ASSIGNMENT 1
Kylie Pang

Caro v. Bron

Claim against Bron for assault
Assault occurs when the defendant directly produces apprehension in the plaintiff of battery. It is clear that because Caro attempted to spin around and avoid Bron, that she was aware of and anticipating a direct physical act on her person. Bron would argue that she did not intend to cause physical harm but there does not need to be intent to cause harm – only intent to act. By “skating full speed into a crowd of people” she clearly intended the act of doing so – or she would not have done it. Furthermore, because this act was driven by a desire for attention, it shows that she fully intended to create a stir in the group of people and that the consequences were desired. Assault does not necessarily constitute a completed battery (Stephens v Myers (1830) 172 ER 735) so whether or not Bron caused actual physical harm to Caro is irrelevant. Caro would most likely be successful in collecting compensatory damages from Bron for assault considering both apprehension of battery and intent by Bron to cause apprehension are clear.

Dee v. Bron

Claim against Bron for battery
Battery may occur when direct physical contact has arisen from a series of events that are put in motion by the intent of the defendant (Scott v Shepherd (1773) 96 ER 525). Bron would argue that she did not directly touch Dee and Caro was actually the one to physically harm her, but Bron’s actions had a ‘flow on effect’ that led to Dee getting injured. Caro was merely acting out of compulsive necessity for her own safety and therefore, she cannot be held liable. While Bron probably did not intend for Dee to injure herself, Dee’s injury stemmed from her intent to skate into a crowd full of people, so she must be held liable for the consequences. Dee would most likely be successful in collecting compensatory damages from Bron for battery considering the precedent.

Bron v. Ariel

Claim against Ariel for false imprisonment
False imprisonment occurs when the voluntary act of the defendant results in the deprivation of freedom in the plaintiff without lawful jurisdiction. Ariel’s act of locking Bron inside the cubicle was clearly a voluntary, willed muscle movement – while Ariel may argue she did not know Bron was claustrophobic and meant her no harm, her intent was still to imprison Bron inside the cubicle. Furthermore, her refusal to release Bron following her “screaming and rattling on the door” shows her clear intent to restrain Bron. Due to Ariel’s voluntary actions, Bron was unlawfully and totally restrained and most likely had no reasonable escape route or she would’ve taken it. The extra 20 minutes Bron spent in the cubicle unaware that Ariel had removed the barricade may also be taken into account as false imprisonment. While the confinement in those 20 minutes was not necessarily physical, the plaintiff was still under the assumption she was imprisoned and Bron may argue that her liberty was still being confined to the authority of Ariel. Because Ariel had no lawful reason for restraining Bron, the defendant will most likely be successful in collecting compensatory damages from Ariel for false imprisonment.

Ariel v. Bron

Claim against Bron for assault
Bron’s act of sending threatening text messages to Ariel that strongly allude to violence on her person was clearly an intent by the defendant to cause apprehension of battery on the plaintiff. It is irrelevant whether or not Bron actually planned to commit the battery (Brady v Schatzel [1911] St R Qd 206) – she intended for Ariel to anticipate the battery. While Bron may argue that she did not use force or act physically toward Ariel, words alone can constitute assault (Fogden v Wade [1945] NZLR 724) and the continued and escalated harassment of Ariel via text message is reasonable enough cause for the plaintiff to anticipate battery. Furthermore, texts that tell Ariel to “watch her back” and to “look behind her” are not ambiguous in nature and were clearly intended to create apprehension in the plaintiff. The fact that Ariel did not leave her house for days, took steps to call the police and involve law enforcement show that her apprehension was and was “extremely frightened” show that she was in no way free from apprehension of battery. Ariel would most likely be successful in collecting compensatory damages from Bron for assault considering both the plaintiff’s apprehension and the intent from the defendant to cause apprehension was clear.

Claim against Bron for false imprisonment
There may be a case to be made that Bron’s actions caused Ariel to be physically restrained inside her apartment in fear of her life. The plaintiff had no reasonable escape route because she was under the assumption that harm would be done to her if she were to leave. Bron’s threat to “stay inside her apartment unless she wanted her ‘reward’” seems to support the argument that while Bron’s restraint was not physical, it was psychological and Ariel felt she had no option but to comply with Bron’s authority (Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447), lest she suffer any harmful consequences. Because Ariel felt compelled to remain in her apartment due to Bron’s actions, fearful of her safety if she were to leave, there is an argument to be made that she was falsely imprisoned. However, it is not clear whether or not Bron’s intent was to restrain Ariel in her apartment. She clearly meant to create apprehension in Ariel for battery, but there is nothing in her actions that show she deliberately intended to deprive the plaintiff of her freedom. Her one text message warning Ariel to stay inside her apartment does not seem to be sufficient enough evidence – unlike the charges against Bron for assault, the text messages alluding to imprisonment were neither continued or escalated in nature. It is unlikely that Ariel will succeed in winning damages for false imprisonment, as the defendant’s intent to cause unlawful detainment is not clear and deliberate. However, the courts may decide to award the plaintiff exemplary damages to punish the defendant for her actions.