In November of 1818, Missouri petitioned Congress for statehood and ignited a controversy over slavery and a balance of power in the Senate that would span two sessions of Congress and threaten the dissolution of the Union and a civil war. Prior to the Missouri question, the Union had eleven free states and eleven slave states, each with two Senators. The Missouri Territory, carved out of land acquired in the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, covered an expanse of land just north of the Ohio River and just west of the Mississippi (these rivers joined in the southeastern corner of the territory). According to the terms of the Ordinance of 1787, which prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory, the Missouri Territory was designated a free territory, but many of the settlers had brought their slaves with them when they settled the area and were determined to enter the Union as a slave state. With the growing abolitionist sentiment in the North and the South pressing to legalize slavery, permitting Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state would tilt the power of the Senate in favor of the South and make the realization of legalizing slavery more attainable. Since 1809, the issue of slavery had been relatively quiet, but Missouri’s request to enter the Union as a slave state just at the nation was beginning to expand westward, thrust the question of slavery back into the spotlight of national politics. A set of compromises, known as the Missouri Compromise of 1820, allowed Congress to avoid a resolution on the issue of slavery.

The Missouri question was the first slavery related political crisis of the 1800’s. It was an attempt to allow slavery in a state considered a free territory. Just after the American Revolution, Congress divided the land ceded by Great Britain in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, into free and slave regions. The Ordinance of 1787 permitted the introduction of slavery in the territory south of the Ohio River and prohibited the introduction of slavery north of the river, creating a balance between the number of free and slave territories that would eventually become states (Ransom 83). While President Thomas Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803 doubled the size of the country, the issue of slavery was not at the forefront, “the issue of settling the new land (with or without slavery) was hardly on anyone’s mind…most of the Louisiana Purchase was far beyond the limits of settlement in 1803” (Ransom 85). As settling this area became more realistic, so did the question of whether or not slavery should be allowed. While the Ohio River formed the boundary between the free and slave territories east of the Mississippi, there was no natural divide on the western border. Southerner’s believed that admitting Missouri as a free state would push the Mason and Dixon line further south and limit their ability to expand. The North felt that allowing slavery in Missouri extended far beyond any area they had envisioned (Dixon 47). Missouri became a moral and political battleground between the North and the South over slavery and westward expansion. The divergent views on these issues produced a tremendous political rift between the North and the South threatening to dissolve the Union and ignite a civil war. To understand the impact the political divide had, it is necessary to understand the role sectionalism played in creating the rift.

The political divide between the North and the South had been brewing as far back as the 1770’s. Not only were cultural differences being noticed, political differences were slowly emerging. Slave owners were considered un-Christian like and heathenish, southern women lacked “the fire and vivacity of the North” (Glover 2), while northerners were seen as sneaky, untrustworthy traders. In 1776, a political issue, which would ultimately resurface in conjunction with the South’s representation in the House and result in the three-fifths clause in the Constitution, erupted over the method for apportioning taxes among the states. It was suggested that each state’s contribution be determined by the size of their population, slaves included, something the South vehemently opposed. Southerner’s believed that only their white population should be taken into account, and that by counting their slave population, they would be unfairly taxed. This issue pitted the North against the South and resulted in a threat from South Carolina to secede from the Union. In 1786-87, the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty negotiations, under the Articles of Confederation, created a firestorm that threatened to dissolve the Union. John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was trying to negotiate a treaty with Spain over navigation of the Mississippi River when he suggested, “that America surrender the right of free navigation on the lower Mississippi for twenty-five or thirty years in return for commercial concessions” (Glover 4). The treaty was never ratified because nine affirmative votes were needed and only seven were obtained, all from Northern states. The South feared the Northern majority, believing that it was willing to, at some point in the future, “inflict grave injury on the South” (Glover 5). The sectional divide was growing and would be solidified at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, slavery and sectionalism converged resulting in a number of compromises written into the Constitution that would later play an integral role in the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Not only was the structure of our new government being debated at the Convention, so was the issue of slavery. “The institution of slavery and it implications,” (Forner 270) as James Madison said, divided the delegates, which included both slaveholders and abolitionists. The Constitution’s slavery clauses, although the words “slave” and “slavery” are never used in the Constitution, became an effort to narrow the sectional divide between the North and the South. Unfortunately, the clauses ended up widening the divide and entrenching slavery further into American life and politics. The clauses included prohibition from abolishing the African slave trade for 20 years, requiring states to return fugitive slaves to their owners and continuing the condition of bondage even if the slave escaped to a free state. The clauses also allowed the slave states to count their slave population in order to determine each state’s representation in the House and subsequently the amount of electoral votes for the President (the three-fifths clause). This was a victory for the South and slavery (Forner 270-71), indeed, “[t]he North paid that price in order to obtain a government that would protect its commercial, financial, and industrial interests” (Glover 8). The clauses restricted the government from interfering with slavery in the pro-slave states, and gave the South more significant representation in the House and greater control in national affairs (Forner 270-71). The adoption of the clauses into the Constitution did not aid the North and the South in finding common ground between their fundamental differences, but it did help delay the impending decision on slavery for another 31 years.

In January of 1818, Missouri delegate John Scott petitioned Congress for statehood. The petition was referred until the 13 of February 1819, when it was taken up for consideration during the 2nd Session of the 15th Congress. At this time, there was no other free or northern territory under consideration for entry into the Union to offset Missouri’s desire to enter as a slave state “with her slave property untouched by Federal interference” (Dixon 48). Allowing Missouri to enter as a slave state would upset the balance of power in the Senate and would give the South the majority in the House, which the North currently enjoyed. The North’s desire to retain political power and keep the Missouri Territory free from slavery caused intense opposition to Missouri’s request to enter the Union as a slave state with her slave property intact. The South believed the opposition was in direct defiance of the liberties guaranteed them by the Constitution, as reflected in the comments of John Scott who declared the people of Missouri “knew their own rights” (Glover 49). He argued that Missouri should be admitted in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and that her citizens should enjoy, “all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States” (Glover 48), including the right to own slaves. He also hinted at disunion, “if admitted into the national family, they would be equal, or not come at all” (Glover 49). The North’s stance on the issue is reflected in the comments of Representative John W. Taylor of New York, …those whom we shall authorize to set in motion the machine of free government beyond the Mississippi will, in many respects, decide the destiny of millions…Having taken this survey, you will be able, in some measure, to appreciate the importance of the subject before us. Our votes this day will determine whether the high destinies of this region, and of these generations, shall be fulfilled, or whether we shall defeat them by permitting slavery, with all its baleful consequences, to inherit the land. (Annals of 15th Congress 1170-71)

The statements of these two men represent the acrimonious situation that existed between the North and the South and underscored the enormity of the issue, each section’s desire to settle the western land with their own culture, and procure the resources for their own use and benefit (Glover 49).

Prior to the Missouri question, Illinois and Alabama had petitioned Congress for statehood. While there was little controversy over the admission of these two states, Representative James Tallmadge of New York argued against the admission of Illinois because the proposed state constitution did not explicitly prohibit slavery. Although his opposition did not prevent Illinois from entering the Union, it foreshadowed the difficulty Missouri would face with its petition for statehood. While Missouri’s petition was being considered for passage in the House, Representative Tallmadge moved to prohibit slavery in the new state and allow for emancipation by introducing two amendments to the petition. Amendment one stated, “That the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for punishment of crimes, where of the party have been duly convicted,” and Amendment Two stated, “And that all children born within the said State, after admission thereof into the Union, shall be free at the age of twenty-five years” (Annals of 15th Congress 1214). Tallmadge’s motion set-off a series of contentious debates, though the House did confer the amendments and passed the bill. The bill was then sent to the Senate for concurrence, but the Senate struck out the Tallmadge clause and returned the bill to the House, where the House refused to concur. The House returned the bill to the Senate unchanged, but the Senate held staunch with their position, creating a stalemate. On March 3, 1819, the 2nd Session of the 15th Congress adjourned leaving the Missouri bill undecided.
When the 16th Congress convened on December 6, 1819, it was clear that the stalemate would continue. The Northern states who opposed slavery, had the majority in the House and would delay the Missouri question indefinitely, while the Senate would continue to oppose the Tallmadge amendment (Ransom 88). To complicate the matter further, an application for statehood by Maine had recently been presented to Congress. As the 15th Congress had shown, those who supported slavery enjoyed a majority in the Senate, while those who opposed slavery enjoyed a majority in the House. The Senators made their intentions known that they would block Maine’s admission to the Union until the House consented to Missouri’s admission as a slave state with her slave property untouched (Glover 87). Senator Jesse Burgess Thomas, of Illinois, authored a proposal that would end the stalemate. The proposal become known as the Compromise of 1820 and included the following provisions: 1. Admit Missouri as a slave state in accordance with its initial petition for statehood. 2. Approve Maine’s application for statehood as a free state. 3. Define which parts of the Louisiana Purchase would be free and slave. The third provision became known as the Thomas Proviso and was attached to the bill approving Missouri and Maine’s application for statehood (Glover 88). The Thomas Proviso took advantage of the language in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and applied it the Louisiana Territory. The Proviso prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude in the Territory “which lies north of thirty six-degrees and thirty-six minutes north latitude, excepting…the State contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude…shall be and hereby is forever prohibited…” (Glover 88). The compromise succeeded in extending the ban on slavery in the Louisiana Territory north of the Ohio River, a victory for the North, and the slave states gained Missouri as slave state, a victory for the South. In the words of historian Roger L. Ransom, “Americans were not ready to “go to the wall” on slavery, they were willing to fashion a compromise that put to rest the issue of slavery in the territories for the next three decades” (83).

Few people realized the significance the Compromise of 1820 had on the future of America better than Thomas Jefferson who understood the root of the conflict. Jefferson was concerned with what ramifications the future held after passage of Compromise of 1820. As stated in a letter to John Holmes, on April 22, 1820 (verbatim), but this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. it is hushed, indeed for the moment. but this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. a geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.

The demarcation line that created the free and slave territories and ended the dispute in 1820 would become the source of a bitter dispute three decades later. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 repealed the Compromise of 1820 and allowed slavery back into the area the Compromise had deemed free by permitting the residents of each territory to decide the issue of slavery (popular sovereignty). In 1857 in the Dred Scott decision, the Supreme Court declared the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional. Jefferson’s concerns were coming to fruition. The fighting that broke out between pro-slavery and anti-slavery settlers after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was a prelude to the Civil War. The Missouri Compromise had only tempered the slavery issue.
With intense sectionalism poised to upset the balance of political power, and the future of western development and the question of slavery set to create an even deeper sectional divide, a compromise each side could live with became crucial. The Thomas Proviso was seen as a long-term threat to each parties interests, but each side had gained something equally important and tangible. The threats became a distant issue easily pushed aside for those tangible gains. Although, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 ultimately allowed Congress to establish the right of the federal government to pass future legislation allowing or prohibiting slavery in the western territories, the impact of slavery on northern interests was not yet enmeshed in the political scene. For many people living in the northern United States at this time, slavery was a quiet, faraway, problem that required tolerance; war was not the answer. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 failed to provide an answer on the question of slavery; it only created a band-aid to cover a wound that would continue to fester for the next three decades.

Works Cited
Primary Sources
Annals of 15th Congress Session 2. Vol.1. A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation. Library of Congress. n.d. Web. 17 October 2012.

“Letter to John Holmes 20 April 1820”. Thomas Jefferson Exhibition. Library of Congress. August 3, 2010. Web. 17 October 2012.

Secondary Sources
Dixon, Susan B. The True History of the Missouri Compromise and its Repeal. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1899. Print

Forner, Eric. Give Me Liberty! An American History. Vol. 1. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2011. Print.

Glover, Moore. The Missouri Controversy 1819-1821. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. Print

Ransom, Roger, L. “A House Divided: American Slavery in the Antebellum Era.” American Slavery Ed. William Dudley. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2000. 83-91. Print.