Introduction
From the late 1960s through the 1970s, America struggled with the legal status of surveillance under the Fourth Amendment (Cetina 2013). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) became necessary in the 1970s after turmoil surrounding the legality of various domestic intelligence activities, especially that of President Richard Nixon’s usage of federal resources to spy on political and activist groups. In response to these conflicts in 1978 FISA was created (Banks 2007). FISA essentially regulated and authorized electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers in the United States. FISA Court was created to setup a standard set of rules while obliging by government’s need to obtain surveillance orders secretly and as quickly as possible. However as a result of our changing world FISA has become a drastically more complicated law than when it was originally passed in 1978, and the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has accordingly grown far beyond the bounds of what government envisioned when the law was created (Blum 2008). FISA has proven to be troublesome in multiple ways for both intelligence gathering agencies, and those concerned with its potential violation of the 4th Amendment and various privacy concerns. It has proved to be a bureaucratic burden for intelligence gathering agencies, but also increased scrutiny from the public about concerns surrounding the 4th Amendment. The best way to revive balance between keeping American safe from foreign threats and the constitutional viability of foreign intelligence surveillance is to forego the FISA warrant procedure completely (Blum 2008; Feingold 2008). These problems will be discussed, and how the best solution may be to rid the intelligence community of FISA procedure altogether as this may be the most beneficiary for both those in the