How has the United Nations performed as an agent of mediation and peace-brokering in ethnic conflicts? Answer with reference to the UN role in Rwanda and Sri Lanka.
Dr. John O’ Brennan
Founded in 1945 with lofty ambitions to advance prosperity and security in the world, the United Nations Organisation (UN) is best endowed to conduct preventive diplomacy by preventing disputes and conflicts arising from interstate and intrastate relationships. It may be argued that the UN currently possess the capability to prevent such conflicts and disputes from emerging and escalating into armed confrontation (Ododa Opiyo 2012:61). Having developed peacekeeping as a form of impartial interposition between belligerents during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the UN has continually broadened its sphere of action. The organisations first 15 years of activity entailed of 15 operations however, between 1988 and December 2012, the UN set up fifty-four such operations to restore or maintain peace. Those missions extended from “simple interposition, as in the case of UNIIMOG in 1988, to enforcement operations mandated by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 770 (1992) for the former Yugoslavia and 794 (1992) for Somalia” (Hatto 2013:497). These operations consisted of humanitarian assistance, election supervision, the repatriation of refugees, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, the restoration of a state's ability to maintain security out of respect for the rule of law and human rights, and support for the founding of legitimate and effective governance institutions (Hatto 2013:496).
The UN, undoubtedly, has had its fair share of success. The organisation have not only created but maintained peace through a plethora of initiatives; facilitating the prosecutions of the Liberian and Serbian leaders Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milesovic, eradicating various famines throughout the world through its World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation and UN-sponsored emergency aid management, the protection of the Galapagos Islands and approximately 1,000 other world heritage sites, as well as being responsible for a myriad of nations voluntarily giving up their weapons as they grew to be efficient; for instance South Africa post-apartheid and Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, since its inception, over 112 major conflicts around the world have left more than 25 million people dead (Ododa Opiyo 2012:63). The U.N.'s failures, from its inability to stop ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan to widespread abuses by U.N. peacekeepers across Africa, are legion. Inaction, incompetence, and even abject inhumanity have, unfortunately, often been synonymous with U.N. operations, which have frequently demonstrated a callous indifference to human suffering.
Whilst the UN may be renowned for being overly bureaucraticised, during the latter stages of the 1980’s the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was shockingly malnourished (Barnett 2002:30). Member states, however, were aware to the DPKO’s dilemma and between the period of 1989 and 1993 responded by substantially increasing its personnel. This advancement, however, still meant that there were only 50 civilians and military officers to oversee its two dozen operations and seventy thousand peacekeepers in conflict-ridden environments. Although member states were sympathetic of the situation and unanimously agreed that the DPKO’s performance was nearly miraculous given its bureaucratic straits, a tight-fisted constituency refused to appropriate the funds for the badly needed workforce. DPKO, despite their woefully insufficient, skeletal staff, still demonstrated a remarkable ability to move quickly up a very steep learning curve, but the shortage of qualified staff meant that it was always struggling to keep pace with the excruciating workload (Barnett 2002:30). This was running in conjunction with the culmination of the Cold War, which witnessed a plethora of new civil wars springing up across the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. These wars were marked by ethnic strife and multiple warring parties and were accompanied by a mixture of humanitarian emergencies, large-scale human rights violations, the collapse of law and order, and the decay of functioning governments. With the end of the Cold War era, it was expected that both interstate and intrastate conflicts would decline. The end of the Cold War reduced the typical East-West ideological competitions that often instigated both intrastate and interstate disputes. Surprisingly though, these crises and conflicts are not disappearing as much as multiplying, and evolving in different forms. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, there was an upsurge in United Nations involvement in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace-making, and even reconstruction of war-ravaged states. These activities invariably placed constraints on the UN budget and resources. The burden was made heavier by global financial crises, a sense of international fatigue and the massive cost of activities around the aftermath of conflicts (Ododa Opiyo 2012:63). In response to these challenges, however, the United Nations launched a series of new peacekeeping missions during the 1990s and early 2000s (Brattberg 2012:156). One such mission was that of Rwanda.
The UN mission to Rwanda, UNAMIR, was first established by Security Council resolution 872 in 1993 to implement and consolidate the Arusha Agreement (Brattberg 2012:158). The Arusha Accords established a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), including the insurgent Rwandese Patriotic Front and the five political parties that had composed a temporary government since April 1992 in anticipation of general elections. The Accords included other points considered necessary for lasting peace during and after the Civil War: the rule of law, repatriation of refugees both from fighting and from power sharing agreements, and the merging of government and rebel armies. While UNAMIR, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement, was to guarantee “overall security” in the country, the actual Security Council mandate was far more restricted than this (Brattberg 2012:157). The Arusha process proved to be “part of the problem than it was part of any putative solution because it heightened tensions within élite circles”, whose monopoly of state power was seriously challenged, and provided a “channel through which aspirant élites could pursue their dangerous goals” (Storey 2012:7). Even more fundamentally, the Arusha process failed to tackle the most immediate of problems in Rwandan society, including crippling, endemic poverty, entrenched and intensifying inequality, the treatment of the poor with contempt and the oppressive presence of the state in all aspects of social life. This disastrous cocktail adversely laid the basis for mass participation in the genocide of 1994 (Storey 2012:7). Rather than contributing to “overall security,” UNAMIR was charged with merely “contributing to security in the capital of Kigali” (Brattberg 2012:157). However, as the frenzied ethnic violence ensued, the UN remained relatively ignorant on the ground until it was too late. Although the genocide began in April 1994, as far back as April 1993, the UN Commission on Human Rights had sent a “special rapporteur”, Bacre Waldy Ndiaye, to Rwanda. His investigations, published in August 1993, found that over 2,000 people had been murdered in the previous two years and that they were predominantly Tutsi. Therefore, he deduced that the word ‘genocide’ would be appropriate and that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was applicable. His report fell on deaf ears, however (O’Keefe 2012:28). The scale of killing consistently accelerated. The International Committee of the Red Cross as well as UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire calls for urgent action were discounted and on 14 April 1994, the number of troops were slashed from approximately 2,500 to 250 following a unanimous vote. Dallaire, who had proposed a moderate increase of 5,500 troops was incensed (O’Keefe 2012:30). Furthermore, UNAMIR’s competencies for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and civilian protection were heavily restricted in the actual mandate. Adding to UNAMIR’s failure to confront the escalating violence on the ground was the fact it lacked the power to use force other than in instances of self-defence. Besides the aforementioned responsibilities, UNAMIR was also to monitor the security situation during elections, assist with coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts, and monitor the ceasefire agreement. Many of these activities would soon prove impossible. Further complicating matters, the UN also faced hurdles raising the African troops for the mission. At the onset, only 1,428 troops had arrived and this helped to fuel violence further. Finally, the mission as a whole was severely under-resourced with many of the peacekeepers being extremely ill-equipped and inexperienced.
An abhorrent lack of communication between key figures such as the Security Council, UNAMIR and the UN Secretariat was palpable and clear for all to see. A notion of widespread tribal savagery may have been perpetuated through mass media as between April and July of 1994, 800–850 thousand Tutsis were slaughtered as the majority Hutus embarked on their murderous rampage. However, this would have been a total misrepresentation of what it truly was; a systematic extermination against a minority, pregnant with highly sophisticated, meticulously planned and very well organised methods. Dallaire himself emphasised this as he stated: “They [Rwandan authorities] had already concluded that the West did not have the will, as it had already demonstrated in Bosnia, Croatia and Somalia to police the world, to expend the resources or to take the necessary casualties. They had calculated that the West would deploy a token force and when threatened would duck or run. They knew us better than we knew ourselves” (Dallaire 2003:79). In Rwanda, the lack of a robust mandate; despite numerous alterations, combined with insufficient troop levels and resources, reduced UNAMIR’s already marginal role in the country to insignificance. Even though the mandate was eventually boosted, and more troops were added, these changes failed to alter the downward spiral of violence, paving the way for genocide to take place in Rwanda (Brattberg 2012:161). Of course, one might rightfully question whether more troops would actually have had any significant impact on putting an end to hostilities in the absence of mandated enforcement powers. Although the Security Council finally authorised the 5,500 troops Dallaire had demanded on May 17th, it was, “little more than a paper force with no firm commitments from member states”, to send their soldiers into the bloodbath (O’Keefe 2012:31). Forty four member states of the UN were known to have surplus military capacity but help was not forthcoming. Zambia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal all were willing to help in spite of their inconsiderable military power. Amid the dithering and dawdling among bureaucracies associated with the UN most notably in relation to the word ‘genocide’, the French government resolved to launch ‘Operation Turquoise’- its very own military operation for Rwanda (O’Keefe 2012:32). They deployed approximately 2,500 elite soldiers, all equipped with modern weaponry, armoured vehicles and extreme air support. Eventually the genocide came to a halt, but not because of the intervention of Western governments, NGO’s or the UN. Ironically, despite all the external interferences, the butchering ceased mainly due to forces from within, and that of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who came to the fore and claimed victory on the battlefield. Rwanda thus remains the UN’s biggest failure to date. In 2000, the UN explicitly declared its handling of the Rwandan conflict a “failure.” Then Secretary General Kofi Annan said of the event “the international community failed Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret” (Brattberg 2012:158).
The grossly embittered Sri Lankan Civil War which raged furiously from July 23rd 1983 right up until May 18th 2009 was not only extremely distinctive but revolutionary in many ways. The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) roared for almost three decades and is one of the longest-running civil wars in Asia. More commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE wants an independent state for the island's Tamil minority. Following a fierce, year-long military offensive, the Sri Lankan government claimed in May 2009 that it had defeated the separatist group (NYT) and killed its leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran (Responsibilitytoprotect.org 2015). Torture, executions, abduction, extortion, forced disappearances, sexual abuse by security forces; as well as suicide attacks, assassinations and recruitment of child soldiers all became unfortunate hallmarks of the gruesome battle which at times even bore witness to the rise of additional armed insurgency groups, for instance the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) who were more than willing contributors to the bloodshed.
The United Nations utilised a protection mandate in Sri Lanka; a mission to protect civilians engulfed in the ferocious ethnic conflict occurring around them. This particular programme differed quite extensively from previous protection mandates (Clarance 2006:3). This was done within an operational strategy of what is, “best described as protective neutral engagement in the war zone, implemented with a range of pragmatically devised and integrated mechanisms” – open relief centres, regular relief convoys across unchartered territory in the presence of international civilian staff (Clarance 2006:3). Crucially, and most significantly, military involvement was non-existent, “even for technical or logistical back-up”, and systematic modalities for protection monitoring and intervention were operated by an unusually small field team (Clarance 2006:3).
The UNHCR programme model devised and implemented in northern Sri Lanka in the early days of Eelam War II was not deployed with the intention to put a halt to the ensuing conflict. Nor was its aim to reconcile the bitterly opposed elements in both communities which sustained the fighting. It did, however, “provide an operational framework for much-needed humanitarian action” within which UNHCR was able to broker fairly satisfactory working relations with both combatants on a back-to-back basis (Clarance 2006:6). This enabled its international staff to disperse freely and establish open relief centres on both sides of the line, organise and shepherd fairly consistent food convoys across no-man’s-land to support them whilst monitoring military access to the centres in Government-controlled areas (Clarance 2006:6). The importance of such an approach extended beyond the operational procedures they directly assigned to the humanitarian care and concern which they expressed and the modicum of dignity and trust they introduced into the intensely partisan atmosphere of the war zone. They also helped in an array of ways which, although small in themselves, when taken together were constructive in the overall situation (Clarance 2006:7). Fortunately, however, Sri Lanka’s was a civil war in which the United Nations was initially regarded by both combatant parties as an organisation with which to uphold a certain respect; even considered as part of a solution, and subsequently they were open to persuasion that there was enough common space between their respective interests for them to accept an active UN agency protection role in the war zone. The “topical resonance” of UNHCR’s active protection role in Sri Lanka is thus not as a one-size-fits-all programme model for international protection in internal conflict; still less as a quick-fix for ethnic warfare (Clarance 2006:8). Rather it is presented as a professional method in which the bottom-up field process of closely observing and analysing population-displacement dynamics in a war zone is an “indispensable prerequisite to determining the appropriate response mechanisms for a specific ground situation” (Clarance 2006:8).
With a budget of a meagre US$1.5 million, dictated by UNHCR’s funding problems worldwide and a rigorously overstretched workforce of only seven internationals, the original Mannar relief programme was critically underequipped (Clarance 2006:237). Such funding was almost a historical low for such an extensive programme as the one that was attempted to be implemented in Sri Lanka, especially one with such a “demandingly operational role” (Clarance 2006:237). Ironically, however, those particular constraints may not have been consistently negative features as it created notions of solidarity and galvanised feelings of commitment within the personnel. Indeed, an authoritative joint review published in September 2001, delineated that the Sri Lanka programme was strong and effective, but expressed disappointment in its performance and importance (Clarance 2006:239).
Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, “a despot”, accused of “war crimes and of turning his country into a brutal dictatorship”, Grant asserts, “threatened”, remaining United Nations aid workers in 2008 by no longer guaranteeing their safety; “a few well-timed artillery salvos next to UN camps amplified the message” (Grant 2014:5). Armed, “to the teeth” with everything from “white phosphorous to cluster bombs”, he was able to unleash his genocidal military force upon an unsuspecting Tamil population which claimed, according to a UN commissioned report, between 40,000-70,000 innocent Tamil lives. Grant’s enlightening book entitled Sri Lanka Secrets, claims Rajapaksa is a man, “governed by the enhanced superiority complex of Sinhalese chauvinism”, and the notion that he shall have to respect anyone, most notably external, interfering agents is almost barbaric (Grant 2014:7). The current Sri Lankan government, under his rule, expend vast amounts of time and energy in trying to distort, or even eradicate the shocking reality of the pre-meditated terror that fills the lives of Tamils. Indeed, no Sri Lankan institution is autonomous from military persuasion as it foists itself to the pinnacle of the nation’s power elite (Grant 2014:8). It remains a consistent feature in infrastructure projects, and operates businesses such as restaurants, resorts and hotels.
Sri Lanka to this day is a “place where torture, disappearances, rapes, jailings, and harassment remain a fact of life for the minority Tamil population” (Grant 2014:1). Substantial, efficient UN reports that have been published post-Civil War highlight the extent of the crimes being committed, by both government forces and the LTTE (Burke and Perera 2015). The report illuminates the “brutal use of torture” and “unlawful killings” conducted by the Sri Lankan security forces, “particularly in the immediate aftermath of the armed conflict when former LTTE members and civilians were detained en masse” and says that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that rape and other forms of sexual violence by security forces personnel was widespread against both male and female detainees, particularly in the aftermath of the armed conflict” (Burke and Perera 2015). The UN, throughout the report, called for the establishment of a special “hybrid” international court to investigate individuals responsible for the worst atrocities (Burke and Perera 2015). For a lasting peace, however, there is a drastic need for a political solution to the ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils that has plagued the country since its independence.
Faced with threats of excessive danger, violence and risks of genocide, the UN ought to send well equipped, multi-national, well trained forces in plentiful numbers operating under the guidelines of efficient, effective mandates that could theoretically deal with anything that the situation throws up apart from full scale conflict. Frequently, however, the UN is deploying under equipped troops from under-developed nations into hot-beds of vicious ethnic conflict under the guidance of ineffective, inadequate mandates with little or no consideration given to exit strategies. As civil wars continue to ravage across sub-Saharan Africa, learning from past experiences of complex civil war situations such as Rwanda and Sri Lanka should be of vital importance to scholars and policy makers alike. Ideally, the UN needs to prevent violence from erupting in the first place. However, if that fails, robust diplomacy and mediation is still required to end the fighting through negotiations and then to help countries navigate the difficult politics of reconciliation and rebuilding. Therefore, despite the organisations many flaws and calls for reform and fundamental changes to the institutions foundations, it still stands out as the “best option the international community can give to address instability arising from conflicts and disputes in Africa.” (Ododa Opiyo 2012:80).

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