Unification of the Navy, Army and Air Force

On 1 February 1968, Bill C-243, The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act became law and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) were combined into one service - the Canadian Forces. This process was accomplished by "integration" of the three services, and then Unification into a homogenous organization. I believe that Paul Hellyer helped shape the Canadian Forces into what it is today and also I do think that the integration and unification was a bad thing at the time as if it didn’t happen back in the 1968 it surely would have happen at a later date with General Rick Hillier. I will look into the process that Paul Hellyer took in bringing these three different services together under unification and explore some other opinions that I have found amongst way vast research upon the web.
In 1964 the Minister of National Defense Paul Hellyer published the White Paper on Defense. In it he proposed the unification of the three services, the creation of a single command structure reporting to the Chief of Defense Staff and the restructuring of the current geographically based commands into six function-based commands. The process began with the introduction of Bill C-90 creating the CDS’ office and a single chain of command and culminated with Bill 243 the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act in February 1968, which unified the three services and created the Canadian Forces, as we know it today. During the 1990’s to the present the CF’s commitments have increased dramatically when compared to the previous decade. There have also been major fiscal cutbacks whose effect has been to degrade our military capabilities. This has resulted in what is called a “commitment-capabilities gap” This is the point at which Military commitments exceed our ability to meet them. General Hillier’s CF Transformation initiative will, through the creation of three new commands and Force rationalization, “aim at fundamentally reorienting and restructuring the functions and the command and control of the CF to better meet the emerging security demands at home and abroad.
Unification was brought about by an urgent need to curb Defense spending at a time when inflation was weakening the Defense dollar and the Liberal government was concentrating spending on social programs. The promise of trimming the fat, so to speak, by Command consolidation and the elimination of a multiplicity of similar functions in the three services, offered the possibility of freeing money within the budget to offset, somewhat, the erosion of the Defense dollar thus maintaining the status quo on Military Capabilities in the short term. General Hillier’s Transformation initiative, on the other hand, is taking place during a time of increased funding and is focused on increasing Military Capabilities through a mid level reorganization of Command structures to better reflect and respond to the Governments requirements domestically and internationally. The CF Transformation is also quite different from the Unification issue in that it is taking place during a period of increased mission tempo where our soldiers are actively engaging in combat on foreign soil, not preparing to fight in set piece battles as planned for during the Cold War. General Hillier’s aim is to enhance the Militaries ability to succeed at whichever mission it is assigned by giving it the right tools to do the job.
This was a steeping stone in the history of the Canadian Forces and at the front line was Paul Hellyer and Jack Granatstein, said it best that “The structure worked. RMC became a tri-service institution; the military's padres, legal services, and dental and medical services were coordinated; and one service or another operated various functions for the other two. The process continued under George Pearkes, Diefenbaker's first Defence Minister, as procurement of food and postal services became tri-service. To go beyond this point in the face of entrenched habits and traditions required a minister with rare determination. (Paul) Hellyer proved to be that man”.
Hellyer came to Defence convinced that the existing structure of command with three separate service chains of command – was dated, and that new integrated commands were required. In the White Paper on Defence, Hellyer made much of the fact that the nature of war was changing rapidly, and it demanded new military organizational structures. General Charles Foulkes, who had been Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee through the 1950s, had proposed in a 1961 paper, which he shared with Hellyer in 1963, the disbandment of the three services and their field forces, and the establishment of task forces commanded by a commander-in-chief, with the task forces organized to meet the particular circumstances dictated by the nature and scope of any international contribution accepted by the Canadian government.
The March 1964 White Paper on Defence outlined a major restructuring of the three separate armed services, describing a reorganization that would include the integration of operations, logistics support, personnel, and administration of the separate branches under a functional command system. The proposal met with strong opposition from personnel in all three services, and resulted in the dismissal of the navy's senior operational commander, Rear Admiral William Landymore, as well as the forced retirements of other senior officers in the nation's military forces. The protests of service personnel and their superiors had no effect, however, and on 1 February 1968, Bill C-243, The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, was granted Royal Assent, and the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force were combined into one service: the Canadian Armed Forces.
The public explanation for the reorganization was that unification would achieve cost savings and provide improved command, control, and integration of the military forces. The then Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, stated on 4 November 1966 that "the amalgamation... will provide the flexibility to enable Canada to meet in the most effective manner the military requirements of the future. It will also establish Canada as an unquestionable leader in the field of military organization." However, the then-serving Liberal ministers of the Crown were accused of not caring for the traditions behind each individual service, especially as the long-standing navy, army, and air force identities were replaced with common army-style ranks and rifle green uniforms. Rather than loyalty to each service, which, as military historian Jack Granatstein put it, was "vital for sailors, soldiers, and airmen and women" who "risk their lives to serve," Hellyer wanted loyalty to the new, all-encompassing Canadian Forces (CF); this, it was said, caused damage to the esprit de corps for sailors, soldiers, air crew and other personnel.
After the last world war, the CF experienced many problems. The CF was forced to downsize and the Canadian people did not want funds spent on national defense. Canada's defense budget peaked in the early 1950s and by 1962, the high cost of doing business, and dealing with new demands on the federal government to allocate more funds to social programs, forced the revaluation of the national defense policy. In the next couple of years, the headquarters and commanders of the three services were aligned under a single Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), and eventually a National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ) was formed, combining the military aspect with the civilian leadership. The Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian Army were abolished and unified into a single entity known as the Canadian Forces (CF). The CF was divided along environmental or functional lines with a single rank structure and was made to wear the same uniform. This led to the origin of the Mobile Command, the Maritime Command, and the Air Command.
The government gave many reasons for imposing unification and integration. The economic factor, soaring costs of maintaining modern armed forces and domestic problems, savings had to be made in the operation of the military. Canada could not afford separate service organizations as they needed to be one. While these money constraints were a major problem. The Department of National Defense (DND) contended that the new organization would make the CF highly agile and flexible, capable of combining all forces. Overall, military and economic efficiency would be improved by dividing the forces along functional lines rather than the formal lines of the traditional service divisions.
When the unification went ahead the savings promised were largely consumed by other avenues, thereby reducing what could be purchased. Under the newly established commands, Canada created a force dedicated to quick response overseas. However, since these forces would be fighting with allied forces that were not unified, Canada continued to offer separate and discrete air, land, and naval units. Because of this, the armed forces never really stopped operating as an air force, army, and navy, although they were formally abolished. Eventually, Maritime Command, Air Command, and Land Forces Command replaced the older services and since 1980, more frequent mention has been made to the separate services and their distinctive uniforms returned. This is where I believe many of savings never occurred as lots of money was invested into new uniforms and it is all right to unify a military but let’s be real here keeping the trades with their own uniforms would have been one way of settling the ripple effects thru the ponds. Also Mr Jack Downey a man I found on the internet as The Galloping Geezer said it best and I quote “The door knob of the unification plan sounds good and looks good on paper and appears to provide a sound financial hinge. But a door is a door and a door knob is a knob and, once the door of unification was opened by Paul Hellyer, out rolled a virtual herd of knobs! Bureaucrats and sycophant Senior Officers, with little or no combat experience or loyalty to the CF, then sold the men and women serving in the line units down the river. Those who saw the unification disaster coming 'the Hinges', left the service that many of them loved so well, as did I. A door with no hinges is just a wide plank, no matter how many knobs it has.”
One of the men that were spear heading unification was Paul Hellyer. Hellyer’s most controversial unification experiment included the wearing of a single uniform for all CF members, and the establishment of a common rank structure. Had Hellyer not tried to impose a green uniform, he might have been remembered as one of the greatest Defence ministers in Canadian history, as Jack Granatstein stated some years ago. But the uniform issue eventually became, in 1967, the galvanizing ‘lightning rod’ for the discontent of the services with unification, as it highlighted Hellyer’s disregard for the unique role and critical functions that the individual services were performing. This brought disarray amongst the troops and morale went down. Hellyer’s unification was rejected and received resistance at many levels. It was this last step, the abolishment of the three services, which caused the most furor. At least four admirals, three air marshals, and two generals resigned or were fired. They complained about confusion, lost values, and reduced combat effectiveness.
Unification was a big thing as most people don’t like change and are against any type of it. Unification has been a “traumatic experience” for the CF, as General Thériault reminded us in 1993, and, as Hellyer lamented in 1990, “...perhaps it was inevitable that there would be some regression in the twenty years since unification became law.” The Canadian forces had to be pushed in a positive direction and this was one of them. With the end of the Second World War the battlefield would change once again and it did as history provides us details on this. One of Canada’s most successful military leader’s General Hillier lead the charge into stardom when he was appointed to the CDS in 2005. Rick Hillier was revered as a military man and not a company man. This brought life back to the CF in many ways as troops wanted to follow him and he lead them. Ultimately, General Hillier’s CF Transformation initiative is a direct response to years of fiscal restraint that have taken place since Unification occurred in 1968. The Government’s benign neglect of the Military during the ensuing years was based on short term fiscal savings to present a more frugal face to the electorate for the next election. Now, during a period of intense operations around the world, Defense funding has increased. General Hillier’s concept is to use what we have today, and what we will be getting tomorrow, in a more efficient and effective manner, ensuring that the CF will be able to meet today’s and the future’s challenges.
Minister Hellyer’s ideas and his policy of unification generated controversy from the outset, with Hellyer frequently being blamed for subsequent failings of Defence policy and the armed forces. Colonel R.L. Raymont, an executive assistant to the CDS between 1955 and 1968, stated in an extensive report on integration and unification that he authored in 1983 that “...whether or not you agree with it, Paul Hellyer was either a saint or the devil. While it is true that the integration of CFHQ and ultimately the unification of the services was finally achieved and became a reality through the leadership and vigorous efforts of Paul Hellyer, the general concept did not originate with him, nor the implementation end with him.” I wouldn’t blame Hellyer myself as he cannot pass laws in parliament, but he was a major factor in the implementation of this restructure. Just another example of paper pushers not knowing what’s best for the men and what looks good on paper doesn’t all work in the real world.

Bibliography:

1. Desmond Morton, 1937- "A Military History of Canada / Desmond Morton. – 5th ed. (2007), 247-254.

2. Keegan, John. World Armies. Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company, 1983.

3. B-GG-005-004/AF-000 "CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS":

4. HIE 208 Course Notes Module 4 – The Cold War and After
HIE 208 Canadian Military History: A Study of War and Military History, 1867 to the Present
Course Notes pg.30

Selected Internet Sites:

Unification of the Canadian Forces

What happened to the Canadian Armed Forces?

Unification http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/unification.htm Major-General Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD
Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification Of The Canadian Forces Is 40 Years Old – Part one

Major-General Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD
Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification Of The Canadian Forces Is 40 Years Old – Part Two

From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation by brigadier-general Daniel Gosselin and doctor Craig Stone.

Fetterley (Lieutenant-Colonel), Ross, >, Canadian Military Review, Vol 5, No 4, Winter 2004-2005, pp. 47-54

Bland, Douglas L., “Finding National Defense Policy in 2004”, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No 4, Winter 2003-2004, pp. 3-10.
< http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no4/policy-police-eng.asp>

Endnotes:

Sokolsky, Joel J., “The Politics of Defence Decisions at Century’s End”, Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspective on Canadian Senior Military Leadership, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 2002, pp. 341-361.

Gosselin (Brigadier-General), Daniel and Craig Stone, “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understand the fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation,” Canadian Military Review, Vol. 6, No 4, Winter 2005-2006, pp. 5-15, Granatstein, Jack Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON, 2002) ISBN 0802046916 p.352 General Charles Foulkes, “The Case for One Service,” July 1961, Hellyer Papers, Library and Archives Canada, MG32-B33, Vol. 82. Also, R.L. Raymont, “Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968,” (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), pp. 7-10, and Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify the Canadian Forces (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), pp. 39-40. Integration and Unification of the Canadian Forces". CFB Esquimalt Naval & Military Museum. http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/unification.html. Retrieved 20 February 2008. Milberry, Larry (1984). Sixty Years—The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924–1984. Toronto: Canav Books. p. 367. ISBN 0-9690703-4-9. Granatstein, Jack (2004). Who Killed the Canadian Military. Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd. pp. 78, 82–83. ISBN 0002006758. Granatstein, Jack pp. 78, 82–83. John Keegan, World Armies, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 93.

John Keegan, World Armies, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 93

John Keegan, World Armies, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 94.

Granatstein, “Unification,” pp. 241-242. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military?, p. 82. Hanson Baldwin, "Canada Moving Toward Full Military Unification," New York Times, 20 February 1967, p. 5.

General G.C.E. Thériault, “Reflections on Canadian Defence Policy and its Underlying Structural Problems,” Canadian Defence Quarterly (July 1993),” p. 3; and Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes, p. x.

Bland, Canada’s National Defence Volume 1, p. 62. See also, Lewis Mackenzie, “Hillier’s Right, So Back Off,” The Globe and Mail, 1 August 2005,

Raymont, “Report on Integration and Unification,” p. 1. Colonel R.L. Raymont was executive assistant to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, then to the CDS, for over 13 years, including the critical period 1963-1968. He also wrote several other key reports between 1978 and 1983