be seen clearly to be surfacing on the horizon. Pakistan’s ISI has a well established base in Kathmandu to aid and augment secessionist activities by various outfits like the NSCN(IM), ULFA, and the Bodo Security Force in India's North-East. The Liberation Front of Seven Sisters which has all the banned organizations from the North-East as its members has its headquarters in the Pakistani embassy in Kathmandu. Indian Parliamentarians must get out of their inertia and short sightedness and view the situation in its totality. India must look after its ex-servicemen in Nepal. They are the most effective and a major source of goodwill for India. Sufficient attention has not been paid to them.

(h) Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the hinge of Asia on which pivots the gateway to India through the Khyber Pass via Pakistan as well as to the back door of Russia. And so, it has been traversed and fought over by the invading armies since the earliest times. Afghanistan is important to India. Should the country fall in the hands of Taliban fundamentalists, they can heavily influence the ongoing proxy war in J& K and India as a whole. In this fluid situation, with an uncertain future, where does India fit in? A stable, well governed Afghanistan which does not take sides is essential for New Delhi. Afghanistan President H.E Hamid Karzai visited India in May 2013. He has requested India’s support in terms of provision of instructors for Afghan military academy, provision of heavy caliber weapon systems, etc. India has already committed approx US $2 billion in development of infrastructure in Afghanistan. The bottom line is that India cannot afford to have a fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan which is completely tilted towards Pakistan. (j) Myanmar. India needs to ensure that it does not lose sight of Myanmar. The country (also known as Burma) is growing in importance for a number of reasons, most notably its strategic location as not only as new battleground in the East, but also as India’s bridge to South East Asia; last but not least, it is a country with immense economic opportunities, which India is easily in a position to benefit from as a consequence of geographical location and historical ties. (k) Maldives. During the last decade, as India’s interests have expanded further into the Indian Ocean, the geo-strategic importance of the Maldives to India has increased commensurately. Not only has New Delhi remained dedicated to its assistance in the Maldives during bilateral disputes, but it has also evinced a pattern of escalating support. In the past, India’s developmental assistance to the Maldives has been driven by three key priorities; maintenance of cultural and historical relations, trade and economic access, and finally, security interests, including the safeguarding of critical sea lines of communication. As India has increased its development cooperation with the Maldives, it has also strengthened security arrangements, demonstrating growing geostrategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean waters. These changes highlight the complexity of the bilateral relationship as New Delhi recognizes the strategic importance of the island chain while in turn the Maldives realizes its own leverage.

Recommendations
15. Finally, keeping India's national interests steadily in view and in full belief in the proposed doctrine, our Regional Policy planners should set about taking initiatives at least ten years ahead on the various issues, some of which are listed as follows:- (a) To ensure that besides external and internal threats to India's North-East, the chances of Pakistan raging a second proxy war in that area are checked and eliminated. (b) To formulate and announce a pragmatic policy on India's nuclear plans, Kashmir and towards those countries which are supplying arms to militants, or supporting proxy wars or other irregular warfare in such a way that it shows India's will to preempt such moves instead of being caught off guard.

(d) To forestall likely Chinese initiative in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean and if necessary enter into maritime agreements with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar to neutralise the likely Chinese influence. (e) To initiate diplomatic moves which will keep the US, China and Russia away from interfering when and if India uses force to have its territory back from Pakistan. (f) To take diplomatic measures to ensure that countries bordering India do not get involved in defence alliances and pacts which are prejudicial to India's security and national interests. (g) To re-examine and redraft existing treaties with Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh, so that foreign powers cannot use these countries against India's interests in the future. (h) To engage Pakistan in a serious and meaningful dialogue, if necessary with the assistance of other countries, over the return of PoK so as to circumvent it from supporting the militants till there is no option left for India, but to use force to re-unify PoK with J&K.

Conclusion
16. India has no option but to maintain high spending on defence and maintaining a superior force against Pakistan and a holding force against China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Indian security remains to a large degree dependent upon a successful diplomatic and a reasonable 'Cold War' against China. Pakistan remains a problem in all cases not because of its intrinsic strength but because of foreign powers acting through Pakistan have a telling effect on Indian vulnerability. Indigenization is the key requirement, considering that arms and equipment are the Indian Armed Forces' weakness.
17. India's national interests and its national goals are no longer foggy and obscure. In essence, these amount to the maintenance of its sovereignty which is badly threatened from external and internal forces - both military and non-military. India needs internal stability - political as well as good law and order for its economic development and social progress. To do that, for the decade years, India’s aim should be "to retain its sovereignty by ensuring self reliance, reunification of its territories, internal stability and economic development of its people".
18. Today, India’s image both within the country and abroad is that of a weak, dependent country which seeks aid and production from outside, a country which has high ideas and values, but low vigour to implement these, a country which has only adhoc foreign and defence policies. And if that image is to change, atleast in the regional scenario, then the country will need a regional policy based on hard realism, strength, protection of its vital interests, which may also include the restoration of its original geographical boundaries as these were on 15 August, 1947. It is by correct policies, and diplomatic efforts only, that India can regain its position as a power hub, not internationally, but atleast regionally in the near future.

References

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