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N1-710-444
REV: FEBRUARY 7, 2011

BHARAT N. ANAND
PETER OLSON

The Rand dom Ho ouse Re esponse to the Kindl e e le By early 2010, the internation news med had begun to character y t nal dia n rize book pub blishing as the next e entert tainment ind dustry to be revolutioniz zed by new digital form mats. Amazon announced that n d
Christ
tmas 2009 had been the fir day ever th its custom rst hat mers had orde ered more ele ectronic versio of ons books for their Kin s ndle reading d devices than p print books.1 Many other companies w were reported to be d ready ying e-readers for an early 2010 launc Most antic s y ch. cipated was Apple Inc.’s iPad, expect ted to chang the terrain of the e-rea ge n ader segment just as the iPhone had r t revolutionize the smartp ed phone marke 2 Worryin et. ngly, prices fo the e-book versions of n or newly publish titles wer at $9.99 or less, hed re, r dropp ping well bel low half the l price of a new hardco list over; public d domain titles (books for w s which copyr right protectio – 70 years after the de on s eath of the au uthor – had e expired) were being offere by e ed some e-vendors fo $0.00.3 Moreover, the ri or ights to electr ronic versions of books pu s ublished befor the re adven of e-books in the 1990s (when publis nt shers first beg to amend their contrac with authors to gan d cts reflect digital edit tions) were i dispute: literary agen and the Authors Gu in nts uild had prot tested vocife erously when Random Ho n ouse, the largest trade boo publisher, asserted in D ok December 2009 that it own the rights to all versio ned ons, electronic or otherwis of all book that it had published in print c se, ks n form, unless the contract speci c ified otherwi 4 Markus Dohle, the p ise. printer-turned d-CEO of Ran ndom House, was likely, in the contex of the paren company’s annual Strat xt nt s tegic Planning Dialogue, to face g o many questions fro his fellow Bertelsmann Executive Board member about Rand y om w n rs dom House’s longterm s strategy in response to the Kindle and o e other e-reader rs. The Tradition Structu of the B nal ure
Book Publ lishing Ind dustry Auth and Age hors ents
Un
nlike the twe enty-first cent tury film and music indus d stries, where the creation of a new product requir investment in talent a red and technolog that can am gy mount to mill lions of dolla (the produ ars uction costs for the film “Avatar” wer estimated t exceed $25 million5), th book busin
“
re to 50 he ness was based on the so olitary and relatively inex xpensive act of writing (S Exhibit 1 for the val
See
lue chain). Since publis shers rarely read unsolicit manuscrip (more tha two million novels wer written in N r ted pts an re North
Amer
rica each year the vast ma r; ajority sent to publishers w o were deposit in a “slush pile” which was ted h occasi ionally visite by summe interns and underpaid assistant editors before b ed er d being relegat ted to landfi the only realistic chanc of getting published wa to be repre ill), r ce as esented by a l literary agent The
t.
agent in return fo 10-15% of t author’s r ts, or the royalties, sold book rights (usually on t basis of a 10-20 d the
_______
_______________
_______________
_______________
________________
_______________
_______________
________________
______
Professo Bharat N. Anand and Senior Lectu or d urer Peter Olson pr repared this case w with the assistance of Research Associ iate Mary Furey. T
This case was dev veloped from publ lished sources. HB cases are develo
BS
oped solely as the basis for class dis scussion. Cases are not intended to s e serve as endorse ements, sources of primary data, or illu p ustrations of effective or ineffective m management. ght resident and Fellow of Harvard Colle ws ege. To order copi or request perm ies mission to reproduc materials, call 1-8 ce 800-545Copyrig © 2010, 2011 Pr
7685, wr Harvard Busin rite ness School Publish hing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to ww ww.hbsp.harvard.e edu/educators. Th publication may not be his y digitized photocopied, or otherwise reprodu d, uced, posted, or tran nsmitted, without t permission of H the Harvard Business S
School.

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The Random House Response to the Kindle

page proposal rather than a completed manuscript) to editors at publishing houses. In the case of bestselling authors the sale was conducted as an auction, with publishing houses bidding “advances” against future royalties. For celebrity authors, the advances could be very substantial: for example,
Sarah Palin received a reported $5 million advance from Harper Collins for the book “Going Rogue,” which was largely written by a co-author.6 An advance of $5 million represented a bet placed by the publishing house that sales (at a royalty rate averaging 15% of list price) would be sufficient for the book to “earn out” the advance. Publishers regarded the estimation of the right amount to advance for a book as an art rather than a science, although in the case of established authors the record of previous book sales could provide a reasonably accurate guideline for forecasts.

Publishers
Editors at publishing houses, in addition to acquiring book rights from agents, were responsible for the development of the manuscript with the author (“conceptual editing”) and copyediting the final version as well as overseeing the timely coordination of production, cover art design, publicity, and marketing. After submission of the first manuscript, the entire process could take from as little as nine months to several years. As a book neared completion, editors would compete internally for the attention of the sales force, since each season only a few titles out of a total list of hundreds or thousands of books would be designated as top priorities for sales and marketing promotion.
By 2010, barriers to entry in book publishing were low: an individual could set up her own publishing imprint with a minimum investment in capital and outsource back-end operations such as distribution, production, and even administration and sales to larger publishing houses. Although small publishers could not compete with the larger houses on auctions for bestsellers, the prospect of discovering the next Pulitzer Prize winner attracted many new entrants, often former editors at larger companies. Although five publishing houses controlled over one-quarter of industry sales, and a disproportionately larger share of bestsellers, thousands of smaller, specialty, and boutique publishing firms accounted for the bulk of book sales.
Random House was the world’s largest publisher, with a market share of 17.5%. The modern
Random House had been created in 1998 through the merger of Bertelsmann’s Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publishing Group and the Random House Group, which had been owned by Advance
Communications until the Newhouse family decided to sell its book publishing operations to concentrate on the more profitable newspaper business.

Printers
Publishers contracted the final production of books to printers, a relatively consolidated industry dominated by R.R. Donnelly, Quebecor, and Bertelsmann (Markus Dohle had previously been the
CEO of Bertelsmann’s USA print operations, which printed more than one-half of Random House’s
200 million books annually). Although digital technology had simplified the printing process, the set-up costs of each print run were relatively high compared to the variable costs of ink and paper.
Traditionally print runs of less than 2,000 copies were considered to be uneconomical; the high fixed costs associated with plant and labor caused printers to compete aggressively for long print runs – such as 1-2 million copies – for top bestsellers such as John Grisham. The advent of print-on-demand technology – a process whereby new copies of a book were not printed until the order was received – had begun to make it worthwhile to reprint “backlist” titles (books first published over one year ago) at a higher unit cost ($2.50-3.00 compared to $1.00-1.50) but in much smaller quantities – some cases,
50 copies or less.

2
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Distributors
Printed books were shipped from printers to distribution warehouses operated by the publishers, where they would be unpackaged, stored, and eventually repackaged to fill orders from 1) independent wholesalers; 2) warehouses operated by major retailers such as Barnes & Noble (B&N) and Borders; 3) independent retail outlets. Large orders from wholesalers and major retailers constituted the bulk of shipping volume whereas shipments to smaller retailers contributed disproportionately to warehouse and shipping costs.

Retailers
Three major book retailers represented almost 40% of industry sales: Barnes & Noble (ca.25%),
Borders (ca. 10%), and the rapidly growing online retailer Amazon (over 10%); independent bookstores accounted for less than 5%, and over one-half of sales were made by a variety of nonbookstore retailers ranging from Wal-Mart to Walgreens. During the past several years Amazon’s relative market share had been increasing by 15-25% annually, driven by first-time buyers during the busy holiday season. All retailers bought books at a discount of approximately 50% off list price and were entitled to return unsold books to the publishers for a full refund (returns rates ranged from 2530% in the case of Random House to over 40% for less successful publishers). Amazon’s returns rate was under 5% for print books and approached 0% for e-books.

Readers
Less than half of all adults ever read a book after leaving school; half of the remainder read at most 1-2 books a year.7 Consequently book publishers had traditionally focused their marketing efforts on the 15-25% segment of the population that bought books on a regular basis, particularly the relatively small number of heavy readers who bought 50-100 books each year. Recent newspaper reports suggested that younger age groups were spending less time reading and more time on electronic media such as video games and social networking.8

The Traditional Economics of Book Publishing
Publishers generally issued the first edition of a book in hardcover at prices ranging in 2010 from
$19.95 to $35.00. About one year later a paperback edition was introduced, either in trade paperback format (the 6” x 9” format traditionally used for literary works) at prices of $12.00-15.00 or in the rack-sized mass-market paperback format (the 5” x 8” format generally used for bestsellers) at prices of $6.99-8.99. Frontlist sales (new titles, generally hardcover) accounted for 60% of annual sales but, due to the up-front cost of advances and marketing, as well as the higher returns rate (40-60%), represented only 20% of annual profits. Backlist was the bedrock of publishers’ profitability: 40% of sales and 80% of profits. In general, trade book publishing, which had only in recent decades evolved from a club-like atmosphere to a profit-oriented business, was considered to be a moderately profitable enterprise with limited growth prospects. Although profitability of individual titles varied widely, depending on the size of the initial advance, the level of returns, and the backlist reorder pattern, the sheer diversity of most publishing programs at the largest houses provided a portfolio effect and had resulted in a relatively reliable profit stream. During the decade prior to 2010 the leading publishing houses achieved operating margins of 5-10% and recorded annual revenue increases of 2-4%.
The profit and loss statement of an average title is shown in Exhibit 2. On a $10.00 book, retailers earned about $0.25 (a 5% margin), authors received about $1.50 in royalties (15% of list price), and publishers retained an operating profit of $0.50 (10% of net sales). Pressure from retailers,
3
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The Random House Response to the Kindle

particularly Amazon, for additional discounts in the form of “co-op advertising” (where manufacturers covered all or part of a retailer’s advertising in exchange for being prominently displayed) or “warehousing fees” (which covered the storage and packaging/handling of books) threatened to reduce publisher margins further.

Amazon Enters the E-Reader Market
Jeff Bezos founded Amazon in 1994 as an online book retailer; publishers welcomed the incremental sales and publicity boost (Amazon’s marketing emphasized the quality of the customer experience, making more books more accessible and affordable to readers than ever before). By 2010,
Amazon, with its relatively low returns rate, had become the fastest-growing and by far the most profitable customer for book publishers. As Amazon expanded into other product lines such as electronics, toys, music, games, apparel, jewelry, and tools, some questioned the company’s commitment to the book business. By 2006, media (books, music, DVDs) represented an estimated
66% of Amazon’s $10.7 billion in annual sales.9 (See Exhibit 3 for a breakdown of financials)
While Amazon continued to sell print books, there were various e-reading devices being introduced in the market, starting with the 22-ounce Rocket Book in 1998. 10 The most successful of these devices was the Sony Reader, which was lighter and more attractive than other e-readers.
Consumers would first download an e-book to their PC’s (either from Sony’s eBook store or from other online stores and libraries) before transferring to the Reader. The Reader was sold through various retailers, including Amazon, Target, and Waterstone. Prices of the Reader ranged from
$299.99 to $399.99 depending on functionality.
Any concerns about whether Amazon still viewed books as a strategic priority were dispelled by the company’s launch of the Kindle (the name was designed to evoke associations related to the ignition and rapid dissemination of knowledge) in 2007. In contrast to prior e-reading devices, the
Kindle offered a wireless connection and Bezos noted that “this isn’t a device, it’s a service.”11 A
Kindle user could purchase and download books (initial storage capacity was 200 titles) only from
Amazon’s store, and could also purchase newspaper and magazine subscriptions and access blogs from the Internet. Proprietary formatting and Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology limited e-book reading to the Kindle device, though reformatting to support other readers was possible. The book-like shape (the Kindle was designed to look and feel like a trade paperback book), the ease of usage (the device turned on instantly, could run without charging for 30 hours, and recharged in two hours), and readability (the screen capitalized on recent technological innovations from e-Ink
Corporation) proved so attractive to readers that the $399 device was sold out immediately.12 The opportunity to select from among 145,000 titles, including recent bestsellers, caused an appreciable increase in e-book sales (to approximately 1-2% of the total market) by the end of 2007. Within a few months Amazon’s annualized e-reader unit sales were ahead of Sony’s Reader. Bezos simply noted that “this is the most important thing we’ve ever done.”13
In February 2009, Amazon launched an enhanced version, Kindle 2, which offered substantially increased storage capacity (1,500 books), faster page-turning, sharper screen resolution, and a sleeker body, at the same $359 price (reduced five months later to $299).14 That same month, Amazon announced that they intended to make Kindle titles available on a variety of mobile phones.15 In June
2009, Amazon released the Kindle DX, a larger and faster version (the screen was nearly three times as large as the standard Kindle screen), which had the ability to display pdf documents; aimed at students, educators, and businesspeople, the Kindle DX retailed at $489. In October 2009, an international version of the Kindle 2, with AT&T as the global wireless provider, was offered at
$279.16 At the same time Microsoft announced the “Kindle for PC,” a free application for reading
Kindle e-books on the personal computer.17 Finally, in January 2010, Amazon announced a new
4
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version of the Kindle DX with a global wireless capability, allowing the wireless download of e-books in over 100 countries.18
Although Amazon consistently refused to provide details on the number of Kindles sold, analysts estimated that Amazon sold 550,000 devices in 2009.19 Bezos stated that sales of the Kindle and ebooks made up 35% of Amazon’s book revenues.20
In a move which provoked the ire of publishers, Amazon began pricing e-books aggressively, setting the price point for new releases at $9.99, compared to hardcover editions that were priced around $25. (See Exhibit 4) Publishers, who had favored a policy of “parallel pricing” where the ebook version would be priced at the same point as the prevailing hardcover or paperback edition, began to consider delaying the release of the e-book version until several months after initial publication of the hardcover in order to maintain revenues on print formats. While Amazon supporters argued that the attractive e-book price points would increase overall demand, publishers feared that e-books were beginning to cannibalize print book sales, particularly on titles for which they had committed large advances. Literary agents also expressed concern that their authors be protected against royalties being reduced by a drop in list prices through appropriate language in future contracts. Reports indicated that Amazon had initiated discussions with literary agents about signing authors to be published by Amazon.

Rivals to the Kindle
Barnes & Noble’s Nook In October 2009, B&N introduced its own e-reader, the Nook, at
$259, a price quickly matched by Amazon. The Nook ran on Google’s Android OS and held 1,500 books, a number which could be increased by purchasing an optional memory card. The device also featured a 6-inch reading screen and a color touch screen control panel.
A wireless connection allowed downloads from the B&N online bookstore. B&N, which already was the second-largest online retailer of books after Amazon, with a market share of around 10%, had launched its eBookstore in July 2009 after buying Fictionwise, an e-book supplier with a catalog of
18,000 titles. The store supported the iPhone, Blackberry, Mac, and PC, as well as upcoming readers from iRex and Plastic Logic.21 The Nook also allowed customers to lend books to a friend while they were not reading them for a 14-day loaner period.22

Apple Tablet Steve Jobs, the iconic CEO of Apple, had commented after the initial launch of the Kindle that “it doesn’t matter how good or bad the product is, the fact is that people don’t read anymore.”23 Nonetheless, Apple encouraged the development of software applications that fulfilled the function of an e-reader. Stanza was an application available for free through Apple’s application store which effectively turned the iPhone into an e-reader (Amazon acquired Lexcycle, the company behind Stanza, in April 2009).24 By the end of 2009, moreover, rumors were rife that Apple would soon release a dedicated e-reader, the iPad, which would be more stylish than existing models and priced between $700 and $1,000.25
Sony Reader In August 2009, Sir Howard Stringer, the first non-Japanese CEO of Sony, announced the launch of a series of e-readers designed to capture a major share of the market: the
$199 Reader Pocket Edition, the $299 Reader Touch Edition, designed to replace the earlier, more expensive Sony readers, 26 and the $399 Reader Daily Edition, which featured a 7-inch touchscreen and was powered by AT&T’s 3G network.27 Through a partnership with Google, Sony’s e-readers offered over 1 million free public domain titles.28 Despite these efforts, as of October 2009, cumulative sales of the Sony reading devices were estimated to be only one-half of the Kindles sold.29

5
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The Random House Response to the Kindle

Other Players As of early 2010 several other companies had launched or were preparing to introduce reading devices: Irex (a reading device with a large, 8.1 inch touch screen display, wireless connectivity through Verizon, and a retail price of $399),30 Plastic Logic (the Que was expected to be launched with an 8.5 by 11 inch flexible screen, featuring the B&N eBookstore, free public domain titles from Google, and AT&T”s network for downloads),31 Samsung, and various unnamed entrants which were considering price points as low as $99.32 And there were also the free e-reader applications – Amazon’s Kindle, Android’s Aldiko, B&N e-reader, and Stanza – available to smartphone owners.33

Random House’s Strategic Options
By 2008, when Markus Dohle succeeded the long-term CEO, Peter Olson, Random House had become the undisputed industry leader in terms of market share (annual sales of over $2.5 billion), profitability (operating margins over 10%), and literary prestige. The Bertelsmann Executive Board had grown accustomed to years of steadily increasing profits. Now Random House, faced with a cyclical downturn in demand for books as a result of the Great Recession of 2008-2009, needed to decide how to respond to the Kindle challenge: should it pursue a policy of confrontation or cooperation with Amazon? Were there other strategic partners to be considered? Should Random
House lead the industry in addressing the issues of e-book pricing and e-book royalty rates? Would the entire structure of the book publishing industry change and what role would Random House play in the future? The only certainty was that the Head Office in Gutersloh was expecting clear answers. 6
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The Ra andom House Re esponse to the K
Kindle

Exhib 1 bit 710-444
7

Value Chain for Boo Publishing Industry ok g

Source: Reprinted with permission fro Bharat N. Anand, Kyle Barnet and Elizabeth Carpenter, “Ran h om tt, h ndom House” H No.
HBS
704-438, Bosto Harvard Busin on: ness School, 2004 Copyright © 2
4.
2004 by the Presid dent and Fellows of Harvard coll s lege.

Exhib 2 bit Typica P&L for a R al Random Hous Imprint (Ci se irca 2003)

Gross R
Revenue
Returns
Net Sales
Royalty Expense and Ad dvance Write-offs (25% s of Whole esale Price)
Paper, Printing, Binding ($2.00-$2.50/Bo
P
ook; approx. 25% of net sales
s)
Total C
Cost of Goods So old Profit
Gross P
Sales an Marketing nd Editorial and Art/Product tion Fulfillme ent Administ tration IT
Freight
Operating Expenses
Net Inc come 130
0%
(30
0%)
100
0%
(25.0%)
(25.0%)
(50.0%)
50
0%
(13.0%)
(10.0%)
(6.0
0%)
(5.9
9%)
(2.5
5%)
(3.0
0%)
(40.4%)
9.6
6%

Source: Reprinted with permission fro Bharat N. Anand, Kyle Barnet and Elizabeth Carpenter, “Ran h om tt, h ndom House” H No.
HBS
704-438, Bosto Harvard Busi on: iness School, 200 Copyright © 2004 by the President and Fello
04.
ows of Harvard c college. Adapted from interview with R m Richard Sarnoff and Company P
Presentation: The Random House Story—October 2001. e e r 7
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710-444

Exhibit 3

The Random House Response to the Kindle

Amazon.com Sales and Income Statements (USD millions)

2006

Year Ended December 31
2007
2008

2009

Net Sales
Consolidated
Media
Electronics and other general merchandise
Othera
Total Consolidated

$7,067
3,361
283
10,711

$9,242
5,210
383
14,835

$11,084
7,540
542
19,166

$12,774
11,082
653
24,509

Year -over-year Percentage Growth
Consolidated
Media
Electronics and other general merchandise
Other
Total Consolidated

19%
44%
23%
26%

27%
51%
34%
35%

19%
44%
42%
28%

16%
48%
22%
29%

Cost of sales
Gross profit

8,255
2,456

11,482
3,353

14,896
4,270

18,978
5,531

Operating expenses
Fulfillment
Marketing
Technology and content
General and administrative
Other operating expense (income), net
Total operating expenses
Income from operations

937
263
662
195
10
2,067
389

1,292
344
818
235
9
2,698
655

1,658
482
1,033
279
(24)
3,428
842

2,052
680
1,240
328
102
4,402
1,129

Interest income
Interest expense
Other income (expense), net
Total non-operating income (expense)

59
(78)
7
(12)

90
(77)
(8)
5

83
(71)
47
59

37
(34)
29
32

Income before income taxes

377

660

901

1,161

Source: Compiled from Amazon.com 2008 and 2009 Annual Report.

a Includes non-retail activities such as promotional and marketing activities, Amazon Web Services, other seller sites, and cobranded credit card agreements.

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The Random House Response to the Kindle

Exhibit 4

710-444

Sample Retail Pricing of a Book, Newspaper, and Magazines
Book Retail Pricing

Date: January 14, 2010
Book: What the Dog Saw: And Other Adventures
Author: Malcolm Gladwell
Publication Date: October 20, 2009
Price
List Hardcover

$27.99

Amazon Hardcover

$13.21

Barnes & Noble Online hardcover - members

$16.79

Barnes & Noble store

$19.59

Amazon Kindle Edition

$9.00

Amazon audio download (Audible.com)

$18.89

Newspaper Retail Price - Yearly Subscription
Date: January 14, 2010
Newspaper: The Wall Street Journal
Price
Newsstand

$595.00

Kindle edition

$179.88

Home delivery

$119.10

WSJ.com full online access

$103.50

Both home delivery and full online access

$155.50

Magazine Retail Price
Date: January 14, 2010
Magazine: The New Yorker

Price

Annual Print Subscription

$39.95

Annual Kindle Subscription

$35.88

Magazine: The Economist
Annual Print Subscription

$126.99

Annual Kindle Subscription

$125.88

Magazine: Newsweek
Annual Print Subscription

$40.00

Annual Kindle Subscription

$17.88

Source: Compiled by casewriters.

9
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The Random House Response to the Kindle

Endnotes
1

“Amazon Kindle is the Most Gifted Item Ever on Amazon.com,” Amazon.com News Release, December 26,
2009, via http://www.amazon.com.
2

Gabriel Madway and Tiffany Wu, “Apple to Launch Tablet in Spring 2010: Analyst,” Reuters, December 9,
2009, via http://www.reuters.com.
3 Peter Kafka, “The Secret Behind the Kindle’s Best-Selling E-Books: They’re Not For Sale,” Cnet, December
29, 2009, via http://news.cnet.com.
4 Motoko Rich, “Writers Guild Disputes Random House on E-Rights,” The New York Times, December 15,
2009, via http://www.nytimes.com.
5 Rebecca Keegan, “How Much Did Avatar Really Cost?” Vanity Fair, December 22, 2009, via http://www.vanityfair.com. 6

Kate Zernike and Motoko Rich, “Palin Tells All. You Betcha.” The New York Times, November 13, 2009, via
Factiva, accessed January 2010.
7

American Booksellers Association survey data, cited by Brian Tracy, Create Your Own Future, (Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley & Sons, 2002), p. 63.
8

“Generation M2: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18-Year-Olds,” Kaiser Family Foundation Study, January 2010, via http://www.kff.org, accessed March 2010.
9

Amazon.com Annual 10K Report, December 31, 2006 via http://www.sec.gov.

10

Roger Fidler, “E-Readers: The Next Generation of the Printed Page,” Newspaper Association of America, July
31, 2008, via http://www.naa.org.
11
Steven
Levy,
“The
Future
http://www.newsweek.com/id/70983.
12

of

Reading,”

Newsweek,

November

27,

2007.

“Amazon Reader Sold Out in Five Hours,” FinancialWire, November 20, 2007, via Factiva, accessed January

2010.
13

Steven Levy, “The Future of Reading; Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Already Built a Better Bookstore. Now He
Believes He Can Improve Upon One of Humankind’s Most Divine Creations: The Book Itself,” Newsweek,
November 26, 2007, via Factiva, accessed January 2010.
14

David Pogue, “The Kindle: Good Before, Better Now,” The New York Times, February 24, 2009, via Factiva, accessed October 2009.
15

Miguel Helft, “Google and Amazon to Put More Books on Cellphones,” The New York Times, February 5,
2009, via http://www.nytimes.com.
16 Geoffrey A. Fowler and Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, “Amazon Cuts Price of Kindle E-reader,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 8, 2009.
17 “Microsoft Amazon Offer Kindle App at Windows 7 Debut,” eWeek, October 22, 2009, via Factiva, accessed
October 2009.
18

Nicholas Kolakowski, “Amazon Kindle DX Now Offers Global Wireless,” eWeek.com, January 6, 2010, via http://www.eweek.com. 19

Nicholas Kolakowski, “Amazon Will Sell 550,000 Kindle Readers in 2009, Analyst Says,” EWeek, December
1, 2009.
20

Nicholas Kolakowski, “Sony Deal, Amazon Announcement Signal Intensifying E-reader Wars,” eWeek,
December 20, 2009.

10
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The Random House Response to the Kindle

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21

Motoko Rich, “A New Electronic Reader, the Nook, Enters the Market,” The New York Times, October 21,
2009, via Factiva, accessed October 2009.
22

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This document is authorized for use only in Estrategia y Teor?a de Juegos (P del Sol) by Patricio del Sol, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez (UAI) from March 2015 to August 2015.