“Clear thinking requires peace of mind rather than intelligence.” ~Meredith Forder …
When it comes to making the right choices in life, mere intelligence will not guarantee the best result. This fact is exemplified by the problems of obesity, anxiety, stress, addictions and depression among highly intelligent people.
At Clear Thinking we believe that many of life’s problems can be solved by simply learning how to think clearly—how to keep your mind calm, focused and within your control.

Critical thinking...the awakening of the intellect to the study of itself.
Critical thinking is a rich concept that has been developing throughout the past 2500 years. The term "critical thinking" has its roots in the mid-late 20th century. We offer here overlapping definitions, together which form a substantive, transdisciplinary conception of critical thinking.

Critical Thinking as Defined by the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking, 1987
A statement by Michael Scriven & Richard Paul, presented at the 8th Annual International Conference on Critical Thinking and Education Reform, Summer 1987.
Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness.
Language is the human capacity for acquiring and using complex systems ofcommunication, and a lanThe English word "language" derives ultimately from Indo-European *dn̥ǵʰwéh₂s "tongue, speech, language" through Latin lingua, "language; tongue", and Old French langage "language".[3] The word is sometimes used to refer to codes, ciphers, and other kinds ofartificially constructed communication systems such as those used for computer programming. A language in this sense is a system ofsigns for encoding and decoding information. This article specifically concerns the properties of natural human language as it is studied in the discipline of linguistics.
As an object of linguistic study, "language" has two primary meanings: an abstract concept, and a specific linguistic system, e.g. "French". The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who defined the modern discipline of linguistics, first explicitly formulated the distinction using the French word langage for language as a concept, langue as a specific instance of a language system, and parolefor the concrete usage of speech in a particular language.[4]
When speaking of language as a general concept, definitions can be used which stress different aspects of the phenomenon.[5] These definitions also entail different approaches and understandings of language, and they inform different and often incompatible schools of linguistic theory.[6] guage is any specific example of such a system. The scientific study of language is called linguistics.
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Language origin hypotheses[edit]
Early speculations[edit]
I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification, aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries.— Charles Darwin, 1871. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.[35]
In 1861, historical linguist Max Müller published a list of speculative theories concerning the origins of spoken language:[36] * Bow-wow. The bow-wow or cuckoo theory, which Müller attributed to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, saw early words as imitations of the cries of beasts and birds. * Pooh-pooh. The Pooh-Pooh theory saw the first words as emotional interjections and exclamations triggered by pain, pleasure, surprise and so on. * Ding-dong. Müller suggested what he called the Ding-Dong theory, which states that all things have a vibrating natural resonance, echoed somehow by man in his earliest words. * Yo-he-ho. The yo-he-ho theory saw language emerging out of collective rhythmic labour, the attempt to synchronise muscular effort resulting in sounds such as heave alternating with sounds such as ho. * Ta-ta. This did not feature in Max Müller's list, having been proposed in 1930 by Sir Richard Paget.[37] Accordin

Tower of Babel hypothesis[edit]
It has been suggested that language might have evolved partly to block communication, to set one's own tribe aside from contamination from the others.[70] This is connected with the Code-talker paradox, the Tower of Babel story, and is not inconsistent with the mother-tongue, grooming within the tribe, and incest avoidance hypotheses described above.
Gestural theory[edit]
The gestural theory states that human language developed from gestures that were used for simple communication.
Mirror neurons and language origins[edit]
In humans, functional MRI studies have reported finding areas homologous to the monkey mirror neuron system in the inferior frontal cortex, close to Broca's area, one of the hypothesized language regions of the brain. This has led to suggestions that human language evolved from a gesture performance/understanding system implemented in mirror neurons. Mirror neurons have been said to have the potential to provide a mechanism for action-understanding, imitation-learning, and the simulation of other people's behaviour.[80] This hypothesis is supported by some cytoarchitectonic homologies between monkey premotor area F5 and human Broca's area.[81] Rates of vocabulary expansion link to the ability of children to vocally mirror non-words and so to acquire the new word pronunciations. Suchspeech repetition occurs automatically, quickly[82] and separately in the brain to speech perception.[83][84] Moreover such vocal imitation can occur without comprehension such as in speech shadowing[85] and echolalia.[86]
Grammaticalisation theory[edit]
'Grammaticalisation' is a continuous historical process in which free-standing words develop into grammatical appendages, while these in turn become ever more specialised and grammatical. An initially 'incorrect' usage, in becoming accepted, leads to unforeseen consequences, triggering knock-on effects and extended sequences of change. Paradoxically, grammar evolves because, in the final analysis, humans care less about grammatical niceties than about making themselves understood.[91] If this is how grammar evolves today, according to this school of thought, we can legitimately infer similar principles at work among our distant ancestors, when grammar itself was first being established.[92][93][94]
Self-domesticated ape theory[edit]
According to a study investigating the song differences between white-rumped Munias and its domesticated counterpart (Bengalese finch), the wild munias use a highly stereotyped song sequence, whereas the domesticated ones sing a highly unconstrained song. In wild finches, song syntax is subject to female preference - sexual selection - and remains relatively fixed. However, in the Bengalese finch, natural selection is replaced by breeding, in this case for colorful plumage, and thus, decoupled from selective pressures, stereotyped song syntax is allowed to drift. It is replaced, within 1000 generations, by a variable and learned sequence. Wild finches, moreover, are incapable of learning song sequences from other finches.[103]
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Cognitive development and language[edit]
One of the intriguing abilities that language users have is that of high-level reference, or the ability to refer to things or states of being that are not in the immediate realm of the speaker. This ability is often related to theory of mind, or an awareness of the other as a being like the self with individual wants and intentions. According to Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch (2002), there are six main aspects of this high-level reference system: * Theory of mind * Capacity to acquire nonlinguistic conceptual representations, such as the object/kind distinction * Referential vocal signals * Imitation as a rational, intentional system * Voluntary control over signal production as evidence of intentional communication * Number representation
Theory of mind[edit]
Simon Baron-Cohen (1999) argues that theory of mind must have preceded language use, based on evidence of use of the following characteristics as much as 40,000 years ago: intentional communication, repairing failed communication, teaching, intentional persuasion, intentional deception, building shared plans and goals, intentional sharing of focus or topic, and pretending. Moreover, Baron-Cohen argues that many primates show some, but not all, of these abilities. Call and Tomasello’s research on chimpanzeessupports this, in that individual chimps seem to understand that other chimps have awareness, knowledge, and intention, but do not seem to understand false beliefs. Many primates show some tendencies toward a theory of mind, but not a full one as humans have. Ultimately, there is some consensus within the field that a theory of mind is necessary for language use. Thus, the development of a full theory of mind in humans was a necessary precursor to full language use.
Vagueness
What does it mean to say that a concept, term, or phrase is vague? Let's start with some examples and then try for an elucidation of the concept. "Tall" is a good example of a vague concept. Some humans are definitely not tall--Danny DeVito, for example. Others definitely are tall--Shaquille O'Neal, for one. But the term "tall" is vague. 5'11 is almost definitely tall for a woman in the United Sates, but might be a borderline case for men. "Tall" is not the sort of quality for which there are definite criteria that sort the world into "tall" things and "not tall" things. In other words, "tall" is vague.
There are lot's of terms that are like tall: short, strong, weak, beautiful, ugly, heavy, light, warm, and cool--all of these are terms that seem to have borderline cases. And that is one way that we might define vagueness. A term is vague, we might say, if and only if it has borderline cases. A term is not vague just in case it has no borderline cases.
As you might guess, the fact of vagueness creates a variety of issues in the philosophy of language. Is vagueness built into the fabric of the universe? Or is vagueness merely a feature of the imprecision of human language? Is vagueness a property of things? Or is it a property of our knowledge of things? We won't worry about these deep questions. For the purposes of this rough and ready introduction, it is sufficient simply to see that there are such problems and that a philosophical theory of vagueness should propose to answers to them or show that they aren't true problems at all.
Ambiguity
What about "ambiguity"? A concept, term, or phrase is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning. Take "cool" for example. One meaning of "cool" has to do with temperature, and in this sense, "cool" contrasts with "warm," "cold," and "hot." Another meaning of "cool" has to do with fashion and social attractiveness. And there are other senses of cool as well, as in, he kept his cool in a very pressured situation.
In a particular context, the meaning of an ambiguous term may be clear. With just a bit more context, the sentence "He's one cool dude" is likely to refer to social attractiveness and not temperature. But in some contexts, the ambiguity may be difficult to resolve: "The mojito is a cool drink" could refer either to the fact that mojitos are served chilled or to the fact that mojitos are fashionable and popular among some social groups.
And this last example, "cool" can be used to illustrate the fact that the same term can be both vague and ambiguous in the same context. If I say, "Bring me a cool drink!", my utterance may be both ambiguous--do I mean fashionable or coldish?--and vague--how far below room temperature is "cool" or are mojitos still "cool" or are
Interpretation of Vague or Ambiguous Texts
Now that we have a basic grasp of vagueness and ambiguity, we are in a position to see that each of these two concepts has a role to play in a theory of the interpretation of legal texts.
Many legal texts are vague. In fact, most law students become very familiar with a variety of vague terms early in their law school careers. Take "reasonable"--was the tort defendant's conduct "reasonable" under the circumstances? There will be clear cases of unreasonable conduct: driving 150 mph in a residential area. But there will also be borderline cases. Was it reasonable to drive at 55 mph in a light fog?
Some legal language general, abstract, and vague. For example, the phrase "equal protection" in the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution might refer to a very general and abstract idea of equality. Given this generality and abstraction, it might be that the "borderline" cases seem to make up the whole of equal protection doctrine. What would count as a clear example of "equal" or of "unequal"? In a common law system, general and abstract language may be translated into relatively more particular and concrete rules through case-by-case adjudication.
Vagueness is ubiquitous in the law, and frequently legal actors (courts and others who apply the law) must resolve borderline cases. Every law student is familiar with the strategies that are employed, which include case-by-case balancing tests, supplementary doctrines that provide bright-line rules to implement vague legal texts, and so forth.
Ambiguity may be less common, because many potentially ambiguous terms or phrases are disambiguated by context. "Seizure" can refer to a physical taking or it can refer to a medical symptom, but in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, it is clear that the correct meaning is the former rather than the latter.

Relationship to the Interpretation-Construction Distinction
The distinction between vagueness and ambiguity is related to the interpretation-construction distinction--discussed in a separate entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon. Roughly, the distinction is that interpretation of a text aims at recovering its linguistic meaning or semantic content. Construction involves the "tranlation" of the semantic content into legal content: we we construe a legal text we formulating legal rules that enable application of the text to particular cases.
Interpretation and Ambiguity--In many cases, problems of interpretation involve ambiguity: a legal text uses a word with more than one meaning and the interpreter looks to context to resolve the ambiguity.
Construction and Vagueness--But when a text is vague, it is usually the case that interpretation cannot resolve the vagueness. Why not? Because interpretation only can take us as far as the meaning of the text: if the linguistic meaning is vague, then something else will be required if we must apply the text to a particular case. Construction allows legal actors (e.g., judges) to devise a supplementary rule or procedure that resolves the vagueness. Thus, a legal text may supply a vague standard ("freedom of speech"), but construction may yield a more particular rule ("no prior restraints"). (There is a Lexicon entry on rules, standards, and principles.)
Conclusion
"Vagueness" and "ambiguity" are important concepts in the theory of legal interpretation generally, and as a consequence, they are important to constitutional theory and the theory of statutory interpretation. I hope this Lexicon entry has clarified the distinction between these two concepts.
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Ambiguity vs. Vagueness in language (and, of course, Cree)
Posted on December 6, 2011by Mr. Môniyâw
Uh oh. Linguistics time. Get to cover!
A useful distinction you’ll learn if you ever take a semantics class – and you happen to have a semanticist who’s trying to teach you useful distinctions instead of HeimNKratzer 3.0 or whatever the latest flavor is – is the distinction between Ambiguity and Vagueness. * Ambiguous: A form or phrase that has two distinct meanings. * Vague: A form or phrase that has an under-defined meaning that is only clarified by context.
This is a good thing to understand. It will save you being a fool in arguments. It will make you a better lawyer. It will CHANGE. YOUR. LIFE. Well, okay, that last one definitely not, but I have to up-sell here. How else could I get grants, I ask you?
Let’s do ambiguity today. I’ll do vagueness at some later time. (Yes. That was intended to be intentionally vague. HUMOR! Linguist HUMOR! FUNN-NEE!)
Ambiguity
It’s easy to see ambiguity in English. For example, consider the following English sentence (a favorite of intro linguistics classes). 1. John saw the man with binoculars.
(We always use John and Mary. It’s terribly uncreative. I tried to use Darth Vader once, but the students didn’t know who that was. I got depressed about being very very old, and so I decided to drop cultural references entirely after that.)
This sentence can describe two entirely different situations – what we linguists mean when we say a sentence ‘means’ something. 1. Situation 1: John has binoculars, sees a man by using them. 2. Situation 2: John sees a man who is in possession of a pair of binoculars.
Since the sentence describes two entirely different situations (with respect to the binoculars), we say that the sentence is ambiguous. In particular, the phrase ‘with binoculars’ is ambiguous, since it’s the part that indicates two different situations (i.e. the seeing is done by John and done to the man in both cases).
Ambiguity can be at the phrase-level, like this, but it can also be at the level of words (or even smaller). A super-basic example is homophones, which English has tons of. 1. bat 2. ball
In these cases, the word (or at least, the very same sounds) means two very different kinds of things. For example, ‘bat’ can be a winged mammal or a stick of wood for hitting balls. ‘ball’ can be a round object that bounces or rolls or is thrown, or it can be a social event where everyone dances in fancy gowns.
There’s a LOT that could be said about ambiguity. For example, a discussion of the distinction between homophony (i.e. two words that accidentally share the same phonological form) or extension (i.e. a word that has one meaning but then is used in an extended sense; e.g. ‘see’ for both the act with the eyes and an act of comprehension with the mind). Linguists fight about whether to analyze something as homophony or extension quite a bit, actually. Mountains of paper are written on this topic.
Cool fact about ambiguity: There’s a neat-o little test you can do to see if a phrase or word is ambiguous or vague. If you add a second sentence that picks out the same phrase or word that matches in context, it ALSO has to match in meaning. 1. John saw a man with binoculars and so did Mary. 2. John bought a bat and so did Mary.
In both these cases, whatever interpretation you get out of the first phrase, you have to do to the second. If John was holding binoculars when he saw a man, then you’re saying Mary did, too. It can’t ever be the case that John saw the man by USING binoculars and Mary saw a man who HAD binoculars. They have to match. Same goes for ‘bat’ in that second one. If John bought a small flighty mammal, then Mary did, too. It can’t mean that John bought a flighty mammal and Mary bought baseball equipment.
Let’s talk about Cree for a second instead, shall we?
In Cree, you see quite a bit of ambiguity – a lot more than people may expect, given the massive amount of specification you get from all the rich morphemes. For example: 1. acimosis [ut-sih-mu-sis]
This word is built from two pieces: (i) atim, meaning ‘dog’ or ‘furry mammal that pulls our stuff’ (see earlier post) and (ii) -sis, meaning ‘diminutive.’ Now, it turns out that this -sis suffix is actually ambiguous. 1. acimosis: a dog of small size (e.g. a chihuahua) 2. acimosis: a young dog, a puppy
How do we KNOW this is ambiguity here? Well, first of all, there is a clear distinction – in the mind of the speaker – between a young dog and a miniature dog. A dog could be miniature but be old. A dog could be young but huge. Hence, the meanings contradict each other. Either John or the man have the binoculars. Either the dog is young or it’s miniature.
But the great thing about linguistics, as opposed to say, post-colonial literature, is that we have data. And we have tests. Let’s test that sentence with our pattern for ambiguity and see if it holds.
Are there things bigger than a single morpheme in Cree that are also ambiguous? Say, a whole phrase? Why yes indeedy-do. Much to the consternation of philosophers and computer scientists the world over, languages tend to love ambiguity. Some of us stranger sorts think this may actually be a design feature, rather than a design flaw. We can get into that some other time, though.
So what would an ambiguous phrase look like in Cree? Well, here’s one: 1. iskwêw kî-tohtêw amiskwâcîwaskahikanihk ohci.
This sentence can, if I understand, mean two different things. 1. A woman who lives in Edmonton came here (from somewhere). e.g. We are in Edmonton right now, and the woman (who is from here) was in Vancouver but has now come here. 2. A woman came here from Edmonton (she may live anywhere). e.g. The woman lives in Vancouver, we are all in Saskatoon, but she was in Edmonton visiting friends and is now here in Saskatoon.
It all boils down to whether we interpret the phrase ‘amiskwâcîwaskahikanihk ohci’ (‘from Edmonton’) as applying to the event of coming or to the person herself. It also, as far as I can telWhat do linguists think about ambiguity?
You knew we’d get to that eventually. We linguists love to ask ourselves what we think about things. We’re the navel-gazers of the empirical sciences. If you want self doubt and introspection, generally your best bet is a linguist. Don’t ask the engineering-oriented disciplines. They’re a bit hard-headed in that regard. Comes from building too many bombs, I guess.
If you think about it, the ambiguity of these phrases clearly relate to how you integrate them into the rest of the sentence. Do you take that phrase ‘with binoculars’ and slap it onto ‘the man’? Or do you slap it onto the whole chunk ‘saw the man’? You can represent this schematically in a tree, or with brackets. I can’t draw trees very easily on this stupid blog system, so you’ll just have to satisfy for brackets. 1. John used the binoculars = [John [[saw the man] with binoculars]] 2. The man had the binoculars = [John [saw [the man with binoculars]]]
So, to a linguist, the ambiguity here can be understood as an uncertainty about how to connect the phrase ‘with binoculars’ to the other preceding phrases. If you just stick it onto the phrase that comes immediately before it, you get a local modification and the man now possesses the binoculars. If you stick it onto the next bigger phrase, you get that the binoculars were used as a tool to accomplish the event of seeing the man. This is classic, basic syntax. Ambiguity of this kind is often treated as a syntactic underspecification.