Running head: DOPING IN CYCLING

25 June 2014
Utrecht School of Economics

The Economics of Doping: policy advices to create a level-playing field in professional cycling.

Authors:
Danilo Fattorini (3790215)
Orkhan Hajizada (3773663)

Supervisors:
Drs. Erwin van Sas (USE)
Dr. Tineke Lambooy (RGL)

Group Supervisor:
Drs. Erwin van Sas

Table of Contents
Abstract3
Introduction4
1. Institutional Framework7
1.1. Embeddedness7
1.2. Institutional Environment9
1.2.1. Formal Institutions9
1.2.2. Informal institution – the doping market112
1.3. Governance14
1.4. Resource Allocation and Employment16
2. Decision-making process16
2.1. Prize money and Doping17
2.2. Health and Doping22
2.3. Size of Punishment and Probability of Detection 23
2.3.1. Doping game: introduction26
2.3.2. Theoretical example using real numbers 30
2.4. Number of participants and Doping 34
2.5. Conclusion 37
3. Policy advices38 3.1. Efficiency Comparison 38 3.2. Application of Criminal Law 41
Conclusion42
Bibliography44
Appendix A: Interview with Filippo Simeoni49
Appendix B: Interview with Axel Dekker55

Abstract Sports victories are often strived to at the cost of sportsmen’s integrity, reputation, health, security, or even life. The tendency to use performance-enhancing drugs is shaped by factors characterizing the institutional framework. In particular, the prize money, health costs, severity and frequency of punishment, and number of participants are expected to play a crucial role in the decision making process of an athlete concerning doping, therefore their significance will be shown empirically. This will lead to the designing of the policy necessary to create a level playing field in professional cycling. Turns out that a mix of increased controls, review of the list of prohibited substances, and application of criminal law in doping cases can help reaching such goal.

Introduction Sports victories are often strived to at the cost of sportsmen’s integrity, reputation, health, security, or even life. Ever since sporting competition began, athletes have used a variety of methods to increase performance. Ancient Greek victors used combinations of plants and fungi. In the-Roman era, feeding substances were given to horses to make them run faster and to gladiators to make them fight in a more spectacular way (Epstein, 2003). However, Emperor Theodosius abolished the ancient games in the fourth century and thereafter, professional sport and spectator sport re-emerged only at the end of the nineteenth century. Doping re-emerged too, and modern chemistry induced a drastic change in doping practices (Epstein, 2003). Substances like steroids and amphetamines had been in use since the first half of the twentieth century, when there was no regulation against it. The acceptance of drug-taking in cycling competitions was shown on the rule book of the Tour de France 1930, where the organization reminded riders that drugs would not be provided by the organizers (Dauncey & Hare, 2003). It was the death of the cyclists Jensen (1960) and Simpson (1967) that sparked public awareness of the use of drugs in sport. Since then, both the sporting federations and the public authorities developed actions against doping (Buti & Fridman, 2001). The International Olympic Committee (IOC) medical commission established the first list of prohibited substances in 1967 and introduced anti-doping testing of athletes in 1972 Munich Games. (Baron et al., 2007) Since then every year many athletes of the caliber of Mercks, Pantani, Armstrong and Di Luca have been found guilty of doping (Dauncey & Hare, 2003). But what is, legally speaking, the definition of doping? In 1963 the European Parliament defined it as “the administration or use of exogenous substances in an abnormal form or way to healthy persons where the only goal is to achieve an artificial and unfair improvement of the performance of the athletes” (Berentsen, 2002). In other words, any practice that improves performance in an unnatural way, is it the use of drugs or other methods like blood transfusion or sleeping in low-pressure areas. The list of the substances and methods prohibited at all times (in- and out-of-competition) is updated and published every year by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).

Table 1. List of the substances and methods prohibited that came into effect on January 1st, 2014. Prohibited Substances | Prohibited Methods | 1.Non-approved substances | 1. Manipulation of blood and blood components | 2. Anabolic agents | 2. Chemical and physical manipulation:2.1. Tampering, or attempting to tamper2.2. Intravenous infusions and/or injections of more than 50 mL per 6 hour period | 3. Peptide hormones, growth factor and related substances: | | 3.1. Erythropoiesis-Stimulating Agents (e.g. EPO)3.2. Chorionic Gonadotrophin (CG) and Luteinizing Hormone (LH)3.3. Corticotrophins3.4. Growth Hormone (GH) and its releasing factors and Insulin-like Growth Factor-1 (IGF-1) | | | | | 3. Gene doping:3.1. The transfer of polymers of nucleic acids or nucleic acid analogues3.2. The use of normal or genetically modified cells | | | 4. Beta-2 Agonists | | 5. Hormone and Metabolic Modulators:5.1. Aromatase inhibitors5.2. Selective estrogen receptor modulators (SERMs)5.3. Other anti-estrogenic substances5.4. Agents modifying myostatin function(s)5.5. Metabolic modulators (e.g. Insulins | Prohibited in competition | | 1. Stimulants | | 2. Narcotics | | 3. Cannabinoids | | 4.Glucocorticosteroids | | | 6. Diuretics and other Masking Agents | |
(Source: WADA, 2014)
The goal of this research is to determine the most efficient way to create a level playing field in professional cycling, that is, giving equal opportunities to every competitor. Neglecting ethical issues, a level playing field could be achieved with the liberalization of doping. However, the necessity of a war against doping is motivated by the fact that such unfairness as doping can damage the society as a whole. Berentsen (2002) identifies three justifications for implementing anti-doping measures: (1) doping never increases welfare (rather welfare is lower with a doping opportunity than it is without); (2) there exists no equilibrium where the expected payoff of any competitor is larger with a doping opportunity than without; (3) the wrong player may win the game because doping changes the probabilities of winning. Despite that, the economic and social consequences of liberalization will be analyzed, before to definitively reject this hypothesis.
In the first section of this paper the institutional framework of professional cycling will be analyzed. This will help understanding the dynamic of sport regulations: who makes the rules, who enforces them and who decides the penalties for misbehavior. As guidance for the institutional framework we rely on Williamson (2000) scheme of new institutional economics, which considers four levels of social analysis: embeddedness, institutional environment, governance, and resource allocation and employment. Other than collecting data available from the internet, two cyclists have been interviewed. A former professional cyclist, namely Filippo Simeoni, was questioned about his professional career in order to have a point of view internal to the world of cycling. Career, the one of Simeoni, that changed in 2002, when he confessed the purchase of doping substances from his doctor Michele Ferrari, the same taking care of many champions of that period, among which Lance Armstrong, in a trial against him. Then, a cyclist participating in amateur competition, Axel Dekker, was interviewed about his experience of doping in the cycling world. Their contribution will result fundamental to understand how the athletes live the issue of doping and which are the most common and effective doping substances among elite athletes. Resource allocation and employment is considered to be the most explicative part of the institutional framework, in order to explain the decision-making process of the athlete, therefore the second section is dedicated to it. This analysis, in fact, should help assessing how to influence the decision of the athletes in the direction of a doping-free performance, and ultimately create a level playing field. The analysis involves a literature review, empirical analysis and a “game theory” approach, using data about the Tour the France, the most important stage race in the world. The results of the analyses performed in section 1 and section 2 will be used to assess, in the third section, the best policy to create a level playing field in professional cycling. First, an analysis of the costs and benefits of liberalization, in respect to persecution will be made, showing the social costs of doping. After, the contribution that criminal law can give to the war against doping will be presented. Finally, the main results of the research will be summarized in order to answer the main research question: what is the most efficient way to create a level playing field in professional cycling?

1. Institutional Framework As guidance for our institutional analysis we rely on Williamson’s (2000) scheme of new institutional economics, which considers four levels of social analysis, from the highest to the lowest: embeddedness, institutional environment, governance, and resource allocation and employment. Every level imposes constrains on the level immediately below, and receive feedbacks from it, in a fully interconnected system. (Williamson, 2000)
Figure 1. The new institutional economics scheme.

(Source: Williamson, 2000)

1.1 Embeddedness According to Williamson (2000) the embeddedness, which refers to the informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms and religions, is an exogenous variable and shapes the institutional environment. In the context of sport, it is often referred to as “the spirit of sport”. “It is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and is characterized by values such as ethics, fair play, honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other participants, courage, community and solidarity.” (WADA, 2009) Someone who takes drugs cheats, ruining the game, and is lacking some or all of these values, which are fundamental not only to sport but also to everyday life. In particular fair play, which requires unconditional respect for opponents, fellow players, referees and fans (CIFP, 2014). In order to promote such values, the International Fair Play Committee (CIFP), funded by UNESCO and a number of international sports governing bodies in Paris in 1963, gives three different awards to individuals or teams: * Pierre de Coubertin Trophy: Awarded for an act of fair play, which cost or could have cost the victory to a contender who sacrificed or compromised his chances of winning by complying not only with the written rules of the sport, but also with the 'unwritten' ones.

* Jean Borotra Trophy: Awarded for a general attitude of sportsmanship all along a sports career, marked by an outstanding and constant spirit of fair play.

* Willi Daume Trophy: Awarded for an activity aimed at promoting fair play: organization of national or local campaigns, lectures, books, articles, reports or comments in the media. (WADA, 2014)

Values, which were summarized by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern Olympic Games, in one sentence: “The important thing in life is not the triumph, but the fight; the essential thing is not to have won, but to have fought well.” (CIFP, 2014). As noble a goal as this is, it has little to do with the reality of modern sports world. There are witnesses of doping cases since the first professional cycling competitions at the end of the 19th century, and even if it is not clear what the origin of this vicious attitude, the periodicity of the occurrence of doping scandals suggest that it displayed a great deal of inertia because of its functionality, overtaking the spirit of sport and humiliating all athletes involved. In other words, it seems that in cycling the essential thing is not to fight well, rather to win. What is not clear yet is the role of the formal institutions governing professional cycling in this context. Two scenarios are possible: either these institutions are incapable to deal with the issue and to enforce an efficient war against doping, or worse they are involved in it.

1.2 Institutional Environment The process of working out the economic and political ramifications of Level 2 features involves understanding the objectives and the reasons of the existence of the institutions governing professional cycling. A process often referred to as Positive Political Theory (PPT) (Williamson, 2000). The final object is simply to understand how things work (or do not work). As already mentioned in the introduction, the persecution of doping started in 1967 when the International Olympic Committee (IOC) medical commission established the first list of prohibited substances (Baron et al., 2007). The European continent claimed a flagship role in the fight against doping in sport in 1989 with the adoption of the European Anti-Doping Convention (Vermeersch, 2006), which was later adopted by many non-Member States of the EU. The document sets a certain number of common standards and regulations requiring parties to adopt legislative, financial, technical, educational and other measures (Council of Europe, 2014). However a lack of legal competence at EU level combined with financial issues at World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) level induced the European Union to moderate its ambitions. Lacking determination and political will seems to be another factor according to Vermeersch (2006). While the European Parliament can be considered as a loyal supporter of the Community action in the field of doping, the Commission openly blamed the Council for lack of backing.
1.2.1. Formal institutions In 1999 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in Lausanne, Switzerland, as a private law foundation. It is an international independent agency composed and funded equally by the sport movement and governments of the world, led by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), with the scope to lead a collaborative worldwide campaign for doping-free sport. It does so through scientific researches, education, development of anti-doping capacities, and monitoring of the World Anti Doping Code (WADC), the document harmonizing anti-doping policies in all sports and all countries. (WADA, 2009) The WADC is the core document in the World Anti-Doping Program (WADP). This program comprises three levels and includes: the World Code (level 1), International Standards (level 2) and Models of Best Practice (level 3). Moreover, cooperating with the IOC, WADA has effective means of sanctions towards international federations and National Olympic Committees by using possible exclusion from the Olympic Games for those who do not adapt to the Code (Hanstad & Loland, 2005). In fact, while the IOC carries out controls during its own events, on a daily basis it is the responsibility of international federations and national anti-doping agencies to take care of it, and the efficiency in the control work depends upon the capacity of these institutions to work closely and efficiently together. Only few International Federations have their own officers who carry out doping tests (Hanstad & Loland, 2005). Among them there is the International Cycling Union (UCI), which, with the election of Brian Cookson as president on September 2013, commenced an in-depth reform of the UCI’s anti-doping procedures, with the intention of reinforcing the independence of anti-doping activities and improving their effectiveness (UCI, 2014). In order to be in a better position to assume responsibility, the UCI delegated to the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation (CADF) the duty to (1) define and implement the rider testing strategy, (2) ensure the proper operation and continuous improvement to the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) program, (3) draw up and implement anti-doping educational programs, (4) provide scientific and administrative support to the Legal Anti-Doping Service for case management, and (5) provide administrative support to the UCI Scientific Adviser on the management of Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUE) (UCI, 2014). The new setting increases transparency avoiding the possibility of interference of UCI directors in the work of anti-doping experts (both scientific and legal). The UCI determines the CADF’s priorities in terms of the testing strategy and broad lines of approach through a contract of services. This contract will be adapted on an annual basis after evaluation of the results obtained and the situations arising from the tests carried out. Reports drawn up by the bodies described above as well as those produced by the UCI President's office, Management and Administrative Service are subject to the strict guidelines of the Internal rules for anti-doping procedures, a document defining the responsibilities and remits of all parties and the manner in which they can, or cannot, communicate with each other. This guarantees the independence of anti-doping activities with regards to the UCI in order to avoid any conflict of interest and thus guarantee the ethics of the fight against doping in cycling (UCI, 2014). The UCI is the first organization involved in the fight against doping to adopt such rules and make them public. In this way the UCI intends to act with complete transparency with a view to establishing and ensuring the strict respect of the principle of accountability, which represents the best guarantee of credibility in the long term (UCI, 2014). These reforms in the functioning of the institution coming right after the Armstrong’s scandal appear like an attempt of the UCI to restore credibility in cycling competition. The effectiveness of these reforms cannot be assessed since they have not been completely implemented yet, however the efforts of the UCI made cycling the sport symbol of the war against doping. Their functionality depends on the capacity of current scientific knowledge to detect the presence of doping substances. Defining all prohibited substances and methods, and the institutions enforcing such regulations (the legal system) is far from being enough. Hein Verbruggen, head of International Cycling Federation, has suggested that “undetectable drugs are 90 percent of estimated doping cases.” (Wadler, n.d.). This is confirmed by Dekker, who declared that, even if the doping controls are evolving together with the cycling world, controls are lagging one step behind. More optimistic is the point of view of Simeoni, who said that the increase in the number of controls and the improvements in the methodology adopted to make doping tests produced great results and hence keeping on this trend the credibility, compromised by the many doping scandals, can be restored. It is worth mentioning also, according to the former cyclist, the surprise checks out-of-competition and the full-time availability required to the athletes, who have to inform about their movements. They both contributed considerably in tackling the phenomenon of doping. However it is too soon to claim victory. There are difficulties in detecting certain kind of drugs or methods having doping effect, like growth hormone (GH), gonadorelin, and blood transfusions (Paoli and Donati, 2014), and the costs of an effective doping tests system are very high, sometimes prohibitive (See section 3). In Williamson’s (2000) words: “the claim that the legal system will eliminate chaos upon defining and enforcing property rights assumes that the definition and enforcement of such rights is easy (costless)”. Relaxed this assumption, the trust in the effectiveness of the reforms of the UCI in restoring credibility in professional cycling decreases, and doubts about the capability of the formal institutions to deal with the issue of doping arise. Before arguing about possible alternative policy reforms, however, it is necessary to look at the other face of the coin, the doping market.

1.2.2. Informal institution – the doping market
From the point of view of criminal law the market of doping is to be considered a semi-legal market. In fact, the effective legal status of supply-side activity varies along the distribution chain and from country to country. Some substances, above all steroids, are produced exclusively for doping purposes in pharmacies or illegal labs, and therefore “born” as illegal. Other doping substances, instead, are produced by legitimate drug manufacturers and are diverted at some stage of the legal distribution chain (Paoli & Donati, 2014). Due to the semi-legal nature of the market, data about the supply and demand of doping products are fragmented and not always reliable. However, Paoli and Donati (2014) collected a quite exhaustive amount of information about the Italian doping market, which are then compared to those of other countries. For the supply side of the Italian market they estimated yearly revenues of about 537 million euro. Steroids, which have a relatively low price, account for about 245 million euro (46%). Peptide hormones, growth factors, and related substances (e.g. EPO), which have higher prices, sum up to 225 million euro (41.9%). However, the share of quantity consumed for these two groups of substances are respectively 58.9% and 6.4%, showing a predominance of steroids as most common drug, in line with Simeoni’s statements. Most suppliers of doping products also have a legitimate professional position: from gym managers to pharmacists or hospital employee. In professional cycling, according to the declarations of Simeoni and Dekker, and the case of Lance Armstrong (see section 1.3), staff members of teams and federations, and other athletes seem to be the main distribution channels. In these cases the suppliers may be driven by motives other than profit. Sport success usually plays a larger part for suppliers belonging to the organized sport world and for supplier who are athletes (Paoli & Donati, 2014). The demand for doping products has two major components: athletes (73%) and body-builders (27%), and cyclists represent the most consistent group among the athletes. These estimations are not very reliable, since they are based on the result of anti-doping tests of urine samples, which cannot detect many current products, and out-of-competition consumption is not taken into account (Paoli & Donati, 2014). However, they give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon of doping in Italy, which has no reason to be smaller or bigger than that of other countries. Doping products availability has been tremendously increased by the spread of dedicated web sites selling on the internet, so much that consumers can bypass the whole domestic distribution chain, which can involve drugs diverted from their legal uses by employees or managers of drug manufacturers or, more rarely, drugs stolen from storehouses, trucks or hospitals (Paoli & Donati, 2014). Having products delivered directly at home by mail and at lower prices, however, incentivizes the use of these substances without an expert supervision, and the diffusion of counterfeited products, increasing the risks for the athlete. Most athletes in fact rely almost exclusively on word-of-mouth or internet forums to decide which products and in which dosages they should take, and a study in the Netherland has shown that at least 50-60% of the products illegally obtained do not contain what is declared on the label (de Hon & van Kleij, 2005).
Given the variety of products, their widespread availability, and the impossibility to detect their presence in athlete’s bodies, seems that no doping-free world is possible relying only on doping tests as mean to tackle it. An alternative strategy could be introducing criminal persecution in the game. A strategy already tested in different countries around the world, but which has not been exploited yet. The analysis of the pros and cons of such strategy will be introduced in the third section of this paper, while now the focus shifts to the third level of the institutional framework: the governance.

1.3 Governance The third level of our institutional analysis looks at the contracts between the athletes and the teams, where the institutions of governance are located. Most contract management and dispute settlement action is dealt with directly by the parties, through private ordering (Williamson, 2000). Therefore an analysis of the contracts of athletes entails an analysis of the private agreements between the athletes and the rest of the agents forming the world of professional cycling (the governance of contractual relations). In particular, the magnitude of the phenomenon and the point of view of the cyclists will be considered, in order to assess whether there is a pressure for the athletes to use performance-enhancing drugs to be competitive. The existence of this pressure has been often revealed by professional cyclist, in particular those processed for use of doping. An emblematic case is the one of Danilo Di Luca, a former Italian professional road-racing cyclist who, after winning the 2007 Giro d’Italia resulted positive to doping tests, resulting in a lifetime ban from the sport. In an interview for the Italian television he declared that it is impossible to rank among the first ten at Giro d’Italia without using doping. He also points to the liberalization of doping as the only solution to the issue, since it is an actual tradition in this sport, and it concerns so many cyclists that without doping the final rank of competitions would be the same (Le Iene, 2014). However, the words of Di Luca did not find much support among the other cyclists. Simeoni describes Di Luca’s statements as superficial, or even silly. The magnitude of the issue is confirmed by the more famous case of Lance Armstrong, an American former road racing cyclist who had won the Tour de France seven consecutive times before receiving a lifetime ban from the sport for doping offenses in 2012. The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) processed the Postal Service Pro Cycling (USPS) Team, captained by Armstrong, for a conspiracy “professionally designed to groom and pressure athletes to use dangerous drugs, to evade detection, to ensure its secrecy and ultimately gain an unfair competitive advantage through superior doping practices…organized by individuals who still play a major and active role in sport today” (USADA, 2012). Judgment that depicts an attitude that concerns many people other than Armstrong him-self, and that one more time tackles the credibility of the Tour de France, and professional cycling in general. To further investigate on the informal institution of doping in professional cycling we interviewed Filippo Simeoni, a former professional cyclist who confessed the purchase of doping substances from its doctor Michele Ferrari, the same taking care of many champions of that period, among which Lance Armstrong. According to Simeoni’s deposition, in order to compete at the highest levels, the doctor suggested and prescribed him doping substances (EPO), which improved performance and recovery. What disturbs the most about this story however is the reaction of the cycling world. According to de Hon and van Kleij (2005), reports from other athletes are the most efficient way to fight doping, and so institutions should support such practice. Instead, they humiliated him, trying to picture him as a liar, a non-reliable person. Simeoni justifies this failure of the institutions saying that “the world of professional cycling, and sport in general, was not ready for a radical change in the matter of doping”. Justice was made few years later with the condemn of the US Postal Service Pro Cycling (USPS) Team, when Simeoni’s career was already finished. However, it has been an historic and important moment for future generations, since a very sophisticated and developed doping system was unmasked. “A system that many people knew, but nobody was able to unmask” adds the former cyclist, who points to the institutions’ vertices as responsible of losing many years in the war against drugs, for economic and personal motivations. Despite the optimism of Simeoni when talking about the future of cycling, from an external point of view as the one of the writer, it seems that there is a wide acceptance of doping among the professionals. Acceptance, which is automatically transmitted to the young athlete, which, too naïve to consider ethic or side effects, accept the necessity to use doping in order to be competitive, as confirmed by the Italian cyclist. Simeoni him-self, actually, admitted the use of doping also at the begin of its career in amateur competitions. Dekker confirms it, confessing to be offered doping substances by its own team while competing at Cross-Cycle races, an amateur category of cycling. That is, according to both cyclists, where the dangers of doping are highest since the huge number of cyclists makes doping tests unfeasible. Social campaign and criminal persecution are probably the only means to fight this problem, which however is beyond the goal of this research paper. The same means, and in particular criminal law, could be the best practice also among elite players (and thus professional cycling). In fact, it is useless to improve regulations when representatives of the institutions could be involved in doping practices. The UCI reforms described in the previews section already represented a reaction to the problem, and an attempt to increase transparency. However, the application of criminal law to doping cases could divert potential wrongdoers, supporting the creation of a doping-free level playing field. As already mentioned, the possibility to apply criminal law in sport competition will be further developed in the third section of this paper, while the last step of the institutional framework is resource allocation and employment.
1.4 Resource allocation and employment Resource Allocation and Employment may sound out of the topic, but it is the label Williamson (2000) gave to the analysis of the marginal conditions. In the context of our research, it refers to the behavior of the cyclist itself, which is determined by all the previous levels of institutions, and other variables, which characterize the competition. This is considered the most explicative part in order to understand what determines the decision of the cyclist to dope, and hence understand how to alter that decision. For this reason the second section of this paper is dedicated to it.

2. Decision-making process of cyclists The decision of a cyclist with respect to the doping choice is shaped by all the different levels of the institutional framework, and other factors determining the particular case, among which additional income, additional moral qualms and heath risks are the most influential (Maennig, 2002 & 2009). Besides these, Maennig (2009) also points at the role of the sporting governance, which is a climate within a sporting discipline, competition bans and financial penalties in the doping decision. Zenic, Stipic and Sekulic (2011) empirically revealed that religiousness, social factors (i.e. parental education), sport and educational factors have an impact on the hesitation of the athletes against doping.
In this section the main variables influencing the decision making process of athletes will be analyzed, with the scope to assess how to influence the decision of the athletes in the direction of a doping-free performance, and ultimately create a level playing field. The variables, chosen according to the results of a literature review, are prize money, health costs, probability of testing, size of the punishment, and number of participants. The analysis involves a literature review, economic regressions and a “game theory” approach, using data available on the Internet about the Tour de France in order to assess the marginal effect of the different variables on the athlete’s decision. The decision to focus on Tour de France is due to its central role in the world of cycling, being considered the most important stage race in the world. It is assumed, throughout the entire section, that the rider is a rational actor, meaning that he aims at maximizing his payoff, which comprises benefits and costs.

2.1. Prize Money and Doping For the last two decades most elite sports events have become big commercial projects with billions of dollars at stake. Cycling events are not an exception. The lion share of the money goes to the organizers and sponsors. According to Sponsorship Report on Pro Cycling by Cyclingnews and Repucom (2013), every dollar invested in Pro Teams returned back to the title sponsors 5.4 dollars. In 2012, sponsors of the cycling teams and organizers of the cycling tournaments generated about 2 billions $ from TV coverage. Even if the winners of the tournament are left with a small part of the money, for an individual it is a substantial amount of money, and so it represents a big incentive to strive for the victory. They do that by legal means, such as stronger training, better nutrition, etc., or illegal means, using performance-enhancing drugs and methods (doping). F.Simeoni claimed, “the existence of doping is mainly due to the humans’ nature of striving for victories”. In an environment where an athlete is valued for his athletic performance it is easily understandable that an athlete is prone to dope. Therefore, besides legal effort, money prize induces athletes to the illegal behavior. Berentsen (2002) in his theoretical model has shown that higher salaries and higher monetary prizes increase the bounds of σ (value of punishment, which makes both agents indifferent between doping and not doping when other player is doped/not doped), making it less likely that a no-doping equilibrium will be reached. In fact, by making the prize high enough, an athlete’s benefits of doping exceed his costs of doping, and thus he decides to dope. Besides this study, a theoretical model by Mueller (2013) has revealed that w (ratio of prize money to marginal doping costs) has an impact on athlete’s doping choice, and on the level of doping threshold (the individual boundary which differentiates whether an athlete choose to dope or not). In his model, he has shown that increasing the prize money will lead to the lower level of doping threshold, meaning that more athletes are left beyond the threshold and resort to doping. The ongoing commercialization of sports has raised prize money in some sports. His implications are supported by the fact that there are more positive doping tests in the commercial sports with high prize money.
The winner of Tour de France 2013, Christopher Froome has brought back to Albion at least 450,000€. So there is big prize money for the winner. We have collected data on prize money in the period 1968-2013. In the period 1976-1990, instead of money prize the winners received an apartment (or a car, or a piece of art in 1988). After 2007, the prize money was set to 450,000€ for the winner. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of nominal prize money for the winner of the Tour de France.

Figure 2. Evolution of prize money during the period 1968-2013.

(Source: Data was collected using WebPlotDigitize in order to extract data from the graph provided by User:EdgeNavidad on the topic “Tour de France” on English Wikipedia with following verification (1990-2013)).

In order to check whether the Mueller’s model applies in the case of Tour de France, we have collected the data on the number of dopers participating in Tour de France from 1968-2013 (cyclisme-dopage.com, 2013), which is pictured on Figure 3.

Figure 3. Number of dopers as % of total participants at Tour de France during the period 1968-2013.

(Source: cyclisme-dopage.com, 2014)

The percentage of dopers out of the total number of participants has been fluctuating for the last half century. During the 1970s, which is known as the steroids’ era, the ratio of dopers to participants was above the average of 37.73 %. The ratio has reached its maximum at the 1978 Tour de France, where 53.6% of participants were dopers (59 dopers out of 110 participants). There was a steady decrease of the ratio in 1980s. This could mainly be due to the addition of anabolic steroids in the list of prohibited substances in 1975 (Verroken & Mottram, 2005), and the introduction of new effective testing methods for steroids in 1983 (CBC, 2003). In the 1990s, known as the EPO era, the percentage of dopers rose again, reaching a peak of 51.3 % at 1998 Tour de France, which is notorious for the Festina scandal. This tour highlighted the necessity for an independent anti-doping agency, which led to the establishment of WADA in 1999 (Wagner, 2010). Doping tests became more accurate and frequent, introducing the new tests for blood doping (Simpson, 2006). This could be the reason of the sharp decrease of the ratio in the following years, reaching a minimum of 9.6% during the last decade. However, such decrease could also be due to the introduction of new performance-enhancing substances that are hard to detect. In order to show empirically whether the prize money has an impact on the decision-making process of an athlete, the regression of number of dopers, being a dependent variable, on the prize money, which was chosen as independent variable, was conducted (Table 2).

Table 2. Stata output on the regression of number of dopers on the prize money for the period 1968-2013.

Dopers=2006.228+0.0000694*Prize Money-0.983388*year

No statistically significant effect of amount of prize money on the number of dopers was found. However, once the decline in the number of dopers during the last decade (2005-2013) is considered to be the consequence of the introduction of the new testing regimes mentioned before, it becomes obvious that amount of prize money had an impact on the decision-making process of a cyclist during the years before 2004 (Table 3).

Table 3. Stata output on the regression of the number of dopers on the prize money for the period 1968-2004.

Dopers=-793.3977+0.0000441*Prize Money+0.4307375*year As it can be seen from table 3, there is a positive statistical impact of prize money on the number of dopers in the period 1968-2004. The sign of this effect also coincides with implications of Berentsen (2002) and Mueller (2013). Thus, higher prize money provides incentives for the cyclists to dope. 22,675.74€ should be subtracted from to the Tour de France winner’s prize in order to diminish the number of dopers at the Tour by one, controlling for the trend. The prize money has to be significantly decreased in order to clean the Tour from dopers, whereas such decrease can remove the incentive of cyclists to participate at the Tour. This is the paradox of prize money.

2.2. Health and Doping
Each rider faces the choice between to dope or not to dope. For now, it is assumed that only expected prize (probability of winning times prize money) and health condition status do matter in the decision-making process of the rider, and the only possible way to increase one’s probabilities of winning is by using performance-enhancing drugs. The expected prize is increasing with the probability of winning, which is proportional to the quantity of harmful substances used. At the same time health condition status is decreasing proportionally with the quantity of harmful substances. Therefore, for the rider there is a tradeoff between expected prize and health condition status to make.
Mirkin and Hoffmann (1978) showed in their survey that more than half of interviewed have accepted gold medal for a death deal. In a similar way, Goldman and Klatz (1992) have interviewed world-class athletes by asking: "If I had a magic drug that was so fantastic that if you took it once you would win every competition you would enter from the Olympic Decathlon to the Mr Universe, for the next five years but it had one minor drawback, it would kill you five years after you took it, would you still take the drug?”. Fifty two percent of the athletes answered “yes”.
Lentillon-Kaestner, Hagger and Hardcastle (2012) have interviewed 16 Swiss elite-cyclists about different aspects of their careers, including the attitude towards doping. The sample (n=16) was equally shared between young cyclists and professionals. Their main findings were in line with the previous studies. Young cyclists were not concerned about long-term negative side effects on health, but they mainly focused on short-term benefits, such as enhanced performance. F.Simeoni affirms that youngsters are not mature enough to realize the health risks associated with taking drugs. It could be the case that athletes discount their future health condition on higher rate (present value of health condition is much lower than the future value). As these facts suggest, negative health consequences of doping are relatively lower than the benefits of the doping, from the point of view of young cyclists.
The preferences of riders vary among different cyclists depending on their social milieu and on their age. Some of them, i.e. F.Simeoni, are quite informed about the negative health consequences, and advised by the personal doctors about the optimal dosage in order to not risk health too much. F.Simeoni asserts that neglecting the doctor’s advice by abusing the substances can be much more dangerous. Some notorious doctors, such as M.Ferrari, played a key role in supervising, advising and providing famous cyclists with the banned substances.
The main problem nowadays is the over-optimistic attitude of young cyclists towards the doping. Lentillon-Kaestner et al. (2012) mentioned inefficiency of actual preventive messages concerning doping as one of the main reasons behind this problem. They propose effective supervision of the young cyclists alongside the preventive messages about doping to be important in decreasing youngster’s temptations to use banned substances.

2.3. Size of Punishment and Probability of Detection
As illustrated in the institutional analysis, the UCI was among the first international sport federations to start the doping tests in its tournaments in 1966 (“A Brief History of Anti-Doping”, 2010), following the two remarkable death cases among the cyclists during the 60s. In 1967 leading cyclist Simpson died during the Tour de France, and in the following year cyclist Mottin died from complications of amphetamines use (Kremenik, Onodera, Yuzuki, Nagao & Yonetani, 2006). These facts have increased the necessity for more effective doping controls. Though the doping controls are evolving together with the cycling world, controls are lagging one step behind. This lag is due to the fact that unknown substances first need to be investigated, and only after decent investigation, the proper tests for these substances might be implemented. According to Liggett, Raia and Lewis (2011), every cyclist in the Tour de France is tested prior to the competition. Following every stage, the stage winner, the general leader after this stage and six to eight randomly selected riders are tested. These regulations vary according to the selection process determined before the race. Given that there were 198 cyclists and 21 stages in 2013, assuming that seven cyclists are tested randomly after each stage, total number of tests should be 387, or 1.9545 tests per cyclist. Report of Independent Observers on the Tour de France 2010 (WADA, 2010) has accounted different testing statistics: 2,552 tests both during and before the Tour de France, or 12.888 tests per rider. According to Rossi, Banuls and Zorzoli (2013), 9,296 tests on professional men road riders were performed in- and out-of-competition. Given that these riders are participating at UCI World Tour (twenty nine events, including the Tour de France), 320.55 tests were performed during the Tour de France, or 1.6189 tests per cyclist. Due to the lack of transparency and frequency of these reports, it is hard to track all the tests performed before. Ryvkin (2013) in his theoretical model showed that equilibrium level of the probability of doping decreases with the probability of testing. The higher is the probability of testing (more tests performed), the lower the probability of doping (more athletes prefer to restrain from doping). Furthermore, Berentsen (2002) has shown that improvements of test technology shift the bounds of σ (value of punishment, which makes both athletes indifferent between doping and not doping when other player is doped/not doped) to the left, making the no-doping choice more preferable to the athlete. Moreover, Stowe and Gilpatric (2010), using game theoretical approach, have shown that the favorite (underdog) is more likely to cheat when the probability of testing is low (high).
According to UCI Cycling Regulations (2012), violator of anti-doping regulations is entitled to the 2-year ineligibility. The second violation will result either in additional years of ineligibility or lifetime period of ineligibility. The third anti-doping rule violation will always result in a lifetime ban. In addition to the ineligibility, the violator is sanctioned together with a fine “equal to the net annual income from cycling that the license-holder normally was entitled to for the whole year in which the anti-doping violation occurred” (UCI Cycling Regulations, 2012). If the license-holder is not a member of UCI registered Team, the minimum fine shall be CHF 3,000 (about 2,463.5€) for elite men and CHF 750 (around for 615€) the “under 23 Riders”. In his theoretical model, Ryvkin (2013) showed that inclusion of small fine in addition to the disqualification could make the random testing more effective, while Gilpatirc (2011) showed that assigning the doper-winner’s prize to the loser might decrease the equilibrium level of cheating. However, as the Armstrong’s doping scandal shows, this is not the case at the Tour de France. After finding Armstrong guilty for doping, it has been decided that there will be no official winners of the seven Tours that Armstrong won (Memmott, 2012).
The WADA has a central role in the fight against doping. Therefore, its contribution since the implementation of first WADA code in 2004 will be tested empirically. In order to show whether there is a relationship between the introduction of WADA code and number of dopers, a regression of number of dopers on the dummy variable WADA was run.

Table 4. Stata output on the regression of the number of dopers on the dummy variable WADA.

Dopers=68.64865-28.2042*WADA There is statistically significant impact of the dummy WADA on the number of dopers. During the years when the WADA code was in force, there were on average 28.2042 dopers less per year, as compared to the years when the WADA code was not implemented yet. Thus, the establishment of WADA and further implementation of WADA code played an important role in the fight against doping, through the Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS, which was launched in 2005), which is considered the shade of the WADA. The elite athletes enrolled in this system are obliged to inform about their whereabouts and must be ready for the instant check up by officials. However, there have been many complains stating that this system conflicts with the ideas of justice, the athlete’s autonomy and the right for self-determination (Morenta-Sanchez & Zabala, 2013).
2.3.1. Doping game: introduction
The game theory approach presents a situation in which players (participants) make strategic decisions that take into account each other’s actions and responses (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009). Other than reminding that athletes are assumed to be rational individual decision-makers, it is also assumed that the winner of the general classification gets only money reward, Mi; and there are only two symmetric cyclists competing with each, cyclist A and cyclist B. Therefore, the chances of winning are equal for both cyclists, ρi=0.5. The odds of winning stay the same if both ridrs are using performance-enhancing drugs, ρi=0.5. If only the first cyclist is doped he wins with the probability ρa > ρi=0.5; and the second player wins with the probability (1-ρa) < ρi=0.5. If only the second cyclist is doped, he wins with ρb> ρi=0.5 and his opponents wins with (1- ρb) < ρi=0.5. Moreover, there are some chances for detection of doping, 0<q<1. If an athlete is tested positive, he needs to pay the fine, Fi. Gilpatric (2011) showed that awarding the winner-doper’s prize to the loser reduces the equilibrium level of cheating. Krakel (2007) has shown that such policy (“windfall-profit effect” in his paper) is an incentive for an athlete to forgo the idea of doping. So we will assume that a doped cyclist-winner transfers the prize money to the loser, Mi . Finally, we have assumed that the prize money award is the only available source of income, and the costs of doping are only the health costs, HCi.
Let’s analyze four different strategies of this game for both players. If the cyclist B “cooperates” (stays clean), cyclist A has two choices (to dope or not to dope):

1. He “cooperates” (stays clean): 1) The expected payoff for cyclist A is:
E(M)1,a=ρ*M+(1-ρ)*0
2) The expected payoff for cyclist B is: E(M)1,b=ρ*M+(1-ρ)*0 * The expected payoff for both cyclists is the weighted-average of prize money, with the probabilities of each outcome used as weights (Pindyck & Rubenfild, 2009). 2. He “cheats” (dopes): 1) The expected payoff for cyclist A is:
EM2,a=1-q*(ρa*Mi+(1-ρa)*0)1-q*(ρa*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρa)*(0+Fi))2-HCi
2) The expected payoff for cyclist B is:
EM2,b=(1-ρa)*Mi + ρa*q *Mi * ① defines the expected prize money for cyclist A when he is not detected. * ② is the expected fine when he gets detected * The expected payoff for the cyclist B is probability of winning times the money prize plus probability of losing times probability that the opponent-doper will get tested positive times the fine

If the cyclist B “cheats” (dopes), cyclist A has two options again:

3. He “cooperates” (stays clean): 1) The expected payoff for cyclist A:
EM3,a=(1-ρb)*Mi + ρb*q *Mi 2) The expected payoff for cyclist B:
EM3,b=1-q*(ρb*Mi+(1-ρb)*0)3-q*(ρb*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρb)*(0+Fi))4-HCi
* ③ and ④ are the same as ① and ② for cyclist A. * The expected payoff for the cyclist A is probability of winning times the money prize + probability of losing times probability that the opponent-doper will get tested positive times the fine.

4. He “cheats” (dopes): 1) The expected payoff for cyclist A:
EM4,a=(1-q)*ρ*Mi +1-ρ*q*Mi- q*ρ*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρ)*q*(Mi+Fi)-HCi 2) The expected payoff for cyclist B:
EM4,b=(1-q)*1-ρ*Mi+ρ*q*Mi-
q*(1-ρ)*(Mi+Fi)+ρ *q*(Mi+Fi)-HCi * The expected payoff for cyclist A (cyclist B) is weighted average of expected prize money and the expected fine, where weights are the probability of detection, minus the health costs. * The expected prize money for cyclist A (cyclist B) is weighted average of possible prize money, where weights are the probability of winning. (Note: in case of losing, there is some probability, q, that cyclist B (cyclist A) gets caught (cyclist A (cyclist B) is not get tested) and cyclist A (cyclist B) gets the prize from the caught doper). * The expected fine for the cyclist A (cyclist B) is weighted average of fine, where the weights are the probability of winning. (Note: in case of losing, there is some probability, q, that cyclist B (cyclist A) is tested positive and he transfers prize to cyclist A (cyclist B), who also doped and tested positive, so cyclist A (cyclist B) returns it back to the organizers).

| Cyclist B | | Stays Clean | Dopes | Cyclist A | Stays Clean | E(M)1,a, E(M)1,b | E(M)3,a, E(M)3,b | | Dopes | E(M)2,a, E(M)2,b | E(M)4,a, E(M)4,b |
Table 5. The payoff matrix for the cyclists.

The above-mentioned doping game can end up by one of the possible equilibria, depending on the parameters’ values. Because of the public interest in the cycling, and desire to reach the level playing field without doping, it would be interesting to bring back the no-doping equilibrium, where none of the two cyclists dope; the requirements for that for both cyclists: 1) E(M)1,a>E(M)2,a ; E(M)3,a>E(M)4,a – For Cyclist A 2) E(M)1,b>E(M)3,b ; E(M)2,b>E(M)4,b – For Cyclist B
When both of these requirements (1 and 2) hold, the riders reach the desired “stays clean, stays clean” equilibrium.

1a) q>Mi*(ρa-p)- HCiρa*Mi + ρa*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρa)*Fi
1b) q>Mi*(ρb-p)- HCiρb*Mi + ρb*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρb)*Fi

If the probability of detection, q, fits both of the above mentioned inequalities (1a & 1b), then E(M)1,a>E(M)2,a and E(M)1,b>E(M)3,b, which means that given that cyclist B (cyclist A) stays clean, the best choice for cyclist A (cyclist B) is also to stay clean.

2a) (1-ρb)*Mi + ρb*q Mi>(1-q)*ρ*Mi +1-ρ*q*Mi- q*ρ*(Mi+Fi)+(1-ρ)*q*(Mi+Fi)-HCi 2b) (1-ρa)*Mi + ρa*q Fi >(1-q)1-ρ*Mi+ρ*q*Mi- q*(1-ρ)*(Mi+Fi)+ρ *q*(Mi+Fi)-HCi

If the inequalities 2a and 2b hold, then given that cyclist B (cyclist A) dopes, the best choice for cyclist A (cyclist B) is to stay clean. Thus, if all of four above mentioned equalities hold, then both cyclists have a dominant “stay clean”. Dominant strategy is a strategy where the cyclist is doing the best he can no matter what his opponent does (Pindyck and Rubenfild, 2009).
It worth to mention that, the same results can be achieved through imposing a certain amount of fine:
3a) F>1-q*ρa*Mi – ρ*Mi – q*ρa*Mi – HCi q

3b) F>1-q*ρb*Mi – ρ*Mi – q*ρb*Mi – HCiq
If both inequalities 3a and 3b hold, then E(M)1,a>E(M)2,a and E(M)1,b>E(M)3,b , meaning that, given that his opponent stays clean, cyclist A ( cyclist B) choses to stay clean as well.

4a) F> HCi - Mi*(2 *ρ*q2 – 3*ρ*q + p – 2*q2 – q*ρb* + q + ρb – 1)q*(ρ*q-1-q)
4b) F> HCi - Mi*(2 *ρ*q2 – 3*ρ*q + p – 2*q2 – q*ρa* + q + ρa – 1)q*(ρ*q-1-q)
Given that cyclist B (cyclist A) dopes, cyclist A (cyclist B) chooses to restrain from doping if the 4a and 4b conditions hold. If 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b hold, then both of our riders have a dominant “stays clean” strategy.
In the next section, real or best approximate numbers will be applied to show how the equilibrium changes in the Tour de France competition. It will be shown that the feature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma could bring an outcome of the doping game different from the best one. However, either implementing more frequent tests and/or imposing higher fines can create the incentives for a doping-free choice, which maximizes the payoff of the athletes.

2.3.2. Theoretical example using real numbers
The data used are partially fruit of our estimation and partially retrieved from the Internet. As approximation of the comparative advantage of the doping user, it is assumed that: when the first cyclist (second cyclist) is doped and second cyclist (first cyclist) is not doped, first cyclist’s (second cyclist’s) probability of winning is ρa=0.7 (ρb=0.7) and second cyclist’s (first cyclist’s) probability of winning is 0.3. For the best approximate number for probability of detection of doping, we relied on Hermann and Henneberg (2013), who estimated 0.0087 probability of detection in a single test, with two tests per year (per person) in cycling on average. Therefore, q=0.0174. The data for the prize is the prize for the winner of the Tour de France, MI=450000€. While in order to estimate the health costs (per year), it is assumed that our cyclists are only steroid and EPO users. According to Kuriloff’s (2005) article published in ESPN.com, health care costs of steroid user is approximated between 333.3$ and 1,000$ per year in US. For simplicity let’s choose, 500$, which is approximately 378.8€ using 2005 March €/$ exchange rate. According to Casadevall et al. (2004), annual health costs of EPO per patient are 26,723€. These health costs sum up to total of 27,101.8€ per cyclist per year.
It is assumed that there is no extra fine imposed on the cheater, Fi=0. Table 6 presents the payoff matrix for both competing cyclists in the Tour de France.

Table 6. The payoff matrix for doping game with 2 tests per cyclist per year.

As can be seen from the table, when there are only two tests per cyclist per year, both cyclists have a dominant “dopes” strategy, which brings “dopes, dopes” equilibrium and gives each of them expected payoff of 193,846.958€. However, this amount is minor to the amount from “stays clean, stays clean” equilibrium, which is 225,000€, showing the features of the “prisoners’ dilemma”.
Given the numbers provided, the probability of detection that makes both cyclists indifferent between decision to dope or not to dope given that his opponent is clean (inequalities 1a & 2a need to hold), q =0.0998384127. Given that the probability of detection in a single test is 0.0087, q=0.0087, about 11.47 tests per cyclists per year have to be performed in order to increase the probability of detection to 0.0998384127. But, as can be seen from table 7, both cyclists are still prone to dope (166,449.1€<170,949.0882€) given that other cyclist dopes.

Table 7. The payoff matrix for doping game with 11.47 tests per cyclist per year. The probability of detection, q, which makes the cyclists indifferent between “dope” and “stay clean” given that his opponent dopes, has to be found through inequalities 2a) and 2b). The probability of detection of doping, q, needs to be at least 0.10694680111 for our hypothetical cyclists to be indifferent between the “dopes” and “stays clean” strategy, given that the opponent chooses to dope. Therefore, with a probability of detection q > 0.10694680111, both our cyclist have a dominant strategy of staying clean, and the “clean, clean” equilibrium is attained (the up-left payoff from Table 8).

Table 8. The payoff matrix for doping game with 12.29 tests per cyclist per year.

In order to increase the probability of detection of doping from q=0.0174 per year to q=0.10694680111, 12.29 tests per year per cyclist have to be carried out.
So far, it was assumed that there is no extra fine imposed on the doper. However, as was mentioned before, the violator of anti-doping rule has to pay a certain amount of money as fine for violating the rule. Let’s assume that (1) the number of tests per cyclist per year is constant and equal to 2; (2) competing cyclists are not members of UCI registered team; and (3) if tested positive for doping, cyclists have to pay the minimum fine of CHF 3,000 (about 2,463.5€), F=2,463.5.

Table 9. The payoff matrix for doping game with the fine of 2,463.5€.

Given that there are 2 tests per cyclist per year, the game does not differ remarkably from the game with no fine, when a fine of 2,463.5€ is introduced. Both our cyclists are still prone to dope and have dominant “dopes” strategy. Again, a “dopes, dopes” equilibrium, with the less-favored outcome (193,825.1526<225,000), is reached, showing the feature of the “prisoners’ dilemma”. The size of fine, Fi, which makes our cyclists indifferent between “stays clean” and “dopes” given that his opponent does not use performance-enhancing substances, was calculated using inequalities 3a and 3b. The fine has to be at least 2,984,839.08€ to change the preferences of cyclists towards no-doping equilibrium given that his rival refrains from doping.

Table 10. The payoff matrix for doping game with the fine of 2,984,839.08€.

Even if, when the opponent stays clean, the riders are indifferent between “stays clean” and “dopes” strategies, they are still eager to dope given that the other cyclist dopes. The fine required to change the game towards “stays clean, stays clean” can be calculated using 4a and 4b inequalities. The fine for violation of anti-doping rules needs to be 6,029,111.619€ in order to make the cyclists indifferent between doping and no doping given that his competitor dopes.

Table 11. The payoff matrix for doping game with the fine 6,029,111.619€.

As can be seen from Table 11, both cyclists have a dominant “stays clean” strategy. A monetary penalty of 6,029,111.62€ is needed in order to arrive at the “stays clean, stays clean” equilibrium, which leads to a payoff of 225,000€ for each cyclist. Therefore, it was shown that either increasing the frequency of tests or including extra fine for the doper-cyclists can change the preferences of riders towards staying clean. However, implementing high fines might be an objection in reaching doping-free equilibrium as the Korda’s case showed (Maennig, 2009). Petar Korda, a tennis player, was found guilty for using doping in 1999 by IOC and was ordered to repay considerable amount of prize money, which he had won during the year when the violation occurred. However, to this day he has not repaid the specified amount. Lazear (1979) proposed a deferred compensation model to solve the problem of high fines. For example, “a large part of the sponsoring money could be paid into funds which would then be paid out at the end of a – doping free – sporting career. Any penalties for doping offences would then be paid from the funds of the individual athletes involved” (Maennig, 2009).

2.4. Number of participants and Doping In the previous section it was assumed that there are only two cyclists competing with each other. However, it is never the case. Fifty-nine cyclists were competing at the first Tour de France in 1903 (“1903 Tour de France”, n.d.) and about 200 cyclists (divided in 22 teams) are going to compete at the Tour de France 2014 (“Teams and Riders”, 2013). It is not clear whether there is any relationship between number of participants and the prize money, but there is evidence of connection between number of competing cyclists and the number of dopers. Increased number of participants induces more competitive pressure for the cyclists, since the increased competition decreases one’s chance of winning the competition. So, in order to increase their own probabilities of winning, the cyclists will either choose to dope or choose to train harder depending on their and competitor’s abilities (depending on the location of the doping threshold) (Mueller, 2011). Mueller (2013) has shown that increased number of athletes has an impact on the doping decision in two ways: strong athletes will have an incentive for larger doping abuse and at the same time weak athletes will be under the “discouragement effect” because of the higher chances of facing the stronger athlete. This is also confirmed by Gilpatric (2011) and Ryvkin (2013), who found that the level of cheating might rise with the number of participants. Figure 5. The relationship between number of participants and number of dopers. 1968-2013.

Source: cyclisme-dopage.com (2014)

It can be seen from the Figure 5 that the number of dopers and number of participants were more or less moving in the same direction in the interval from the late 60s till the late 90s. However, for the last decade the magnitude of this relationship (if any) has been negative.
In order to check whether there is actually any relationship between these two variables, a regression is conducted. The number of dopers was used as the dependent variable with the number of participants as the explanatory variable.

Table 12. Stata output on the regression of the number of dopers on the number of participants.

Number of dopers=1476.775+0.3732*Number of participants-0.7423*Year

Number of participants has a statistically significant effect on the number of dopers. Every 2.6794 additional cyclists competing at the Tour de France, increase the number of dopers by one person, controlling for the trend. These finding are in line with the findings of Gilpatric (2011), Ryvkin (2013) and Mueller (2013). Thus, a higher number of competitors makes the athlete more prone to use performance-enhancing drugs in order to increase his/her chances of winning.

2.5. Conclusion
To sum up, all variables investigated (prize money, health side effects, size of the punishment, probability of detection, and number of participants) have a significant effect on the doping decision of the athlete.
It was shown that an increase of the prize money had a significant effect on doping in the period 1968-2004, when a decrease of 22,675.74€ in the prize would have diminished the numbers of dopers by one; while its effect is insignificant after 2004, pointing at the importance of WADA (especially, the WADC implemented in 2004) as the leading body fighting against doping.
Cyclists, especially young ones, are used to put higher value on the victories rather than on the health condition. Simeoni pointed at the immatureness of the younger cyclists, who do not realize the real magnitude of the negative health consequences. More efficient preventive messages together with the supervision of the doctors could create incentives for young cyclists to restrain from doping.
Furthermore, it was shown that providing 12 tests per year per cyclist, instead of the current 2 tests, could change the preferences of the riders towards the doping-free equilibrium. By conducting this amount of tests the doping game with the feature of the “prisoners’ dilemma” can move toward the most-favored outcome, where both athletes have a dominant “stay clean” strategy. Moreover, introducing fines for wrongdoers would decrease the number of tests needed, leading to a more efficient strategy to achieve a level playing field.
Finally, the increased competition changes the cyclist’s preferences towards doping. Increasing the number of participants at the Tour by 2.94 people can induce one more cyclist to opt for doping.

3. Policy advises After analyzing the institutional framework, and the decision making process of the athletes, two more aspects need to be analyzed, which could provide interesting insights for creating a level playing field: the level of liberalization of doping, and the application of criminal law in sport competitions. For what concerns the liberalization issue, the level playing field at the Tour de France can be attained either through allowance of doping or further restriction of doping. Therefore, in the first part of this section, the comparison of the liberalization of doping versus the further enforcing of anti-doping programs from an economic point of view will be touched upon. For convenience, each case’s costs and benefits will be introduced separately, before comparing them. In the second part of this section, the contribution that criminal law can give to the war against doping will be presented.

3.1. Efficiency comparison When it comes to the liberalization of doping, it is necessary to check whether the so-far existence of doping in the Tour de France really has a negative effect on the spectator’s preferences, and therefore has an impact on the social costs. According to Van Reeth (2011), the existence of doping has a statistically insignificant impact on the average audience of the Tour de France stages in Belgium. Thus, it might be the case that spectators do not care enough about the doping; that they put higher value on the performance rather than on how this performance was gained. If this is the case, then only costs related to substances have to be taken into account. According to Dopeology (n.d.), EPO and anabolic steroids (in particular testosterone) are the prevailing substances in the doping cases. Casadevall et al. (2004) estimated that annual health costs of EPO per patient are 26,723€, while Kuriloff (2005) mentioned that the total costs related to health care, law enforcement, lost productivity, treatment and testing for the anabolic steroids users is estimated to be around $7,794,500,000 per year in US. Given that there was on average 2 million illegal steroid users in US, total cost per anabolic steroid user is thus $3,897.25 on average. This makes 2,953.2€ per user per year using 2005 €/$ exchange rate. So if we will assume that after liberalization of doping, all 200 contesters will be using only steroids and EPO, total costs for society become: 2,953.2€+26,723€*200=5,935,240€ Thus, costs of liberalization of doping will entail on average of almost 6 million € per year. The real number for the concerned total costs may be even higher considering that besides EPO and steroids, cyclists use other risky substances and methods in order to enhance one’s performance. Many scholars and regulatory bodies of sports discipline are big supporters of maintenance of anti-doping regime. They see prohibition of drugs in sports as the only path to reach the level-playing field. They pursue this goal by different testing regimes (both out-of-competition and in-competition checks) and different punishment schemes. In the game theory it was shown that 12.29 tests per cyclist without additional fine is needed in order to change the cyclist’s preferences towards “stay clean” equilibrium. Moreover, it was illustrated that 2 tests per cyclist per year together with monetary fine of about 6 million € can achieve the same results. According to Hermann and Henneberg (2013), the approximate cost of one test is 584€. Given that there are 200 cyclists, total costs of persecution of doping, presented on table 13, are varying depending on testing and punishment scheme. Table 13. Total costs of persecution of doping depending on different testing and punishment schemes. As can be seen from the table 13, the most expensive persecution strategies with no fines and more frequent tests entail total costs of 1,435,791€. This number being much smaller than the social costs related to liberalization, it is clear that persecution of doping is the only strategy to follow in order to minimize the social costs of achieving a level playing field. Simeoni, however, suggested a mixed strategy. While substances like EPO or steroids have an evident effect on the athletes’ performance, there are hundreds of substances considered doping that have arguably any effect (Paolo & Donati, 2014). For these substances the institutions could consider a policy of increasing tolerance, in order to avoid the manipulation of doping cases of little relevance, and to simplify the doping tests needed. Besides the costs of testing, it is valuable to define the preferences of the viewers. Will the audience be satisfied with performance without drugs? Or the Tour de France risk to loss its value because of anti-doping regulations? All these questions raise the necessity for further studies and researches. Moreover, it might be the case that doping still will be prevalent and most dopers will leave undetected even after more stringent testing systems. As can bee seen from figure 6, the average winner’s speed at the Tour de France has significantly increased from period 1971-1990 to 1991-2004, approximately 8% positive change, that cannot be accounted for by improvements in equipment, nutrition or training (Shermer, 2008). According to Shermer (2008), this can be explained by the wide usage of EPO after 1991. It is worth to mention that by 2007 the average speed at the Tour has reached the level of 1991-2004 period, which might be due to the enforcement of even stricter rules and massive disqualification of dopers in that year (Shermer, 2008). However, in the following years the winner’s speed at the Tour inclined and reached the level of the period 1991-2004, which might be pointing at the continuation of doping at the Tour. Figure 6. Average Tour de France winner speeds. (Source: Bakeraceinfo.com)
3.2. Application of Criminal law
Given the variety of products, their widespread availability, and the difficulties in detecting their presence in athletes’ bodies, it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to create a doping-free level playing free relying only on doping tests. An alternative strategy, as mentioned before, is the introduction of criminal law in the game. During the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin, for example, one night of raids, prompted by a report to the officers, was enough to collect items that a thousand tests carried out by a renowned laboratory on urine and blood samples had failed to bring to light (Paoli & Donati, 2014). It is thus clear that criminal investigation is far less expensive than laboratory tests, as stated by the WADA vice-president Arne Ljungqvist in 2010 referring to the case of Turin. The difference law enforcement can make is also illustrated by the case of Lance Armstrong, where an ongoing investigation on Dr. Michele Ferrari carried out by NAS and coordinated by the Padua Prosecutor Office provided decisive document evidence to corroborate the incriminating statements of Armstrong’s former team colleagues and other riders (Paoli & Donati, 2014).
In Italy such persecutions have been possible according to Act 376/2000 of the Italian legislation, which criminalizes three type of doping offenses: the first two concern both athletes and their support personnel for procuring, administrating, assuming, or even encouraging the use of doping substances and methods (art 9, section 1 - 2), the third concerns the suppliers who trade doping substances outside the official distribution channels. (Art 9, section 7) Imprisonment from 3 months to 6 years and fine from 2,580€ to 77,468€ are the sanctions foreseen for misbehaviors, with aggravating circumstances for components of sport federations and those practicing a health profession (Ministero della Salute, 2008). All law enforcement officers and experts agree that the introduction of wide-ranging anti-doping criminal provisions with Act 376/2000 boosted criminal investigations on doping (Paoli & Donati, 2014).
Outside Italy and few other countries like Sweden, Germany and Australia, doping is not persecuted by criminal law, and even in those countries where it is persecuted by the law, they only recognize the illegal trade in doping products, but not an athlete’s use of performance-enhancing products, as a criminal offense (Paoli and Donati, 2014). Therefore, its application could be widened, recognizing the use of doping as a fraud and designing the punishments in order to create ex-ante dis-incentives to dope.
An important aspect is the need to harmonize the laws across countries, and to simplify the bureaucracy needed. The heterogeneity of national criminal legislation on doping matters makes it difficult for prosecutor to request investigate act from a foreign counterpart. He (or she) has to submit a letter to the Ministry of Justice, which then translates the letter and sends it to its counterpart in the selected country; the latter ministry finally forwards it to the prosecutor’s office with jurisdiction. The answers, if sent at all, also go through the same lengthy procedure (Paoli & Donati, 2014). Therefore, all countries should pass appropriate legislation on the basis of a standardized model so as to facilitate international police and judicial cooperation. Another option to increase the efficiency of the criminal persecution of doping could be the establishment of prosecutor’s offices specialized in doping or health-related offenses, like the ones established in the German states of Bavaria (2009) and Baden-Württemberg (2011). The records of the older Bavarian prosecutor’s office demonstrate the veritable leaps forward in the criminal prosecution of doping that can be achieved when a specialized team is set up (Graber, 2011).

Conclusion In this study the institutional framework of the cycling world has been explored on all its levels, focusing on the doping related aspects, in order to find eventual lack of consistency or space for improvements for achieving the goal of a level-playing field in professional cycling competitions. Despite realizing that the establishment of the WADA, together with the introduction of its WADC, already represented a big step toward a doping-free world, few more policies could be implemented, which would contribute to the achievement of our goal.
The diffusion of the use of doping among the youngest cyclists witnessed by our interviewee, Simeoni and Dekker, revealed the need to create public awareness about the side effects of doping through social campaigns or other anti-doping educational programs. This could refrain some uninformed athletes from the choice to dope, or at least encourage them to do it under the supervision of a doctor, decreasing the health costs of the doping phenomenon.
Both severity and frequency of punishments have a very significant effect on the doping choice of the athlete, and so their application could be widened. However, while an increase in the frequency of the tests would entail higher costs of the anti-doping policies, the severity of the punishment can be increased with the introduction of fees for misbehavers. So far, athletes found guilty of doping are only obligated to return eventual prices received and eventually serve a sentence, but the monetary penalty is too low.
The list of prohibited substances could be reduced, including only those substances, which have an actual performance-enhancing effect. Both Simeoni, and Paoli and Donati (2014) argued that most of the drugs included have barely any effect on performance. Removing them would simplify the testing process for the officers carrying them out, and would avoid the manipulation of doping cases of little relevance.
Finally, applying criminal law to doping cases could increase efficiency in the war against doping, by criminalizing the use of doping, other than the trade of doping products, and harmonizing the different legislations in force around the world. Persecuting doping criminally is much cheaper than relying on doping tests, as has been shown during the 2006 Olympic games of Turin. Moreover, forbidden practices, which are not detectable through doping tests, e.g. blood transfusions, become potentially detectable by officials. The effectiveness and efficiency of criminal persecution can be farther improved with the establishment of specialized prosecutors’ offices, following the example of the German states of Bavaria (2009) and Baden-Württemberg (2011).

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Appendix A. Interview with Filippo Simeoni.

Hi Filippo. We know you have been a professional cyclist between 2000 and 2008, is that correct? What is, in short, your professional history?

I became a professional cyclist in 1995 with the legendary Carrera team of the 80s 90s, captained by Pantani and Chiappucci. Started as a reserve, I slowly became more important for the team until 2000, when I achieved my first important victory as a professional cyclist in Civitanova, in the region of Marche, Italy. During my career I collected 10 victories in different races around the world: Cina, Luxemburg, Germany, Italy and Austria. I attended 2 world championships, 2 Tour de Frances, 5 Giro d’Italia and 5 Vuelta de Espana. More about my career on Wikipedia.

Sports victories are often strived to at the cost of sportsmen’s integrity, reputation, health, security, or even life. When did you meet doping for the first time?

The first time I met doping was unfortunately at the amateur category, before I became a professional cyclist. It was a very soft impact, but I realized very soon that I had to accept certain practices (among which taking doping substances) in order to compete or impose my self at the highest levels.

In 2002 you admitted to have used doping, denouncing the wrongdoings of doctor Ferrari, and with him Lance Armstrong. Can you tell us something more about that story? What was the reaction of the cycling world to your declarations?

In 2002 I was listen to as a witness in the trial against the medical trainer Michele Ferrari, who was taking care of many champions of that period, among which Lance Armstrong. Personally, with honesty and transparency, I assumed my responsibilities and I confirmed what I already said: in order to compete at the highest levels, the doctor suggested and prescribed me doping substances, which improved performance and recovery. EPO is the substance we are talking about, and it’s the substance that has shaped sportive results for more than 20 years. The cycling world did not react well to my deposition and I have suffered great humiliations. They tried to picture me as a liar, a non-reliable person. My professional career has not been easy from that moment, because the world of professional cycling, and sport in general, was not ready for a radical change in the matter of doping.

In 2012 the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) processed the Postal Service Pro Cycling (USPS) Team, captained by Armstrong, for a conspiracy “professionally designed to groom and pressure athletes to use dangerous drugs, to evade detection, to ensure its secrecy and ultimately gain an unfair competitive advantage through superior doping practices…organized by individuals who still play a major and active role in sport today”. Probably it was a nice revenge for you. But why, in your opinion, it took so long to the institutions to detect such wrong doings? How do they avoid controls?

The process of lance Armstrong and the US Postal team by the USADA occurred when I had lost every hope. My career was already finished, but it has been an historic and important moment for future generations, because a very sophisticated and complex doping system was unmasked. A system that many people knew but nobody was able to unmask. Unfortunately the institutions governing cycling have not been able to deal with the issue for many years; some representatives of such institutions have also been involved in this ill system of doping, and that contributed to lose many years in the war against doping. Recent investigations have shown that leaders of world cycling have favored the system of doping and it has been a terrible error, led by economic and personal motivations.

According to Danilo di Luca’s interview, it is not possible to be competitive or win important races without using performance-enhancing drugs, and every cyclist must face this issue during its career. Do you agree with di Luca’s statement?

The case of di Luca occurred when things were already changing for the better. During the last years, in fact, after the many humiliating scandals involving the world of cycling, the attention of the institutions has increased and the behavior of Di Luca has been quite superficial, if not silly. Nowadays, I do believe in cycling without doping. The real problem is to restore credibility after many years of scandals.

Have you ever been pressured by your colleagues or other members of your team to use any kind of doping?

I have never received pressures to use doping. Sometimes suggestions or consultations, but never pressures.

You have won the Italian Championship in 2008; did you use any substance or methods forbidden by the World Anti-Doping Code? Why (not)? Which ones?

After the deposition of 2002 for the trial against doctor Ferrari, my view of cycling and sport has changed so I refused doping. I worked hard, I made sacrifices, sometimes inhuman, but I have shown that it is possible to win, also without doping, and the victory of the Italian championship has been the practical prove.

Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern Olympic Games, said: ’The important thing in life is not the triumph, but the fight; the essential thing is not to have won, but to have fought well.’ As noble a goal as this is, it has little to do with the reality of modern sports world. Do you think there are such values in professional cycling?

I think the words of Baron Pierre de Coubertin must be taken as an example, to restore those values that sport embodies. For many years, unfortunately, sport has lost some of its basic values, but the young guys, the future generations, must absolutely rediscover such values to restore credibility in sport.

What percentage of cyclist, approximately, uses doping?

The issue of doping in cycling is very complex. Currently in the professional world it has decreased considerably, since tests are better target and precise. There will always be somebody trying to cheat, thinking to be smarter, but the percentage of cheaters is very small. The real problem involves the world of amateur cycling, since it is out of control and it is unmanageable due to the huge number of members subscribed. There doping is very common and most dangerous, since it is practiced beyond professional structures by pseudo-doctors.

We often read about anabolic agents, growth factors, diuretics, blood transfusions; what is the most common method to enhance performance according to your personal experience?

There are many different doping substances available, but I think that many of them don’t have a real effect on the body, rather they work on a psychological level. At the same time there are substances like EPO which improve the oxygenation of the blood , or anabolic, which have a considerable effect on the muscles, or the practice of blood transfusion, they all have evident effects on the performance of the athlete. However if they are not scheduled professionally, their effect could be different than expected. Thus, the doping substance, combined with a particular professional training increase the performance of the athlete.

What do you know about side effects of doping? Do you think most cyclists are concerned about it?

For what concerns the side effects of doping substances, unfortunately when you are young you are not mature enough to fully understand the risks you are taking. Personally, I was always quite documented about the side effects of the substances I was taking, and I was always advised by a doctor, while unfortunately I witnessed people abusing of some substances, without caring of the advises of the doctors, and that is definitely more dangerous.

Are the size of the prize and the number of competitors important factors shaping the decision of athletes to use doping?

The existence of doping is due to the nature of the human being that makes him always strive for victories and money. For the athlete, victory represents supremacy, power and economic incomes, thus in an environment where you are valued for your athletic performance it is easily understandable that the athlete is persuaded by the use of doping.

In 2013 the International Cycling Union (UCI) commenced an in-depth reform, delegating to the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation (CADF) the duty to define and implement the rider testing strategies, in order to avoid conflict of interests. Do you think these reforms will be enough to guarantee fairness, and restore credibility in professional cycling?

In my opinion, lately the world of doping, together with its institutions have been doing a great job. Actually cycling became the sport symbol of the war against doping, since the number of controls and methodology adopted to make doping tests have been improving a lot, hence keeping on this trend the credibility, compromised by the many doping scandals, can be restored. It is worth mentioning also the surprise checks out-of-competition and the full-time availability required to the athletes, which have to inform about their movements. They both contributed considerably in tackling the phenomenon of doping.

Hein Verbruggen, head of International Cycling Federation has suggested that “undetectable drugs are 90 percent of estimated doping cases.” In light of that, do you think it is possible to create a level playing field free of doping in professional cycling? Is liberalization of doping a better alternative?

I think that the most important doping substances, which actually have important effects the performance of the athlete, are all detectable at the doping tests. Then there are hundreds of substances considered doping that have arguably any effect on the performance. In my opinion for them the institutions could consider to increase the tolerance, in order to avoid the manipulation of doping cases of little relevance.

You are now leading a cycling school for kids in Sezze called “Pirata” in honor of Marco Pantani. What can these kids learn from the story of “il pirata”?

The experience in the world of cycling changed me a lot, both as a cyclist and as a human. The creation of a school of cycling named to Marco Pantani, with the help of many friends, which have been impressive for their effort and morality, is to teach young cyclists to practice sport in a clean and healthy way. Cycling gave me a lot, thus sharing my experience and the one of Marco Pantani could be important to let them grow as cyclists and as men.

Appendix B. Interview Axel Dekker.

Hi Axel. We know you are a semi-professional cyclist, is that correct? What is, in short, your professional history?

My history is based on 8 years of cycling where I learned a lot of new and important stuff to get to the point where I had some chances to turn pro. I raced years for my hometown team, where my father was the team manager, and where I learned how to ride in a team, finish races and be the last and second last man in the sprints.
My passion for cycling kept strong with all the doping discussions because I was mainly in Cyclo-Cross, a discipline of cycling.

This part of cycling has never really been in the dope news, because it’s a race of maximum an hour. This hour is so intensive and strikes on your power and strength that dope is not really necessary. I don’t know why nobody tried to use it, (some people did and got banned) but there was not a big organized dope story in my time of riding with the juniors and U23 category in cyclo-cross. We did had one guy, Ben Berden, that had the pressure of surviving the selections for teams because he wasn’t the best, and wanted to survive the selections.

In my second year with the Cyclo-cross team I got asked to use some stuff to maintain the core value of my muscles, telling me that it was just as the other ‘stuff’ that was allowed. After a while it got more and more and at a certain point in my short career as a pro I got the question to use dope to actually win those races where I got 4th or 8th.

At that point I wasn’t sure about what to say. I never would have think of dope or anything in this way, and then it was there. It was my chance to win, but also to ruin my life and cheat. I never would have thought that it would happen to me, and I would never ever take dope in a competition. I was done with cycling and I started another period of my life. I was still in the team, but went to the amateur level of cycling, where everything was a lot easier. People don’t train 24/7 and they have kids, jobs and other lives next to cycling.

I felt that the doping was too close to me, and I realized that many people use it, and that this issue is bigger than everyone knows. I am not saying that everybody in the sport uses doping. But I am never surprised when someone comes out of the box and confesses.

Sports victories are often strived to at the cost of sportsmen’s integrity, reputation, health, security, or even life. When did you meet doping for the first time?

When I was in the U23 category at the age of 19. I started my second year in the team and I got asked to improve my races by taking some ‘good stuff’. Obviously we all used to take the drugs that weren’t on the dope list and were legal. It was just to keep your body focused and fit after hard days of training. I started to feel uncomfortable about it and tried to talk about it with my parents. They didn’t think that the chance of taking dope would be there, and they said that I should have bailed the team.

It is common knowledge that there is a lot of doping in the sporting world. A lot of football players take doping substances, but the news will never talk about them. The same happens in tennis. When a tennis player gets caught on dope, the only thing that happens is that a player is suspended for several months. They say that he is injured or that he is having a break, but research founded that they are expelled from playing by the organizational league.

To sum up, I met doping the first time when I was 19 years old in a professional education team meant to train and develop young talent to higher levels. The conclusion is definitely that doping is there in the early stages of an athlete’s career.

In 2012 the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) processed the Postal Service Pro Cycling (USPS) Team, captained by Armstrong, for a conspiracy “professionally designed to groom and pressure athletes to use dangerous drugs, to evade detection, to ensure its secrecy and ultimately gain an unfair competitive advantage through superior doping practices…organized by individuals who still play a major and active role in sport today”. Why, in your opinion, it took so long to the institutions to detect such wrong doings? How do they avoid controls?

I think we are far behind in the detection of dope. I know that old team riders avoided problems with doping checks by taking the next level stuff. The research by the institutions towards doping is far behind the development of new drugs. They can’t find it, cause teams are far ahead of the rest. Lance Armstrong had power and was a great, powerful, and also smart cyclist. He cheated, but he was still the best of the cheaters.

I think the structure of the organization of doping in the USPS team was impressive but predictable. They spent millions of dollars to bribe the UCI and USADA, so I find it hypocritical that now the USADA comes out with this story. Lance Armstrong is for me one of the most impressive bike riders there has ever been.

According to Danilo di Luca’s (2007 winner of Giro d’Italia banned from professional cycling competition for doping) interview, it is not possible to be competitive or win important races without using performance-enhancing drugs, and every cyclist must face this issue during its career. Do you agree with di Luca’s statement?

I think with the difficulty of races, and the level where cycling is on, thanks to doping, a lot of cyclist need to still get better and take doping. It is their job, and for 90% of the professional cyclist it is the only thing they have. If you need to feed your children and need to survive the hard life of cycling you need to be a good cyclist. And from the way cycling is developing, it’s difficult to imagine it without doping. I think there is a lot of stuff in the cycling world that needs to be corrected, and I think a lot of riders you wouldn’t expect, actually dope. If only one of the top 10 bikers takes doping, the others cannot compete.

Have you ever been pressured by your colleagues or other members of your team to use any kind of doping?

Yes. It was a structured worked out plan with a budget. The team that I raced for had doping and they offered it to me, and I have a contract stating that I can’t say anything about it.
I think it is not really where you ride, rather it’s a matter of category. If you are having a team where it is possible to win continental or pro-continental stage races there is doping. I believe some people have the talent to win without the use of doping. That is a talent not a lot of riders have.

Have you ever used any substance or methods forbidden by the World Anti-Doping Code? Why (not)? Which ones?

No. I stopped cycling because I didn’t wanted to and my team didn’t support that. I think it is the most un-respectful thing to do towards the sport and people you love. If you really love your sport you don’t cheat like that. Not for me.

Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern Olympic Games, said: ’The important thing in life is not the triumph, but the fight; the essential thing is not to have won, but to have fought well.’ As noble a goal as this is, it has little to do with the reality of modern sports world. Do you think there are such values in professional cycling?

I think the main goal in Cycling is to win as much races as possible. That will always be the goal of a cyclist. Winning is the most beautiful thing you can get. But I experienced how it is to finish a really hard race and be happy to ride over the finish. The main example that I can give is a cobble stone race 3 years ago. I started to develop myself towards professional levels and tried to get higher in the rankings. I was invited to ride a cobble stone race in Drenthe where there are a lot of hard cobble stone tracks. I was riding for the team and our main sprinter Robin Wennekes. We were all day keeping him in the front group. After 70 kilometers we lost 5 of the 8 team riders. For me it was a matter of surviving because the pace was the highest average I ever experienced. 30km before the finish I was looking around and saw my teammate Robin crashing hard. After that point everybody dropped out of the race. I wanted to recover and finish the race properly. When we crossed the finish there were 25 riders left. A good friend won the race and I sprinted to the 13th place. I didn’t even think of sprinting, I just wanted to finish. Afterwards I laid down for 50 minutes in the grass, recovering from what for me was the most intense cycling experience ever. The feeling of finishing was the best feeling I had in ages.

So I think if you keep your mind set towards your goal, and learn to appreciate the achievement of such goals, even if they do not entail winning an important race but rather finishing it, it is possible to see the best aspect of sport, where its values are embodied.

What percentage of cyclist, approximately, uses doping?

Political correct answer: More then we can think of. I think there are a lot of riders that can do it without dope, but there isn’t a big group of riders clean anymore. In my experience I learnt that there are a lot of riders using doping, and every rider knows it because the Hotel life is small and full of ears.

We often read about anabolic agents, growth factors, diuretics, blood transfusions; what is the most common method to enhance performance according to your personal experience?

There is a lot of research on Internet that tells you what kind of doping there is. The most common things now a days and within the last 5 years: EPO, Testosterone Boosters, hCG, homologous transfusion, Cera, Steroid, MIRCERA, Heptaminol, DHEA, insulin, IGF-1 and Blood Transfusion.

What do you know about side effects of doping? Do you think most cyclists are concerned about it?

I think they do, but the pleasure of winning a competition overtakes it. We all know drugs are bad, and they are not good for your health and body. So why would you do it? Winning is the most beautiful thing a cyclist can have. We love it, we live for it and we want it over and over again. What we do is train and work for results. I think at a certain point they get blind and start focusing on winning and nothing else.

Are the size of the prize and the number of competitors important factors shaping the decision of athletes to use doping?

Yes, I think the prizes that can be won within racing are of high value to survive and live your own life. They don’t get paid millions like football players. The paycheck you get when riding for a small team are not enough to live from. You need to win races to get better paid. I think the struggle to keep up with the dopers is too hard not to use any. You can easily see the difference between a doper and a clean rider. I don’t want to say that Chris Froome used dope, but the way he rode up the mountain in the last year at the Tour de France was unbelievable.

In 2013 the International Cycling Union (UCI) commenced an in-depth reform, delegating to the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation (CADF) the duty to define and implement the rider testing strategies, in order to avoid conflict of interests. Do you think these reforms will be enough to guarantee fairness, and restore credibility in professional cycling?

I think that it is good that they give more pressure onto the riders. They make clear that they are working on improvement, and try to make sure that riders wont use doping anymore. I think it is a good sign for the outer world, but that riders will not be scared to keep using it. The doping structure is so complicated and is way further then UCI en CADF. It is a good way to try to restore structure into cycling, but it will not give a structural meaning towards the controlling. There is already a good structure with the whereabouts and the on house controls. I hope it will come with a better-structured way to check on doping. But for now there is not a structured way to make sure that it doesn’t happen anymore.

Hein Verbruggen, head of International Cycling Federation has suggested that “undetectable drugs are 90 percent of estimated doping cases.” In light of that, do you think it is possible to create a level playing field free of doping in professional cycling? Is liberalization of doping a better alternative?

It is like hackers. People think they have programs that can’t be hacked, but in the real world hackers come into everything and are far ahead.

There will not be a doping free cycling world, but in my opinion liberalization is not a really smart idea. Doping is dangerous, and can kill you. I think the use of doping will never disappear, and will kill the sport even further.

The stupid part of the whole doping problem is that it focuses too much on cycling. Football, ice-skating, basketball, American football, tennis and many more sports have doping, but the focus stays on cycling. I don’t get it, and the rest of the world and media should think twice before they start judging again and again. The sport will be killed if it keeps on going like this. And yes there are a lot of cyclists that make this problem worse and bigger. People like Di Luca and Ricco are not banned for life for nothing.

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[ 1 ]. In an economic model, an exogenous change is one that comes from outside the model and is unexplained by the model. Thus an exogenous variable is something given, which is independent of all other response values (Studenmund, 2005).
[ 2 ]. The fundamental principle of the Athlete Biological Passport is to monitor selected biological variables over time that indirectly reveal the effects of doping rather than attempting to detect the doping substance or method itself (WADA, 2014).
[ 3 ]. The Legal Anti-Doping Service intervenes when a case of an apparent breach of anti-doping rules is reported to it, in particular by the CADF, and takes responsibility for the procedure that can result in the sanction of the rider in question (UCI, 2014).
[ 4 ]. The bounds of σ are decreasing in the relative cost of doping, c=CW, where c is costs of doping and w is utility of winning. See Berentsen (2002)
[ 5 ]. Besides actual dopers in a particular year, this data also includes the potential dopers who have been found guilty for using doping during their whole cycling career.
[ 6 ]. The doping scandal concerning mainly Festina and TVM cycling teams. All riders of Festina team had confessed the usage of different doping substances (including EPO) at the 1998 Tour de France.
[ 7 ]. The p-value of 0.130 is higher than the chosen threshold of 0.05 (5%). Therefore, the null hypothesis of “prize money has no effect on the number of dopers” is confirmed.
[ 8 ]. The null hypothesis of ”prize money has no effect of on the number of dopers” is rejected in favor of alternative hypothesis of “prize money has an effect on the number of dopers”, because the p-value of 0.035 is below the chosen threshold of 0.05.
[ 9 ]. In order to find the amount of prize money which changes the number of dopers by 1, the inverse of the magnitude of the effect of prize money on the number of dopers was used: 1/0.0000441=22,675.74€.
[ 10 ]. The Independent Observer (IO) Team at the Tour de France was a multinational group made up of representatives possessing a variety of expertise in anti-doping. (WADA, 2010).
[ 11 ]. Previous report of independent observers was performed in 2003 and lacked the statistics.
[ 12 ]. License-Holder is the individual exercising the professional activity in cycling and in any event for members of a team registered with UCI
[ 13 ]. The spot exchange rate of € to CHF was retrieved on 15th June. S2014, June 15(€/CHF)=0.82117€/1 CHF.
[ 14 ]. Number of dopers is chosen as a dependent variable, whereas dummy variable WADA is an explanatory variable. Dummy variable “WADA” takes the value of 1 if the observations are after 2004, otherwise it equals 0.
[ 15 ]. p-value of 0.00 is lower than the chosen threshold of 0.05 (5%). Thus, the null hypothesis of “existence of the WADA code has no impact on the number of dopers” is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis of “existence of the WADA has an impact on the number of dopers”.
[ 16 ]. 28.2042 is a coefficient of the relationship between the variable “number of dopers” and the dummy “WADA”, which can be found on Table 4.
[ 17 ]. By symmetric, it is meant that both cyclists initially are equally strong.
[ 18 ]. However, we acknowledge the fact, that the famous cyclists have other sources of income, such as numerous advertising contracts. These contracts constitute the biggest share of income for these cyclists.
[ 19 ]. The prisoners' dilemma is a classical example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two purely "rational" individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.
[ 20 ]. Exchange spot rate of € to $ in March, 2005: Smarch, 2005(€/$)=0.757765€/1$. See http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=USD&to=EUR&year=2005
[ 21 ]. 0.0998384127/0.0087=11.4756796.
[ 22 ]. 0.10694680111/0.0087=12.2927368.
[ 23 ]. See section 2.3.
[ 24 ]. See table 6 for comparison.
[ 25 ]. The p-value of 0.004 is below the chosen threshold of 0.05 (5%). Thus, the null hypothesis of “there is no impact of the number of participants on the number of dopers” is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis of “there is impact of the number of participants on the number of dopers”.
[ 26 ]. In order to find the incremental change in the number of dopers, the inverse of the coefficient of the effect of the number of participants on the number of dopers is used, 1/0.3732=2.6794.
[ 27 ]. Smarch, 2005(€/$)=0.757765€/1$.
See http://www.xrates.com/average/?from=USD&to=EUR&year=2005