The Legalists and their influence on Qin administration
During the Warring States period, seven dominant states were in consistent struggles to take power over the others. Even though they all put much emphasis on military and warfare, the state of Qin was the one who concluded the period with the wars of conquest, annexing other contender states through exceptionally cruel administration. On the background of the rise of Qin existed the two most eminent administrators, Lord Shang and Han Fei zi, whose philosophies are demonstrated as Legalism. The Legalists emphasized an establishment of effective institutional structures based on impersonal and objective norms and standards: “laws, administrative regulations, clearly defined rules of promotion and demotion, and the like” (Watkins). Through the strict legislation, the Legalists “sought to attain a ‘rich [and empowered] state with powerful army’” (Pines). Adopting their philosophies and practicing them through reformation, the Qin administration could conquer its competitors; we can recognize the influence of Legalism on the state administration by analyzing the laws of Qin before the empire and comparing them to the philosophies of the two prominent Legalists. During the regime of Duke Xiao, the state of Qin went through a series of reforms successfully conducted by Lord Shang, and the characteristics of the reformation are well reflected on the laws of the state. First and foremost, Lord Shang emphasized on a powerful government with a centralized power and strict authorities. As he believed that powerful subordinates hinder the superior or the ruler from establishing strong government, he endorsed reducing the power of dominant families by “reorganizing the populace into a system of subdivisions inspired by military command structure” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 147) as institutions of collective responsibility, called the “group[s] of five” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 150). We can recognize that several statements from the excerpts of the laws of Qin describe the role of “the group of five.” The first statement stipulates that “[if] they hid healthy youths or are negligent about declaring the disabled, the [village] chieftain and elders pay [the punishment] of having their beards shaved off. For those who dare to deceive or defraud [the state] by [declaring themselves] old when it is not warranted, or, upon reaching old age, [by removing themselves from the tax rolls] without bothering to request [a release], the fine is two suits of armor. If the chieftain and elders do not indict them, they are each fined one suit; the members of their ‘group of five’ are to be fined one shield per household; and all are to be exiled” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 148). The statement clearly delivers that if one member of the “group of five” committed a crime, the other members all might become subject to reprisals. By controlling communities as a form of the “group of five,” the ruler of the state could become an undeniable authority and have more centralized power. Furthermore, Lord Shang insisted on “increasing the efficiency in apprehending law-breakers” (Beck). As an anti-Confucian, Lord Shang believed that “institutions of law and harsh punishment will ‘exercise’ the human tendency to self-interest more than the equally natural human tendency to social conformity” (Beck). As a result, he actively proposed stipulating penal codes to avoid people from wrong doing. The above-mentioned law statement not only depicts the role of the “group of five” but also emphasizes the responsibilities and political roles of the chieftain and elders to indict the village members’ transgression. One of Lord Shang’s central ideas of law enforcement is that “[whoever] did not denounce a culprit would be cut in two; whoever denounced a culprit would receive the same reward as he who decapitated an enemy; whoever concealed a culprit would receive the same punishment as he who surrendered to an enemy" (Beck). According to the law statement, as the chieftain and elders failed to report the culprit and intentionally concealed him, they were sentenced under the strict authority. Another law statement shows a statutory punishment for an illegal action: “For killing a child on one’s own authority, [the punishment] is to be tattooed and made a penal laborer or grain-pounder” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 148). Clearly expressing the punishment for killing a child who does not have strange marks or is not deformed in words, the Qin administration intended to avoid fathers who killed their children by abusing their right to ask for killing their unfilial sons. Lord Shang’s third central philosophy was to stimulate economic growth by emphasizing importance of agriculture. Lord Shang insisted that “[among] the inner affairs of the people, nothing is more bitter than farming,” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 139) and along with this thought, he increased labor for public projects aimed at boosting agriculture. One statement of “[how] many rat burrows in a granary warrant a sentence or reprimand? The Practice of the court is to fine one shield for three or more rat burrows and to reprimand for two or fewer” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 149) depicts that Qin administration penalized those who did not cultivate carefully. From the afore-mentioned law statements, we can infer that Qin administration was partly modeled on Shang Yang’s philosophy. Another outstanding Legalist who influenced on Qin administration was Han Fei whose philosophies are well exposed on the laws of Qin before the empire. Han Fei’s philosophy was formed by burrowing different ideas of the philosophers during the period, emphasizing that the autocrat will seize a firm control over the state with the mastering of methodologies: his position of power, technique, and law. Han Fei insisted that the ruler’s position of power should be undeniable so that he can regulate the subordinates from deceiving him and keep them responsible for what they say. According to his thoughts, the ruler should listen to “all sides of every story and hold speakers responsible for their words,” and if what the speaker “says beforehand does not tally with what he says or does later, he must be punished” (Beck). His emphasis on the ruler’s position of power can be inferred from Qin administration’s law statement: “[while] interrogating in a case, one must always first hear [witness’] words completely and write them down as each one lays out his statement. Even when you know that [a witness] is lying, there is no need to cross-examine hastily. If he cannot explain himself once his statement has been written down completely, cross-examine those points that are [vulnerable to] cross-examination. Again review the unexplained points and perform another cross-examination. If the cross-examination comes to an end and [the witness] has repeatedly lied or changed his words without acknowledging [the inconsistencies], then, in cases where the statutes warrant flogging, flog him” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 149). From this excerpt, we can assume that the interrogator represents the ruler and that the lying witness represents ministers who are not responsible for their words and are sentenced for their transgressions. Furthermore, Han Fei’s emphasis on a technique is reflected on the sociopolitical system of the “group of five,” in which people watch each other and are responsible for reporting crimes in their community. Han Fei further elaborated on the idea of collective responsibility, which was suggested by Lord Shang, into a systematical method to detect all kinds of culprits by “rewarding those who denounce criminals and punishing those who refuse to do so as complicit” (Beck). We can infer this idea from the firstly mentioned law statement which stipulates on the punishments for those who fail to report. Qin administration also contemplated on abuses of reporting transgressions and made clear for the solution by legislating the law statement of “[if] members of a ‘group of five’ indict each other to avoid guilt by bringing a false charge, they are to be found guilty of the crime which they were [trying to] avoid” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 148-149). Lastly, Han Fei believed that a strict law enforcement for even small crimes will make people deter from committing major crimes at all. This idea is well reflected on several laws of Qin: “[commoner] A was in a fight. Drawing his sword, he hacked and lopped off another’s hairknot. The crime warrants penal labor, but he is left intact” and “[if] one draws a sheathed lance, halberd, or spear in a fight, but without causing injury, the sentence is as though [the weapon] were a sword” (Mair, Steinhardt, and Goldin 148). Although no one caused any serious injuries during the fight, the premeditation of killing another warrants penal labor; harsh penalties on slight fights would avoid people from committing serious crimes. As the three methodologies are apparently inferred from the laws of Qin, we can assume that the administration was partly modeled on Han Fei’s philosophies. During the early Warring States period, the state of Qin was in its decline; however, the reformation conducted by Duke Xiao enabled the state to attain military power and the ruler to become an undeniable figure. After the reformation, the government was centralized and was administered by a hierarchy of officials, all serving the ruler. The strict authority was formed in guidance of the Legalists, and soon, well-publicized laws and punishments were stated in order for more powerful administrative control. The administration established a viable sociopolitical system which should “allow individuals to pursue their selfish interests exclusively in ways that benefit the state [and] a proper administrative system [which] should allow officials to benefit from ranks and emoluments but also prevent them from subverting the ruler’s power” (Pines). Since these systems were fundamental in the legislation of the laws of Qin, we can clearly conclude that the Qin administration was modeled on the Legalists’ philosophies by comparing the laws and their ideas.

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