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Strategic Analysis
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Addressing Kashmir
Satish Chandra Available online: 08 Feb 2011

To cite this article: Satish Chandra (2011): Addressing Kashmir, Strategic Analysis, 35:2, 304-307 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.542928

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Strategic Analysis Vol. 35, No. 2, March 2011, 304–307

Addressing Kashmir
Satish Chandra

he spate of rioting which plagued Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from June 2010 is testimony to the mismanagement of developments by both the state and central governments. This is all the more unfortunate as near normalcy had been established in Jammu and Kashmir following the November 2008 elections and the downtrend in insurgency through 2009 and early 2010. The immediate cause of the rioting that engulfed the Valley through the summer of 2010 may in large measure be attributed to the vacuum in governance which antinational elements, aided and abetted from across the border, were quick to exploit. The original sin lay in the failure of the local authorities to neutralise those who organised the riots and incited the youth to take to the streets in violation of the law. It also lay in their reluctance to use the force necessary for quelling the riots. If the state authorities had acted firmly from the very beginning and made it clear that they were determined to quell the violence no matter what the cost, law and order would have been established earlier and with lesser loss of life. Once the rioting acquired momentum and civilian casualties mounted, the authorities panicked and were paralysed into inaction. Accordingly, even the charge levelled against the local authorities of insensitivity to the heavy casualty toll borne by youngsters, who were not even bearing firearms, remained unanswered. The simple and straightforward response that needed to be made was that these youngsters were acting against the law and, while not using firearms, were indulging in orchestrated stone pelting, causing serious injury to those charged with maintaining public order as well as damaging public property. Resort to force therefore was unavoidable in the public interest and no-one, young or old, could be allowed to flout the law with impunity. The central government’s reaction was also disappointing. It neither spelt out the bottom line on Jammu and Kashmir (specifically, that it is an integral part of India and, therefore, a secessionist agenda would not enjoy any traction), nor installed a government in the state that could promptly restore law and order. Instead it dithered for weeks on end. It was only on September 20 that the government sent an all party parliamentary delegation led by the home minister to Jammu and Kashmir ostensibly to secure a better understanding of the local scene necessary for defusing the situation. Soon thereafter, on September 25, it announced the following eight-point programme to help defuse tensions:

T

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The author is the former Deputy National Security Advisor, Government of India.
ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online © 2011 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.542928 http://www.informaworld.com

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(1) Appointment of a group of interlocutors to dialogue with all sections of society of J&K. (2) Release of all youth detained on charges like stone pelting. (3) Withdrawal of detention cases against those detained under the Public Safety Act (PSA). (4) Grant of Rs 5 lakh to families of those who died in clashes with the security forces during the unrest. (5) Setting up of a task force each for Jammu and Ladakh to assess implications of the situation in Kashmir on them and to examine their developmental needs. (6) Reopening of schools and colleges. (7) Grant of Rs 100 crore for rebuilding school and college infrastructure. (8) Holding of a unified command meet to review the provisions of the Disturbed Area Act and descaling of barricades and check points to ease movement of civilians in public areas. On October 14, the home minister announced the formation of a group of three interlocutors for a ‘sustained uninterrupted dialogue’ with all shades of opinion in Jammu and Kashmir. He indicated that they had been entrusted with this task of carrying out a dialogue with the people ‘to understand their problems and chart a course for the future’.1 All these steps are no more than mere band aids. Indeed, they, and in particular the appointment of a three-member group of interlocutors who have no clout whatsoever and are mandated to report back after one year, are seen as no more than dilatory tactics. It is also strange that the government should have found it necessary to send an all party delegation to Jammu and Kashmir and, thereafter, appoint a group of interlocutors simply to understand the sentiments of the people in the state as these are only too well known in the corridors of power in Delhi given the fact that the state always figures prominently on its radar screen. The central government’s approach to Jammu and Kashmir has been marked by a sense of drift. This will further embolden anti-national elements, increase alienation amongst the people in the Valley, and pave the way for further unrest which, if unattended, could make the state once again an international hot spot as it was in the 1990s. Clearly the government needs to act fast to establish normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir. In order to do so it must establish good governance in the state, put paid to the hopes of secession harboured by anti-national elements and erase the sense of alienation harboured by some in the Valley. Towards this end the following steps should be taken urgently: (1) Omar Abdullah should be replaced as chief minister at the earliest. He has no connect with the people and has not been able to govern effectively. If necessary, the Congress should withdraw support to the National Conference and governor’s rule should be established with a view to restoring good governance and the rule of law. (2) Once the situation has normalised fresh elections should be held. (3) The prime minister must reiterate that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, that secession is not an option, and that, as detailed in the February 1994 joint parliamentary resolution, one needs to secure the vacation of aggression by Pakistan and to put an end to terrorism in the state. The prime minister should also point out that demands for the repeal of the

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Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) are a red herring as the army was not involved in any of the crowd control operations in J&K in the last few months which had resulted in civilian casualties. Accordingly, as and when the army is called out in areas declared disturbed, it will act under the AFSPA as that alone can ensure its effective utilisation. Such an unambiguous assertion will signal to all concerned that India is determined to maintain peace and stability and that all efforts at destabilisation will be put down firmly. (4) In keeping with the tenor of the aforesaid assertion, the prime minister must not make adoption of measures for addressing the situation in Jammu and Kashmir hostage to a dialogue with Pakistan. Non-implementation of the recommendations of the five working groups with regard to Jammu and Kashmir, the setting up of which was announced by government way back in 2006, notably on confidence building measures, strengthening relations across the line of control (LOC), economic development, good governance and centrestate relations, as well as the grant of a year’s mandate to the recently appointed three-member group of interlocutors headed by Dileep Padgaonkar, lends credence to the view that the government is waiting for a dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan before embarking on any major initiative on the state. Indeed, Mr. Padgaonkar’s assertion to the effect that Pakistan’s involvement is essential for a comprehensive solution to the situation in the state, coupled with another interlocutor’s (Ms. Radha Kumar’s) suggestion that the Indian Constitution could be amended to accommodate elements in the state,2 is further proof, if any were required, that Delhi not only wants to work in tandem with Islamabad on the Kashmir issue but is prepared to show unprecedented flexibility. Nothing could be more counter-productive, given the fact that Pakistan’s ultimate objective is to undermine India’s sovereignty in the state. Accordingly, it is imperative that India must unilaterally and immediately start addressing the issues pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir, in particular the sense of alienation in the Valley. Once normalcy is established in Jammu and Kashmir through the restoration of law and order, good governance, and by winning the hearts and minds of the people, the significance of the Pakistan factor in the state would greatly diminish. In furtherance of this objective, the government should move towards implementing those recommendations of the five working groups that it finds acceptable and that have broad acceptance across all party lines. It may be mentioned that four of the five working groups submitted their reports by April 2007 and the fifth one, notably on centre-state relations, in December 2009. Some of the more contentious issues are, of course, those relating to centre-state relations, including the issue of Article 370, and the demands for increased autonomy, not only because the various national parties have differing views but also because there is no consensus on this even within the state. The only way out of this impasse is to urge the various players in the state to evolve a consensus on these issues and come forward with their specific proposals. Simultaneously, a national level consensus in the matter must also be developed. In so doing, all would have to keep in mind the following:

• Jammu and Kashmir is sui generis in the manner of its accession to India and is the only Indian state with its own constitution.

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• Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India both as per Article I and the First •
Schedule of the Indian Constitution as well as the Preamble and Section I of the J&K Constitution. A complete reversion to the terms on which Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India, as per the instrument of accession or as per the Delhi Agreement of 1952, is not in its own best democratic interests given the many benefits accruing to it through the ‘erosion’ of such terms, such as for instance the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Election Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, etc., to the state as well as the provisions for the state’s financial integration with the centre which make possible its economic viability based upon massive economic assistance. It needs to be noted that in the financial year 2008–2009 Jammu and Kashmir received as much as almost Rs 11000 crores from the centre by way of grants and its share of the union taxes making it the eleventh largest recipient amongst 30 states and union territories forming a part of the country. The steady erosion over the years of the autonomy enjoyed by Jammu and Kashmir was in accordance with the provisions laid down in Article 370 and, therefore, with the concurrence until 1956 of the J&K Constituent Assembly and, thereafter, consequent upon the termination of its work by the J&K legislative assembly. Thus this erosion of autonomy which now appears to have become a sore point was with the consent of the elected representatives of the people of that state. The argument that the enlargement of the centre’s powers at the cost of those of the state after the J&K constituent assembly ceased to exist in 1956 was not in conformity with Article 370, as this Article only refers to the constituent assembly as the validating mechanism for any changes in distribution of centre-state powers, is mistaken as the constituent assembly was succeeded by the state legislative assembly which is fully imbued with constituent powers and exercised the same to validate the increase in the centre’s powers vis-à-vis the state. By the same token the elimination or modification of Article 370 would require validation by the state legislative assembly. A via media would need to be evolved between the extent of autonomy enjoyed by the state at the time of its accession and that currently enjoyed by it. Whether this is done on the basis of an all India exercise undertaken through a commission patterned on the Sarkaria Commission, or specifically for Jammu and Kashmir, is also an issue on which a consensus would have to be evolved. It needs to be noted that the factors behind the demands in the Valley for greater autonomy are essentially emotional and psychological. These demands cannot be rudely brushed aside and need to be carefully examined across the table through free and frank discussion. Once a dialogue is undertaken with the elected representatives of the state in the cold light of reason on what is best for the state, many of the demands that may initially be made are unlikely to be persisted with and compromise solutions acceptable to all would emerge.

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Notes
1. Business Standard report, ‘Government Forms Group of Interlocutors on Kashmir’, BS Reporter, New Delhi, 14 October 2010. 2. D.K. Singh, ‘Whose Line is it Anyway: J&K Interlocutors Leave Cong Worried’, Indian Express, 29 October 2010.