1. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss and provide information concerning the U.S. Army Air Force’s raid on industrial targets in Schweinfurt, Germany during World War II.
2. On 17 August 1943, the U.S. Army Air Force conducted the first raid on industrial targets in Regensburg and Schweinfurt. Their goal was to reduce German production of ball bearings, airplanes, and other materials necessary for the war. At the time, the majority of German ball bearing production capabilities were in Schweinfurt.
3. The initial plan called for the 1st and 4th Bomber Wings (BW) to conduct simultaneous attacks of the respective cities. Due to fog, however, the 1st BW did not take off when planned. The 4th BW did not delay and struck their targets in Regensburg. The time difference between the two forces allowed German fighters time to refuel and refit between the 1st and 4th BW’s attacking bomber runs.…show more content… The U.S. Army Air Force provided fighters to escort friendly bombers. However, for unknown reasons, the fighters did not have additional fuel in drop tanks. This prevented the fighters from escorting the bombers outside of friendly airspace. They had to turn around before the bombers reached their objective.
5. As a result of the timing issue and a lack of U.S. fighter support, the U.S. Army Air Force lost 60 B-17 bombers and 55 personnel. Despite the casualties, the raid was a success with a 34% drop in ball bearing production for a short time. The original plan also called for a rapid follow-on attack. Casualties and equipment shortages postponed the second raid.
6. The second raid was on 14 October 1943. This raid, like the first, was a daytime raid. Bombers had fighter escorts for the trip to the objective and back, but had insufficient coverage while attacking the objective. Friendly bombers entered the objective without fighter escorts due to the limited range and harassment from enemy fighters prior to the