TOPICS FOR THE 2ND ESSAY (Introduction to Problems of Philosophy, Weeks 6–10)

REVISED DUE DATE: THUR NOV 14th

* Matthews believes that Merleau-Ponty gives us better advice on how to treat demented patients than does Locke and Parfit. To what degree is Matthews right about this? * "There is a body and there is a mind. They are two radically different types of stuff. Merleau-Ponty's idea of a body-subject is incoherent." Do you agree? Why or why not? * Matthews believes that the demented patient John is the same person as the earlier non-demented John. If the earlier non-demented John wrote an advance directive, stating that in the event of incompetence he was not to be offered any life-saving treatment, what would Matthews say the doctor should do, and why? * Assess Nixon's contention that any belief that a radical sceptical scenario is possible – including Neo's belief that he was previously in the Matrix – must in fact be ‘self-defeating’. * Both Erion and Smith (22-25) and Nixon (28-30) argue that a distinction between ordinary versus philosophical conceptions of knowledge enables a successful response to the radical sceptical challenge. Do you agree? (Would Stroud agree?) * Does ‘the Matrix Possibility’ (or radical sceptical scenarios in general) even make sense? Assess Nixon's answer to this question. * Assess J. L. Austin’s criticisms of radical philosophical scepticism as discussed by Stroud. * Explain and evaluate the use to which Stroud puts the distinction between conditions of appropriate assertion and conditions of truth (Stroud 103–106). Do you agree with Stroud or Austin on this and why? * In relation to Stroud and Austin’s arguments, what do you think our everyday standards and procedures show – or fail to show – about radical scepticism in relation to the truth of our ordinary knowledge claims? * Critically assess Nagel’s view that that no presently available conception of a ‘physical theory of mind’ [for example, Harman] gives us ‘even a clue’ as to how to account for the subjective character or intrinsic quality of experience. * In what sense are the very aims of natural science in tension with the possibility of explaining subjective consciousness, according Nagel? How might a scientific naturalist or materialist reply? Assess. * Explain what the ‘mind-body problem’ is in relation to the ever-expanding successes of natural scientific explanation of the human mind in terms of brain processes. Is a fully adequate scientific explanation of the mind in principle possible according to Nagel, or not? According to you? Why or why not? * What is ‘functionalism’ and what are its prospects according to Harman? Does the intrinsic or subjective nature of consciousness present an insoluble problem for functionalism, in his view? In your view? * Assess Harman’s overall argument that getting clear about ‘intentionality’ shows that ‘you are not aware of the intrinsic character of your experience’ in any way that poses a problem for a functionalist explanation of the nature of thought and consciousness. * Does the ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment, discussed by Harman, successfully refute functionalism in your view? Why or why not? <END>