A third strong element of operational design for planning was decisive points. Planners used decisive points appropriately to give the commander a good sense as to the status of the operation and a measure for reaching operational objectives. The decisive points tied to the LOO and included actions such as suppress Scud Launch boxes and defeat IADS (Ibid.). The decisive points were important to the commander and deserved the allocation of forces required to reach the desired effect.
An evaluation of OIF planning reveals the following weak elements of operational design: Center of Gravity (COG), forces and functions, and military end states. The decision to identify Baghdad as the Center of Gravity was among the planner’s most serious errors. …show more content…
Although troops in the fight understood the ground truth, the war plan was not adjusting (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 501). Franks never admitted that the COG was the Fedayeen, nor did he acknowledge the insurgency (Ibid.). The U.S. returned sovereignty to Iraq in an attempt to force them to take charge and to allow the U.S. military to depart even though Iraq was not self-sustainable. After Casey took command of MNF-I, he recognized the need for more counterinsurgency operations and created an academy to train incoming leaders. Concurrently, MNSTC-I improved and increased its ability to train the Iraqi police and military. Security of Iraq remained as the weakest link. The MNF-I campaign plan called for isolating and neutralizing the insurgency; however, U.S. forces continued to operate from the large FOBs which hindered civilian security efforts (Mansoor 2013, 19). In 2006, the Joint Campaign Progress Review assessed the changing conditions in Iraq, but the plan remained the same (Ibid., 32). There was no legitimate progress to report and the missing element was security for the Iraqi’s from sectarian violence (Ibid.). When Petraeus became the MNF-I Commander, the conditions for a new approach were in motion. President Bush initiated the surge of twenty-thousand Soldiers to Baghdad to work with the Iraqi military to secure the area and four-thousand Marines to Al-Anbar to work with tribal leaders to confront al-Qaeda (Ibid., 55). Upon obtaining command, Petraeus seized upon the recent opportunities to join with tribal groups that had been killing U.S. troops in order to fight a common enemy, al-Qaeda. Within five months, conditions in al-Anbar were improving, U.S. forces were increasing partnerships with Iraqi forces in an increasing number of joint combat outposts, and some of the worst areas in Baghdad improved due to joint clearing, holding, and building