Brief Notes on Parfit’s “Personal Identity” in Reading Metaphysics

Introduction, p. 13

He’s going to be discussing two beliefs:

1. That questions about personal identity must (always) have an answer.

a. E.g., “Is A=B?” or “Am I identical to this future person?” Parfit will argue that there are cases where, presumably, there is no answer, i.e., “yes” and “no” are both incorrect.

(Later, however, on p. 17, he suggests that he means to say that we can’t at all tell or identify the answer; this epistemological skepticism is less radical than the claim above).

b. He can only give a case to make this assumption above “implausible” (p. 14).

c. If this – a – is so, then the principle of self-interest isn’t so important. And aging and death …show more content…
What happens to you?

1. You don’t survive. NO.

2. You survive as one. (which?) NO

3. You survive as both.

a. If survival implies identity, then you are two different people.

b. Usually this is thought to be impossible. Parfit suggests however, that you could be two bodies with a divided mind. (p. 15)

Description of a “full” and then “divided” (and then re-united) stream of consciousness. (p. 16). Thus, two bodies and a divided mind, one person.

If permanent division, hard(er) to speak of one person. (p. 17)

c. Parfit’s (positive) suggestion: you survive as two different people but are not identical to them (and they are not identical to you). (p. 17). (And nothing important requires identity).

Parfit thinks this case suggests that belief (1 above is false, so questions about personal identity do not (always) have an answer.

II.

Survival needs not be “one-one” (but identity must be “one-one,” i.e., one person identical to one and only one person; that’s why in branching cases, there is no …show more content…
What matters for survival are relations of degree.
What matters for survival doesn’t presuppose identity (according to Parfit).
Psychological continuity is what’s really of interest, not necessarily identity..
Non-branching psychological continuity is identity which is one-to-one. (p. 21)

III Q-Memory

Memory presupposes personal identity: if you genuinely remember doing X, then you are identical to the person who did X.

[Problem: circularity! (p24) So, Parfit is going to try to analyze survival / personal identity in terms of psychological relations that do not presuppose identity]

S “q-remembers” experience X = (p. 22)

(1) S believes that he experienced X; it seems to him that he experienced X;

(2) someone did have such an experience;

(3) S’s belief that S experienced X is dependent on that experience in the same way that a genuine memory of an experience is dependent on that experience.

[??????? P. 23 ] See Parfit’s