The Station Night Club Fire
Professor Arthur J. Deyo
BFS 3251, Introduction to Fire Protection
February 21, 2015

On February 20, 2003 in West Warwick Rhode Island the Station night club was a scene of a horrific and fatal incident. The Station Night club was located on 211 Cowesett Avenue. The building was a single story wood frame building with a small basement underneath the main bar room. The building had been modified several times over the years and changed ownership several times as well. The building was built between 1946 and 1950. Inside the nightclub, polyurethane foam was installed on the rear wall, platform wall and in the alcove as a sound attenuation material. The ceiling was raised and was constructed of gypsum board and a light rack was suspended from the ceiling. There was a sun room which consisted of wood paneling as well as portions of the night club. The night club consisted of three exits which were not obstructed and were working the night of the fire. The building did not have a sprinkler system or any fire retardant material built in. There were built in windows in the sunroom and main bar area which were accessible. The Station Nightclub had consisted of several additions and remodeling projects that were completed since the original construction. The nightclub had changed ownership as well as foreclosures as well. In March 1972 the nightclub was the scene of a fire which closed the night club in 1974. When the night club was reopened, it was opened as a restaurant. During this time there were renovations made as well as interior paneling and partitions placed inside the building as well as exterior renovations. In 1985 the restaurant was then changed to a pub which was later closed. In 1991 the building was then opened as a nightclub. In December 1999 it was documented that modifications were made but it was listed as non-permitted work and then in 2000 change in ownership. In 2001 a car rammed the building which repaired an interior and exterior wall. Since the construction it shows the building changed ownership several times. There were no stable records of ownership but quick purchases which seemed to show that the night club was never a stable business. The night of the fire, the building was not protected by any sprinkler system. It had a fire alarm that went off but it was not connected to the local fire department or any call system. At the time of the fire the building was still wood-frame construction, the exterior walls had wooden shingles that sit underneath a flat roof. The interior walls that surrounded the stage area were stuffed with sound proof polyurethane insulating foam. The windows were located on the north side of the building and on the east side of the main entrance. The windows became a primary exit at the height of the fire. The station nightclub had only four doors which were all functional during the fire, a front main door, bar side exit door, platform exit door, and one kitchen exit door. After reading through extensive interviews it was later collected that the building was going to be sold the next day. Prior to the event the station nightclub removed an ATM machine from the front bar area that was replaced with a piece of plywood. This hole becomes an exit for several people during the fire and was later used in the testimony of many survivors.
The fire started at 11:07 PM, on Thursday, February 20, 2003. The band Jack Russell’s Great White was the band playing the main event that night. When the band started playing with only about a minute into their performance, the pyrotechnics ignited the polyurethane foam which was being used as insulation for the sound. This encompassed the walls around the stage. The eruption from the fire on the polyurethane foam put up adequate enough heat to catch fire to the wooden panels that were above the stage. This resulted in the spreading of the fire throughout the station nightclub. When the flames started up the back wall, the audience seemed to think that the flames were an addition to the show. When the audience comprehended that the fire was not planned and it was an accident they began to run and push toward the front entrance. There were three other exits in the nightclub that was not properly utilized during this event. The West Warwick Fire Department Serve a population of an estimated 30,000 residents. The West Warwick Fire Department responds first to all fire and EMS calls for the 8 square mile area of West Warwick. The West Warwick Fire Department consisted of four stations with a total of four fire engines, one main ladder truck, two ambulances, and one special hazards unit. On the night of the fire the West Warwick Fire Department was responding to a dispatch call of a multiple casualty fire which was reported to 91 and the police that had made it to the scene. The West Warwick Fire Department then requested mutual aid from the encompassing jurisdictions for any fire engine or ambulances that was available. The total result of mutual aid and cooperation was a combination of 583 EMS, firefighters and law enforcement personnel. This included a total of 57 ambulances and two buses which was used for transportation and shelter for the victims of the event.
The investigation consisted of Local, State and Federal agencies and a special panel that was appointed by the Rhode Island governor as well as a grand jury investigation. The Station Nightclub fire uncovered many issues and violations. The polyurethane foam that was located on the interior walls of the stage was a main factor in the ignition of the fire from the pyrotechnics Station Nightclub fire. This material was easily ignited and also aided to the fire spreading faster to the ceiling and walls. The NFPA 101, Life Safety Code states that the interior surface is required to be Class A or B for general assembly locations with occupant masses of more than 300. The building had occupancy of around 420 persons according to the 2003 model codes. During the night of the fire it was estimated that the number of occupants at the Station Nightclub was around 440-458 occupants. The eruption of the fire on the polyurethane foam gave out a large degree of black thick smoke that was very toxic to breath. The heat was so intense that this combined with the thick smoke in such a small period of time resulted in mass chaos. The panic was so chaotic that everyone pushed towards the main entrance. The entrance seemed to become an obstacle to get out because it was not within regulation. “NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, section 13.2.3.6.1 states that the main entrance or exit shall be the width that accommodates one-half of the total occupant loads and shall be at the level of exit or shall connect to a stairway or ramp leading to a street”. This building was not in compliance with this code or was it ever inspected. The investigation showed that pyrotechnics was the main ignition source of the fire. Prior to the concert the owner or the band manager did not have approval or authorization for use of pyrotechnics. The owner, band manager did not consult the fire department of the pyrotechnics of did they seek professional assistance. The night club did not have a sprinkler system even after the business was rebuilt after a fire incident. The city should have had a stronger codes system that was in effect prior to this reconstruction. The Nightclub owner wasn’t aware of codes and regulations on the sprinkler systems. The NIST reported that even with the West Warwick Fire Department arrival within five minutes of the fire, this could have not prevented the mass casualty that resulted. . The NIST report pointed out that the nightclub had fire extinguishers present, but they were not properly accessible or was the staff aware of the proper use and locations. This shows lack neglect by the ownership and the band manager with the knowing that pyrotechnics were being used. In videos you can see that when the fire started that the crowd rushed toward the main entrance. This was also showing that the ownership did not have properly marked exits as well as informing the crowd of the exits in case of an emergency prior to the event. The findings also presented that one third of the people escaped through windows and the sunroom windows. After studying the map of the Station Nightclub, it shows that the building had only four exits in the entire structure. One exit was located in the kitchen area; this exit would have only been known by the staff. This exit was in a location that was not accessible by general public or seen. This would result in only three general public exits for local patrons to know about. The exits should have been properly marked and a clear path to each exit should have been present. After the investigation the bands road manager who set the pyrotechnics off and the two owners of the nightclub were charged with 200 counts of involuntary manslaughter. All three later plead to lesser charges as well as sentences. My recommendations for this and all events that have a large number of people would be very simple. I would be proactive; I would work with the event organizer as well as the owner in making sure that all incidents would be addressed. I would have stationed a first responder truck there to assist in emergencies. If other cities were to view this as a failure from the owners and band manager, I would strongly disagree. An event in any city that has that many people in one area should have had a police presence or first responder there. Cities should be more proactive in making sure that the citizens’ safety is being addressed. In a city that has four fire stations it seems could have had the ability to send a truck to an event like this just as a safety precaution. Cities should also see this as a warning to inspect older buildings that were grandfathered under new codes.
References
Report of the Technical Investigation of the Station Nightclub Fire. (2005, June ). Retrieved January 29, 2015, from http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire05/PDF/f05032.pdf
SPECIAL REPORTS/STATION FIRE. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22, 2015, from http://www.providencejournal.com/topics/special-reports/station-fire
The Station Nightclub Fire, Rhode Island, 2003. (n.d.). Retrieved February 21, 2015, from http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/fire/station_nightclub_fire_2003.cfm
The Station Night Club Fire (GRAPHIC). (n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2015, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOzfq9Egxeo
The Station Nightclub Fire | Firehouse. (n.d.). Retrieved February 21, 2015, from http://www.firehouse.com/article/10463469/the-station-nightclub-fire