Thet Paing Soe
Professor James Rowe
Philosophy 1500
14 May 2015
Prompt 1
The True Nature of Reality
When it comes to describing the nature of our reality, philosophers have been in search of a system that truly and completely explains everything. It is noteworthy that numerous system have developed over the past few centuries. However, in this paper only four notable theories (dualism, materialism, idealism and transcendental idealism) will be explored. Each theories provide adequate explanation of reality but there are limitations and shortcomings when one contemplate carefully. The theories will be explored and critique by using the mind body problem, The Chinese room, the radical emergence theory. Moreover, one should consider which theory describes the nature of reality with least logical incoherencies.
Substance Dualism is a theory that describes “mind and matter” as “two distinct things” (Nagel Thomas 206). Furthermore, substance dualism categorize matter as “physical or material substance” and mind or soul as “non-physical or immaterial substance” (Lacewing Michael) “Substance Dualism”). So, dualism is the proposal that human being as a living, thinking entity not only includes brain and physical matter but also a non-physical substance to account for the mind. The famous seventeenth century French philosopher René Descartes claimed that as “a subject of conscious thought and experience, he cannot consist of spatially extended matter”. He therefore states that “his essential nature must be non-material, even if in fact his soul is intimately connected with his body” (qtd in.Nagel Thomas 206). Here, we will explore the arguments that tries to support the claim. The Conceivability Argument shows that one can “imagine a robot that resembles a human with no consciousness or inner life”. Furthermore, one can also “imagine spirits or creatures with emotions and desires but no bodies”. It is logical to state that “if two thing can exist without each other, then they are not the same thing”. It can be concluded that “body and mind are distinct”. (Rachel James 72). Another justification is The Divisibility Argument quoted in Descartes book:
…there is a great difference between mind and body … body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. …when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish…any parts…and although the whole mind seems to be united that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be…said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm… is separated from my body, I am aware (Descartes 76).
The essence of Descartes argument is that the mind is indivisible and all extended things can be divided into parts. This suggest that the mind is not an extended thing. Descartes is now able to conclude that the mind is a different substance from the body. It is true, regardless of whether one consider the mind as an immaterial substance or mental activity of the brain, that in a physical nature, the mind cannot be divided like the body. However, modern science has proved that brain damage or other “stimuls” can have significant impact on the mind. This example is supported by the argument of philosopher Ryle Gilbert “theorists are found speculating how stimuli, the physical sources of which are yards or miles outside a person’s skin, can generate mental responses inside his skull, or how decisions framed inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities” (Ryle Gilbert 328). In addition, the assertion of mind and body as two distinct substance also leads to an unfavorable problem called Mind-Body problem. The problem was brought up by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia in her letter to Descartes. Elizabeth insists that “…how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—being as it is merely a conscious substance…and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing’s being immaterial” (qtd in Rachel James 74). In other words, how can something that is immaterial or mental, which does not exist spatially and has no physical force, affect something that is physical, which exist spatially and is moved by physical force. This question brought up by Elizabeth points out a vital flaw that persist in Substance Dualism. Another lack of explanation was pointed out by the Radical Emergence Theory. “Why does the immaterial mind exists at all?” It is a well-known fact that “human being begins is a purely physical thing in the womb”. Interestingly, when the “brain reaches a certain level of complexity, a new kind of substance pops into existence” (Rachel James 75). As the philosopher Huxley said “the emergence of mind from matter seems inexplicable”, he than compares with an analogy of “the emergence of genie from the lamp” (qtd in Rachel James 75). Filled with numerous logical inconsistency Substance Dualism must solve these problems to be considered a system that describes the nature of reality and substance accurately.
Another theory that tries to account for the nature of substance is materialism. Materialism started off with “the view that everything is made up of matter”. This view comes from “Democritus of Abdera” who proposed that “the world consisted entirely of atoms” (Lacey Alan “Materialism 530). However the advancements in technology and science has forced philosophers to substitute “matter” with “whatever it is that can be studied by the methods of natural sciences” (Lacey Alan 530). This view is a contrast to Dualism as it does not believe in non-physical or immaterial substances. By holding this view one can solve the problem of how the immaterial substances came to being or “how they can interact with physical bodies” (Rachel James 77). Gilbert Ryle refers to the Substance Dualism view as “the dogma of the ghost machine” and said “By exorcising the ghost, behaviorist avoided the problems that had plagued Mind—Body Dualism” (qtd in Rachel James 77).
While it is true that the mind-body problem concerning with immaterial substance is solved, it does not necessarily means that it is a system free of problems. Desecrates claims that some human abilities can’t be embodied in machines, so materialism needs some explanation for the matter (Rachel James 89). Modern materialism to be competent with science provided a theory called Functionalism. It “implies that any sufficiently complex system will have a mind and that the physical composition of the system doesn’t matter”. This implies that a human “could even be made of silicon chips, like a computer” (Rachel James 77). However, the Chinese Room Argument suggest that present day computers are not sufficient and “to have a mind must have more than a syntax. It must also have a semantics” (Rachel James 77). The Chinese Room argument tells one to imagine an English speaker whom does not understand Chinese locked in a room with boxes of Chinese symbol. The English speaker is provided with an instruction book written in English to manipulate the symbols. Furthermore, there is a person outside the room sending in the Chinese symbols for the English Speaker to manipulate. Therefore, it suggests that the English speaker, without understanding Chinese, will be able to get the right answers. (qtd in Rowe, James. “The Chinese Room” Rachel James 98). However, not being able stimulated specific human abilities in machines is not evidence such machines can’t be built in principle. It may very likely be our current limited understating of technology.
Idealism is another “metaphysical theory about the nature of reality… maintains in general that what is real is in some way confined to or at least related to the contents of our own mind” (D W Hamlyn 386) George Berkley the first proper idealist, came up with the dictum “to be is to be perceived” (qtd in Flage, Daniel “George Berkley”). Berkley’s main idea was that “the perception of qualities of things, such as color, taste, and warmth is circumstance dependent” therefore “those qualities cannot be real properties of things”. He “argued that this applied to all perception” To Berkley “perception is… a matter of having sensations or ideas, and since to be is to be perceived”, he claimed that “only sensations or ideas can properly be said to be or to be real” (D W Hamlyn 387). Berkeley suggestion lead to the conclusion that if objects are only properties and properties only exist in our heads than there is not a physical world distinct from us. This leads to the conclusion that things don’t exist unless they are being perceived. Since Berkley thinks that there is no real world independent to our perception this leads to the suggestion that hallucination and dreams are as real as anything else. It is absurd to think that the tiger one see’s in a dream is as real as a tiger one see in a real zoo.
Moreover, unsatisfied with the idealism provided by Berkeley, Kant “held that perception provides us only with representations, however meditated by concepts”. His belief that “Berkeleian Idealism… did not make it possible to distinguish properly what is objective form and what is subjective” (D W Hamlyn 387). His theory of transcendental idealism claims that “the spatial-temporal objects are as given in experience are empirically real but transcendental ideal” (D W Hamlyn 387). This means the truth of space and time is a priori that relies on one’s mind. The physical objects one sense are just impressions and not “thing-in-themselves” (D W Hamlyn 387). However, the critique of this theory, the Coyote Argument by Professor James Rowe suggest that if this assumption were to be true, if one were to run off the cliff without looking down one should not feel the pull of gravity until one looks down. The reality as one perceive should be similar to the one portray in Road Runner Cartoon. It does not take one long enough to realize that this is not the world we live in. (Rowe James “Coyote Argument”).
After exploring the concepts of the theory and contemplating carefully, it is apparent that Substance Dualism does not adequately explains the immaterial substance. However, materialism also still cannot provide us with detail explanation concerning with consciousness. Moreover, transcendental idealism also has a fundamental flaw and difference with the way one perceive nature and the reality in which one live in. It seems that idealism, although not perfect, is the one with the most logical coherency and best describes the nature of reality and substance

Works Citied
Nagel, Thomas. "Dualism" The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. 314-15. Print. 14 May 2015
Lacewing, Michael. "Substance Dualism." Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Web. 15 May 2015.
Rachels, James, and Stuart Rachels. "Body and Mind." Problems from Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009. 72-89. Print.
Descartes, Rene. Discourse on the Method And, Meditations on First Philosophy. Digireads.com, 2005. 76. EBook.
Ryle, Gilbert. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Ed. John Perry. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. 328. Print.
Lacey, Alan. "Matterialism" The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. 530-532. Print. 14 May 2015
Rowe, James. “The Chinese Room” Class. Baruch College Vertical Campus 10-175, New York. 16 April 2015. Lecture.
D W Hamlyn. "Idealism" The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. 386-388. Print. 14 May 2015
Flage, Daniel. "George Berkley." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 14 May 2015.
Rowe, James. “The Coyote Argument” Class. Baruch College Vertical Campus 10-175, New York. 21 April 2015. Lecture.