During the first few years of Gorbachev’s leadership, the focus of the regime had been on the economic and then political reform. Although there had been some concerns about nationalist resurgence, few predicted it would escalate and lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speech in 1986 stated that there was no longer any nationalities issue within the USSR as everyone was dedicated towards his reforms regardless of identity. This can be argued with the collapse of the USSR as it was brought on by movements within Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Russia. However, the collapse of the USSR can also be argued by looking at the failure of Gorbachev’s economic reforms and political stagnation.

The failure of acceleration and the reforms within the economy had an impact in the Republics where people began to question whether Gorbachev was committed towards the reforms as was required to to reinvigorate the economy. The reforms of Uskoreniye that was believed to be the gradualist approach to help to invigorate the economy failed. His estimates of national income were short by 2% and the initial measures of perestroika were having no effect. He blamed poor economic advice and the Republics were obstructing change, and this led to societal stagnation as the USSR began to experience shortages of food and higher prices for goods. By the summer of 1990, it was clear there was a major crisis in the economy. Most reformers now accepted that tinkering of the economy was over and only a rapid move to a full market based economy could avoid catastrophe. Gorbachev allied with Yeltsin to set up a team of reforming economists headed by Shatalin. Gorbachev refused to accept the Shatalin plan, as it was proposed decentralising economic powers to the Republics. The Supreme Soviet came up with a compromise and their plan was: Commercialise state enterprises, relax state control over prices and protect the vulnerable, changes to the housing market and the rouble would become a fully convertible currency. This programme failed to satisfy the conservatives or radical reformists. In January 1991 the Russian Supreme Soviet implemented a law permitting private property ownership. This ended the planned economy as this allowed private enterprises. The economic base of the USSR was destroyed. Laver states that Gorbachev’s reforms were: a hotchpotch of initiatives that were not thought through, were characterised by indecision, often lacked support. The economy was heading into meltdown. It is clear that the economic conditions within the USSR contributed to the nationalities issue and therefore the collapse.

It was becoming clear to Gorbachev that by the late 1980’s elements of perestroika such as encouraging democracy in the workplace and through widening participation in the local Soviets wasn’t enough. He wanted a real democracy to tackle the stifling bureaucracy. He wanted to preserve the main elements of the Communist State: the Party, the planned economy, the local Soviets; however he wanted to return to democratic centralism and ideas from below through democracy. It was evident that the constitutional approach hadn’t been a success, as there were disagreements between the Congress of People’s Deputies, Supreme Soviet and the USSR council of ministers. Gorbachev insisted there was an election for a president, even though he was the only candidate, with 71% of the people voting for him, showing that there was no legitimacy within the USSR. Other Republics went for a single chamber, a directly elected Supreme Soviet, although they eventually changed to the central model. This model was to be very significant as it gave the Republican Supreme Soviets direct control over both law making and administration in their Republics, so it could be seen as paving the way for the break up of the USSR. Gorbachev’s late democratisation and construction of the Congress of People’s Deputies was a step forward and could have appeased the national movements in 1985; however in 1990 it was clear that some Republics voiced their discontent towards Gorbachev and was determined to break away from his political manoeuvring and his continued tolerance of the conservatives in the Party apparatus.

He first became aware of the problem of Nationalism in 1986 when Kazakhs rioted in their capital Alma Ata in protest at the replacement of the Kazakh party by a Russian. The weakening of the central control was also crucial as several of the republics contained minority ethnic groups within their borders and local tensions (controlled by the party) simmered beneath the surface. Glasnost resulted in these tensions coming to the surface. Nagorno-Karabakh showed a dangerous nationalist tension as ¾ of the population were Armenian but it was part of Azerbaijan. There were demonstrations in Armenia calling for it to be controlled by Armenia. The Azeri population reacted and massacred 30 Armenians. Russia hesitated in their response and the union with the Azerbaijan was quashed by Moscow, as they wanted to directly rule the region. Nationalism was pursued to a different extent, as within the Baltic States the claim for independence had always been strongest, as these areas had been incorporated within the USSR. Anti reform forces, Lapidus notes, views the rise of nationalism as proof positive that the reform had gone to far. Sakwa claims, “The rise of separatist nationalism can be seen to be a consequence of the inadequacy of the unreformed Soviet state”. The rise of Yeltsin became prominent in Russia as he had his ideas based around the removal of power of the Party and to destroy the Soviet Union. He had a popular mandate as a legitimate President of Russia. Even without the coup of 1991, the nationalities had lost faith in the system and were no longer scared to exercise their constitutional rights to leave the USSR (as explained in 1936 and 1977 constitutions).

To conclude, one can ascertain that the collapse of the USSR was the Nationalities issue, as the rise of groups such as the Rukh and the conflicts within Azerbaijan extenuated the issue of the Nationalities. The reforms of the economy didn’t aid Gorbachev as the failure of Uskoreniye ultimately led to the meltdown of the economy. By looking at the nationalities, the failure of Gorbachev to use force to stop the coup from taking place, undoubtedly led to the collapse of the USSR, as did his failure to enact radical reforms early.