Lying in general is something that is chastised in all societies. No one likes being deceived by false statements. Kant believes that it is our duty to tell the truth no matter the circumstances. He believes that by lying, regardless of any harm done to either person involved, there was harm done to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 64-65). I unequivocally disagree with Kant’s view on lying. The premise behind Kant’s theory is morally correct, but there are various circumstances where lying is necessary for the betterment of mankind. Kant is also not consistent with his categorical imperatives with regard to intentional deception as opposed to lying. There is a major discrepancy regarding deception and lying with his moral viewpoint. Where is the line drawn in regard to deception versus lying? Certain situations including the case of the “would be murderer” are examples where disagreement becomes evident and Kant’s absolute moral rule on lying is exploited. The first argument against Kant’s view on lying deals with his belief that all lies harm someone or humanity, either directly or indirectly, and everyone has “a right to the truth” (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 64). I disagree with this because in many circumstances small lies are necessary. For example, parents lie to their children about Santa Clause, the Tooth Fairy, and the Easter Bunny, and many other things. Now this may seem a bit absurd of an argument but Kant would argue that if asked by your child about these three, it would be their duty to tell their children the truth. This would destroy so many children’s childhood experiences and memories. There is no way that parents would harm anyone by keeping the truth from their children. Humanity is not harmed, nor is anyone personally. Kant believes that truthfulness in statements is the formal duty of a human being to everyone, even when speaking truthfully may work to someone’s disadvantage (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 64). So in this situation, although disadvantageous to the children, it is the duty of the parents to tell their children the truth. This also raises the question of a well-intentioned lie. Now Kant would argue that a well-intentioned lie is also bad because it too will have unforeseen consequences (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 65). In this example there is no way that there are any negative unforeseen consequences that will arise because this lie is well-intentioned.
Another example that disproves Kant’s theory is the case of the “would be murderer.” If someone was out to murder your friend who you were hiding in your home, and you were approached by this “would be murderer” asking of his whereabouts, would you tell him the truth? Kant would argue that it is our responsibility and duty as human beings to tell him that you are hiding him (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 66). I completely disagree with this because in this situation, it is evident to you of the murderer’s motive. No competent human being who knows the motive of the murderer, or anyone with the intent of murder in general, would tell them that they are hiding the desired victim. Especially in the situation where it is a friend. Kant would disagree with this decision to lie to the murderer. Kant would argue that the murderer has the right to the truth, just as you have the right to the truth, yet by lying to the murderer he is being used as a means to his own end and fails to respect the rational nature of the murderer (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 23). Also, Kant would argue that being honest with the murderer would keep you from any public justice consequences (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 65) when in reality; you are doing society a favor by preventing a murder by lying. In no circumstances would preventing a murder have any adverse effects on you. The lie violates the second form of Kant’s Categorical Imperative by failing to respect the “rationality of the murderer” in these two situations (Lying, Deception and Kant), From this it becomes evident that Kant’s theory on lying is indeed outlandish. There are times where lying is necessary and Kant’s arguments against lying are incorrect and inaccurate. Another argument against Kant’s moral theory deals with deception as opposed to lying. My biggest question deals with deception and violation of the categorical imperative. Using a similar example of the “would be murderer,” let’s assume that someone is running away from the person who is trying to kill them (the “would be murderer”). Now this person running away is on foot and comes to a fork in the road. They can choose to go either way, and decide to leave an article of clothing on one path to deceive the “would be murderer” into thinking they traveled that path. When in reality the person running away went down the other path. Now in this situation there is no lie taking place. The person running away may or may not have intended to deceive the “would be murderer,” but clearly there is no lie taking place. The “would be murderer” decides to follow that path based on evidence and the belief that because there is an article of clothing, this must be the path traveled by them. Now this raises the question of whether the fleeing person is not actually liable for the lack of honesty in this action, which he made for the sake of his own personal safety. This was indeed an untruthful action, but Kant’s view on lying does not include deception, and therefore this action would raise questions regarding Kant’s views on moral value (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 19). When in reality, these actions violate Kant’s categorical imperatives and his view on lying (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 63-67). There was no lie that took place, and therefore the person running from the “would be murderer” may or may not be at fault according to a judgment of moral value which cannot be seen (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 19). This is where there is an inconsistency because Kant believes that lying is in no way, shape, or form acceptable because everyone has a right to the truth. Now with deception there is this discrepancy that it is okay to deceive people because there was no trust violated or lying that took place. Just a judgment on the location of the fleeing individual by the “would be murderer.” This completely contradicts Kant’s theory on lying because it violates his categorical imperative in the exact same way as lying. Therefore, this theory on lying is flawed because there is no possible way to see the inner principles of the fleeing person. Consequently, because of these three situations, I refuse to defend Kant’s views on lying. This is a flawed theory that is just irrational. Yes it is frowned upon to lie, but there are instances where lying is necessary. Take the example with parents and their children. This doesn’t just apply to Santa, there are many parenting lies told to children for the sake of their children and the parents. Not all lies have some sort of negative effect as Kant believes. In the situations provided, it is evident that lying in certain circumstances will not cause any harm to anyone and is actually beneficial. It is morally wrong to value the truth over a life in the case of the “would be murderer,” which is why Kant’s theory is flawed. Telling one lie to save a life is something that many people would do. The truth valued over life is something that is just irrational. No one in their right state of mind would willingly tell a murderer that they were hiding the murderer’s next victims. It is just not plausible. Furthermore, Kant fails to cover deception, which is a secondary form of lying where no lie actually took place. Realistically the act of deceiving someone, many would argue, is a form of lying. Kant fails to maintain consistency in regard to deception and lying. This is another reason why Kant’s theory on lying is inaccurate. In conclusion, these facts and scenarios presented are three reasons that disprove Kant’s theory on lying. No one likes getting lied to, but sometimes it is necessary for the mutual benefit of yourself and others.

Works Cited
Kant, Immanuel, and James W. Ellington. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1981. Print.
"Lying, Deception and Kant." Lying, Deception and Kant. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 Nov. 2012. .