Prof Ed 12
Relevant Laws for Teachers

.

Submitted to:

Professor Rodrigo Duque

Submitted by:

Abbie Irish M. Mendoza
III-2 BECEd
G.R. No. L-39275 December 20, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RICARDO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellee.

In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the provincial fiscal thereof filed an information against the herein appellee, which reads as follows:

The undersigned provincial fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of the crime of assault upon a person in authority committed as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

That on or about September 30,1932, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil of the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack and lay hands upon her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the premises of the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity.

Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the trial court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light felony. The present appeal was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of setting aside the order of dismissal in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as alleged in the said information really constitute the crime of assault upon a person in authority or at least an assault upon an agent of authority, or any other grave or light felony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases of People vs. Villacenda (G.R. No. 32596, promulgated April 26,1930, not reported); People vs. Lagrimas (G.R. No. 33529, promulgated April 8,1931, not reported); and People vs. Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a question similar to the one under consideration was discussed and decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the information constitute an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and affirming two of the judgments rendered by the courts a quo, really held that the acts committed by the defendants therein constituted the crime of assault upon a public officer and, therefore, they should be sentenced to the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old Penal Code. The reason for such doctrine is based on the fact that the said article, as explained in the case of People vs. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as follows:

The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of the preceding article shall be imposed upon those who shall have employed the force or the intimidation mentioned in No. 1 of article 249 for the object indicated in No. 1 of article 229 or who shall have placed hands upon persons coming to the assistance of the authority or upon its agents or upon public officers.

Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the decisions in the three cases were promulgated and the acts complained of therein had been committed long before the present Revised Penal Code went into effect, it was necessary that the defendants and appellants in the aforesaid cases be convicted of the crimes with which they had been charged and sentenced later to the penalty prescribed in the afore-cited article. The reason is obvious because said acts constituted a violation of the article in question, as held by this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, the truth is that said article 251 was not fully reproduced in the Revised Penal Code as shown by article 149 thereof. The article in question now reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.

It will be noted that the Legislature suppressed and omitted all reference to public officers in the article just cited, which necessarily conveys the idea that it did not intend to make the same applicable to cases of assault upon public officers who are not persons in authority or agents thereof. And there cannot be the least shadow of a doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase, as employed in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a directly vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the ground that, as has been held in the case of United States vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in support thereof, agents of authority are only those persons who, by direct provision of law, or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, and those who come to the aid of persons in authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is true that Viada said that by implication and in accordance with the final section of article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code, which corresponds to the aforesaid article 251 of our old Penal Code, it may be affirmed that for the purposes of the said article, public officers are also entitled to be considered as agents of authority. However, such consideration was due to the fact that assault upon public officers was penalized likewise in the said article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the necessary requisite thereof prescribed by law. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines a person in authority as follows:

In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.

The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the case of United States vs. Smith (39 Phil., 533), so as to include only persons who perform some of the functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands and who according to the aforesaid article, are directly vested with jurisdiction. By "directly vested jurisdiction" is meant "the power or authority to govern and execute the laws, particularly the authority vested in the judges to administer justice, that is, to try civil or criminal cases or both, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the law" (Escriche, Rational Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, p. 1154); and "authority" as well as "directly vested jurisdiction" are two things which should be conferred by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department and the bureaus and offices dependent on it, for the purpose of exercising the executive functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands, is silent with regard to powers had or which may be had by high school teachers, in defining those vested in functionaries of the aforesaid offices. The Code in question only defines the duties and powers of the Director of Education and of the division superintendents. Nothing is said about principals, except that their authority should be determined by the Director of Education, and much less about high school teachers. The powers granted to the said Director of Education and division superintendents are very limited and are not for purposes of government nor execution of any law, but only as provided for in section 910 et seq. of the aforesaid Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority not only on the grounds already stated but also because the distinction between the two may be inferred clearly from the very provisions of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. After defining less serious physical injuries, the law provides as follows:

Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such persons.

If the Legislature had not intended to exclude teachers from the category of persons in authority or agents thereof, it would have omitted them from the enumeration of those against whom the act, as defined therein, may be committed and for which a heavier penalty is provided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There is no question that a teacher is a public officer inasmuch as it is an actual fact that he performs part of the public functions of the Government. Furthermore, the same ruling has been established in the afore-cited cases of Villacenda, Lagrimas and Tacud. However, this cannot be construed to mean that every public officer is at the same time an agent of authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Commenting on articles 263 and 264 in connection with article 416 of the Spanish Penal Code, which corresponds to articles 249, 250 and 401, respectively, of our old Penal Code and from which articles 148, 149 and 203 of the Revised Penal Code had been taken, with slight alterations, although assault upon public officers has been omitted in the latter Code, Groizard has said:

Are public officers agents of persons in authority? If not, may they be the subject of assault although they are not included in article 263 which describes and defines said crime? And if they should be so, in the case stated in the last paragraph of article 264, shall it be understood that may also be, in all the cases relative to persons in authority and their agents as stated in article 263? To decide these questions, it is necessary to know beforehand who are public officers. Article 416 defines them as: those who, by direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority, take part in the performance of public functions. From the above cited provision, it follows that every agent of authority is a public officer but not every public officer is an agent of authority. The officers of a ministry and those of provincial governments are public officers inasmuch as they perform functions intended for the preservation and government of the State, yet in spite of it, they are not in authority nor agents thereof. They are not persons in authority on the ground that they are not directly vested with jurisdiction either individually or as members of some court or public corporation. They are not agents of authority because, as subordinate officers, they are not charged with the task of executing the orders of any such person. This important difference should be borne in mind so as not to mistake offices for functions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of authority or upon public officers defines the difference between one and the other. Therefore, an agent of authority cannot be confused with a public officer when the legislator himself speaks of them separately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of authority, it seems that, generally speaking, they cannot be the subject of the crime of assault, as defined in article 263, on the ground that said article considers assault as only those acts committed upon persons in authority and their agents, it being silent with regard to public officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the generic doctrine of article 263 and the specific statement of article 264 relative to penalty. It is true that if there can never be any crime of assault upon mere public officers for want of one of the essential requisites thereof as stated in article 263, neither can the last paragraph of article 264, relative to public officers, have any application even if the guilty parties lay hands on them. Yet, what can we do? There is conflict in the law and it is useless to pretend not to notice it. (Groizard, Penal Code, vol. 3, p.468.)

It is for the specific purpose of clarifying the law and eliminating such conflict that the Legislature suppressed the phrase "public officers" in enacting article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, which is a reproduction of the afore-cited article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code. It therefore becomes clear that the crime of assault cannot be committed against a public officer unless he is a person in authority or agent thereof at the same time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

For further elucidation of the matter, it was held in three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain: one of May 7,1874, another of November 16, 1889, and the other of October 8, 1901, that a teacher of a public primary school, a professor in a higher school for teachers, and instructors in public primary schools, are public officers. (Jose Garcia and Romero de Tejada, Penal Monographs on Assaults upon Persons in Authority and Their Agents, Resistance and Disobedience, p. 80; Alcubilla, Dictionary of Spanish Administration, vol. I, p. 742; and Viada, Revised Penal Code of 1870, Fourth Supplement, p.281.)chanrobles virtual law library

The afore-cited reasons show that a teacher is neither a person in authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore, the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the performance of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in authority nor an agent thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There is no question that the acts complained of, as alleged in the complaint, constitute light felony, whether they be considered under the provisions of article 359 (Slander by Deed), or of article 266 (Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code. However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege the motive of the defendant in maltreating the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the fact that the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in accordance with the law to consider the aforesaid acts as merely constituting light felony as defined and penalized in the said article 266, with the third aggravating circumstance. In such case, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the penalty therefor as prescribed by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the doctrine laid down in the case of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Rosauro (G.R. No. 39289) 1, for we had it before us in considering the case at bar. The truth is that there is no similarity between the former and the present case on the ground that although the crime alleged therein was "direct assault upon a person in authority" and the offended party therein was a public elementary school teacher acting in the performance of his duties as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in the body of the complaint that the defendant therein gravely intimidated and threatened said teacher. There is no question that, in accordance with the provisions of article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, the jurisdiction to try cases of grave threats belong to Courts of First Instance by reason of the penalty prescribed therein. Prescinding from the title of the offense stated in the information under consideration, it is observed from the allegations contained in the body of said pleading that the crime committed is slight in nature, the trial of which falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of dismissal appealed from is in accordance with the law and should therefore be sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Let the costs be declared de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RICARDO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellee

A N A L Y S I S

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001]

MA. VILMA S. LABAD, Petitioner, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF REGENTS/HON. RICARDO GLORIA (DECS Secretary) Chairman, DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, Vice Chairman and USP President, and NEDA DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, JR., Member, and EVA M. ANTEPUESTO, USP PTA-LABORATORY SCHOOL PRESIDENT, ET AL., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Resolution [1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1999 in the case entitled Ma. Vilma S. Labad vs. The University of Southeastern Philippines dismissing the appeal of Ma. Vilma S. Labad herein petitioner and the Resolution dated July 22, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern Philippines (hereafter respondent) Laboratory (high school) and was designated as the adviser for the schools yearbook TRAILS 95, the schools regular school organ INSIGHTS, and the schools student government known as the LSOCSG.

On February 1, 1996, the officers and members of respondent universitys Parents Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of respondent university, charging petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness as a Teacher. The letter-complaint reads in part:

1. She deliberately lied to the parents the total amount she paid for the printing of the Trails 1995. She publicly announced during the PTA meeting that she paid P64,000.00 but when the financial report of Tesoro Printing was given to us (sic) the cost including the discount was P 54,000.00.

2. She violated several provisions of R.A. 7079, Campus Journalism Act of 199.

Xxx

8. Up to this point in time (sic) the Yearbook 1995 is not receive (sic) yet. This x x x is attributed to the inefficiency of the adviser or coordinator of the yearbook which I think she acknowledged her inefficiency and ineffectivity.

12. She thrusted (sic) an unfinished assignment to Jeffrey Teros mouth of (sic) the full view of his classmates while she was seated on her table. Her temper is beyond control which could endanger our children physically, psychologically and emotionally.

13. She grabbed the hair of some of her students in the computer class, again due to her temper and heartlessness.

14. She exacts illegal collection to (sic) our children for her test paper and handouts ranging from P0.50 to P50.00 which is not allowed by law x x x.

15. She failed more than 30% of her class because according to her, they cannot cope up (sic) with her standard.

16. Miss Labad does not possess the patience and the competence of a secondary school teacher.

20. The NSAT charge was exorbitant without the benefit of liquidation presented to the parents after the exam nor end of the school year (1995). x x x[2

The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 96-001. In her, answer, petitioner denied the charges against her. The Office of the President of respondent university then created an Investigating Committee to investigate the complaint.

The Investigating Committee rendered a report recommending the penalty of dismissal from the service through the non-renewal of petitioners probationary status on the ground of dishonesty and misconduct. Respondent universitys Board of Regents subsequently approved and adopted the report of the Investigating Committee as its decision. Respondent then did not renew the probationary status of petitioner as teacher for the school year 1996-97.

Petitioner appealed said decision to the Civil Service Commission.

On April 14, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued a Resolution affirming the decision of respondent universitys Board of Regent.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

On December 11, 1998, petitioner received the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated November 13, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.

On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Period to File Petition for Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 to do so.

On January 12, 1999, petitioner filed her Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.

On February 17, 1999, petitioner through counsel received a copy of the Resolution dated January 28, 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals, Special Fifth Division, granting an extension of 15 days from December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, to file the petition for review. The Resolution reads:

Acting on the motion filed by counsel for petitioner on December 28, 1998, the Court resolves to grant petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, within which to file petition for review.[3

On March 10, 1999, counsel of petitioner received a copy of the Resolution dated February 24, 1999, issued by the Court of Appeals, Former Fourth Division, dismissing the petition for review. It reads:

CONSIDERING that the petition for review was filed on January 12, 1999 by registered mail, beyond the extended period which expired on January 10, 1999, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.[4

On March 24, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

On July 29, 1999, counsel of petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. The Resolution states:

CONSIDERING that petitioner herself admits filing the petition at least one day late, the motion for reconsideration of Our dismissal is hereby DENIED.[5

Hence, this petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER PETITIONERS APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS TIMELY PURSUANT TO SECTION 4, RULE 43 IN RELATION TO SECTION 1, RULE 22 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE;

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTIONS DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1999 DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND THE RESOLUTION DATED JULY 22, 1999 DENYING RECONSIDERATION (ANNEXES A-REVIEW AND B-REVIEW, SUPRA) - ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE AFORE-STATED RULES AND THE SUPREME COURT RULINGS OR ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CASES OF ASTA MOSKOWSKY VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 10422, MARCH 3, 1994 (230 SCRA 657); JAVIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 48194, MARCH 15, 1990 (183 SCRA 171); CAPULONG VS. WORKMENS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (178 SCRA 314); ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION VS. NLRC (189 SCRA 743); AND NATALIA DE LAS ALAS, ETC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 1-38006, MAY 16, 1978;

3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION DATED JULY 22, 1999 WHICH FAILED TO RULE ON THE FIRST GROUND RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THAT THE FILING OF HER APPEAL/PETITION WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 43 IN RELATION TO SECTION 1, RULE 22 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE MANDATES OF DUE PROCESS SUCH AS SECTION 1, RULE 36; ARTICLE 9 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THAT THAT THEY MUST RULE ON ALL CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, AS ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE, AS IN THE CASES OF MARCELINO A. BUSACAY VS. ANTONIO F. BUENAVENTURA, G.R. NO. L-5856, DATED DECEMBER 29, 1953 AND AGOLTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, L-23025 (33 SCRA 771), DATED JUNE 30, 1970;

4. WHETHER IN THE SAID RESOLUTIONS, THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH IS TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF EVERY ACTION AND PROCEEDING (SECTION 6, RULE I, GENERAL PROVISION, 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE) AND THAT OF A HOST OF JURISPRUDENCE, AMONG WHICH THOSE STATED IN PREVIOUSLY ENUMERATED GROUNDS AND ISSUES, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER HAS PRESENTED SUBSTANTIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF LAW, AMONG WHICH ARE THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS THAT SHOULD HAVE MERITED JUDICIAL DETERMINATION, WHICH BECAUSE OF THE SAID QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS WHERE SUPPRESSED ON TECHNICAL AND INSUBSTANTIAL REASONS;

5. WHETHER SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT No. 4670 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS APPLIES TO THOSE TEACHERS IN A STATE UNIVERSITY, SUCH AS PETITIONER AND IN HER CASE;

6. WHETHER THE COMMITTEE CREATED WITHOUT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM AND APPOINTED BY THE TEACHERS ORGANIZATION WHERE PETITIONER BELONGS HAD JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE PETITIONER AND THE DECISION RENDERED THEREON IS VALID AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAID PROVISION OF R.A. 4670 OR THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS;

7. WHETHER THE CASE OF HON. ARMAND FABELLA, ETC. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 110379, DATED NOVEMBER 28, 1997 IS APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER AND HER CASE;

8. WHETHER USP AND ITS COMMITTEE AND NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS THRU ITS REGIONAL OFFICE, HAS JURSIDICTION OVER THE CASE INVOLVING THE APPLICATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7079, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CAMPUS JOURNALISM ACT;

9. WHETHER PETITIONERS STATUS ON WHETHER SHE IS A PERMANENT OR PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE AND/OR HER CASE IS COVERED BY AND/OR SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW, ITS RULES, THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CASE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. VERSUS THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, G.R. NO. 88167 DATED MAY 3, 1993 (221 SCRA 598);

10. WHETHER THE STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN MET IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER;

11. WHETHER PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN PROTECTED; AND

12. WHETHER PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED AND ENTITLED TO THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEFS OF REINSTATEMENT, BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS.[6

Without delving into the merits of this petition, we limit the discussion on the threshold issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by petitioner before it on the ground that the petition was filed late.

Petitioner maintains that she timely filed her petition for review with the Court of Appeals. She points out that she received the adverse resolution of the Civil Service Commission on December 11, 1998. Petitioner then claims that from said date, she had 15 days or until December 26, 1998 to file her petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Since December 26, 1998 was a Saturday, it was on the next business day, December 28, 1998 which was a Monday, that petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Period to File Petition for Review instead of filing her petition for review. In that motion for extension, petitioner sought an additional 15 days counting from December 28, 1998 to file her petition, invoking the power of the Court of Appeals to grant such extension as provided for by Section 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [7 While the Court of Appeals favorably acted on the motion in a Resolution dated January 28, 1999, it granted the additional 15 days commencing from December 26,1998 or until January 10, 1999, for petitioner to file her petition. Petitioner bewails the fact that she received the resolution embodying said grant only on February 17, 1999. By that time, she had already filed her petition on January 12, 1999, having reckoned the extended period from December 28, 1998, as she had prayed for in her motion for extension.

In disputing the dismissal of her petition, petitioner insists that the 15-day extension was timely sought since December 28, 1998, a Monday should be considered as the fifteenth day of filing her appeal, not December 26, 1998, which was a Saturday. In support of her claim, petitioner relies on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court that provides:

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner also contends that assuming that January 10, 1999, a Sunday, was the last day of the extension period, petitioner asserts that January 11, 1999, a Monday, should be considered as the last day of filing the petition based on the just quoted law for pretemission of holidays. Hence, petitioner submits that the delay is only one (1) day, a delay that is allegedly excusable due to a mistake in good faith and without any intention to delay, because the petition was filed the following day therefrom or on January 12, 1999.

The petition has merit.

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases, [8 where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next business day to move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the last day for petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension filed on December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. [9 The next issue to resolve then is when should the 15-day extension be reckoned, should it be counted from December 26, 1998 or December 28, 1998?

As a rule, the extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately after the expiration of such period. [10 However, in Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals [11 and Vda. De Capulong vs. Workmens Insurance Co., Inc., [12 we allowed the extended period to commence from the specific time prayed for in the motion for extension. In this case, petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the commencement of the additional 15 days should have been from December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the petition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days from December 28, 1998, was filed on time.

The underpinning consideration in Moskowski, Vda. de Capulong and in the case at bar, is the liberal interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if the original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15day extension period. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. [13

The unfairness of the situation becomes even more apparent when we consider the fact that petitioner received notice that the extension was to be counted from the original period and not from the date that she had prayed for, a month after she had already filed her petition. The equitable solution in the case at bar, as amply supported by jurisprudence, is to thus base the extension from the period requested by petitioner.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED and the case is hereby REMANDED to the appellate court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, Petitioner, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF REGENTS/HON. RICARDO GLORIA (DECS Secretary) Chairman, DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, Vice Chairman and USP President, and NEDA DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, JR., Member, and EVA M. ANTEPUESTO, USP PTA-LABORATORY SCHOOL PRESIDENT, ET AL., Respondents.

A N A L Y S I S
G.R. No. L-12495 July 26, 1960

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DIONISIO LIDRES, Defendant-Appellant.

Dionisio Lidres was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Criminal Case No. V-4137) with the crime of usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10, under the following information:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1954, in the municipality of Balamban, province of Cebu, Philippines, with the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and without pretense of official position did, then and there wilfully, and feloniously perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the Biasong Elementary School of the aforementioned municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by Miss Joseta Diutay who had been duly appointed to said position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and was, thereafter tried. After trial, he was found guilty to the crime charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 3 years to 5 years, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, he appealed to us directly assigning as sole error the trial court's finding that under the information and facts of the case, he was guilty of the crime formation and facts of the case, he was guilty of the crime of usurpation of the official functions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The records disclose that Magdalena P. Echavez, a public school teacher Biasong Elementary School, at Balamban, Cebu, applied, for and was granted maternity leave beginning the first school day of January, 1954 and ending on March of the same year. To fill up the vacancy expected to be created by said leave of Echavez, Josita Diotay and defendant Lidres filed their respective applications as substitute teachers. On December 30, 1953, Diotay was recommended by the supervising teacher of the aforementioned school Hilario Laspi�as, to fill up the position of Echavez. Laspi�as, however, requested Diotay to sign agreement take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the period from January, 1954 would be equally divided between them. Thereafter, Diotay received her appointment (Exh. B) as substitute teacher, vice Echavez, effective January 4, 1954. Diotay then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade class in said school.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 12, 1954, apparently on the strength of the agreement (Exh. 1), defendant appeared at Biasong Elementary School, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of Diotay. When the defendant asked Diotay to sign said letter of resignation, the latter refused. Subsequently, defendant made known to Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he would take over her class on Monday, (date February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay was conducting her classes, and insisted to take over the same, but Diotay tried to hold on. As a consequence, both held classes, Diotay on 2 rows of pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2 rows. In order to assert his authority, defendant also erased Diotay's named from the attendance chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant's actuation, Diotay, left the classroom, and reported the matter to the principal teacher, Exequiel Tecson, at Balamban. The latter advised her to return to her post, which she did. When she arrived at her classroom in the afternoon of the same day (February 22), defendant was still there, holding the class until 4:00 o'clock. In view of this, Diotay went back to inform said principal about defendant's insistence in taking over her class.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were summoned by the supervising teacher (Laspi�as) for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said supervising teacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back to school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24, 1954, without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay's class, against the latter's will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at the beginning of this opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In regard to the offense of usurpation of official functions, the law, as originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal Code), provides:

ART. 177. Usurpation of official functions. - Any person who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis supplied.) chanrobles virtual law library

Any person who, with or without pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than ten years. (Sec. 1; Emphasis supplied.)

Still later on, or on June 14, 1949, Republic Act 379 was adopted, amending Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, to reads as follows:

ART. 177. Usurpation of Authority or official functions. - Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of any lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis supplied.)

On May 31, 1954, appellant was, as already stated, prosecuted and later tried and convicted under Republic Act No. 10. Appellant now contends in his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to his case because this law is an emergency measure and intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became Republic Act No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of official position required under Article 177 above-quoted of the Revised Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty from prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (under the latter provision) to not less 2 years nor more than 10 years (under Rep. Act No. 10).

MR. SUMULONG. Now, if the gentlemen will allow me to add something to that - because I do not want to have any possibility of misunderstanding - when I say that this proposed measure is intended to supplant the provision of the Penal Code, I want to make it clearly understood that this is going to replace the Penal Code provision only so long as the situation which we intend to correct with this measure continues to exist, and we like to believe that this situation will not be permanent but only transient and ephemeral.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

MR. ROY. I should like that to made clear on the records. Do I understand from the gentleman from Rizal that this is a sort of an emergency measure? chanrobles virtual law library

MR. SUMULONG. Exactly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

MR. ROY. And, if so, will the gentleman explain the justification for the existence of that emergency? chanrobles virtual law library

MR. SUMULONG. This is an emergency measure because the situation which we propose to correct this bill, we believe, has its origin during the Japanese occupation. It is a situation which was created on account of psychology which arose during that extraordinary period in our history.

MR. ROY. Now referring to present conditions, does the gentleman have in mind the reported activities of some organizations in the Central Plains of Luzon to the effect that those organizations are levying or collecting taxes and performing marriages? chanrobles virtual law library

MR. SUMULONG. I think those are intended to be corrected by this measure, if the newspaper reports and the information contained in official reports are true, which I cannot definitely state one way or the other.

(Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. I, No. 16, June 18, 1946, p. 309; emphasis supplied.).

The explanatory note of said bill, states:

In some provinces of the Philippines, the rule of the law and order has been impaired or replaced by before and terrorism. Using economic injustice as a rallying cry, unscrupulous agitators have succeeded in destroying public faith and confidence in the orderly processes of government and in imposing extralegal rule over the inhabitants therein. That faith and confidence must be restored and constituted authority respected. The Government must resist with all the forces at its command any attempt to subvert public authority. The accompanying bill seeks to remedy the situation and approval thereof by this body is, therefore, hereby urged. (Id., at p. 307; emphasis supplied.)

Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations, it would create an absurd situation where a lesser offense - performing official functions without pretense - it penalized with a higher penalty, that of imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than 10 years, insteads of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. And since it is neither alleged in the information aforequoted, nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of said seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under said provision of Republic Act. No. 10.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof (2 Padilla, Revised Penal Code Annotated [1958 Ed.] 267), or an emergency measure as stated, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379 effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177 prior to its amendment by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense by defendant, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense "without pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government , inasmuch as the information does not charge the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed; the accused acquitted, with costs de oficio, and the bond given for his provisional liberty cancelled. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, C. J. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DIONISIO LIDRES, Defendant-Appellant.

A N A L Y S I S