Does the identity of a person survive if that person succumbs to dementia? In his essay, Matthews, explores the different views, of Locke, Parfit and Merleau-Ponty, and how they define the identity of a person and how that definition applies to a person suffering from dementia. In this essay, I will summarize Merleau-Ponty’s definition and give his ideas on how to treat a person with dementia. I will then do the same for Locke and Parfit. Finally, I will compare both theories. In this essay, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty gives better advice on how to treat demented patients than does Locke and Parfit. The philosophical problem that Matthews is trying to solve is what is the best way to define personal identity and how it applies to the treatment of a person suffering from dementia. Dementia is a very serious disease, where one loses their experiential memory, their self-consciousness and has a hard time recognizing themselves and family and friends. Merleau-Ponty defines a person as an “actual human being, with whom we can have certain kinds of dealings and relationships- someone like ourselves, to whom we can relate as ‘another self’” (pg 172). The “someone like ourselves” that he is referring too is another biological organism in our own species with whom we can communicate with and cooperate with. Merleau-Ponty is saying that persons are embodied biological organisms that are capable of thought and reflection on their “experience and of communicating these thoughts and so forth to other persons” (173). His theory on personal identity is mainly expressed as a ‘body-subject’ view. The ‘body’ refers to the fact that persons are essentially creatures that are existing in a bodily form and the ‘subject’ refers to the fact that these “creatures” have the ability to communicate, reflect and think. The body-subject theory essentially means that “being embodied affects the nature of human subjectivity” (173). The two different elements, body and subject, both work together as a union and are not separate from one another. Our existence as a ‘person’ manifests not only from our embodiment, but also our bodily existence has to be accepted as the expression of our individuality. This doesn't mean just in the communication of language and recalled experience, but also in our habits, our behavior, our body-language and mannerisms (174). So, according to Merleau-Ponty’s theory, a person with dementia is still the same person they were before. Even though demented people have a loss of memory and or a loss of self- consciousness, through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s theory, they are still alive and the same person. For example, Matthews knew a women suffering with dementia. She recalled little of her past, and lost her bearings of who she was, however, elements of her ‘self’ shown threw her dementia with her familiar characteristics of always being polite (175). Demented people may not have a sense of self-consciousness but they have the ability to retain some of their past mannerisms, or habits which shows that they have some elements of their ‘self’, and are not dead. Locke and Parfit both have very different views on how to define the identity of a person, and therefore a different view on how to treat a person with dementia. Locke views a person not by his or her biological character, but by kinds of “characteristically personal activities and states” (165), which strongly suggests thinking. Locke believes what makes a person the distinct individual they are is that they can reflect on their own actuality and, so identify themselves as who they are. The origin of our own person is self-consciousness, which enables a person to “consider itself as itself” (165). Parfit does not have the same theory, but has a modification of Locke’s theory. Parfit’s theory is based on ‘psychological continuity’. This theory is a mixture of similar behavior and the ‘continuity of memory’ which Locke many time emphasizes. Parfit’s essential view on personal identity is that all there is to being me is “looking like me, behaving like me, thinking of myself as being me and remembering my past life as my past life” (168). He believes a ‘person’ is ways of behaving within experiences. The main thing that Locke and Parfit have in common is a specific view of what a ‘person’ is. They both believe that a person should be identified with regard to self-consciousness and nothing else. For both of them, life as me, “begins and ends with the life that i recognize as mine and can recall as mine” (170). So according to their theories, the person with advanced dementia who does not recall very much from his or her past life, but who looks the same, is not to be regarded as the same person. The former person is dead. However, Locke and Parfit accept that they are still human beings and they deserve humane treatment. To a larger degree, Merleau-Ponty has a more developed view of personal identity and therefore, I believe he gives better advice on how to treat a person suffering from dementia. There is a major flaw in Locke and Parfit’s argument about personal identity, which essentially makes Merleau-Ponty’s argument more credential. Locke and Parfit both say that our essential ‘self’ is composed of our self-consciousness and nothing else. When one is asleep, they are not aware of his or herself . Does this mean that our ‘self’ dies every time we go to sleep? And when we wake up, are we a new ‘self’ because our old ‘self’ previously died when we went to sleep? Unlike Locke and Parfit who thinks your ‘self’ only consists of self-consciousness, Merleau-Ponty believes that there is much more to a person than just that. Our bodies are who we are as a person just as much as our experiences, our reflections and our self-consciousness. It may be easier for one to take Locke and Parfit’s view of personal identity and apply it to a demented person and say they are not the same person and their former self is dead, but that is not morally correct. The person is not dead and should be treated with respect and continue to live with dignity. Creating a familiar environment can help both the demented person and the caretaker. I agree with Merleau-Ponty’s definition of personal identity and believe his advice on treating a demented person is more ethical and respectful than Locke and Parfit’s view.