What is the current state of Latin American international relations, particularly relations with the United States? What is unique or “new” about the present situation? How much have we seen before? Make sure to discuss both economic and geo-political/security dimensions, and make reference to at least two historical periods, whether identified by particular doctrines, presidencies, or regimes of international relations.

Current state of Latin Ameican international relations with the US— * Emerging independence from US—US is no longer the immediate partner of choice. Regional resentment of US perceived self-serving exercises of power * Economics: * Increased intra-regional economic integration—ALBA, UNOSUR * Expanding economic partners outside the hemisphere—China * Security: * States worry about subordination to the “gringos.” Address problems themselves or with immediate neighbors, rely less on US— * LatinAmerican presidents joined together to defuse tension between Colombia and Ecuador/Venezuela after Colombia’s March 2008 raid inside Ecuador * South American Defense Council (2008)—aimed at institutionalizing and coordinating “defense and security policies in the region while preventing and mediating conflicts within South America * United States: * Economic dependence on the region on the rise— * 50% of US energy imports (largest share accounted for by any region) * 32% of all US FDI * Environment, illegal drug trade, and immigration have intensified interdependence * Economic stronghold at risk * China—offers a path independent of US and liberal economic orthodoxy * #1 trading partner for Brazil, Chile, and Peru * #2 trading partner for Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba * 2000-2009—imports increased from $5 billion to $44 billion, exports increased from $4.5 billion to $42 billion, 17% (by 2009) of total Chinese FDI * US—share of regional trade is declining (2002-2008) * US share of exports fell from 48% to 37% * Chinese share of exports grew from 4% to 10% * Trend will continue—long term trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru * Military dimension— * China does not pose strategic or military threat for the hemisphere * China’s military presence is small but there are security ties with Cuba and Venezuela * Nicaragua canal (Chinense entrepreneur) may complicate geopolitics * No evidence that China aspires to take over Panama Canal or project power into region

Is democracy’s “glass” in Latin America half empty or half full? Focusing on a particular country we have studied, what are the principal obstacles to more satisfactory democratization? How might these be overcome? Be sure to define terms like democracy and democratization, and what standard you are using to judge countries.

Were political movements of Peronist populism in Argentina dominant party authoritarianism as practiced by Mexico’s 20th Century Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) obstacles to democratization? Or, rather, were these just a different means of organizing and representing the interests of traditionally excluded social groups? Be sure to define your terms and discuss the evidence in relation to both the concrete cases mentioned.

Discuss at least three different strategies used by the opposition in Venezuela from the time of the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 to the present. If you were an advisor to the opposition coalition (M.U.D.), what do you think the best strategy is going forward to take power back from chavismo?

What explains the emergence of armed guerrilla movements in El Salvador and Nicaragua? Why were the revolutionaries able to take power in Nicaragua, but not in El Salvador?
Compare and contrast the modes of engagement with 1) the United States, 2) other countries of the hemisphere and 3) the rest of the world of at least two Latin American countries. Discuss at least two modes of engagement of the following: economic, political/international relations, social, or cultural.

Critically discuss the rise of “the new left” in Latin America. How widespread is it? To what does this trend owe its rapid rise? What are the different types of "lefts" according to Luna? Cite at least two illustrative examples. Finally, do recent economic and political trends suggest an end to this "wave" and the likely return to prominence of political parties and leaders of the center-right? Why or why not?

Rise of the Left— * Causes: * 1994—Mexican Peso Crisis * Devaluation of the peso against the dollar * Investor jitters, capital outflows and suspension of financing * Mexican GDP fell by 6.2% in 1995 * Deep crisis averted but it revealed vulnerabilities of the new free market system * Social Failures of the Washington Consensus * 1990-1994—households still more likely to be poor than at the end of 1970s (39% in 1994) * 1996—210 million living in poverty; racial and ethnic exclusion * Economic Failures of the Washington Consensus * 1990-1994—weak economic growth, 3% growth * Collapse of the Argentine economy * Drying up of foreign investment capital, which had fueled growth of 1990s * 1998-2003—capital outflow led to slow growth, high unemployment, rising or changing poverty * General Principles of the Pink Tide: * Marxism and Socialism * Equality and justice * Community movements, social democratic parties * State intervention in economies, redistribution over allowing market forces to determine winners and losers * Association with subordinate classes—challenges to established system

How widespread is the rise of the “new Left?” * By mid-2000s, the left, center-left won elections—Some 60% of Latin Americans were governed by the left * Venezuela: Chavez (1998), Maduro (2012) * Brazil: Lula (2002, 2006), Rousseff (2010, 2014) * Argentina: Kirchner and Fernandez de Kirchner * Bolivia: Morales and the MAS * Leftist governments won elections based on three elements— * (1) Mobilizing economic and political discontent during the 1998-2002 economic crisis * (2) Bringing together a diverse populace in fragmented civil societies with different electoral strategies * (3) Having a charismatic leader who was able to bring together citizens, broaden electoral appeal—Chavez, Lula, Vazquez, etc.

What explains the political success of the left in the past 10-15 years? * (1) Standard explanation— * Combination of inequality and democracy tends to help the left—poor vote for people who are likely to help their conditions by redistributing wealth. BUT… * Inequality and poverty are constants, and the left was not seen as the best equipped to solve these problems * (2) New dynamics under democracy— * Military could less easily intervene to block the left * Elites and conservative groups less worried due to globalization * New experiences of parties of the left in local government/legislatures * Rise of social movements movements (civil society) * Jobs became the more important issue, and the electoral coalition of the center-right reduced * (3) Government and opposition cleavage— * Leftist parties opposed neoliberal reforms * Failure of these reforms to deliver growth or social progress meant incumbents were punished—most incumbents during “lost half decade” (1998-2002) were center-right * Political opportunity for left wing and anti-establishment candidates * (4) Weak Political Institutions— * Weak democratic institutions and failures of political representation caused discontent * Discredited institutions favor challengers, anti-systemic, populist candidates (“outsiders”) * (5) Commodity Boom— * Leftist governments were in office for long time because of economic bonanza due to by commodity boom * Commodity boom helped sustain and strengthen shift to the left

Two Different Groups of Leftist Governments: * (1) Populist Left (Radical/Constituent)— * Origin: deeper crises of political representation and collapse of traditional party systems * Charismatic leaders emerge rapidly to fill power vacuum left by the collapse of an outgoing party * State rents (oil, natural gas) are important for explaining how different leaders attempted to institutionalize electoral coalition * Aims: alternatives for political and economic inclusion outside liberal democracy and market economy * New compromise between regime and development (i.e. clientelistic distribution of state rents) * Maintain popularity regardless of economic management, democratic values, or anti-US rhetoric * Examples: Venezuela (Chavez), Bolivia (Morales), Nicaragua (Ortega) * (1) Populist machine—established party organization and concentrated power (APRA, FSLN) * (2) Populist left—new political movement, concentrated power (Chavez, Correa) * (3) Movement left—new political movement, disperse power (Bolivia and MAS) * (4) Institutionalized Left—Socialist Party in Chile, and FA in Uruguary * (2) Social-Democratic Left (Ameliorationist/Institutional)— * Origin: long-standing leftist parties that pursued a process of ideological moderation * Revolutionary movements and leftist fronts of (1960s-1970s) * Context of an institutionalized party system and underwent a long process of adptation to compete * Aims: social-democratic project within liberal democracy and market economy * Examples: Chile (Bachelet), Uruguary (Vasquez), and Brazil (Lula)

Return of the Right?—Region’s leftist evolution is being validated, not repudiated * Brazil: Rousseff won 51% of the vote * Extends 12-year rle of the Workers Party, founded by da Silva—redefined Brazilian politics with a commitment to lift up the poor * Workers Party’s legacy is engrained in Brazil’s politics—pro-market challenger Neves promised to preserve the socialist and environmental gains of the Left while seeking to rekindle the economic growth * Even amidst a recession, Rousseff still won * Public disappointment with the economy, blamed on government missteps * Voters not ready to risk gains that they experienced from Workers Party reign * Regionally, overall trend is in a progressive direction— * Pivot towards pragmatic center that addresses the public’s demand for economic growth but without sacrificing a pursuit of greater economic equality * Commitment to reduce region’s poverty, break from oligarchic regimes * No threat from extreme Right—exception is Colombia where conservatives forces remain very popular * Moderation of the harder-line Left—Venezuela * Right is shifting to the center—Peru * First generation of the Pink Tide—growing middle class * Demands more efficient welfare state and more flexible economic model with private and public investment and less poverty and crime * Translates into left-of-center candidates—promising reforms to address corruption and offering to make other corrective changes to government programs * However, the Pink Tide is ebbing— * Brazil: Rousseff is immensely unpopular, approval rating fell to 13% in 2015, lowest of any president since Mello in 1992 * Stagnating economy, expected to slip back into recession this year * Corrution scandal (state-run oil company Petrobras)—more than 100 executives and politicians have been implicated in kickbacks, bribery, and money-laundering dating back to 1990s * Argentina: Kirchner approval ratings fell below 30% * Economy slipped close to recession * Protests over suspicious death of prosecutor Nisman * Venezuela: Maduro * 22% approve of the job done by Maduro, lowest rating since he replaced Chavez * Lacks predecessor’s charisma (similar to Rousseff after Lula) * Economic challenges: low oil prices, inflation, rampant black market and shortages of basic goods * Violent street protests (40 dead last year, at least one dead this year) * Common threads behind declines: * Past decades: favorable conditions because of China-driven commodities boom and abundance of international liquidity * Now: major change, leftist governments are now encountered with bad international conditions * Less money for social programs that were already starting to see diminishing returns * Poverty reduction stalled in Brazil and Argentina since 2013 * Increasing poverty in Venezuela * Regardless of whether the left loses in the short term, they have solidified reputation—championing social issues and individual rights, serve them in the long run * “Pink Tide” murkier than 10 years ago, but is not over yet

Critique the neo-liberal model of economic development as implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. What have been the strengths and weaknesses of this model for Latin America’s economies? Your answer should include specific reference to at least two countries in the region (not counting the U.S. and Canada).

What is the Washington Consensus? * General Theoretical Principles * Growth is maximized when rational individual actors are able to pursue their self interest in competitive markets—growth comes from competition between self-interested individuals * Rejection of developmental state (similar to liberalism) * Policies— * Fiscal discipline * Redirection of public spending to achieve high economic returns and income distribution * Interest rate and trade liberalization (competitive exchange rate) * Privatization and deregulation * Secure property rights * Tax reforms

Strengths of Neoliberalism— * (1) Growth of Large Firms— * Concentration of ownership in industry— * Productive industries tend to be capital intensive * Employment has been created in small and medium-sized enterprises in informal sectors * Privatization process—signficant transfer of assets to transnational enterprises * Alliance with domestic grupos in industry (telecommunications, infrastructure development, etc.) * Shifted to sectors in which competition from abroad was not as powerful * Capital intensive investment— * Increasing productivity—large firms are in better position to upgrade production processes * Access to capital is key—large firms are able to attrack credit in domestic and global markets, FDI * (2) Chile— * Success story of neoliberalism, similar results in Argentina * Economic boom as a result of implementation of neo-liberal policies following the coup * Increased competition * Greater efficiency * Infrastructure improvement * Lower prices and increased foreign investment * Inflation rate dropped from 508% (1973) to 23% (1983) * Economy grew at an annual rate of 8% * International reserve rose from $167 million (1973) to $4 billion (1980) * Influx of huge capital into Chile

Weaknesses of Neoliberalism— * (1) Low economic growth and little job creation— * 1990-1994—weak economic growth, 3% growth per year on average * Collapse of the Argentine economy * Drying up of foreign investment capital, which had fueled growth of the 1990s * Industries disappeared because of global competition—other areas of economic activity emerged and that sometimes substituted for jobs * 1994—Mexican Peso Crisis * Devaluation of peso against dollar—investor jittors, capital outflows and suspension of financing * Mexican GDP fell by 6.2% in 1995 * Revealed vulnerabilities of the new free market system * 1998-2003—capital outflow led to slow growth, high unemployment, rising or unchanging poverty * Resistance—protests, riots, and armed rebellions * Unemployment rates exceeded 10% in 2001 * South America—expansion in capital and tech-intensive sectors, did not create that many jobs * Mexico, CA—employment expanded but in low-wage, low-skill manufacturing sectors * Mexico—118,000 workers in 1980 1.2 million by 2001 * DR—500 workers in export processing zones in 1970 164,000 by 1996 * (2) Poverty and inequality— * Inequality—top tenth of the population earned 48% of income (29% in OECD countries) * Brazil—top tenth of population were 68x those of the bottom tenth * Guatemala—top tenth of population were 55x those of the bottom tenth * Poverty—beginning of the 2000s, nearly 50% population lived in poverty * 1990-1994—decline in poverty did not offset increases of the 1980s * 1994—more likely to be poor than in the 1970s * 1996—210 million living in poverty * Social exclusion, alienation and violence * (3) Weakening of the state— * Neoliberalism—decrease in the size of the state and a reduction in the scope of public intervention * Public employment declined from 16% of the workforce (1990) to 13% by end of decade * Subsidies eliminated * Expenditures on public health and education systems were curtailed * Labor and collective actors were impacted— * ISI Period—workers and low-income groups organized to increase their political participation * Press for better wages, benefits and working conditions * Stable employment allowed worker to be covered by minimal guarantees * Neoliberal globalization—unionization rates fell sharply, no labor flexibility * 2001-2003—Economic Decline * Collapse of the Argentine economy—held up as perfect example of Washington Consensus * Popular doubts gained expression through the ballot box * Emergence of a growing number of leftist leaders—questioned whether globalization had served to enhance social welfare and new development strategies

What have been long-term consequences of the construction of the Panama Canal? What if an inter-oceanic waterway had been built in Nicaragua instead? What are some of the possible economic, geopolitical, and environmental implications of planned construction of a canal across Nicaragua today?

Nicaragua Canal Implications— * Economic: * Nicaraguan Economy— * Construction project would employ over 50,000 workers * Once in operation, it would generate 200,000 jobs (10% of current workforce) * Canal would provide a powerful business boost to Nicaragua—help easy transition away from fading Venezuela financing * Future Global Commerce— * Global trade will grow fast enough over the coming decades to overload the Panama Canal * Provide sufficient business for the Nicaraguan venture * Passageway will be broad enough to accommodate the next generation container ships * Competition— * North American land bridges in Mexico and US will compete in the traffic between Asia and US—competition may undermine the economic viability of the canal * If Chinese entities provide the bulk of the financing, they are likely to tie their support to Chinese equipment and Chinese workers—possibly restricting opportunities for US firms and others to bid * Geopolitical: * US-China geopolitics— * Chinese economic pressure in the hemisphere has increased dramatically * US has taken a “wait and see” attitude, acknowledging the mutuality of commercial benefits and not pre-judging political or geopolitical opportunities that China might seize * Canal would signal a much higher level of Chinese assertiveness * Canal will siphon off traffic from the Panama Canal and the Chinese will likely have a more relevant geopolitical influence in Nicaragua (country not fully integrated with US) * US concerned about Chinese presence but not because of canal competition * Panama Canal has lot a lot of geopolitical relevance for US—US west coast doesn’t need to go through Panama to trade with Asia; east coast doesn’t either to trade with Europe * Panama Canal has been more relevant for other countries to reach Pacific/Atlantic * US economy and military hegemony in the region— * Nicaragua Canal streamlines supply chain between China and Brazil * New trade advantages to the Global South (Mercosur, ALBA) * Potential impact of reducing US economic and military hegemony in the region * Latin American geopolitics— * Ortega-championed project—solidify one-party politics in Nicaragua for the future * In light of the instability in the northern-tier Central American states (Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador) and Costa Rica’s extra-regional prism * Strong unified Nicaragua could become dominant power in the isthmus * US-Russia geopolitics— * Russia announced that it will take part in building the canal— * Viewing the project as an opportunity to pursue strategic interests in the region * Geopolitical threat to the US in the region * Environmental: * Lake Nicaragua—provides Nicaraguans with drinking water * Canal cuts through the lake and ship traffic will pollute the water with industrial chemicals * An oil spill would have serious and lasting consequences * Dredging bringing up toxic sediments, disruption of migration patterns of animals, and potential to introduce invasive species to the lake * Hurricanes—canal route lies in the middle of a hurricane belt * Hurricane would cause the canal to flood, triggering mudsline that would break locks and dams * Communities, homes, roads, and power lines would be swamped * Local environments—destroy or alter nearly one million acres of rainforest and wetlands * Domestic Affairs: * Local opposition to intended expropriations— * Number of people who will be displaced range from 29,000 to 100,000 * Farmers protested against possible eviction from their lands * Agreement curtails Nicaragua’s sovereignity— * HKND will keep all revenues once the canal is in operation * Not obligated to pay market prices for the land * Does not have to use Nicaraguan construction companies or hire Nicaragua workers * Not obligated by Nicaragua laws

Discuss the historic and contemporary relevance of “the Mexican-American War” of the 1840s in U.S.-Mexican relations. In particular, discuss the different ways the war is remembered and understood in Mexico and the U.S.

The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) * Mexico and the US go to war over territory— * Causes: US annexation of Texas and Americans’ to expand North American continent to Pacific * Invaded Mexico on three fronts: north through Texas, east from Veracruz, west in CA * Americans won every major battle because of superior artillery and officers * End of the War— * War ends with a US victory after troops capture Mexico City (1847)—Mexico forced to accept treaty * Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: cedes nearly half of Mexico’s territory to US in exchange for $15 million

Historical Significance in U.S.-Mexican Relations * Manifest Destiny— * Americans’ wanted to expand North American continent to Pacific, major cause of the war * US had a god-given right to occupy and “civilize” the whole continent * Democratic English-speaking America, with its high ideals and Protestant Christian ethnics, would do a better job of running things than the Spanish-speaking Catholic Mexicans * Loss of Territory— * US acquired the northern half of Mexico—California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah * Ensured that Mexico would remain an underdeveloped country well into the 20th century * Casaulty figures were higher for Mexico (25,000+ compared to 14,000 for the US) * US-Mexico relations remained tense for many decades to come— * Several military encounters along the border— relations did not improve until WWII when Mexico decided to join the Allies * La Reforma (Benito Juarez)—liberals vs. conservatives political blame game after U.S.-Mexico War * Liberals vs. Conservatives—political blame game after the war * Liberals fault? Are we looking too much to be like the gringos with their liberal constitution * Can conservatives can save us? Catholic values * As a result of the humiliation of the war and the loss of territory, young Mexicans embraced La Reforma * Opposed the treaty with the US * Reformers came to power in Mexico in 1850s, vowing to strengthen the country’s political system so that never again would they be victims of U.S. aggression * La Reforma was the start of a political and economic modernization process that continues to this day * The Constitution of 1857—went against economic and institutional power of the Church * Expropriation of Church lands and removal of special priviledges for the Church and military

Contemporary Significance in U.S.-Mexican Relations * Americans have generally forgotten about the war for the most part * Mexicans are still irate about the “theft” of so much land and the humiliation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo * No realistic chance of Mexico ever reclaiming those lands * Many Mexicans feel they still belong to them * Since 1848, Mexican Americans have struggled to achieve political and social equality within the US—former Mexican citizens considered foreigners by the US settlers who moved into new territories

Porfirio Díaz is one of Mexico’s most controversial figures: many see him as a dictator, while others praise his promotion of economic development. Was his tyranny a necessary price for progress?

Porfirio Diaz: El Porfiriato (1876-1910) * Dictatorship and Poverty— * Diaz was insensitive and dictatorial—social inequality and poverty were rampant * Maintained control through patronage to political allies * Dissolve all local authorities and all aspects of federalism * Secured power through co-optation and coercion— * Gave Mestizos political positions of power to satsify them * Did not interfere with Creole wealth and haciendas * Created the illusion of democracy— * Structure of elections remained, façade of democracy * Neither assaulted the Church nor protected the Church * Native American population left to advance on their own * Suppression of civil society and public revolts— * Suppressed the media and controlled the court system * Increased control over the military and police * Regime grew unpopular due to repression and political stagnation * Economic instability caused by dispossession of peasant lands * Communal local lands were privatized and sold * Regime generated a contrast between growth and poverty of rural masses * Economic policies helped a few wealthy landowning hacendados to acquire huge areas of land that left rural farming campesinos unable to make a living * Few jobs and low wages for working population * Gains of this development did not reach the masses * Necessary Tyranny for Progress— * Modernization and economic growth * Favored European technology and US investors over his countryman * Influx of foreign investment and rapid economic development * Golden age of Mexican economics, 3.2 dollars per peso—compared economically to power such as France, Great Britain, and Germany * North: mining and ranching * Central Valley: large-scale farms for wheat and grain and large industrial centers * Heavy investment in mining and railways from American and British business * Tax waivers and other incentives encouraged FDI into the country * Baja California Sur—desolate region benefitted from establishment of an economic zone and the commercial development of a copper mine * Guanajuato—substantial FDI in local silving mining ventures, period of prosperity * Diaz created such an effective centralized government— * Able to concentrate decision-making and maintain control over the economic instability * Modernizing policies of Diaz opened up Mexico to foreign investment

What were causes and consequences of the Mexican Revolution? How did it change society and politics?

Introduction: * Major armed struggle (1910-1920), started with an uprising led by Madero against longtime autocrat Diaz * Most important sociopolitical event in Mexico and greatest upheavals of 20th century—resulted in an important experimentation and reformation in social organization * Causes of the Mexican Revolution: * (1) The dictatorship-like rule of Porfirio Diaz for over 30 years * (2) Exploitation and poor treatment of workers * (3) Great disparity between rich and poor

Background & Causes of the Mexican Revolution: * El Porfiriato, Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) * Regime grew unpopular due to repression and political stagnation * Economic policies helped a few wewalthy landowning hacendados to acquire huge areas of land that left rural farming campesinos unable to make a living—few jobs and low wages for working population * Favored European technology and investors over his countryman—US, European investors favored * Foreign investment and economic development—gains of development fail to reach the masses * Diaz was insensitive and dictatorial * Social inequality and poverty were rampant—Diaz ran out of legitimacy * Moderate Phase (Madero): Effective Suffrage and No Re-Election * Madero, an elite, ran against Diaz in the presidential elections as a member of the Anti-Reelectionist Party * Declared himself candidate against Diaz’ seventh re-election * Diaz had Madero jailed and wins election * Madero was released and fled to San Antonio, TX * Plan de San Luis Potosi: Madero called for revolution and overthrow of Diaz on November 20th * Radical Phase: Polarization Between Huerta and the Rebels * 1910: Mexican Revolution, overthrow of Diaz by Madero * Tactical difficulties forced Madero to delay revolt * Madero returns to Mexico and launches the Mexican Revolution and becomes president * 1911: Plan de Ayala * Zapata calls for more radical land reform—distribution of land to landless peasants * Believed that Madero was too moderate for the cause * 1913: Huerta’s, military chief of staff under Madero, counter-revolutionary coup * Orchestrates a coup with the help of US ambassador Henry Lane Wilson * Madero is executed and Huerta becomes President * 1914-1917: social revolution unleashed * Plan de Guadelupe—Carranza, governor in north, argued that Huerta’s presidency was illegitimate * Different bands of paramilitary armies trying to get Huerta out of power * Huerta resigns under pressure from US and revolutionaries (Villa, Obregon, etc.) * Carranza becomes President of Mexico—challenged by Villa (North) and Zapata (South), who demand more radical reform * 1917: The Revolutionary Constitution * (1) Gives government power to redistribute land (Article 27): land expropriated * (2) Guarantees labor rights (Article 123): collective bargaining, wage restrictions * (3) Restricts the power of the Catholic Church

Consequences of Mexican Revolution * (1) The Mexican Revolution was the first social revolution of the 20th century * Not just a change in political power * Different class gains power or representation in a way that they had not before—not many social revolutions by that definition (Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Bolivia, etc.) * (2) Achieved “effective suggrage and no re-election” * No re-election (constant in Mexican politics) * Consecutive re-election allows dictatorship to get consolidated * (3) 1917 Constitution is one of the most progressive constitutions in the world * Diaz system removed and replaced with a new dynamic system that appealed to multiple social groups * Young leadership represented different national interests * New government was largely populist only for political stability (clear in PRI) * Final result of the leftist revolution— * Document written by young populists (authenticity for the peasentry) * Streamlined the federal government—added term limits to prevent a personal dictatorship * Article 27—government could intervene in all matters essential to national security * Revolution made the Mexican state stronger (less autocratic, more efficient in attaining interests) * Power did not get consolidated yet (still fighting in the North) * (4) Launched a significant government land reform * Article 27: land and subsoil may be expropriated * Redistribution of land to landless peasants * Originated in Zapata’s call for decentralized local rule * (5) Led to the rise of the PRI * Formed under Calles as the PNR (1929), PMR (1930s), PRI (1940s) * Established to build stability in the post revolution period * PRI built up as a big tent corporatist party—bring every political faction/interest group together * Calles—built various delegations composed of popular, agrarian, labor, and military groupings * Attempt to control people from all walks of life to keep political order * Made it appear that the public was in power * Central Executive Committee— * Had a lot of the power, budgeted all government projects * Turned Parliament into a rubber stamp body for PRI’s leadership * PRI—state’s incorporation of idea of revolution into political discourse * Very authoritarian and hierarchical, little room for opposition * Avoided empowering one fraction too much—played off both populists and bourgeoisie * (6) Generated a set of important symbols and myths which have defined Mexican national identity probably more than any other episode in its history

What explain rise, demise, and return to power of PRI? Does it pose a threat to Mexican democracy?

Introduction: * Longest reigning one-party state in the world * Matched by USSR before dissolution and perhaps by Peoples’ Republic of China * In hemisphere, only Cuba claims similar longevity * Centrist party member of the Socialist International * PRI is not considered a social democratic party in the traditional sense * Modern policies of neoliberalism and privatization have been characterized as centrist/liberal

Rise of the PRI: * “Party-based” authoritarian regime— * Controlled opposition and sustained growth until 1980s and 1990s * Political structure of the PRI—corrupt hierarchy of power in which governors and mayors used extortion and violence to enforce authority (La Ley de Herodes) * Major lasting legacies of the Mexican Revolution— * Formed under Calles as the PNR (1929), PMR (1930s), PRI (1940s) * Established to build stability in the post revolution period * PRI built up as a big tent corporatist party—bring every political faction/interest group together * Calles—built various delegations composed of popular, agrarian, labor, and military groupings * Attempt to control people from all walks of life to keep political order * Made it appear that the public was in power * Central Executive Committee— * Had a lot of the power, budgeted all government projects * Turned Parliament into a rubber stamp body for PRI’s leadership * PRI—state’s incorporation of idea of revolution into political discourse * Very authoritarian and hierarchical, little room for opposition * Avoided empowering one fraction too much—played off both populists and bourgeoisie * 1929-1982—PRI won every presidential election by well over 70% of the vote * Obtained by massive electoral fraud * PRI held an overwhelming majority in Chamber of Deputies and every seat in the Senate/governorship * “The tap of the finger”—incumbent president in consultation with party leaders, selected the PRI’s candidate in the next election (led to PRI’s overwhelming dominance) * Create broad-based political alliances necessary for PRI’s long-term survival * Splitting the party into mass organizations representing different interest groups and acting as the political consciousness of the country in a more realistic level * Protect labor rights within certain boundaries as long as they play by certain rules * Revolution about peasant workers rights and regime wants to represent these interests but they don’t want radical autonomous peasants forming coalitions * Settling disputes and power struggles within the party structure helped prevent congressional gridlock and possible armed rebellions * Created a “rubber stamp” legislative apparatus * Pillars of the PRI-State Corporatism—undemocratic mode of representation, but a way for the revolution to retain power and popular legitimacy * (1) CNC—“peasant sector” * (2) CNOP—“popular sector” * (3) CTM—“worker sector” * Cardenas institutionalized the PRI (1938) * Nationalized oil reserves— * Key element of Mexican nationalism—“stood up” to the US and consolidated the revolution * Turned ownership of all Mexican oil reserves over to the Mexican government * Distributed “ejido” lands— * Allowed privatization of “ejido” lands, promise of revolution that was implemented * Institutionalized the revolution * “Mexican Miracle”—PRI maintained legitimacy * First four decades of PRI—period of economic growth through substitution of imports and low inflation * Successful development plans—following steps of USSR, provided for major investment on infrastructure * 1940-1970—GDP increased sixfold, population only doubled while peso-dollar parity was maintained

Demise of the PRI: * Earthquake in Mexico City (1985)— * Government not able to deal with it—key element in change in Mexico’s political culture * People organized at local level to rescue people who were trapped * Strengthening of civil society because government could not deal with it * Political effects were immediate—PRI lost support, PRD (left) and PAN gained support * PRI became a symbol of corruption and election fraud— * 1976: PAN obtained the support from businessmen after recurring economic crises * 1989: PAN, left wing, formed its own party * Growth of these two parties culminated in the loss of the presidency (Vicente Fox, PAN) * 2000: Vicente Fox democratic transition, first alternation of power in more than 70 years * 2006: Felipe Calderon (PAN) elected in a close and contested election, consensus that political environment was changing because PRI was in third place * The Debt Crisis (1994)— * Statist development policies of the post-war, when combined with corporatist and authoritarian traditions, allowed economic and political elites to consolidate power and resources * Little accountability existed—incentives existed for populist spending, backed by international borrowing * The Debt Crisis changed everything— * Forcing a reckoning by Mexico’s reckless and irresponsible spenders * Prompted a backlash of citizen mobilizations credited with launching democratizations—especially in the North (PAN) and inside the PRI * Weakened the PRI—had been able to retain legitimacy despite corruption and poverty * Caused the PRI to lose its absolute majority in both chambers of the federal congress in 1997 * State no longer possessed resources to “buy” and hold interest group alliances

Return of the PRI (Pena Nieto): * 12-year struggle lies in the disappointment of the ruling PAN— * China’s economic growth and economic recession in the US * Annual growth of Mexico’s economy between 2000 and 2012 was 1.8% * Poverty exacerbated * PAN unable to pass structural reforms without a ruling majority in Congress * Monopolies and Mexico’s educational system unchanged * 2006: Calderon chose to make the battle against organized crime the centerpiece of his presidency * 60,000 dead, many Mexicans are tired of a fight they had first supported * No alternatives for Mexico— * Obrador was seen as a “disgraceful behavior” * Mota carried out an ineffective campaign * Pena Nieto wins by default

Threat to Democracy: Pena Nieto * Pacto—agreement reached between new administration and Mexico’s three main political parties (PRI, PAN, PRD) * Negotiated secretly during presidential transition and signed publically the day after inauguration * Bound signatories to work together to advance 95 legislative initiatives * Balanced core policy concerns of the president and opposition * Five broad categories of policies— * (1) economic growth, employment, and competitiveness * (2) societal rights and liberties * (3) justice and security * (4) transparency, accountability, and combating corruption * (5) Democratic governance * Interest Groups— * Historically—business community traditionally used economic/political leverage to force government into modifying legislation to meet demands * Government managemed powerful interest groups/private actors that had weakened or blocked previous reform measures * Pena Nieto/PRI—worked to earn support of telecom giants and to ensure that measures to democratize internal labor unions was excluded from reforms * Pacto Reforms were a threat to unions—i.e. Teacher’s Union, Petroleum Workers’ Union * Threatened union power by basing decisions on hiring, tenure and promotion of teachers on performance evaluations instead of union decisions * Government jailed head of union on corruption charges before she got the chance to oppose the education reform (part of Pacto) * Election Reforms (PAN)— * “Democratizing reforms” long opposed by PRI * Reelection of legislators and mayors to consecutive terms * Transformed attorney general’s office into autonomous agency independent of president * Requires restructured Federal Election Institute to oversee state/federal elections * Scholars criticized last two reforms * Untested agency with poorly defined responsibilities tasked with overseeing elections * Reform allows election results to be overturned because of violation to campaign financing policies—recipe for increased postelection conflict * PRI can return to one party dominance— * Implenting reforms requires only a simple majority in both houses of Congress * PRI can build majority in lower house with support of two small parties * PRI cannot build support in Senate without cooperating with PRD or the PAN * No Anticorruption Proposal— * Significant for Pena Nieto * Comes from party who has historically tolerating corruption * Popular concern about corruption has increased in recent years * Campaigned on need to crack down * Progress against corruption matters for energy reform * Public believes that corruption and favortism are inevitable in upcoming contracting process * Allowing private investment in Pemex will benefit rich/well-connected * Similar to privatization of Telmex and banking system in 1990s * Vital to creating public perception of fairness and confidence in government in implementation * Return to Presidentialism— * 2013: impressive reforms of the new administration * 2014: legislative achievements remain incomplete and missteps must be fixed * Return to Mexico’s traditional presidentialism—power of president to hammer out deal with the opposition and powerful interest groups, leaving general public silent/on sidelines * Good for governability in Mexico * Bad for core democratic practices in Mexico