The time-lag argument is an argument in the philosophy of perception whose conclusion is that we never (directly) perceive physical things of any sort expect our own inner experiences in our brains. The author of the time lag argument assumes that by simply appealing to facts from the uncontestable laws of physics, one will realize that the common belief about objects of vision are mistaken. However, in this paper, I will show that the author has failed to realize that the key to the argument is the notion that we perceive things happen when they happen, and not later; and we perceive things in the states in which they are, at the time when we perceive them. I argue that the argument pivots on the ordinary use of the word “perceive”. There …show more content…
This common belief is “I perceive a table” or “What I perceive is a table”. However, in this paper, I will show that the author has failed to realize that the key to the argument is the notion that we perceive things happen when they happen, and not later; and we perceive things in the states in which they are, at the time when we perceive them. I argue that the argument pivots on the ordinary use of the word “perceive”. There is an indecision by the author whether one perceives outside one’s own inner experiences or perceiving is simultaneous with what is perceived. Hence the author of the time lag argument commits the fallacy of equivocation which causes the argument to be unsound and …show more content…
Then one must perceive that something after that something happened. Now if it is true that premise (1)* when considered as an empirical statement is false, one must think that the author’s unstated assumption that premise (1)* of the time lag argument only shows that it should not be regarded as an empirical fact. Rather premise (1)* should be regarded as a feature of the meaning of “perceive”. Nonetheless, the author of the time lag argument does not realize that a decision must made between yielding the idea that one perceives outside one’s own inner experiences and yielding the idea that perceiving is simultaneous with what is