113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE Nelson Nogot Moratalla*
I. INTRODUCTION This paper will present a condensed report on graft and corruption in the Philippines. Information was compiled by the author from documents, articles, newspaper clippings and other data gathered from the reports and journals of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, two of the constitutional bodies mandated by Philippine law to investigate and act on complaints filed against public officials and employees for violations of graft and corrupt practices. More specifically, this report will cover input from an unpublished research paper prepared by scholars from the University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, whom I will accordingly acknowledge in this work.1 This report will generally follow the outline as provided. The first portion will introduce the theoretical perspective and context of corruption in the Philippines. It clarifies the national context within which corruption operates. It will look into the intersection of corruption and Philippine history and culture. It will likewise discuss some public perceptions of corruption. Estimates of the extent and losses of corruption in the Philippines will be briefly discussed. The history of the Philippine
* Deputy Director / Dean of Academic, Philippine National Police Academy, Philippine Public Safety College, Philippines. 1 “Initiatives Taken Against Corruption: The Philippine Case”; unpublished paper prepared by Ledivina V. Cariño, University Professor and Dean, Gabriele R. Iglesias, Assistant Professor, and Ma. Fe V. Mendoza, Associate Professor, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

fight against corruption will be taken up i n t e r m s o f l a w, a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n constitutional bodies, and other government agencies and non-government initiatives. Finally, there will be an assessment of the anti-graft and corruption programs, and recommendations on what might be done in the light of Philippine democracy, culture and development. II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE We view corruption as an agent’s departure from the principal’s demand for the responsible use of power in society. As such, although it is centered on a public official’s act and is indicated by a violation of law, it does not involve the state alone. Rather, it is embroiled in the accountability of public officials, and indeed of the state, to the people. Thus, in analyzing and combating corruption, we look beyond the state. Corruption shows up what the society views as the responsible use of power and thus what it will accept and support. In this light, any attack against corruption must come to terms not only with the law, but also with the country’s history, ie what is accepted by the culture and the behavior of civil society as well.2 III. THE CONTEXT OF CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES In the late 1980’s, the Philippines entered the Guinness Book of World Records for allegedly the biggest corruption of all time, referring to the period of the dictatorship of the former President,
2

Ibid, “Initiatives Taken Against Corruption: The Philippines Case”; p.4

501

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos was ousted from his twenty-year presidency by a bloodless people’s power revolution in February 1986. To describe the corruption of his regime, “kleptocracy” and “plunder” became part of the Filipino’s political vocabulary and discourse.3 “Government by thievery” did not stop with the enactment of the Republic Act No. 7080 in 1991, entitled “An Act Defining Plunder”. Indeed, although both laws and agencies to combat corruption have increased in the post-Marcos period, it remains one of the prime problems complained of by the people. The currency and gravity of the problem are manifested in the following clippings from a September 7, 1998 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer: “On board a Philippine Airlines chartered flight to Manila from Mindanao where he inspected ongoing government infrastructure projects, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada... thought of a slogan reminding Filipinos that he is serious in fighting graft and corruption in the government. Dubbed “Supilin, pigilin ang pagnanakaw sa pamahalaan,” ( “ Wi n o v e r, s t o p t h i e v e r y i n government”), he thought of puttingup such a message on billboards, huge posters and the like to remind people in government and the private sector not to succumb to the “evils of stealing from government coffers.” Stealing, if aggregated with other misdemeanors of public service and their “transactees,” he said, would sum up to about 20 percent of the national budget. With a proposed budget of more than 500 billion in 1999, “this means roughly 100 billion
3

pesos will go to waste if corruption remains unchecked.” While the figure cited above is a ballpark figure that cannot be validated, the concern of President Estrada is certainly warranted by the findings of this research. It is also not a recent phenomenon but one that has been identified and decried since the Spanish colonization in the 16th century. A. Filipino Culture and Corruption Corruption has been viewed as a “cultural and psychological phenomenon in a country marked by incompatible legal and cultural norms” (Tapales 1995:407). The former emphasizes “rationality and universal principles of action” as against and in conflict with “reliance and obligation toward kinship, friendship and primary groups” (Bautista 1982). This conflict is highlighted in the use of the alibi of a giftgiving culture to justify bribery and extortion, or the Filipino regard for the other (pakikipagkapwa-tao) to justify giving benefits to unqualified but personally known recipients. This is a real problem, but it can be overblown. For instance, both culture and law similarly define cases of corruption and rectitude. One’s kin may ostracize a bureaucrat who chooses to stay within the law. The state may, however, leave them alone, provided they do not compromise their official role. Another case is when an official participates in a decision involving kin, even if they vote against that person’s interest, that official (under the Republic Act 3019) can still be charged with corruption. For an official similarly situated, but who bends over backwards to make sure their kin gets a prized government contract engages in so called “favour corruption”. This is indeed the quintessential conflict between culture and law.

Lengthy discussion on this is presented in “Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos”, Belinde Aquino, Great Books Trading and UP College of Public Administration, 1987.

502

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS The idea of cultural acceptance of corruption also needs to be re-examined in the light of a string of public opinion polls where Filipinos decry it as a major problem. The media, church pastoral letters and other culturally valued sources likewise denounce this. Indeed, the long list of laws enacted against them manifest that graft and corruption are not colonial impositions but are desired by Filipinos themselves. B. Public Perception of Graft and Corruption In a speech in 1988, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Archbishop of Manila, stated that “corruption was the biggest problem of them all” (Murphy, October 9, 1988). In 1989, after months of declaring the rectitude of the government she heads, President Corazon C. Aquino despaired, “Corruption has returned, if not on the same scale, at least with equal shamelessness (Cagurangan, 1989).” Apparently, many Filipinos agree with her. In a survey conducted in July 1989 in Metro Manila by the Social Weather Station (SWS), a respected public opinion polling firm, as much as 58 percent of respondents agreed that given current conditions, corrupt government officials are a greater threat to the country than the NPA (New People’s Army, communist guerrillas who lost ground after Aquino’s assumption to office). Those who were satisfied with the performance of the Aquino administration in fighting graft and corruption decreased from 72 percent in March 1987 to 26 percent in July 1989 (Guidote, 1989). In her State of the Nation Address in July 1989, President Aquino shared the people’s exasperation that she would leave as a problem the very issue that she wanted to leave as a legacy: a clean and accountable government. Indeed, her successor, Fidel V. Ramos, ranked graft and corruption as third among the major problems that obstruct the country’s achievements in his development strategy for the Philippines 2000. The SWS poll of September 1993 validates this fear: 89 percent of the respondents felt that corruption would indeed be a big obstacle to attaining this vision. Other SWS polls since have produced consistent results. An August 1990 survey conducted in Metro Manila asked respondents to state their satisfaction with the activities of several agencies in reducing graft and corruption. The proportion of dissatisfied respondents is consistently higher than those satisfied, for each agency. They stated that graft and corruption is big in the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Cabinet as a whole, the courts of justice, the Bureau of Customs (BOC), and in the police force. They considered corruption in the courts and in the military as small. Very few thought that there was no corruption in any of these government institutions. In November 1991, 41 percent of those polled agreed that most high-ranking government employees are not suited to their positions based on their knowledge and capabilities, and 62 percent noted that the performance of government employees has not improved from 1986 (SWB, July 1993). In a February 1992 nationwide poll on the attributes of high officials in government, 40 percent of its respondents stated that, based on personal observation, “most” of these high officials are corrupt, and another 27 percent said “some” of them were, a total of 67 percent weighing in on the positive side (SWB, July 1993). The public verdict on the judiciary is mixed. In 1985, a Bishop-Businessmen’s Conference poll revealed that 30 percent agreed and 29 percent disagreed with the statement that most judges could not be

503

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 bribed. In 1993, a similar split in half can be discerned. While 50 percent said none or few judges could be bribed or bought, 49 percent thought many or most could (SWB July 1994). However, one out of two Filipinos considered the degree of corruption in the judiciary serious (SWB July 1993). Over the years, the performance of the government in fighting graft and corruption was evaluated more poorly than that of the overall performance. It indicated that the government performance in fighting corruption has indeed has been dismal. Philippine Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, in a nationwide public affairs TV program, Firing Line, aired on September 14, 1998, stated that the Philippine anti-corruption landscape “is improving as evidenced by the good marks the country is getting from international groups like Transparency International (IT) and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), Ltd”. The Hong Kong based Political Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd, likewise graded 12 Asian countries and ranked the Philippines the 4th least corrupt country in its survey. As PERC (1998:1) hinted, most survey grades deteriorated probably as a reflection of the change of sentiment in businessmen from “turning a blind eye to corruption when economic times are good. As economic conditions worsened, however, such tolerance disappeared... Economic conditions were becoming more difficult and it was easier for businessmen to see the link between that deterioration and corruption.” On the whole, the results of national and international surveys consistently depict the Philippines as riddled with corruption and unable to effectively fight corruption. C. The Magnitude of and Losses due to Corruption It is difficult to estimate the total losses due to corruption. The best measure is the amounts involved in cases filed with the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) reported that about P9 billion was lost to government due to malversation, estafa (swindling) and violation of the provision of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for a period of eight and a half years (1990 to June 1998) (OMB 1998). In the Ombudsman’s report, 63 agencies and departments contributed to the losses. However, the top ten of these agencies alone accounted for almost P8.5 billion. Large though these sums are, bigger amounts are involved in cases involving the Marcoses. From the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Ombudsman, the money value of cases filed against the Marcoses involving the same offences (malversation, estafa and RA 3019 violations) for the same period was P1,117 billion. These cover cases of behest loans, both filed and under review and investigation, forfeiture cases, PCGG cases for recovery, criminal cases against Marcos cronies, and criminal cases against other public officials. The Ombudsman claimed that, “the government lost P1.4 trillion and continues to lose P100M daily since the Office began investigating corruption in government since 1988.”4 This is similarly pointed out by President Joseph Estrada when he said, “at least P24.13 B of what the Philippine government spent last year for various projects was lost to graft and corruption, or barely 20% of all project funds are lost to grafters.”5

4 5

Desierto, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10, 1999. Estrada, Philippines Daily Inquirer, June 10, 1999.

504

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS III. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES AND PROGRAMS Philippine initiatives against corruption have taken the form of law and anti-graft bodies created by the Constitution, law and executive orders. In addition to the state, others institutions have been active in the fight against graft and corruption. A. Anti-corruption Laws The accountability of public officials is enshrined in the Constitution of 1987, as it has been in the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935 and then the Constitution of 1973, the Martial Law period. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, entitled “Accountability of Public Officers”, states the fundamental principle of public office, as public trust. It requires full accountability and integrity among public officers and employees. The President, Vice-President, members of the Supreme Court, members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be impeached for violations of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, and for betrayal of public trust. Other public officials committing such acts can be investigated and prosecuted through the regular judicial process provided by law. The Philippine government is directed to maintain honesty and integrity in the public service, and to take action against graft and corruption (Section 27, Art. II). It is also directed to give full public disclosure of all transactions involving the public interest (Section 28, Art. II). This provision is complemented by the Bill of Rights within the Constitution, which gives people the right to information on matters of public concern, including official records, documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, and to government research data used as the basis for policy development (Section 7, Art. III). The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) was passed in 1960. It enumerates what may be considered corrupt practices by any public officer, declares them unlawful and provides the corresponding penalties of imprisonment (1 month, 6 years and 15 years), perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture of unexplained wealth in the favour of the government. It also provides for the submission by all government personnel of a statement of assets and liabilities every two years. Considered landmark legislation at the time, it also elicited the following wry comment: “The anti-graft law was passed not because there was a need for it but only to appease public opinion. There was no urgent need for anti-graft legislation because the Revised Penal Code and other laws were sufficient to bring the guilty to court” (Congressman Manuel Zosa, quoted in G.U. Iglesias, 1993:35). B. Laws During the Martial Law Period (1972-1986) Presidential Decree no.6, which took effect six days after the imposition of Martial Law, was the “legal” basis for the purge of almost 8,000 officials and employees in the first year of the dictatorship. The provision for summary proceedings was reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Act of the period and was repealed by the Corazon Aquino administration. All other anti-graft presidential decrees remain in effect. This includes: (i) Presidential Decree No. 46 (1972), making it unlawful for government personnel to receive, and for private persons to give, gifts on any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the gift is for past or future

505

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 favors. It also prohibits entertaining public officials and their relatives. (ii) Presidential Decree No. 677 (1975) requires the statement of assets and liabilities to be submitted every year. (iii) Presidential Decree No. 749 (1975), granting immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes or other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private persons guilty of these offences. C. Laws of the Redemocratization Period (1986 to the present) Immediately after Aquino’s assumption to office, she promulgated the “Freedom Constitution” which, among other provisions, declared all government positions vacant unless otherwise identified (Section 3, March 28, 1986). This Freedom Constitution was the basic law of a revolutionary government and was superseded by the Constitution of 1987. Six new anti-corruption laws emerged under its operation. The Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)6 incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance. It reiterates public accountability as the fundamental principle of governance. In 1989, the Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees was passed. It promotes a high standard of ethics and requires all government personnel to make an accurate statement of assets and liabilities, disclose net worth and financial connections. It also requires new officials to divest ownership
6

in any private enterprise within 30 days from assumption of office, to avoid conflict of interest. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) provides the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Act further defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249) places the Sandiganbayan as a special court on par with the Court of Appeals. D. Constitutional Anti-corruption Bodies The 1987 Constitution established special independent bodies to support the principles of honesty, integrity and public accountability. These are: (i) the Office of the Ombudsman as the people’s protector and watchdog; (ii) the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency; (iii) the Commission on Audit as the supreme body responsible for auditing the government’s expenditures and performance; and (iv) The Sandiganbayan as a special court that hears cases of graft and corruption. To ensure that these organizations and their commissioners can fulfill their duties without fear of reprisal from other agencies of the government, the Constitution grants them fiscal autonomy7 (Section 2, Article VIII). Their actions are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The Office of the Ombudsman was created to investigate and act promptly on complaints filed against public officials and
7

Executive orders promulgated by President Aquino during the revolutionary period when she was sole legislator (1986-87) have the force of the law.

Fiscal autonomy in that their approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released, so that there can be no undue delay in the execution of their duties. Their annual appropriation cannot be reduced from that of the previous years.

506

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS employees, and to serve as the people’s watchdog of the government. It is an institution with the biggest responsibility to prevent graft and corruption. It provides for a Deputy Ombudsman for the military, and at least one each Deputy for the geographical divisions of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel tasked to promote efficient and responsive public service delivery, to establish a career service, strengthen the merit system and human resource development, promote public accountability and enforce the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713). It undertakes anti-corruption functions, such as values orientation workshops and employee voluntarism. The Commission on Audit, while primarily regarded as an evaluator of the government’s performance in handling funds, also has as a function on the input side, as it conducts audits on the income and revenues of government. Aside from ensuring financial accountability, the Commission may also inquire as to the effectiveness and impact of programs, and not alone into the economy, efficiency or the legality and regularity of government operations. The Sandiganbayan, literally “the pillar of the nation”, is a special court with jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases involving graft and corrupt practices. E. Presidential Anti-corruption Bodies Each president has appointed his or her anti-graft or investigating agencies “as an exercise of the president’s power to probe into the anomalous members of his/her administrative organization (Alfiler, 1979: 329)”. President Aquino broke tradition by organizing a committee of cabinet officials rather than an agency with full-time personnel, the President’s Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA). Its framework advanced the inseparability of accountability from other acts of governance, the idea that corruption can be tackled by management actions that increase its risks and decrease its benefits, and decentralized graft-busting. President Fidel V. Ramos created the Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) under Executive Order No. 151 dated January 11, 1994. It was tasked to investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption. Likewise, it functions as a coordinating body in the efforts of inhibiting the practice of graft and corruption, to expeditiously prosecute such practices by officials in the executive department, and to monitor the implementation of the Moral Recovery Program. Unlike other presidents, President Estrada has not created his own anticorruption body and has allowed the Ramos’ created PCAGC to continue in office. He seemed to be inclined to use instead the Inter-Agency Anti-graft Coordinating Council, composed of the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, the Ombudsman, the Department of Justice, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption. F. The Rank and File as Graft Busters (Cariño, 1992) Because of their knowledge of the workings of both formal and informal processes, employees are natural sources of information about deviations from accountability. It was in the Aquino regime in 1986, that the potential of employees as

507

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 graft-busters was tapped. Several unions had tangled with their respective management on the issue of their accountability and performance. The union in the National Electrification Administration has unearthed anomalies and delays in the implementation of some projects such as the USD$ 192 million rural electrification revitalization program, a joint project of the World Bank and the Office of Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan (Manila Chronicle, November 13, 1995:4). The most successful effort is still that as described by Gaffud (1994), which was able to remove the top administrators of an agency in 1990. The union questioned transactions worth P176 million, including overpricing, purchases made without being utilized, purchases made for non-existent projects, etc. After being ignored by the Department of Justice and the higher officials of the department to which it is attached, the union finally found a listening ear in an NGO (non-government organization), the Gising Bayan Foundation, which then filed complaints with the Ombudsman. After investigation, President Aquino dismissed three assistant administrators, but not the head administrator. Since 1986, the leadership of at least seven other unions faced harassment, intimidation, and sometimes, removal from office for their anti-corruption stance. Nevertheless, they have succeeded in bringing cases of corruption, abuse and nepotism practiced by their superiors to the attention of control bodies such as the Commission on Audit, the Ombudsman and legislative committees for further investigation. G. Participation of the Nongovernmental Sector People power energized in the EDSA inflamed non-government organizations (NGOs) to get concerned about issues of integrity and corruption. Their initial approach centered not on punishing corruption, but in being involved in keeping government operations clean and effective. The Community Employment and Development Program (CEDP) of the late 1980s became the laboratory for this new partnership of government and causeoriented groups. For instance, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)8 branched from election cases to the monitoring of CEDP implementation in various local areas. Based on this virtual experiment, the government promulgated guidelines on the use of such volunteer groups for exception monitoring. Some associations focused directly on preventing corruption. Operasyong Walang Lagay (OWL), its name connoting a movement to prevent bribery, assisted some departments and local governments in streamlining procedures and improving bidding committees. However, it folded in 1989 because the volunteers could not cope with the increasing demands on their time, a very real problem for volunteerism in a growth field such as corruption. The National Coalition of Transparency was launched in 1989 to show that public support for measures to enhance accountability could still be mustered. Composed of over thirty NGOs, including Bishop-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC), NAMFREL, and other groups that were in the forefront of the anti-Marcos struggle, it put forward a comprehensive approach to the problem as it recognized the private sector’s incrimination in the continuation of governmental corruption. Lacking selfrighteousness, its first campaign was for its membership to pay the proper taxes, and thus be morally capable of censuring the dissipation of public revenues by
8

NAMFREL is now active in sponsoring seminarworkshops on Japan’s koban system of policing.

508

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS government. It was in meeting with them that the President admitted the return of shameless corruption in her administration (Cagurangan, 1989). Anti-corruption organizations associated with religious groups include the BBC, the Gising Bayan Foundation 9 and the religious right, calling itself Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) 10 . The Nationalista Party, a political party, also formed an anti-graft panel, composed largely of former officials of the Marcos regime (Manila Bulletin, June 4, 1989), making it suspect as a political neutral body. Meanwhile, the Anti-Police Scalawag Group (APSG) is focused on police corruption. It recently called on the Philippine National Police (PNP) to curb rampant “tong” and payola collection from operators of illegal gambling, ironically perpetrated by members of the PNP’s own illegal gambling task forces. An APSG spokesperson disclosed that in Metro Manila alone, there were about 30 to 45 gambling “maintainers” of vice dens such as video karera, sakla, hi-lo, 11 lottery, bookies, and prostitution dens who give goodwill money ranging from P500, 000 to P1 million, aside from the monthly “payola” for protection of P100, 000 to P500, 000 (Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10, 1998:22). IV. THE OMBUDSMAN'S STRATEGY AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION In this portion, I will present some data from the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan that can provide us with insight on the results of the Philippine anticorruption effort. These efforts are focused on the intriguing causes of corruption: (i) I n d i v i d u a l c a u s e s w h i c h a r e attributed to weak moral fiber and distorted values among bureaucrats, such as materialism, lack of integrity and nationalism; (ii) Organizational causes refer to deficiencies, in the bureaucratic apparatus such as low salary, poor recruitment and selection procedures, and red tape in government; and (iii) Societal causes where corrupt behavior is itself the norm of society. A. Programs of the Office of the Ombudsman The OMB is mandated under the Constitution to protect the people from abuse or misuse of power by government, its agencies or functionaries. It must fight for justice for all citizens, prevent loss of government funds and bring the culprit to justice. It faces a gigantic challenge in c a r r y i n g o u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’s determination to rid itself of undesirables in the public service. The conferment of this extensive authority by the Constitution insulated the Office from political influence or interference by: (i) Stating that the Ombudsman is removable from office only by impeachment; (ii) Prescribing a fixed term of office for seven years without reappointment; (iii) During the term, his/her salary cannot be diminished; (iv) Leveling the Ombuman’s rank with
509

9

“Gising Bayan” means “Wake Up Nation.” It was originally the title of a radio program under Radio Veritas, the Catholic station. 10 CIBAC is coined from the Tagalog word “sibak” which means to cut down. 11 These are local gambling practices considered illegal.

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 that of a Supreme Court justice. B. Five (5) Major Functions12 The Ombudsman performs five major functions, such as investigation, graft prevention, public assistance, prosecution, and administrative adjudication. It is invested with corresponding authority to be able to carry out these functions. The investigative function of the Office involves determination of violations of the anti-graft laws by public functionaries through factfinding or evidence gathering. It also includes the finding of probable cause through formal preliminary investigation for the purpose of prosecution. In graft prevention, the Office has the authority to prevent the commission of graft by ordering or stopping the implementation of government contracts that are found to be disadvantageous to the government. In the exercise of its public assistance, the Office of the Ombudsman extends assistance to citizens in getting basic public services from the government. In prosecution, the Office may file charges or prosecute cases in court against erring public officials and private citizens found to have connived with them. The Office of the Special Prosecutor may prosecute the case in the Sandiganbayan. In the regular courts, regular prosecutors are deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to handle prosecution. Under its administrative adjudication function, the Office has the authority to conduct administrative penalties where the erring public official or employee, including Cabinet Secretaries, may be suspended or dismissed from public service. It holds disciplinary authority over all government functionaries, except the president and members of congress and the judiciary and other impeachable officials. In all other
12

criminal cases, however, all public officials and employees, without any exception, are under the Ombudsman’s investigative jurisdiction. In consonance with all these functions performed by the Ombudsman, s/he shall act on all complaints, but not limited to acts or omissions which: (i) are contrary to law or regulations; (ii) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory (iii) are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s function, though in accordance with law; (iv) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (v) are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (vi) are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. In its effort to solve the twin evils of graft and corruption, the Office of the Ombudsman employs a two-pronged strategy: confrontational and psychological approaches. The confrontational approach involves the administrative and criminal investigation and prosecution of erring members of the bureaucracy. In this regard, a number of criminal cases were filed in the Sandiganbayan involving highranking officials and about 2,500 cases referred to the ordinary courts involving low-ranking members of the bureaucracy. To complement this capability, the InterAgency Consultative Committee with the Commission on Audit (COA), Civil Service Commission (CSC), Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) have been formed and organized for effective coordination.

The Ombudsman Primer, p.2.

510

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS As part of the strategy, the tripod system was adopted to enforce honesty and efficiency. This system includes the establishment of Corruption Prevention Units (CPUs), Junior Graftwatch Units (JGUs) and installation of the Offices of the Resident Ombudsman. The CPU’s were organized to broaden community participation and serve as the Ombudsman’s eyes and arms, closely monitoring critical and substantially funded government projects and/or transactions in their respective areas of concern. They also serve as a front desk to receive and facilitate requests for assistance, complaints, or reports of any anomalous or corrupt practices. In addition, the CPU’s work hand-in-hand with the Office of the Ombudsman in promoting the objectives of the latter through the conduct of various activities involving community participation, such as consultative workshops, symposia, seminars and conferences, developing moral values of honesty, as well as educating the public on preventive measures in its fight against graft and corruption. At present, about 200 CPU’s have been already organized from among civic-minded non-governmental organizations. The Junior Graftwatch Units (JGU’s) have been organized to mobilize the youth (both at high school and college level, including the out-of-school youth) in the fight against graft and corruption, by encouraging them to become the primary coordinating arm of the Ombudsman with respect to the educational and motivational projects involving youth, and as an effective ally of the Office of the Ombudsman. All over the country, there are already seven hundred and seventy-four (774) Junior Graftwatch Units accredited by the Ombudsman. These are organized to develop and strengthen their instinct of goodness and idealism which is anchored

Figure I. THE POLICY OF GRAFT PREVENTION Stages of Graft Prevention

UNCOVERING PLANS FOR CORRUPTION STOPPING ON-GOING ACTS OF CORRUPTION DETERRING CORRUPTION

CONDITIONING THE MIND AGAINST CORRUPTION

PROACTIVE GRAFT PREVENTION

RESIDENT OMBUDSMEN

JUNIOR GRAFTWATCH UNIT

CORRUPTION PREVENTION UNITS

511

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 in the principle that a child who grows up in an environment of honesty will be difficult to corrupt when s/he attains maturity. The Office of the Ombudsman believes that in empowering the citizenry to practice their innate virtues of honesty and uprightness, and getting them involved in the Ombudsman’s struggle for the right values, we can expect a citizenry with even stronger moral fiber in the future. The Office’s graft prevention efforts are directed at sustaining the support of all sectors of Filipino society, which is a healthy sign of empowering the citizenry in nation building. It has likewise installed Resident Ombudsmen (ROs) in 22 important departments of the government to serve as watchdogs and guardians of integrity and efficiency. They closely monitor the performance of government functionaries, thereby producing strong deterrence to bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency. See Figure I for the stages of graft prevention as conceived by the Ombudsman. The psychological approach adopted has been designed to create and nurture an environment of integrity in the Philippine society. This proceeds from the principle that corruption cannot thrive in a milieu of honesty. This approach, which has a long-range objective, is expected to have a lasting effect because it aims to develop a strong moral fiber for the citizenry. For this purpose, the Office has worked with the Education Department on introducing graft prevention modules that will teach students old Filipino values of honesty and integrity. It has forged an agreement with the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) to ascertain that corrupt practices pictured in movie films and television programs have redemptive values or punishment of

Figure II. THE OMBUDSMAN’S TOTAL STRATEGY AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH

Investigation

Protection

Administrative Adjudication

Enforcement of Laws on Public Accountability

Community Mobilization

GRAFT-FREE BUREAUCRACY/SOCIETY

Public Assistance

Values Formation & Reorientation

Strengthening of the Citizens’ Moral Fiber; Graft Deterrence

Graft Prevention Education

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

Resident Ombusmen

512

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS the corrupt. Orientation seminars for new government entrants are also conducted to provide a deeper understanding of public service values and of the accountability attached to their positions in the government. It has continuously conducted values orientation seminars/workshops to enhance organizational effectiveness and strengthen the moral fiber of the personnel. The totality of the Ombudsman’s strategy against graft and corruption is shown in Figure II. C. Focus on New Initiatives: Dealing with “Graft-prone Agencies” Given the fact that stolen money is usually never recovered, even if a conviction is obtained, the Ombudsman decided that the problem must be confronted before it is committed. A psychological approach was developed to address the social environment within which graft and corruption occur. The approach as previously mentioned attempts to strengthen the citizen’s moral fiber and deter the opportunities for graft. In determining the graft-prone agencies of the government, the Ombudsman adopts three criteria: (i) the size of the budget of the agency, (ii) the number of its personnel; and (iii) the number of cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman. As may be noted, the first two criteria relate to the presence of opportunities for corruption, while the third relates to actual cases uncovered by complaints and investigation. The agencies meeting these criteria are the following: Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) (ii) Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) (iii) Department of Environment and (i) Natural Resources (DENR) (iv) Department of Agriculture (DA) (v) Department of Health (DOH) (vi) Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) (vii) Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) (viii) Department of National Defence (DND) (ix) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (x) National Irrigation Administration (NIA) (xi) National Power Corporation (NPC) (xii) B u r e a u o f I m m i g r a t i o n a n d Deportation (BID) (xiii) Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) (xiv) Philippine Ports Authority/Bureau of Customs (PPA/BOC) (xv) Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) (xvi) Board of Investment (BOI) For these agencies, the Resident Ombudsmen reviews processes to cut red tape, and inspects bidding requirements and contracts for evidence of graft. This program appears to be a worthwhile initiative to the extent that the Ombudsman assists an agency in improving policies and programs to prevent corruption. In that sense, it is proactive, and views corruption from a systemic perspective. However, the work that the Resident Ombudsman is given should not duplicate or take away the responsibility of the management, through a working internal control unit, in supervising the performance of the functions assigned to that agency. To transfer this responsibility to an outside agency may enmesh the Ombudsman in implementation problems, as well as corruption opportunities, and decrease its capacity for enforcement and provision of sanctions. This seems to us similar to the pre-audit functions that used to be performed by the Commission on Audit, until it recognized that management

513

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 should wield this important power, for which it is responsible. Another problem may be in the labelling of agencies as graft-prone. Bigness alone is not necessarily a prelude to corruption. Besides, the third criteria of the number of cases may be misleading if they primarily consist of cases still under investigation, rather than resolved. A litigation-prone agency may not be equivalent to a corruption-prone one. We may point out that this issue shows the urgent need for the Ombudsman to expeditiously dispose of cases brought to its jurisdiction. VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Philippines has unleashed many weapons against irresponsible behavior in the government. It has a comprehensive set of laws that may have ascertained all the possible instances of graft and corruption that can be devised. The anticorruption agencies have been given ample powers to identify and punish offenders. They recognize the burden of power, with special agencies to give priority to catching the “big fish” and grave offences, over the acts of lower ranking personnel. They started on their own to coordinate with each other for greater over-all effectiveness. They approach corruption in both a preventive and punitive way. They recognize that the task is not only with the government, and have enlisted civil society in the struggle. For their part, citizens have also volunteered, in cooperation with state agencies or by themselves, in fighting corruption. On the whole, the Philippine approach has used democratic means, relying on due process, transparent procedures, and volition in effecting many of its aspirations. Yet corruption continues. What else needs to be done? A. Re-examination of Existing Laws The Philippines does not need any more laws against corruption. If anything, what it needs is a re-examination of anticorruption laws not only to remove duplication, but also to ensure that those existing are accepted by the populace and enforceable by the anti-corruption agencies. We can only cite a few areas for further study. There are at present some provisions that, in their strictness, may encourage their breach: (i) The Anti-gift Decree has never been implemented, but it can conceivably be used against a completely innocent, generous person, who (being a devout Christian) cannot help but give gifts on Christmas day, an act sanctioned by PD 46 and ignored by almost everybody immersed in Philippine culture. (ii) T h e s t a t e m e n t o f a s s e t s a n d liabilities, a simple but potentially strong mechanism to find unexplained wealth, is submitted yearly by all public officials, but no one ever studies them. In any case, any well-paid accountant can hide unexplained wealth, and so the only people potentially at risk are civil servants that cannot afford to have others write their statements. (iii) Other provisions may work against getting good people in government, for example, by the requirement for divestment. This approach to possible conflicts of interest will be met by well-qualified people entering into the highest reaches of the state apparatus. The current divestment procedure may be too harsh, since it could effectively mean that no top industrialist for instance can be Secretary of Trade and Industry, and no top banker may be Central Bank

514

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS Governor. That would be denying the government valuable human resources. A possible alternative is to put more trust in transparency and the press (which requires an amendment of existing law). When a president chooses a person who shows reluctance because of the divestment requirement, exemption must be made for that person, provided that he or she discloses in detail and publicly all personal interests that have public implications. This could mean that the citizenry could keep track of the development of the relevant businesses and industries, while a valued member is in public office. Conversely, the problem of conflict of interest must be tackled head on by removing persons whose personal interest prospered while they were in office. This is amply provided for in RA 3019 and RA 6713, even without the divestment requirement. (iv) The schedule of penalties may also be looked into. In some cases the penalty may be too low, e.g, the maximum imprisonment for corruption under RA 3019 is 15 years. In others, it may be too high, e.g, the sole penalty for grave misconduct on first offence is dismissal from the service. Extreme penalties do not encourage prosecution of offences, even when they are blatant, because of the cultural trait of “sayang” (waste of time) for those who will merit only low penalties and “awa” (pity) for those who will be hit by harsh punishment. B. Enforcement The Philippines has an impressive number of laws to tackle practically all cases requiring fast actions. However, enforcement of these laws leaves much to be desired. The retention of officials whom the President’s anti-graft agency itself recommended to be removed suggests a lack of political will, and the priority of partisanship over the public interest. This would have provided an occasion for articulating the Administration’s ethical vision, catching a big fish, and warning everyone that the leadership means business. The people expect not only equal enforcement of the law, but even more strictness on persons perceived to be in the President’s inner circle. Decisiveness would also be perceived if the public is informed of a clear connection between the official’s misdeed and his/her removal. Part of the popular dissatisfaction with the conduct of accountability is the lack of closure of cases. The number of investigations that were not finished, or have “softer” findings and conclusions when no longer laboring under the public eye, does not increase public confidence in the anti-corruption programs. C. Leadership in the Anticorruption Drive Leadership of the organizations primarily focused on fighting corruption requires higher qualifications than what is normally demanded. This applies particularly to the Ombudsman and to the heads of other agencies specifically created for this purpose. The very concept of an Ombudsman requires a person of high integrity whose very presence provokes respect and rectitude. The Philippines has not been blessed with the appointment of such persons to this office. Instead, they have been controversial, such that they raised questions about the Office, itself not only about its head. The President who appoints the Ombudsman should be cognizant of the high expectations of the

515

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 people to bring to the Ombudsman’s office persons known for their ethical role modeling, non-partisanship, and good judgement. D. More Resources for Enhancing Accountability Resources for enhancing accountability and attacking corruption must be provided. This is an investment that will pay off in the long run. Guardians must be supported in their programs and given incentives not to stray from accountability. The funds, personnel, technology, and other resources of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan must allow them to keep in step with the corrupt they are trying to catch. The personal income of such officials should be competitive with the private sector, subject to the conscientious performance of their duties. Their organizations should be provided with the necessary equipment high-tech devices like hidden cameras, etc and mundane matters such as paper clips, envelopes, filing cabinets as is needed in their work. Incumbents should be imbued with a sense of mission early, via a well-planned orientation program, and keep them going with peer group and leadership support, and a hotline for counseling on the problems they meet. Civil servants who perform exceptionally well should be recognized. The Civil Service Commission program to this effect is a step in the right direction, but it honors too few people. The increase of salaries across the board through the Salary Standardization Law is a way to keep up with inflation, but it has had the pernicious effect of eating up any resources that may be given competitively. Merit increases and promotion can signal that an agency recognizes that one official is doing better work than the others are. E. Better Public Administration The management approach started under the Aquino administration should be continued and improved. Persons in decision-making positions should be trained and encouraged to think strategically. The challenge is to use whatever capacity there is towards work that is focused on enhancing the public interest. There is also a need to institutionalize some of the efforts that have been put into enhancing accountability since 1986. This means the support of agency reform measures, as well as the establishment of new procedures, to pave the way for cleaner administration. F. Encouraging Public Sector Unions Democracy is developed in the bureaucracy as the rank and file are given the chance to air their grievances, press for better working conditions, and demand responsibility and rectitude from the management. Even with Civil Service Commission encouragement, unions still face an uphill battle in being heard by their bosses. An arrangement where the union keeps its independence while remaining open to a partnership for service with management would provide the best avenue not only for policing how accountable management is, but also for improving the performance of everyone at all levels of the organization. G. Reform of Politicians and Business People Changes should also focus on the main corrupters, the politicians and the private sector. The NGOs that require their members to pay the right taxes and conduct activities towards corruption prevention within their ranks should be encouraged. Political parties should reform themselves, primarily through the continuous training of their members on party principles and policies, and their acceptance of the

516

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS principle of political neutrality among civil servants. Pending that, the passage of the law required by the Constitution against political dynasties, and increased recourse to and encouragement of the activities of the Ethics Committees of both Houses would be more immediate steps. Causeoriented groups and public sector unions may assist politicians, especially those who regard themselves as non-traditional, in developing support groups to re-enforce their desire for true public service, not mere patronage. H. Transparency and Accountability Make transparency real, allowing civil servants and the public to access information in government. A question hour in Congress, or a radio-TV program with questions and comments to be answered by executive officials may help inquiries into any aspect of their policies and performance. Reports of investigations should be made available to the public. The support of the mass media in these endeavors, accompanied by their own efforts at reforming their ranks, would be crucial to the success of these efforts. Accountable performance would be supported if the public is informed about what the agency does and why. It is a means of ensuring that the personnel themselves know its mission. At the same time, both they and the public would also then understand the reasoning behind what seem to appear only as red tape. Information sharing - particularly of steps in service delivery - also makes it unnecessary for the client to seek out a ‘fixer’. Open transactions can build a sense of partnership between the government and the people the agencies serve. I. Moral Reform Having role models, a code of ethics and value formation exercises speak of a desire for moral reform within the government. While cultures cannot be changed overnight, support for value changes must be developed through a system of rewards and punishments that becomes regularized in standard operating procedures. Also, the meting out of positive and negative strokes must be swift but fair, and even-handed. Value development seminars should be case-oriented, thought provoking, and able to encourage innovative behavior, while raising alarm about continued violations. J. Role of the People There is a need for popular involvement in ethics and accountability. Paying the proper taxes, obeying regulations, being well informed about government services these are only the first steps in moving to a disciplined but democratic society. In addition, support for politicians who promote causes rather than just their charm and personality would also make the line of accountability clearer. The development of parties with coherent platforms should then be a focus of people’s participation, to tie up with the reforms suggested above. These are all in addition to the encouragement of NGOs that are non-partisan in exposing corruption and bringing violators to justice. The start of many of these measures has already been made. They are in tune with democratic principles, as well as the culture. One hopes that many more financial, human and moral resources will be placed at the service of accountability in the country.

517

518

Table 1 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN STATISTICAL REPORT ON CRIMINAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CASES From 1988 to 1998 1988 1989 1990 57 3,722 3,997 1,811 2,814 6 6,592 3,056 2,996 60 6 3,536 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 5,142 5,303 8,172 9,454 6,122 8,117 8,150 19 92 28 998 145 314 105 154 46 552 3,536 6,403 8,805 9,928 12,789 14,652 12,975 12,473 1998 8,551 18 9,159

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56

OMB Cases Received during the year Cases received back to pending Old Tanodbayan Cases Carry-over from the previous yeaer Total Workload of Criminal/ Administrative Cases/ Complaints Disposed of Dismissed/ Closed and terminated Penalty Imposed Prosecution Regular Courts Pending 1,868 1,862 1,862

8,511 11,690 14,422 18,205 22,397 20,839 21,736 20,651 17,728 2,108 2,885 4,494 5,416 7,772 7,864 9,263 11,492 10,816 1,908 2,278 3,839 3,605 4,851 4,262 5,109 8,986 8,397 73 93 95 179 296 253 200 607 655 1,738 2,828 3,507 3,975 2,210 2,166 405 393 1,378 2,198 2,988 3,734 1,722 1,700 603 8,805 9,928 12,789 14,625 12,975 12,473 9,159 6,912

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS Table 2 WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1997)
Central Luzon Office

Particulars

Visayas Mindanao Military

Total

Cases received during the year Referred by the other OMB office Disposed cases reverted back to pending Carry-over from 1996 Total workload of criminal and administrativecases Less cases recalled to central office / transferred to OMB office Net workload of cases Disposed Dismissed / exonerated Prosecution Penalty imposed Closed and terminated Pending

1,246 8 0 3,980 5,234 186 5,048 3,249 2,812 254 148 35 1,799

1,494 13 0 2,460 3,967 68 3,899 1,772 1,337 383 15 37 2,127

2,075 0 0 1,932 4,007 177 3,830 2,094 1,527 357 86 124 1,736

1,150 49 28 3,244 4,471 9 4,462 2,034 1,520 451 47 16 2,428

2,185 0 0 857

8,150 445 28 12,473

3,417 21,473 5 445 3,412 20,651 2,343 11,492 989 8,185 765 2,210 0 296 589 801 1,069 9,159

Table 3 WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES (as of December 31, 1997)

Particulars

Central Office

Luzon

Visayas Mindanao Military

Total

Cases received during the year Referred by the other OMB offices Disposed cases reverted to pending Carry-over from 1996 Total workload of criminal cases Less cases recalled to central office / transferred to OMB offices Net workload of criminal cases DISPOSED Dismissed Closed and Terminated Prosecution with regular courts with Sandiganbayan Pending

880 7 0 2,989 3,876 179 3,697 2,749 2,460 35 254 176 78 948

1,125 13 0 1,997 3,125 2 3,123 1,480 1,097 0 383 244 139 1,643

1,242 0 0 1,281 2,523 132 2,391 1,440 1,070 13 357 291 66 951

847 46 25 2,765 3,683 6 3,678 1,746 1,295 0 451 309 142 932

1,370 5,454 255 321 0 25 756 9,788 2,381 15,855 3 321 2,378 15,267 1,643 9,058 878 6,800 0 48 765 2,210 752 1,772 13 438 735 6,209

519

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 Table 4 WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1997)
Central Office

Particulars

Luzon

Visayas Mindanao Military

Total

Cases received during the year Referred by the other OMB offices Disposed cases reverted back to pending Carry-over from 1996 Total workload of administrative cases Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other OMB offices Net workload of administrative cases DISPOSED Dismissed / exonerated Penalty imposed Closed and terminated Active / awaiting final disposition

366 1 0 991 1,358 7 1,351 500 352 148 0 851

379 0 0 463 842 66 776 292 240 15 37 484

833 0 0 651 1,484 45 1,439 654 457 86 111 785

303 3 3 479 788 4 784 288 225 47 16 496

815 120 0 101 1,036

2,696 124 3 2,865 5,508

2 124 1,034 5,384 700 11,492 111 1,385 0 296 589 753 334 2,950

Table 5 TOTAL WORKLOAD OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1996)
Central Office

Particulars

Luzon

Visayas Mindanao Military

Total

Cases received Referred by other OMB offices Disposed cases reverted back to pending OSP / TBP transferred cases Carry-over from 1995 Total cases received Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other offices Net workload of cases Disposed Dismissed Prosecution Penalty imposed Closed and terminated Pending

1,342 19 0 6 4,718 6,085 65 6,020 2,974 2,063 350 21 0 3,046

1,525 13 0 1 2,063 3,602 7 3,595 1,135 879 185 65 6 2,460

2,026 1 5 1 2,062 4,095 210 3885 1,765 1,472 201 46 46 2,120

1,140 16 87 544 3,079 4,866 6 4,860 1,219 909 221 39 50 3,641

2,084 8,117 243 292 0 92 0 552 654 12,576 2,981 21,629 4 292 2,977 21,337 2,121 9,214 741 6,604 549 1,506 8 179 823 925 856 12,123

520

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS Table 6 WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES (as of December 31, 1996)
Particulars Central Office Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military Total

Cases received Referred by other OMB offices Disposed cases reverted to pending OSP/TBP transferred cases Carry-over 1995 Total criminal cases received Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other offices Net workload of criminal cases DISPOSED Dismissed Closed and terminated Prosecution with Regular Courts with Sandiganbayan Pending

1,028 18 0 6 3,402 4,454 60 4,394 2,339 1,989 0 350 195 155 2,055

1,213 13 0 1 1,657 2,884 7 2,877 880 695 0 185 181 4 1,997

1,424 1 4 1 1,342 2,772 144 2,628 1,159 941 17 201 153 48 1,469

828 10 76 544 2,605 4,103 5 4,098 936 701 14 221 194 27 3,162

1,228 5,761 178 220 0 80 0 552 605 9,611 2,011 16,224 4 220 2,007 16,004 1,252 6,566 703 5,029 0 31 549 1,506 542 1,265 7 241 755 9,438

Table 7 ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS (as of December 31, 1996)

Particulars

Central Office

Luzon

Visayas Mindanao Military

Total

Cases received Referred by the Central Office Disposed cases / reverted back to pending Carry-over 1995 Total administrative cases received Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other offices Net workload of administrative cases Disposed Dismissed / exonerated Penalty imposed Closed and terminated Active / awaiting final disposition

314 1 0 1,316 1,631 5 1,626 635 614 21 0 993

312 0 0 406 718 0 718 255 184 65 6 463

602 0 1 720 1,323 66 1,257 606 531 46 29 651

272 6 11 474 763 1 762 283 208 39 36 479

856 65 0 79 970 0 970 869 38 8 823 101

2,356 72 12 2,965 5,405 72 5,333 2,648 1,575 179 894 2,685

521

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56 Table 8 TOTAL WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1995)
Particulars Central Office Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military Total

Cases received Referred by the Central Office Disposed cases / reverted back to pending Referred by the other OMB offices OSP / TBP transferred cases Carry-over 1994 Total criminal / administrative cases received Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other offices Net workload of criminal / administrative cases Disposed Dismissed Prosecution Penalty imposed Closed and terminated Pending

1,203 0 0 27 9 5,855 7,094 30 7,064 1,984 1,637 307 1 39 5,080

0 1,142 0 18 0 1,692 2,852 2 2,850 1,416 1,140 252 24 0 1,434

1,159 109 0 6 0 2,257 3,531 85 3,446 1,475 1,143 246 15 71 1,971

1,354 137 19 19 1 3,459 4,989 231 4,758 1,834 1,311 379 55 89 2,924

617 248 0 285 36 602

4,333 1,636 19 355 46 13,865

1,788 20,254 7 355

1,781 19,899 1,155 7,864 473 5,704 336 1,520 0 95 346 545 626 12,035

Table 9 CRIMINAL CASES (as of December 31, 1995)
Particulars Central Office Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military Total

Cases received Referred by the Central Office Disposed cases reverted back to pending Referred by the other OMB office OSP / TBP transferred cases Carry-over 1994 Total criminal cases received Less cases recalled to central office /transferred to other office Net workload of criminal cases Disposed Dismissed Closed and terminated Prosecution Pending

955 0 0 21 9 4,372 5,357 26 5,331 1,576 1,266 3 307 3,755

0 852 0 15 0 1,272 2,139 2 2,137 1,105 853 0 252 1,032

710 85 0 4 0 1,446 2,245 64 2,181 929 648 35 246 1,252

1,135 100 11 10 1 2,796 4,053 206 3,847 1,397 987 31 379 2,450

295 3,095 217 1,254 0 11 250 300 36 46 559 10,445 1,357 15,151 2 300 1,355 14,851 775 5,782 439 4,193 0 69 336 1,520 580 9,069

522

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS Table 10 ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS (as of December 31, 1995)
Particulars Central Luzon Office Visayas Mindanao Military Total

Cases received during the year Referred by the Central Office (CO) Disposed cases / reverted back to pending Referred by the other OMB office Carry-over from 1994 Total administrative cases received Less cases recalled to CO /transferred to other office Net workload of administrative cases Disposed Dismissed Prosecution Closed and terminated Active / awaiting final disposition

248 0 0 6 1,483 1,737 4 1,733 408 371 1 36 1,325

0 290 0 3 420 713 0 713 311 287 24 0 402

449 24 0 2 811 1,286 21 1,265 546 495 15 36 719

219 37 8 9 663 936 25 911 437 324 55 58 474

322 31 0 35 43 431 5 426 380 34 0 346 46

1,238 382 8 55 3,420 5,103 55 5,048 2,082 1,511 95 476 2,966

523