Spencer Davison
European Politics
The Demand and Supply Side Causes of the Austrian Radical Right The 2008 Austrian Parliamentary elections followed an increasingly familiar pattern. Two far right political parties received a combined 29.1% of the votes which translated to 52 seats of the 183 seat legislature, only 30,000 votes away from the leading party. For the past twenty years the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) has become one of Austria’s most influential, and controversial, political parties. Its strong anti-immigration stance, xenophobic rhetoric, and suspected anti-Semitism have garnered international attention since its creation. Even though this right-wing populism phenomenon of Austria has become one of many cases in Europe, the sheer scale of FPO involvement in the country makes it a unique study. Ruud Koopmans explored the emergence of the extreme right in an attempt to define the causes of it. He compared two contrasting theories in his analysis. Grievance, demand side, theories suggest that growing rightist populism is a direct result of an increasing discontent and xenophobia within a country due to immigration and the consequences of it. Opportunity, supply side, theories focus on the institutional attributes of a particular polity, and how these arrangements make it possible for the right-wing movement to not only start, but flourish as well. He concluded that opportunity theories best explain the rightist movement. However, others believe that one cannot exist without the other; supply-side is tandem to demand-side. Wouter can der Brug wrote, “We agree with Koopmans that grievances do not exist without discourse. But the reverse is also true: Without grievances political entrepreneurs will not be able to successfully mobilize public support for claims regarding these grievances.” Through examining Austria I have determined opportunistic theories are the most applicable approach, particularly in the revival years of the party, however, the demand side grievances also contribute to their growing electoral success. The supply side explanation can be found in the history of the rightist movement and electoral structure of Austria. The grievances on the demand side played a lesser role in its success, but certainly accounted for its continual growth.
A working definition of the radical right will be beneficial in looking into the Austrian situation. The rightist movement can be divided into two categories, the violent mobilization of extremists and established radical right parties. The extremist protests represent more of a marginalized social movement, distanced from the electoral process. In contrast, the political parties are active in the political system as in the case of the FPO. Their weapons are not ones of underground violence, but of public rhetoric usually occupying anti-immigration and ethnic cultural stances. Meindert Fennema identified three attributes of these radical right parties including anti-materialism, rejection of liberal democracy, and propaganda based on conspiracy theories. In varying degrees, the FPO has exhibited these characteristics since their inception. The party has another unique dimension to them as well. Its roots in Nazism, including their occasional reference to the ideology, has given them a distinct feature, further entrenching the party into the far right.
Before looking into the Austria’s radical right, it is necessary to develop the concepts of grievance theories and opportunity theories. Grievance theories account for a large amount of the coverage of social movements. Activists and the media focus on this type of theoretical framework because of the nature of it. It implies a direct causal relationship between social discontent, demand side, and political claims making. It suggests that the deprivations within a state are manifested into a collective response either in rightist movements or votes for radical right parties. For example, a surge of immigrants in a country will result in a decrease of job availability due to lower wages being set. Consequently, employee displacement ensues creating a frustrated and isolated group. This faction then becomes politically or socially mobilized either in the form of parties or marginalized radical right activities. The deprivation is usually ethnically motivated; nevertheless, these grievances come in a wide variety of forms. Austria’s case involves shrouded anti-Semitism in addition to anti-immigration propaganda. Opportunity theories do not stress the social discontent to explain the electoral success of the radical right. Instead, the institutions and networks are responsible for mobilizing social movements. Koopmans lists several aspects which cause this including: openness of the political system, the stability or instability of leading parties, the presence of elite allies, and a state’s ability to repress these movements. He writes, “The socially excluded will become engaged in xenophobic activities only to the extent that the institutional context provides favorable opportunities for the rise of extreme-right political behavior.” Koopmans believes this theory to be correct. He approaches it to be a contrasting theory to grievance, but I am not convinced of this as mentioned earlier. Austria’s interesting case will clarify the need to merge these theories to explain the situation in this country. I will now look into the history of the Austria rightist movement to provide a framework for the political structures in place as it has risen and social discontent the movement reflected. While the FPO has only recently, the last twenty years, become a force in Austrian politics it has long historical roots. Following World War II, the two mainstream parties in Austria were the Socialists (SPO) and Christian Democrats (OVP). Together they provided a stable and somewhat healthy polity within postwar Austria. However, political unrest did remain in certain areas of the government. The Ehemaligen, former Nazi functionaries, began to gather support from certain industrialists who disapproved of the nationalist policies of the government. As much as Austria tried to self-victimize itself following the war, the truth is a large portion of their population sympathized with the pan-Germanic movement. Soon the coalition government of the SPO and OVP began loosening restrictions on Nazi regulations. Many of the previously disenfranchised, or “less tainted” Nazis began to have full citizen rights. This development allowed political space for the creation of the League of Independents (VdU). While this party eventually collapsed due to the State Treaty of 1955, its creation showed the sort of openness Koopmans describes in his work which will lead to political opportunities for the radical right. The FPO will later follow a similar pattern with exception of institutional repression which collapsed the VduU. The State Treaty of 1955, created after Austria regained its full independence, is worth examining because of the long standing effects it has had on the Austrian far right. It removed any acknowledgement of guilt following the war. Instead the treaty placed the country into “first victim” status. There existed no Jewish compensation laws as there was in Germany following the war. More importantly was the public sentiment at the time, particularly in the state’s capital Vienna. Initially after the war anti-Semitism was quite low as oppose to other European countries. But, there existed an underlying agreement between Austrians that it was the Germans, and only them, who were responsible for the genocide of the Jewish people. The grand de-Nazification in Austria created a victim mentality. They believed they had no sins to atone for and, more importantly, this belief eventually created opportunities for political parties of the radical right to emerge.
Out of the ashes of the VdU came the Freedom Party of Austria. Founded in 1955, the party served as a way for integrating former Nazi’s. Duncan Morrow writes, “[It allowed] those with unsavory past connections to enter into mainstream post-war politics, avoiding the creation of a permanent and large anti-democratic opposition.” Only a few years had passed since the end of World War II, and its strong Nazi ties did not produce much electoral success. It received only five percent of the vote in the 1960’s. One of the few reasons this Nazi sympathizing party was tolerated in its early years was that it gave larger parties a greater chance to win over their opponents. However, as the trend away from German nationalism became evident to FPO leaders, they began to shy from any Nazi ties. In the early 1980’s it appeared that the FPO had begun to embrace the liberal democratic approach favored by the mainstream parties.
The election of 1986 was a turning point in the FPO. The reemergence of the right-wing populism can be contributed to several factors. The SPO began to weaken from public discontent over slowed growth and increasing unemployment. The wealthy constituency and less skilled workers became frustrated by the apparent incompetency of the ruling coalition. Austrians began looking at the old OVP and SPO coalition government with distrust. In addition, the Presidential election of 1986 of OVP candidate Kurt Waldheim revealed a masked anti-Semitism in the country which had largely been ignored. During Waldheim’s campaigned it was revealed that he had been previously served as an officer in the Wermacht, the Nazi armed forces. International outcry poured in concerning the popularity of this political figure. Surprisingly, the OVP strongly stuck by him. The campaign even went as far as to imply that a vote for him was a patriotic duty Waldheim went on to easily win the election and the implicit anti-Semitism in Austria suddenly became well known.
The FPO took advantage of this emergence of this right-wing vocalization from the Waldheim affair, which had previously been quiet. Like an agitated bee, the radical right began to swarm into the political scene. The liberal half of the party became silenced by the passion of the German nationalist side. Jörg Haider led the charge with his ability attract the media and, consequently, the public’s attention. As an extremely charismatic and savvy politician, he quickly became the figurehead for the entire right-wing populist movement. Lutz Musner described him as “not just a tactically clever revisionist of the Nazi past; he is above all a rhetorically brilliant politician and exceptionally effective in instrumentalizing the logic of modern media.” In short, Haider became the face of the rightist populist movement. As its leading representative Haider’s rhetoric became unofficial political positions for the FPO. His propaganda began to be associated with the platform of the party. According to the FPO website, the official party positions include excluding Turkey from the European¸ restricting Austrian citizenship law, and stopping abuse of the asylum system. However, the party’s official platform does not fully exemplify their radical right position. For example, Haider’s referendum, Austria First, called for the immediate stopping of immigration to Austria, as well as stricter punishments for illegal immigrants. Additionally, the tone of the document and the speeches promulgating it were implicitly racist. The FPO and Haider racked up a fair share of controversies through the 1990’s including a public admiration for Hitler’s employment policies, attendance to an SS veterans’ meeting, and referring to the Nazi SS as a “stuggle for freedom and democracy.” Yet, amidst all of the controversy the party received the largest portion of votes ever, 26.9 percent, in the parliamentary election of 1999.ithie

The history and political positions of the FPO mentioned above follows closely with an opportunity theorist framework. The State Treaty of 1955 produced long term affects in the polity. Austria’s stance as a victim of Nazi Germany gave it a guiltless position. Unlike Germany, where far right parties linked with Nazism were immediately diffused, Austrian parties did not experience these sorts of obstacles. Nazism was seen as an exclusively German. This idea was partially reinforced by Haider’s Nazi revisionist rhetoric. When the supply side, government and its institutions, denies responsibility for any sort of radical rightist past it opens up the polity for extremist parties, such as the FPO. Another supply-side feature giving credence to opportunity theories was the institutional fallibility during the 1980s and early 1990s. The previous leading parties were beginning to deteriorate credibility which resulted in political space open for the revival of the FPO. The type of government they had in place, called Proporz, was a large factor of the advantageous opportunity structures. Political influence was divided into the OVP and SPO. This sphere ensured total over political institutions. Heinisch Reinhard writes, “[It] was generally considered to be the most highly centralized corporatist system in any advanced economy.” However, scandals began to rise in the 1970s and 1980s, and the system began to crack. This governmental system was seen by many as the reason for corruption at the state level. A poll taken in 1995 showed that 66 percent of Austrian’s approved the governmental system. Furthermore, 47 percent of Austrians preferred “new parties in the political arena.”
Aside from the scandals and corruption becoming increasingly more common, the OVP and SPO were finding difficulties appeasing their respective demographics. The working class began to break away from their historical ties with the socialist SPO. Add the rhetoric of Haider into the mix of a growing lame duck government and the FPO finally found an opening to flourish. In 1993 Haider asserted, “In reality, Austria is not a functioning democracy but an authoritarian democracy like a developing country, under the rule of licensed parties which were never founded by the people but were permitted by the Allies.” The FPO successfully attempted to become the outsiders of the polity with an anti-establishment tone. In doing so, Haider and the FPO opportunistically grabbed onto the political system and used the fallibility of the coalition as leverage. Koopmans predicted the instability and openness of the polity would allow for a radical right party to take hold. There remains another aspect of the supply side, which some have attributed to the electoral success of these radical rights parties. Terri E. Givens argues that these parties will have difficulty receiving votes in countries where the electoral systems encourage strategic voting. This tactic occurs when a voter supports a candidate other than their preferred choice out of fear of losing their vote. For example, in the United States the plurality voting system ensures that a single winner will be chosen based on who received the largest number of votes. One may be dissuaded from voting for their preferred Green Party candidate because of the unlikelihood of this candidate winning. Instead of throwing their vote away they will simply vote for the Democratic candidate who has a large chance of winning.
A look into Austria’s electoral system will show how it is a fertile ground for radical right parties. Austria uses a proportionality based electoral system. Seats in the legislature are based on the percentage of votes a certain party received. The electoral system is divided into three levels: regional, land (state), and national. Only if a party receives four percent of the national vote can it the hold seats in the legislature. Neither the SPO nor the OVP could win enough seats to hold a majority in parliament. However, their coalition in 1986 allowed them to edge the FPO out of much policy making. The weaker the coalition became the more it made sense for a voter to vote for the party of their preference instead of one that has a higher chance of winning. Thus, strategic voting, a major obstacle for radical right parties, is not an issue in Austrian politics, hence the FPO’s near seamless transition into mainstream politics. Austria’s case supports many of the aspects predicted by opportunity theories. Its electoral system, political space allowing for institutionalization, and historical lack of repression of far right movements can all be attributed to the impact of the supply side on the far right. Austria follows Koopmans structure perfectly. Its wide political space and strong discursive opportunities allowed for institutionalization. The demand side should not be neglected though. If one were to only focus on the institutional structures in place to explain the rise of the FPO, one would risk of ignoring the root causes. A study of the demand side will reveal that the emergence of the FPO was not only a result of strategic calculations and opportunistic foresight, but also a xenophobic and shrouded anti-Semitic sentiment in the country. Prejudices against the Jewish population in Austria were still strong years after the end of World War II. The fact that Waldheim was still elected President, after being exposed as a former member of the Nazi army is a strong indicator of Austrian anti-Semitism. In 1986, the year of his election, a public opinion poll was taken asking if all Jews should move to Israel. Sixty percent of Austrian’s believed that they should. The rightist populism also appears in the media as well. Neue Kronenzeitung, one of the most popular tabloids in Austria, regularly supports the FPO and radical right causes. Reinhard Heinisch writes, “The paper is known for periodic bouts of anti-Semitism, extreme hostility toward immigrants, and generally negative views about European integration and globalization.” He goes on to write that it is one of Austria’s most influential mediums, regularly reaching 44 percent of the population fourteen and up. Beginning in the 1990s anti-Semitic violence spread to the public sphere. Jewish graves were desecrated in Vienna on October 1991. Neo-Nazi paramilitary camps began sprouting out resulting in police raids. Several bombs by these groups were sent in letters to Vienna government offices between 1990 through 1995 due to SPO officials publicly decrying anti-foreigner campaigns. Furthermore, in 1995 four gypsies were killed in a small village in Austria. Many blamed these killings on the growing amount of hate groups in the country.
Beyond the clear cases of anti-Semitism and ethnic violence in the public, there also existed a notable amount of anti-foreigner sentiment. Popular opinion says that increased immigration will lead to fewer jobs. Consequently, this situation would result in xenophobia on the demand side manifesting itself in more votes for radical right parties. Terri Givens did a statistical analysis of the effect of immigration on unemployment and voting trends. She found that there was a clear causal relationship between the vote for the radical right in Austria and the presence of foreigners and unemployment. However, the FPO exploits this correlation in order to secure more votes. Their outspoken criticism of foreigners augments voters’ fears and frustrations over immigrants. Givens concludes that economic factors play a role in “increasing the insecurity of voters.” Exclusively focusing on the supply-side to explain the radical right movement is detrimental to a full understanding of the phenomenon. Koopmans most likely excludes writing about the demand-side because there is not much difference of grievances between countries. Brug writes, “The most likely explanation is that there is not so much systematic variation between different countries at the demand side. In all post-industrial societies, there is a substantial group of citizens with so much fear of immigrants that they are willing to support a radical-right party if they see it as democratic, and if the established parties provide no alternative.” For the case in Austria it is worthwhile to look at both demand and supply, even though the supply side may explain a larger portion of the radical right’s success.
One final issue worth briefly looking into is the damage these radical parties afflict. Today the FPO’s constituency is split with the BZO (another radical right party formed from former members of the FPO including Haider himself). It can be argued that these parties excite xenophobia in their constituency that was previously nonexistent. Also, the continual offensive against the EU by the FPO is not productive by any means. However, there is another dynamic effect of these growing rightist parties. The electoral success of the FPO has most likely reduced far right violence. Koopmans states that when there are channels, i.e. parties, to express political ideologies there will be a more moderate extreme right. Though it may be hard to swallow, the existence of the FPO in Austria may help quell violent actions against immigrants, foreigners, and Jewish people. Nevertheless, intolerance threatens democracy and the danger of these parties should not be underestimated.

Bibliography

Betz, Hans-Georg. "The Divergent Paths of the FPO and the Lega Nord." Shain, Martin and Aristide (eds.). Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. 61-80.

Brug, Wouter van der. "What Causes People to Vote for a Radical Right Party?" Journal of Public Opinion Research (2007): 1-14.

Givens, Terri. Voting Radical Right in Western Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Hainsworth, Paul (ed.). "Jorg Haider and the new FPO: Beyond the Democratic Pale." The Politics of the Extreme Right. New York: Pinter, 2000. 33-61.

Harris, Geoffery. The Dark Side of Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994.

Heinisch, Reinhard. "Right-Wing Populism in Austria." Problems of Post Communism (2008): 40-57.

Koopsman, Ruud. "The Extreme Right: Ethnic Competition or Political Space." Koopsman, Ruud and Paul (eds.) Statham. Contested Citizenship. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 180-205.

Mendleson, Rachel. "Hard Times Boost the Far Right." Maclean's (2009).

Musner, Lutz. "Memory and Globalization: Austria's Recycling of the Nazi Past and Its European Echoes." New German Critique September 2000: 77-91.

Nordland, Rod. "Charging to the Right." Newsweek 13 October 2008.

Pauley, Bruce F. From Prejudice to Persecution. London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Pick, Hella. Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000

--------------------------------------------
[ 2 ]. Givens, Terri. Voting Radical Right in Western Europe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 2.
[ 3 ]. Hainsworth, Paul (ed.). "Jorg Haider and the new FPO: Beyond the Democratic Pale." The Politics of the Extreme Right. (New York: Pinter, 2000) 34.
[ 4 ]. Koopsman, Ruud. "The Extreme Right: Ethnic Competition or Political Space." Koopsman, Ruud and Paul (eds.) Statham. Contested Citizenship. (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 180.
[ 5 ]. Brug, Wouter van der. "What Causes People to Vote for a Radical Right Party?" (Journal of Public Opinion Research, 2007) 2.
[ 6 ]. Ibid 2.
[ 7 ]. Koopmans 183.
[ 8 ]. Hainsworth 34
[ 9 ]. Koopmans 190.
[ 10 ]. Ibid 42.
[ 11 ]. Pauley, Bruce F. From Prejudice to Persecution. (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 307.
[ 12 ]. Koopmans 33.
[ 13 ]. Ibid 43.
[ 14 ]. Betz, Hans-Georg. "The Divergent Paths of the FPO and the Lega Nord." Shain, Martin and Aristide (eds.) Xolberg. Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) 64.
[ 15 ]. Ibid 47.
[ 16 ]. Hainsworth 53.
[ 17 ]. Musner, Lutz. "Memory and Globalization: Austria's Recycling of the Nazi Past and Its European Echoes." (New German Critique September 2000) 79.
[ 18 ]. Hainsworth 52.
[ 19 ]. Pick, Hella. Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider. (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000) 184.
[ 20 ]. Heinisch, Reinhard. "Right-Wing Populism in Austria." (Problems of Post Communism, 2008) 43.
[ 21 ]. Musner 82.
[ 22 ]. Betz 64.
[ 23 ]. Heinisich 45.
[ 24 ]. Ibid 46;
[ 25 ]. Hainsworth 54.
[ 26 ]. Given, Terri. Voting Radical Right in Western Europe.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 3.
[ 27 ]. Ibid 101.
[ 28 ]. Ibid 104.
[ 29 ]. Koopmans 189.
[ 30 ]. Pauley, Bruce F. From Prejudice to Persecution. (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 305.
[ 31 ]. Heinisich 43.
[ 32 ]. Hainsworth 52.
[ 33 ]. Givens 85.
[ 34 ]. Brug 9.
[ 35 ]. Koopmans 184.