Logic: Peter Singer
An Evaluation of Singer Peter Singer questions our conception of equality as it relates to the human species and other animal species. He fundamentally argues that, “The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.” The statement, revealing Singer’s essential argument, also comprises two approaches we might take towards establishing equality among living things. Let’s trace Singer’s claims surrounding these two approaches and finally consider his fundamental, philosophical assumption. One approach to equality stems from philosophers, who determine a base-line set of attributes or functions that constitute human beings. Typical treatises attribute humans with rational, linguistic, or emotional capacities that differentiate them from “brutes.” However, Singer culls evidence from the medical field, not research but simple observations of medical disabilities, where a human with born defects actually functions at a lower level than certain animal species.
For example, someone with severe cognitive paralysis may be less rational or “able” than a normal-functioning dolphin. Thus, Singer points out that if we wish to establish equality based upon attributes, we have a hard time excluding many species of non-humans. As a corollary, the standard of equality by a typical set of characteristics must be set lower and lower to encompass all humans when we consider those with severe disabilities. In other words, writes Singer, “the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans.”
In support, Singer confronts those who attach human equality to genetic distinction. He claims that genetic evidence remains inconclusive at this point, and that we cannot determine human character based upon genes or environmental factors alone. Furthermore, evidence suggest that abilities may associate with certain races and sexes more than others; that is, abilities may derive from genes rather than the environment, but studies are still inconclusive.
The case of Singer against the argument from“factual equality” is largely inductive, tracing the reasoning of the argument to its logical conclusion. While it rests on deductive principles of logic, Singer gathers evidence to construe his argument inductively. He begins with the assertions of his opponents, presents examples of low-functioning humans and high-functioning non-humans, and concludes that his opponent’s reasoning is difficult to maintain. As long as Singer is presenting his opponents fairly, which I have reason to believe he does, his argument is strong. Based upon attributes and capacities, such as IQ, exceptional cases of human disability to call attribute-determined equality into question. The other approach to equality is from presumption. Singer claims that if we begin with the prescription, “all humans are equal” without a basis of ability, it is quite difficult to exclude animal species from the lot. Singer disfavors one version of the presumption argument. He traces “distinctive human dignity” back to Renaissance humanists and asserts the following:
Once we ask why it should be that all humans—including infants, mental defectives, psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the rest—have some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals.
In other words, the humanists cannot have their cake and eat it too. They cannot justify the claim that inherent dignity lies only in humans rather than also in non-humans. From here, Singer forwards a more positive argument. Having demonstrated that we should not logically exclude non-humans from our claims of equality and dignity, he advances that animals deserve our consideration because they are “interested” species, that is, they have the capacity to suffer and to enjoy. He remarks, “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.” Again, Singer reveals the logical conclusions of his opponents, and does so with validity, however, as we shall see in the next section, he overlooks the basis for certain claims to human “dignity.” At this point, we should note that Singer takes up his own version of “factual equality.” He states that the possibilities of suffering and enjoyment constitute the fundamental traits of “interested” species, and therefore, species that deserve consideration within our purview of equality. This claims depends upon Singer’s underlying utilitarian philosophy, which champions the effects of actions and holds these as primary when determining moral decisions.
Counterargument
While Singer presents some sound insights regarding the equality of humans and non-humans, he relies upon a weak ethical perspective and shortchanges the view of inherent “human dignity” that he attributes to Renaissance humanists. First, regarding his ethical perspective, Singer places himself among Utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sedgwick. He claims that, “the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.” Quoting Sedgwick, “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.'' Thus we see a cold, impersonal universe and decisions between right and wrong determined by the outcomes of our action. The problem with utilitarianism is that it fails to justify criteria for a good and bad action. While Singer may claim that a bad action causes suffering, who determines what suffering is and who can justify that it is indeed a bad thing? Likewise, Bernard Williams (1985) questions the scope of Utilitarians: “how far does one, under utilitarianism, have to research into the possibilities of maximally beneficent action, including prevention” (p. 76). Furthermore, the big, bad universe that wishes to encompass all interested beings as equal leads us to the logical conclusion that we should not show interest in any being whatsoever. A merciless natural world cannot explain our actions of mercy. Singer also fails to properly acknowledge arguments for “human dignity.” The view beings much earlier than the Renaissance, traveling back to the second millennium BC. The strongest advocates of this view point to the Jewish text known as the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament, which recounts the creation of the world. In the Book of Genesis, the author claims that God endowed humans, and only humans, with his “image”: “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’” (Genesis 1:26). This quality differentiates man who furthermore rules with responsibility over the animals that God created. Christian scholars (1988) note that this view of human dignity stems not from the impersonal universe or from the subjectivity of human beings, but rather from a supreme, personal, and involved God. This tenant, the existence of a creative and powerful being, justifies a moral standard for good and evil, the distinguishing factor of humanity outside of man-measured “abilities,” and explains the relation of animals to man and their place in the world. But most of all, the given human dignity of God determines human equality, as it depends not on IQ, race, or gender, nor on the capacity to suffer or enjoy; rather, the image of God entails an awareness of God that all humans and no brutes possess (Frame, 2008, pp. 101–103). Thus, a theological perspective on equality refutes the assumptions of Singer and furthermore offers a view that makes sense of all the data.
References
Frame, J. (2008). The Doctrine of the Christian Life. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R. Retrieved from: http://www.frame-poythress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/John-Frame-Doctrine-of-the-Christian-Life-Excerpt.pdf
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Wright, D., S. Ferguson & J.I. Packer, eds. (1988). New Dictionary of Theology. Grand Rapids: IVP Academic.
The Holy Bible: English Standard Version. (2008). Wheaton, Ill: Crossway.