Terry Moe’s "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure” goes on to retort that federal bureaucracy is not structured on the basis of a theory of public administration but should instead be viewed as the product of politics, as federal bureaucracy has foundations in both political choice and self-interest. In this summary, I’ll be breaking up the perspective on structural politics into the following subheadings—technical problems regarding interest groups, political problems pertaining to interest groups, legislators and presidents structural choice, and structures.
For starters, we must cover the technical problems of structural choice in interest groups. Interest groups inherently focus on politicians, which is harmful as the concern for constituencies and elections surpasses the concern of outside populations. Interest groups also have an expertise problem, and the experts that do partake in these acts may not act in the groups best interest, in turn exploiting their role. Control problems are at the heart of structural choice when considering the groups assured political power. They can make rules to restrain bureaucratic behavior though, such as criteria and procedures. Lastly is the problem of reputation, and how the reliability of a title incentives consistent behavior that could vary …show more content…
Democratic governments, in particular, give rise to two major forces that cause the structure of public bureaucracy to depart from technical rationality. The first problem, political uncertainty, is inherent in democracies and varies winning groups perceptions as they favor structural design. The second problem, political compromise, deals with the fact that legislative victory almost always requires compromise, appealing to the idea of unitary and divided government. Cumulatively, there are some inherent political issues that come along with interest groups as their premise within society is