Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the objectives of the American involvement in the occupation of the Caribbean nation of Haiti. Highlighted are the pretenses under which America began their involvement and the subsequent results of the invasion. The economic, political and social effects that the US had on the Haitian community had it’s successes in areas such as the rebuilind of the infrastructure, but were significantly countered with blatant violations in human rights laws and corruption within the government. These areas of failure reject the fundamental basis of what a successful counterinsurgency entails. Although there is much evidence of successes and failures in Haiti, to conclude, a realist argument will be presented in order to provide some answers as to why decisions were made to occupy Haiti under a COIN objective, but withdraw without meeting those objectives. Keywords: cacos, violence, attitudes, counterinsurgency

“For our forebears, for our country, Oh God of the valiant! Take our rights and our life under your infinite protection, Oh God of the valiant! For our forebears, for our country.” –Haitian National Anthem

Haiti, which is officially the Republic of Haiti, is a Caribbean country. It occupies the western, smaller portion of the island of Hispaniola, in the Greater Antillean archipelago, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. The country's capital is Port-au-Prince. Haitian Creole and French are the official languages. Haiti's regional, historical, and ethno-linguistic position is unique for several reasons. It was the first independent nation of Latin America and the Caribbean, the first black-led republic in the world, and the second republic in the Americas when it gained independence in 1804 as part of a successful slave revolution lasting nearly a decade. Haiti is the most populous full member-state of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)-bloc. It is the poorest country in the Americas as per the Human Development Index. Political violence has occurred regularly throughout its history, leading to government instability (Country, 2012). There are many Americans that believe the efforts and actions taken by the Marines under President Woodrow Wilson’s administration elicited a successful counterinsurgency. However, the purpose of this paper is to rebuff that argument, and instead show that though the counterinsurgent efforts had some successes, the final outcome is not that of a completely successful counter insurgency.

The American occupation of Haiti began on 28 July 1915. 330 US Marines set foot in the capital, Port-au-Prince by order of President Wilson. The specific order from the Secretary of the Navy to the invasion commander, Admiral William Deville Bundy, was to “protect American and foreign” interests. An additional motivation was to replace the Haitian constitution which prohibited foreign ownership of land. However, to avoid public criticism the occupation was labeled as a mission to “re-establish peace and order and] has nothing to do with any diplomatic negotiations of the past or the future” as disclosed by Rear Admiral Caperton. (Hochschild, 2011). A pretext for intervention came on 27 July 1915, when Guillaume Sam, a pro-US strongman, executed 167 political prisoners. Popular outrage provoked mob violence in the streets of Port-au-Prince. A throng of incensed citizens sought out Guillaume Sam at his sanctuary in the French embassy and literally tore him to pieces (Seabrook, 1929). The spectacle of an exultant rabble parading through the streets of the capital bearing the dismembered corpse of their former president shocked decision makers in the United States and spurred them to swift action. The violence in Haiti during the period from 1911 to 1915 brought special attention to the need for intervention as 6 political leaders were either assassinated or forcibly exiled during that time. These actions were carried out by various rebel groups know as cacos. Cacos were peasant guerrillas from the north who were resisting forced labor and the expropriation of their lands. While this is a justifiable reason to resist, the cacos can also be defined as peasant guerillas that were recruited by opposition parties to over throw the present ruling party.

The United States Government had been interested in Haiti for decades prior to its occupation. As a potential naval base for the United States and other imperialist powers, Haiti’s stability was of great interest to U.S. diplomatic and defense officials who feared instability might result in foreign rule of Haiti. Policymakers in the United States were concerned about increased German activity and influence in the country. In the beginning of the 20th century German presence in Haiti increased as German merchants began establishing trading branches in Haiti, quickly dominating commercial business in the area. German men married Haitian women to get around laws denying foreigners land ownership and established roots in the Haitian community. The United States considered Germany its chief rival in the Caribbean, and feared German control of Haiti would give them a powerful advantage in the area (U.S Invasion).

There was much opposition that existed due to the American invasion. The rebels continuously and vigorously resisted the counterinsurgent efforts, but were equally opposed with campaigns to disband these rebel groups. Members of the Haitian Union Patriotique, an organization of elite Haitian nationalists, felt that this intervention was unwarranted. Dantes Bellegarde (1929), diplomat and leading member of the Union, deemed the intervention “in violation of the right of the people and in contempt of Haiti’s sovereignty” (p.5).

In COIN scenarios, the term security is frequently used to refer to the degree to which the government can suppress insurgent activity in an area. However, the concept of ‘Human Security’ is a more complex idea which can only be measured through the spread of individual perceptions across a community. The paramount concern is the absence of physical violence, but other relevant factors include maintenance of laws, the protection of human rights, freedom to conduct economic activity, public safety and public health. The economic and development function in COIN includes immediate humanitarian relief and the provision of essential services such as safe water, sanitation, basic health care, livelihood assistance, and primary education, as well as longer term programs for development of infrastructure to support agricultural, industrial, educational, medical and commercial activities. It also includes efforts to build the absorptive capacity of local economies and generate government and societal revenues from economic activity (much of which may previously have been illicit or informal). Assistance in effective resource and infrastructure management, including construction of key infrastructure, may be critically important to COIN efforts. It must be tailored to the affected government’s willingness to undertake key reforms, capacity to absorb support, and ability to manage its outcomes (Components, 2009, p. 22).

On the positive side of the spectrum the US made massive improvements to infrastructure: 1,100 mi of roads were made usable; 189 bridges were built; many irrigation canals were rehabilitated; hospitals, schools, and public buildings were constructed, and drinking water was brought to the main cities. Sisal was introduced to Haiti, and sugar and cotton became significant exports. This can all be potentially seen as a way to gain public support in the area, stimulate economic activity, and improve the general welfare and safety of the public. Haiti’s recovery is a strategic imperative for the United States. The U.S. Government’s development strategy focuses on stimulating economic activity and enhancing the delivery of basic services in designated development corridors, or areas of the country, while engaging the private sector in the reconstruction process. Consistent with the Haitian Government's action plan, the U.S. Government’s reconstruction and long-term development plan seeks to support new and diverse economic opportunities outside of Port-au-Prince using focused and catalytic investments in housing, energy, agriculture, health, security, and national and local governance. These are all consistent with the tenets that define what a counterinsurgency entails, but this can only be a part of a successful counterinsurgency strategy if it isn’t countered by more negative and detrimental acts that will essentially be unbeneficial to the Haitian public as a whole.

For example, racial attitudes towards the Haitian people by the American occupation forces were blatant and arguably widespread. The NAACP secretary Herbert J. Seligman in the July 10th, 1920 NATION, wrote: “Military camps have been built throughout the island. The property of natives has been taken for military use. Haitians carrying a gun were for a time shot on sight. Machine guns have been turned on crowds of unarmed natives” and the poor class of citizens were the ones forced to conduct the hard labor aspects of renewing the infrastructure that is viewed so positively. Such conditions were very reminiscent of virtual slavery (Pietrusza, 2007, p.133). One purpose of successful COIN strategy should be to gain public support and to make the general public feel as if their safety is being insured along with their general welfare and overall quality of life. The racial attitudes and violent practices however, are exactly the opposite of what should have been one of America’s prime objectives. The local populace cannot simply learn to support a new and foreign system that has no respect for them as a people or nation regardless of the relatively positive influences they may have. America’s attitude was one of condescension and it was no surprise that they were widely unpopular in the area.

Political strategy is the key function in a COIN effort; because it provides a framework around which all other programs and activities are organized. In general terms, the progress of a COIN campaign is only as good as the political strategy it supports. Where the political strategy is vague, unrealistic, or lacking in support from domestic or international stakeholders, the campaign is unlikely to succeed, whatever the efficiency of individual programs. An effective political strategy focuses on strengthening the government’s capability and capacity to respond to the needs of its people. Almost by definition, a government facing insurgency will require a degree of political “behavior modification” (substantive political reform, anti-corruption and governance improvement) in order to successfully address the grievances that gave rise to insurgency in the first place (Components, 2009 p. 23-24).

With this in mind American involvement should garner some sort of political reform that is generally popular with the local citizens. The aim should be to achieve local, progressive objectives rather than the foreign objectives. American involvement made some positive achievements in this area; to include diminishing the level of corruption that existed in government that usually was only beneficial the rich upper class society. Also, Caperton declared martial law, a condition that persisted until 1929. A treaty passed by the Haitian legislature in November 1915 granted further authority to the United States, the Haitian-American Treaty. The treaty allowed Washington to assume complete control of Haiti's finances, and it gave the United States sole authority over the appointment of advisers and receivers. The treaty also gave the United States responsibility for establishing and running public-health and public-works programs and for supervising routine governmental affairs. The treaty also established the Gendarmerie (Haitian Constabulary), a step later replicated in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. The Gendarmerie was Haiti's first professional military force, and it eventually played an important political role in the country (Heinl, 1978, p.418). In 1917 President Dartiguenave dissolved the legislature after its members refused to approve a constitution purportedly authored by United States assistant secretary of the navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. However, in 1918 a referendum subsequently approved the new constitution (by a vote of 98,225 to 768). Generally a liberal document, the constitution allowed foreigners to purchase land. Dessalines had forbidden land ownership by foreigners, and since 1804 most Haitians had viewed foreign ownership as an abomination. Americans took control away from the Haitian government almost completely and in areas where it seemed like Haitians still had some levels of control, such as the election of Dartiguenave, were essentially manipulated by the American government. Dartiguenave was “selected” because he was partial to American policies and would be relatively agreeable to suggestions and intervention.

As seen, the US has continuously stifled the Haitian perspective and influence in its own country. However, this is not the only way in which the people of Haiti were being ignored and toppled on. For example, Charlemagne Peralte was a very influential caco leader that was vehemently opposed to the Dartiguenave administration. He organized support and rallied for the exit strategy of US forces from Haiti. His tactics included attacking areas with a high concentration of US forces while acquiring weapons in the process. Peralte was eventually killed on 1 November 1919. With his death also came the death of caco support and acts of resistance. The movement did not progress after his death partially because of the way in which Peralte’s body was strapped naked to a door and left as an example to whoever went against the Marine forces in the area. This act displayed the same brutality that the Americans found so shocking when it was exhibited by the Haitians in the murder of Guillaume Sam (Heinl, 1978, p.418).

Furthermore, in the campaign to free Haiti of banditry, significant number of cacos were murdered. The numbers of deaths of the cacos people ranged from 1,500 to 3,000. The numbers difference is vastly inconsistent because no one even bothered to count how many of these lives were lost. Up to 5,500 Haitians also died in forced labor camps during the US occupation. This was possible because of system enacted known as the corvee. Corvee is labor exacted in lieu of taxes by public authorities especially for highway construction or repair. American officials in Haiti used this system to exploit the men and take them away from their families for unreasonable stretches of time. These actions were highly reminiscent of how slavery was conducted during French rule (Trouillot, 1990, p. 106). The local people were kept in a constant state of relative bondage and were continuously told that they were doing this to benefit themselves and their people.
Additionally, there was a serious level of censorship that was placed on the press. Journalist, editors and anyone involved in spreading the word of the true conditions of the Haitian people under American rule were arrested and put in jail. News of what was really happening eventually did reach American shores shedding a very inhumane and hypocritical light on the events that took place. And of course, riots ensued because of the lack of freedom of expression. The most prominent of these has come to be known as the Cayes Massacre. In 1929 the Marines shot into a crowd of unarmed people, killing at least 24 of them (de Bekker, 1929). Violence in a counterinsurgent effort should be avoided at all costs. The Americans were supposed to be trying to gain the hearts and minds of the people, but instead they covered their mouths and promoted their productiveness in the country through visible and materialistic aspects such as the infrastructure.

Meanwhile, back in the United States, the Great Depression hit and citizens began wondering why the government was spending so much money to occupy a country that resented its presence and was contradicting its economic efforts by violating various human rights laws and their own constitution. In 1930, President Hoover sent a delegation to meet with President Louis Borno, who had succeeded Sudre Dartiguenave in 1922. It was decided that new elections would be held and the process of withdrawing American forces and administrators would begin. Sténio Vincent was elected president and the withdrawal of American forces began. The last of the American Marines left in 1934. A small American delegation remained in Haiti until 1941 to defend American economic interests. For a while, the order established by the Americans lasted in Haiti. The capable Vincent remained in power until 1941, when he resigned and left Elie Lescot in power. Elie Lescot fell under protest from the masses, at which point the army assumed power. By 1946 Lescot was overthrown and the next president was ushered in. Subsequent presidents came and went by a series of such coup d’états, culminating in the Duvalier’s dictatorial reign in the 1950s. This marked the return to chaos for Haiti until 1957 when the tyrannical François Duvalier took over, beginning a decades-long reign of terror (Price-Mars, 1983, pp. 1-221).

While "Papa Doc" Duvalier, as he came to be known (in a name that linked him to the voodoo deities), was not installed by the U.S. government, his regime survived and thrived on American support even though during President Kennedy’s administration he was very unpopular. This was because Duvalier proved that he was very useful to U.S. imperialism in two major ways. First, he unconditionally supported U.S. capital. In the first four years of his regime, the American Reynolds Mining Company, who maintained a monopoly on Haitian bauxite mining, paid a mere 7 percent of its earnings to the Haitian state; and those exports controlled by the U.S. such as sisal, sugar cane, copper, and bauxite increased. Second, during the Cold War Duvalier acted as a bulwark against communism, a counterweight against Cuba (Scott, 2004). He proved his anti-communist credentials by destroying the Haitian Communist Party, Parti Unifié des Communistes Haitiens and then pursued a witch hunt against the Leftist opposition forces.
Consequently, the Gendarmerie, which was viewed as one of the American achievements, was the ones that facilitated the series of coups that caused the changing hands of power so frequently. The subsequent leaders that were brought into power and overthrown were each trained by the Marines in areas of politics and crowd control. They were also educated, in that; they graduated from the American military school that existed in Haiti (Trouillot, 1990, p. 106). These unstable displays of power are an exemplary example of the United State’s failed efforts to educate the potential Haitian leaders of how to establish and maintain a functional system of democracy. By doing so the US presence inconsequently trained the local population to accept military control as supreme law and to acquiesce in the arbitrary use of superior power. Essentially, the occupation failed to transform the underlying political system in Haiti while inadvertently aggravating the general population in an effort to extend their self help influence to protect their own interests in the region under the facade of aiding an ailing nation.
There are many ways in which to view the actions taken by the US forces in Haiti and though this paper argues against a successful counterinsurgency effort there are various explanations that answer the question “why?” If analyzed from a Realist perspective there are certain tenets that should be addressed. Realism focuses on statism, survival and self-help (Baylis, 2008, p. 93). Realism focuses on interests rather than ideology, which is evident in America’s initial involvement in Haiti, which was to protect their interests there. Realism also offers a framework for maximizing the interest of the state in a hostile environment. In realist theory, the state is the primary actor and they must pursue power. It is the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile environment. In the case of Haiti, the US intervened under one of their own prefaces of not wanting the German influence to gain a foothold in the region so close to American shores. America acted as a state, but their conveniently ignored the statehood of Haiti by swooping in and virtually taking over control of the government and military. Also significant to note, realist argue that the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality which attaches a positive value to caution, piety, and the greater good of humankind as a whole. This accurately supports the ideas and reasons why drastic measures were not taken against the US Marines in Haiti as they continuously disregarded human rights laws, the US constitution and their own personal beliefs of morality in an effort to further their own goals and objectives. There was blatant disregard for the general population of Haiti and their welfare, which is not a basis for conducting a successful counterinsurgency. Furthermore, realists correctly assume that all states wish to perpetuate their existence. It is dually noted that the actions of some states resulted in other states losing their existence. US occupation of Haiti was a prime example of one states strive for power while simultaneously diminishing the other states existence and influence in the international and local spheres. Americans took over economic, governmental and militaristic paradigms enacting all their own policies and manipulating the little Haitian influence that they actually allowed to stay within the public eye, as with Dartiguenave.
Moreover, according to realism, each state actor is responsible for ensuring its own well being and survival. Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its safety and survival on another actor or international institution, such as the UN. States should not depend on other states or institutions to ensure their own security. Consistent with the principle of self-help, if a state feels threatened, it should seek to augment its own power capabilities by engaging in a military arms buildup (Baylis, 2008, p. 92). In the case of Haiti, this has been proven to be insufficient, which leads us to the idea of a balance of power in order to preserve the liberty of states. If a weaker state is threatened by a hegemonic state they should join forces, establish a formal alliance and seek to preserve their own independence. This was one of Haiti’s major flaws. They had virtually no means to protect themselves from French, German or American influences. America on the other hand, nipped the possible German influence in the bud before it was able to present a real threat. The Haitian government essentially had to choose, or rather fall in line with, a hegemonic power in order to survive at the time. The choice was survival over sovereignty. Whether this was a wise decision can be debated, but from a realist perspective survival is essential at almost all costs.

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