25 April 2011

The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 defines covert action as "an activity or activities of a government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the government’s role will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” Simply put, covert action allows governments or organized groups to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad allowing them to fulfill their objectives without any parties knowing who sponsored or carried out these activities. This not only conceals the identity of the sponsor but also opens up the option of plausible denial if they were ever suspected. Covert action is a third option when “soft” exercises of national power such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or informational power are ineffective in influencing conditions abroad on one hand, while the use of overt military force is undesirable or not feasible on the other.1 Covert action is traditionally divided into three categories: propaganda, paramilitary operations, and political action.
Propaganda involves disseminating specific message or viewpoints to a target audience. As an example, in the late 1940’s, the U.S. covertly used propaganda to assist anti-communist political parties in Italy and France during close elections.
Paramilitary operations involve training, equipping, and supporting paramilitary groups in target countries. A successful example was when the U.S. supported the Afghan guerrilla fighters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s into the 1980s. An example of an unsuccessful paramilitary operation is the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in the 1960s.
Finally, political action involves influencing the political situation in a particular country, whether by influencing current government officials, election results, economic situations, or civic groups. Political activities may also involve coups such as the U.S. covert involvement in the Indonesia coup of 1965.
In order to distinguish between “intelligence activities” and “covert action”, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) described intelligence activities as consisting of "the gathering of information" while characterizing covert action as "an instrument of foreign policy that goes beyond information gathering". This also helps to reinforce the difference between covert action and clandestine operations where clandestine operations are designed to accomplish intelligence gathering type operations in such a way that assures the concealment of the actual operation itself, whereas the emphasis placed on covert action is to conceal the identity of the sponsor.
One of the main benefits of covert action is the freedom of action allowed for when acting covertly and in accordance with the notion of secrecy. Another is the advantage contained in the principle of plausible deniability. Covert action provides the opportunity to conduct firm silent diplomacy, influencing situations to achieve preferred circumstances and serving own interests with the minimum of risk. It is also a cheap, inexpensive way of influencing very important outcomes. Covert action raises a number of important policy issues. First, many question the legitimacy of covert action. Some critics argue that covert action violates the principles of international law and the United Nations charter as it involves “meddling” in the affairs of another sovereign nation-state without a legitimate mandate or resolution to do so.1 In addition, covert action may be considered an act of war by the target nation. There is some concern that the secrecy of covert action creates a lack of accountability and transparency, despite the oversight requirements. Finally, with larger paramilitary operations there is a risk of discovery and public disclosure which may have adverse consequences for a U.S. administration.2 Public disclosure of a covert action could embarrass the U.S. government as well as the government of the target country and could effectively limit or even reverse the foreign policy gains sought from the covert action in the first place. It can also be used as a substitute for well thought-out policy and as a half-measure solution when they are unwilling to come to a decision to commit security forces. Covert action could enable heads of state or government officials to feel that something is being done even when it is not enough to achieve real results, the danger therefore exists that there is a high degree of probability that covert action can become what it is not, namely an alternative to foreign policy.3
During the Cold War, covert action became an integral part of the national security mechanism and policy for the U.S. due to the threat of communism. To that end, the National Security Council (NSC) authorized covert action programs in order to contain the spread of communism. The U.S. did this by strengthening non-communist political and military forces, countering Soviet propaganda, weakening communist regimes by supporting resistance movements inside their territory, and weakening the loyalty of the targeted country's citizens through directed propaganda by means of radio broadcasts, leaflets and Western literature.
An example of covert action conducted successfully by the U.S. was during the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état organized by the CIA to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, the democratically-elected President of Guatemala. The Guzmán government formed new policies that were viewed by the CIA as communist in nature. This led CIA director Allen Dulles to fear that Guatemala would become a "Soviet beachhead in the western hemisphere".4 This fear reverberated throughout the CIA and the Eisenhower administration. This coupled with Eisenhower’s favor of covert action as a means of cheaply and covertly combating communism resulted in a covert operation known as code name Operation PBSUCCESS, launched in late 1953 and lasting until 1954. During this operation, the CIA armed and trained an ad-hoc "Liberation Army" of about 400 fighters under the command of then-exiled Guatemalan army officer, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, and used them in conjunction with a complex and largely experimental diplomatic, economic, and propaganda campaign. They even established a Voice of Liberation radio station (located across the border in Honduras), which relayed programming originating in Miami, and pretended to be the spontaneous voice of patriots opposed to the elected government. The operation effectively ended the experimental period of representative democracy in Guatemala known as the "Ten Years of Spring", which ended with Árbenz's official resignation.
An example of covert action that failed can be referenced in the Bay of Pigs invasion in which a force of CIA-trained Cuban exiles invaded southern Cuba with support and encouragement from the U.S. government in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. The conflict was launched in April 1961, less than three months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States. The Cuban armed forces, trained and equipped by the Eastern Bloc nations defeated the invading combatants within three days. On 22 April 1961, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, Robert F. Kennedy (Attorney General), Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Allen Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence) to form the Cuba Study Group to report on the lessons to be learned from the failed operation. General Taylor ultimately submitted the report to President Kennedy. The key points within the report blamed the defeat on the lack of early realization of the impossibility of success by covert means, inadequate aircraft, limitations of armaments, pilots and air attacks to attempt plausible deniability, and ultimately, loss of important ships and lack of ammunition.
Covert action should have a good chance of success, but as noted the Bay of Pigs invasion had no chance of success. Also, the failure to maintain plausible deniability during this covert action greatly embarrassed the Kennedy administration because they were exposed as the ones responsible for the failed invasion. The attempt by the United States to influence the political situation in Cuba had the exact opposite effect because Fidel Castro not only remained in power but became more wary of future U.S. intervention in Cuba. The failed invasion also made Castro even more popular among his people as it added nationalistic sentiments in support of his economic policies as well as motivating Castro to develop closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection. This helped to usher in the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is an unfortunate reminder of the serious consequences that can develop from using covert action.
Speaking of consequences from using covert action, Congress in 1990 toughened procedures governing covert actions in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, after it was discovered that the Reagan Administration had secretly sold arms to Iran (an avowed enemy that was branded as terrorist), and used the proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, also referred to by some as “Contras.” In response, Congress adopted several statutory changes, including enacting several restrictions on the conduct of covert actions and establishing new procedures by which Congress is notified of covert action programs. This allowed for enhanced oversight, accountability, and better scrutiny over all covert-related matters from start to finish which better enabled the U.S. to avoid certain covert actions which it deemed to be unfruitful.
An example of covert action that succeeded but ended up with a negative effect down the road can be referenced during the Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 in which Operation Cyclone was launched by the CIA to arm, train, and finance the Afghan mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviets. Operation Cyclone was one of the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken; funding began with $20–30 million per year in 1980 and rose to $630 million per year in 1987. This covert program relied heavily on using the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as an intermediary for funds distribution, passing of weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan resistance groups. Despite its heavy reliance on the Pakistanis, the U.S. also sent its own military trainers and advisors to mujahedeen bases in Pakistan where they instructed Afghan fighters in the use of U.S.-supplied equipment as well as guerilla warfare in general. Civilian personnel from the U.S. Department of State and the CIA also frequently visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time. The powerful Stinger antiaircraft missiles (developed by the United States) were supplied to the mujahedeen in very large numbers which struck a decisive blow to the Soviet war effort as it allowed the lightly armed Afghans to effectively defend against Soviet helicopter landings in strategic areas. In the end, Operation Cyclone was a success from the stand point that the Soviets completely pulled out of Afghanistan, having suffered over 14,000 killed & missing and over 50,000 wounded. However, the Stingers that were used were so renowned and deadly that in the 1990s, the U.S. conducted a "buy-back" program to keep unused missiles from falling into the hands of terrorists. This program may have been covertly renewed following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, out of fear that remaining Stingers could be used against U.S. forces in the country. 5 The U.S. government has been criticized for allowing Pakistan to channel a disproportionate amount of its funding to controversial Afghan resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the Soviet conflict as he was criticized for killing other mujahedeen and attacking civilian populations, including shelling Kabul with American-supplied weapons causing 2,000 casualties. Hekmatyar was also said to be friendly with Osama bin Laden who was running an operation for assisting "Afghan Arab" volunteers fighting in Afghanistan during that time called Maktab al-Khadamat. U.S. support for the native Afghan mujahedeen unfortunately contributed to the radical islamization of Afghanistan as well as the weakening and near-disintegration of the Afghan state which ultimately led to the Taliban takeover. Some members of the Taliban presently fighting the U.S. in Afghanistan were in fact trained, equipped, or funded by the U.S. or its allies during the 1980s at which time they were more commonly referred to as "freedom fighters". Moreover, U.S. support for the mujahedeen enabled and prolonged their resistance to the Soviet presence, ultimately resulting in thousands of battle-hardened, radicalized, non-Afghan veterans returning to their home countries and forming the core of what is now referred to as Al Qaeda or "The Base". It is estimated that 35,000 foreign Muslims from 43 Islamic countries participated in the war. At that time the United States wanted to prevent Soviet expansion and the spread of Communism. On that note, Operation Cyclone was a success because the Soviets were forced out of Afghanistan which was what the U.S. wanted. However, Operation Cyclone ultimately led to some unintended consequences for the U.S. due to the formation of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Sometimes the intent of the U.S. government or any other governments for that matter to positively influence conditions abroad through covert means (no matter how noble it may be) can still bring negative consequences that are deemed to be both unintended and very difficult to predict despite achieving their set objective, which in this case was the expulsion of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan only to ultimately deal with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. A similar principle can be traced back to the Indonesian coup of 1965. The Indonesian Communist Party was gaining a lot of power and momentum under Indonesian President Sukarno. In an effort to suppress the rise of communism in Indonesia, the U.S. supported a coup d'état led by Nationalist military leader Suharto in his efforts to seize control. The U.S. covertly provided a list of names to Suharto’s followers which identified key people loyal to President Sukarno. The U.S. also provided other covert action through logistical support in the form of providing tactical communications equipment and small arms to Suharto’s followers through a designated liaison in Bangkok, Thailand. The coup was a success and Sukarno was forced to transfer key political and military powers to Suharto who had become the head of the armed forces, and ultimately the President of Indonesia. Although the coup was a success and the U.S. got what they wanted, Suharto’s 30 years of authoritarian rule in Indonesia (albeit Pro-U.S.) was nevertheless marred with human rights violations, corruption, and a host of other issues that left the U.S. with a lot of heartache and frustration.
Despite some concerns over covert action, it would be very difficult to imagine the United States abandoning or even reducing the use of this action in the future, especially when it comes to combating terrorism. Terrorists will continue to scatter and operate globally in a way which will make it very difficult to track them down, this makes covert action that much more essential to the U.S. government as it engages in covert activities against countries or organizations that support terrorism.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) recently stated that the U.S. military needs to improve its ability to conduct covert and clandestine operations in order to employ military power while minimizing political repercussions - a task difficult to do with the overt employment of forces. He also recognized that some developing situations might require secret preemptive action in order to prevent a crisis that would require the large, overt employment of forces. He indicated some countries might welcome U.S. military assistance even though they would be unable to acknowledge it due to political reasons. The ability for the United States to employ agents especially in denied areas, on secret, unacknowledged missions, is critical. Congress increased the capability for the Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct paramilitary operations by creating a new paramilitary funding mechanism for the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This enables the U.S. special operations forces to pay and equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Previously, DoD forces had to go to the CIA for this type of funding. Referring to this, Admiral Eric Olson, commander of USSOCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee “the most important tool in our ability to build the capacity of partner nations to conduct counterterrorism or stability operations is our continued authority to train and equip foreign military forces.” 6 Admiral Olson added that these authorities “have made a big difference in developing carefully selected counterpart forces.” 6 DoD’s increased financial capability to conduct paramilitary operations will undoubtedly allow for a continued upsurge in the number of covert operations carried out by the military in the future, especially when it comes to combating terrorism or conducting stability operations. It came to light publicly in March 2011 that these stability operations are being conducted in Libya with the U.S. forces providing covert assistance to Libyan Rebels fighting Gadhafi forces, although it is unclear as to the specific nature of these covert activities. In a March 2011 interview with President Obama, Diane Sawyer asked the President if he would rule out arming the Libyan insurgents or if he would consider sending weapons to these rebels. The President responded by saying, "We are examining all options to support the opposition." 7 According to Mark Quarterman, director of the Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, he believes arming the rebels would become necessary as they are “under-gunned and outmanned by the professional soldiers of the Gadhafi regime. The rebels would have to get better and bigger weapons." 7 To that end, although the President did not clarify whether or not these anti-Gadhafi forces would be equipped with weapons from the United States, it would not come across as a huge surprise if the U.S. already began equipping the rebels with these weapons around the same time or even before the interview with the President took place, especially since the whole notion of covert action is to conduct these operations in a secretive manner with no attribution attached. Whether or not this actually happened remains to be seen especially since NATO forces are currently fighting against Gadhafi forces helping to alleviate significant pressure from the rebels.
In addition to living in a world with terrorism and unstable authoritarian regimes, the U.S. is also confronted with cyber threats due to significant advances in technology. In order to protect and further U.S. interests, the U.S. will continue to uphold covert action as a viable option despite its flaws and the potential consequences that can come about as a result. Many nations depend on technology as a means to manage and operate their critical infrastructure, both from a national and military stand point. The United States knows that it will need to win the covert cyber war to remain in power. The rise of technology puts the U.S. in a vulnerable situation because it means that only a handful of people with the right set of knowledge and equipment can wreak havoc to U.S. infrastructure within minutes or hours. These people do not need aircraft carriers, jets, tanks, missiles, or millions of troops to carry this out. To that end, certain governments and organizations are trying to seek better ways to engage in covert cyber operations in an effort to cripple the U.S. both economically and militarily. The U.S. government knows that it must be ready to counter these types of actions or even be preemptive in its actions to thwart potential threats. One of the reasons the U.S. government established the U.S. Cyber Command came from the realization that cyber threats were very real and can bring about very chaotic results. An article from the Economist writes that China has plans of “winning the information war by the mid-21st century”. They note that other countries are likewise organizing for cyber war, among them Russia, Iran, Israel and North Korea.8 To that end, the U.S. will increasingly focus its efforts on the covert cyber war in line with President Obama’s statement when he declared America’s digital infrastructure to be a "strategic national asset”. 9
Many presidents have used covert action to a certain degree ever since the formation of the United States. When new dangers threatened the security or interests of the United States, the president considered the use of covert action as an instrument to enable the United States to quietly but convincingly exert its influence in the international arena. Over this time covert action have yielded many success, many failures, and have often been anything but quiet. 10 Nevertheless, it will remain as a viable option for the current president and for future presidents due to the continuing threats posed in the form of unstable regimes, terrorist organizations, and cyber warfare as a force multiplier.
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1William J. Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 2 and 19-25.
2Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), p. 165-167.
3Jansen V. Rensburg, "Covert action and its contemporary status in the United States of America” University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1402/is_1_28/ai_n29294955/?tag=mantle_skin;content
4Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 17.
5Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Kabul Confirms New Effort To Buy Back U.S.-Built Stinger Missiles,” RFERL, January 31, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057196.html
6Admiral Eric T. Olson, “Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of Special Operations Forces, March 4, 2008”, 9, http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2008_Posture_Statement.doc
7Jake Tapper, “President Obama Authorizes Covert Help for Libyan Rebels,”ABC News, March 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/president-obama-authorizes-covert-libyan-rebels/story?id=13259028
8"Cyberwar: The Threat from the Internet". The Economist. 1 July 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16481504?story_id=16481504&source=features_box1
9Wikipedia, “Cyberwarfare,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare
10Micah R. Redfield, “The Quiet Option: Presidential Use of Covert Operations in American History,” USAFA, 2008, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Redfield.pdf

BIBLIOGRAPHY

William J. Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington,
KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 2 and 19-25.

Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ
Press, 2006), p. 165-167.

Jansen V. Rensburg, "Covert action and its contemporary status in the United States of America,” University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1402/is_1_28/ai_n29294955/?tag=mantle_skin;content

Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 17.

Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Kabul Confirms New Effort To Buy Back U.S.-Built Stinger Missiles,” RFERL, January 31, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057196.html

Admiral Eric T. Olson, “Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy, Commander,
United States Special Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of Special Operations Forces, March 4, 2008”, 9, http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2008_Posture_Statement.doc

Jake Tapper, “President Obama Authorizes Covert Help for Libyan Rebels,”ABC News, March 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/president-obama-authorizes-covert-libyan rebels/story?id=13259028

"Cyberwar: The Threat from the Internet". The Economist. 1 July 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16481504?story_id=16481504&source=features_box1 Wikipedia, “Cyberwarfare,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare

Micah R. Redfield, “The Quiet Option: Presidential Use of Covert Operations in
American History,” USAFA, 2008, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Redfield.pdf