Mark Dissen
4/15/2013
Nuclear Arms Race Term Paper

The Nuclear Threat During the Berlin Crisis
Introduction
On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech at a Soviet-Polish meeting in Moscow that would ultimately culminate into one of the most profound crises of the Cold War. The Soviet leader accused the Western Powers of violating the 1945 Potsdam Agreement and sabotaging the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and recommended that the Federal Republic abandon, “the hope that we shall cease to support the German Democratic Republic.” (Address by Premier, 1958). Soon after, Khrushchev delivered a speech giving an ultimatum to the allies and gave them six months to demilitarize West Berlin. The Allies' subsequent refusal and the resulting tension put both the U.S.S.R. and the United States in a particularly dangerous situation. Although it is unlikely that full-out thermonuclear war would have resulted from the Berlin Crisis, there was a very real threat of a limited nuclear strike or conventional warfare to both of the superpowers until the tension over Berlin was assuaged.

Although November 1958 marked the official beginning of the crisis, Berlin had been a source of contention between the US and the Soviets from the initial division of Germany after WWII (Tine, 2005). The three territorial zones in Western Germany, controlled by France, Britain, and the US, contrasted greatly with the Soviet-controlled East, which upheld socialism. Berlin itself was divided in a similar fashion. However, when the Soviets severed the connection between West Berlin and non-Soviet zones in June 1948, substantial tension with the allies ensued. In fact, this led to the famous Berlin Airlift, which is when the allies flew supplies to Western Berlin over the Soviet controlled territory in East Germany. In May 1949, the blockade was put to an end, but the