TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Chapter-1: Introduction……………………………………………….………2 2.1. Jurisdiction: meaning; 2.2. Jurisdiction and Consent. 2. Chapter-2: Kinds of Jurisdiction………………………...…………...........…..5 3.3. Territorial or local Jurisdiction; 3.4. Pecuniary Jurisdiction; 3.5. Subject Matter Jurisdiction; 3.6. Original and appellate Jurisdiction. 3. Chapter-3: Lack of Jurisdiction and Irregular jurisdiction……………..…10 4. Chapter-4: Jurisdiction under S0ection -9 of CPC………….…........................23 5.7. Conditions; 5.8. Who may decide; 5.9. Presumption as to Jurisdiction; 5.10. Burden of Proof; 5.11. Exclusion of Jurisdiction; 5.12. Exclusion of Jurisdiction of civil court: Principles; 5.13. General Principles.

5. Chapter-5: Effects on a decree passed by the court without any jurisdiction…………………………………………………………………….....34 6.14. Essentials of decree. 6.15. Kinds of decree. 6.16. Place suing. 6.17. The effect on a decree passed by a court having no:
5.4.1. Territorial jurisdiction;
5.4.2. Pecuniary jurisdiction;
5.4.3. Subject matter jurisdiction. 6. Bibliograpgy……………………………………………………………………..35

CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental principle of law that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy (ubi jus ibi remedium) has been adopted by the Indian legal system also. In fact right and remedy are but the two sides of the same coin an they cannot be dissociated from each other. Accordingly, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute is bars it. 1.1. Jurisdiction: Meaning
Jurisdiction (from the Latin ius, iuris meaning "law" and dicere meaning "to speak") is the practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to a political leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. The term is also used to denote the geographical area or subject-matter to which such authority applies.
Jurisdiction may be defined to be the power or authority of a court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it. In other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority which the court has to decide the matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way of its decision. Thus, a jurisdiction of a court means the extent of the authority of a court to administer justice prescribed with reference to the subject matter, pecuniary value and local limits.
In Official trustee v. Sachindra , after referring to various decisions, the Supreme Court observed:
“From the above discussion it is clear that before a court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders sought for. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of the suit. its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties. 1.2. Jurisdiction and Consent
It is well settled that consent cannot confer nor take away jurisdiction of a court. If the court has no inherent jurisdiction, neither acquiescence nor waiver nor estoppels can create it. A defect of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the authority of a court to pass a decree. Such a basic and fundamental effect cannot be cured by the consent of the parties and the judgment or order passed by the court, however precisely certain and technically correct, is null and void and the validity thereof challenged at any stage. A decree passed without any jurisdiction is non est and its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. In short, a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. In the case of kiran singh v. chaman paswan , the Supreme Court observed:
“it is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings, A defect of jurisdiction strikes at very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties” Conversely, where a court has jurisdiction to decide a dispute, the same cannot be taken away or ousted by consent of the parties. An agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court would be unlawful and void. Being against public policy (ex dole malo non oritor action ).
But if two or courts has jurisdiction to decide a dispute, it is open to the parties to select a particular forum and exclude the other forums. And therefore the parties may agree among themselves that the suit should be brought in one of those courts and not in the other, since there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court. Such an agreement would be legal, valid and enforceable.

CHAPTER-2
Kinds of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court may be classified under the following categories:
2.1. Territorial or local jurisdiction.
2.2. Pecuniary jurisdiction.
2.3. Jurisdiction as to subject matter.
2.4. Original and appellate jurisdiction.

2.1. The Territorial or local jurisdiction:
Every court has its own local or territorial limits beyond which it cannot exercise its jurisdiction. These limits are fixed by the government. The District judge has to exercise jurisdiction within his district and not outside it. The High court has jurisdiction within his district and not outside it. The High court has jurisdiction over the territory of a state within which it is situate and not beyond it. Again, a court has no jurisdiction to try a suit for immovable property situated beyond its local limits. For eg:
District Courts: For example in Delhi, there are three District level courts, viz. Patiala House, Tis Hazari and Karakardooma. All these courts have nearly same powers. However, being on a same horizontal line, these courts are divided territory wise, i.e. area wise. Again for example, cases pertaining to South Delhi, New Delhi and West Delhi will lie before Patiala House, and North Delhi cases will lie before Tis Hazari, and cases pertaining to East Delhi will lie before Karakardooma.

High Courts: Similarly High Court of two different states, say Delhi, and Punjab may have similar powers in their respective states, but are divided on the basis of area. Cases pertaining to Delhi will lie before Delhi High court and cases pertaining to Punjab will lie before Punjab High Court.
How can territory be decided, Territory of a court is decided after taking into account several factors. They are: 2.2.1. In Case Of Immovable Property: If the suit is with regard to recovery, rent, partition, sale, redemption, determination of right of immovable property, it shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated. 2.2.2. Immovable Property Situated Within The Jurisdiction of Different Courts:
In such a case the suit may be instituted in any court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate

2.2.3. In Case Of Dispute Between Two Or More Persons With Respect To Movable Property, Business Or Any Other Wrong Done: Where a wrong has been caused to a person, or any damage has been caused to a movable property, then the suit may be instituted either, In the place, where wrong or damage has been caused, or In the place, where defendant (the person who caused the loss) resides. Where there is a dispute in business, agreement or any other kind of civil dispute, except matrimonial matter, then the suit may be instituted either, In a place, where the defendant resides, or carries on business, or In a place, where the cause of action has arisen, i.e. where the dispute or wrong took place

2.2.4. In Case Of Matrimonial Dispute: Where a dispute arises between Husband and wife in regard to their marital life then the case may be filed either: In the place where marriage was solemnized, or In the place, where opposite party is residing, or; In the place, where Husband and Wife last resided together, or; In the place, where person filing the case is residing, provided that. Opposite party has not been heard of as alive for the last Seven years, or opposite party resides outside the jurisdiction of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 Courts may also have jurisdiction that is exclusive or concurrent (shared). Where a court has exclusive jurisdiction over a territory or a subject matter, it is the only court that is authorized to address that matter. Where a court has concurrent or shared jurisdiction, more than one court can adjudicate the matter.

2.2. The Pecuniary Jurisdiction :
There is a pecuniary limit of each court. The value of subject matter of the suit should not exceed the pecuniary limit of the court. A court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit value of subject matter of suit exceeds the pecuniary limit of that court.
For Example: a presidencies small cause court has pecuniary limit up to Rs. 1000. In the same way, the courts in Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana, a sub judge third class can hear cases up to Rs. 5000. The sub judge Second class can hear cases up to Rs. 10,000; and the sub judge first class and district judge hear cases that exceed 10,000 and there is no upper limit. Some of the courts have no upper limit to its pecuniary power, for eg: the high courts and the district courts. 2.3. The Jurisdiction as to Subject Matter: Different courts have different jurisdiction and this depends upon the subject-matter. There are certain courts that have no jurisdiction to entertain particular type of suits. For e.g. : * The presidencies small cause courts had no jurisdiction to hear cases of specific performance of contract, * Suit for partition of immovable property. * Suit for closure of redemption of mortgage.
There are certain suits which can be filed in the court of district Judge, for eg. Testamentary, divorce, probate, solvency. 2.4. The Original and Appellate Jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction of court may be classified as original and appellate. In the exercise of original jurisdiction, a court entertains and decides suits and in its appellate jurisdiction, it entertains and decides appeals. Munsif’s Courts, Courts of Civil Judges and Small Cause Courts possesses original jurisdiction only; District Courts and High Courts have Original as well as Appellate jurisdiction.

CHAPTER-3
Lack of Jurisdiction and Irregular Exercise of Jurisdiction
There is always a distinction between want of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of it. Once it is held that a court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a matter, the correctness of the decision given cannot be said to be without jurisdiction inasmuch as the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In the words of Lord Hobhouse: “A court has a jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken, the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed.” In other words, if there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, the decree passed by a civil court is a nullity, and that nullity can be set up in any collateral proceedings. However, if a court has a jurisdiction but it is no such remedy or is not availed of, the decision is final. In Mathai v. Varkey Varkey , it was contended that the decree passed by a court was a nullity since the suit was time barred. Negative that contention, the Supreme Court observed:
“If the suit was barred by time and yet the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. Bu it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. . . . If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have the error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold no good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity.”
The difficult question, however, is: what is the distinction between absence of jurisdiction and erroneous or irregular exercise thereof?
After the landmark decision in Anisminic ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commision , the legal position is considerably changed. It virtually assimilated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise thereof. As observed in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur ,the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction has been reduced almost to a vanishing point
The following observations pithily put the legal position; “after anisminic every error of law is a jurisdictional error … the distinction between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional error is ultimately based upon a foundation of sand. Much of the superstructure has already crumbled.

CHAPTER-4
Jurisdiction under section-9
What remains is likely, quickly to fall away as the courts rightly insist that all administrative actions should be simply lawful whether or not jurisdictionally lawful”. * Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 deals with the jurisdiction of civil courts in India. It says that the courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation I- a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit or a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.
Explanation II- for the purpose of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place. 4.1. Conditions:

A civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit if two conditions are fulfilled:
4.1.1. The suit must be of a civil nature; and
4.1.2. The cognizance of such a suit should not have been expressly or impliedly barred.

4.1.1. Suit of civil nature: Meaning: in order that a civil court may have jurisdiction to try a suit, the first condition which must be satisfied is that the suit must be of a civil nature? The word ‘civil’ has not been defined in the code. But according to the dictionary meaning, it pertains to private rights and remedies of a citizen as distinguished from criminal, political, etc. the word ‘nature ‘has been defined as ‘the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character; sort, kind, character’’. It is thus wider in content. The expression ‘civil nature’ is wider than the expression ‘civil proceedings’. Thus, a suit is of a civil is of a nature if the principal question therein relates to the determination of a civil right and enforcement thereof. It is not the status of the parties to the suit, but the subject matter of it which determines whether or not the suit is of a civil nature. Nature and scope- the expression “suit of a civil nature” will cover private rights and obligations of a citizen. Political and religious questions are not covered by that expression. A suit in which the principal question relates to caste or religion is not a suit of a civil nature. But if the principal question in a suit is of a civil nature (the right to property or to an office) and the adjudication incidentally involves the determination relating to a caste question or to religious rights and ceremonies, it does not cease to be a suit of a civil nature and the jurisdiction of a civil court is not barred. The court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those questions also in order to decide the principal question which is of a civil nature. Explanation II has been added by the amendment act of 1976. Before this explanation, there was a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether a suit relating to a religious office to which no fees or emoluments were attached can be said to be a suit of a civil nature. But the legal position has now been clarified by explanation II which specifically provides that a suit relating to a religious office is maintainable whether or not it carries any fees or whether or not it is attached to a particular place. Doctrine explained: Explaining the concept of jurisdiction of civil courts under section 9, in PMA Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma, the Supreme Court stated: “The expensive nature of the section is demonstrated by use of phraseology both positive and negative. The earlier part opens the door widely and latter debars entry to only those which are expressly or impliedly barred. The two explanations, one existing from inception and later added in 1976, bring out clearly the legislative intention of extending operation of the section to religious matters where right to property or office is involved irrespective of whether any fee is attached to the office or not. The language used is simple but explicit and clear. It is structured on the basic of a civilized jurisprudence that absence of machinery for enforcement of right renders it nugatory. The heading which is normally a key to the section brings out unequivocally that all civil suits are cognizable unless bared. What is meant by it is explained further by widening the ambit of the section by use of the word ‘shall’ and the expression ‘all suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred’. Each word and expression casts an obligation on the court to exercise jurisdiction for enforcement of rights. The word shall make it mandatory. No court can refuse to entertain a suit if it is of the description mentioned in the section. That is amplified by the use of the expression. ‘All suits of civil nature’. The word civil according to the dictionary means, relating to the citizen as an individual; civil rights.’ In Black’s legal dictionary it is defined as, ‘relating to provide rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings’. In law it is understood as an antonym of criminal. Historically the two broad classifications were civil and criminal. Revenue, tax and company etc. were added to it later. But they too pertain to the larger family of civil. There is thus no doubt about the width of the word civil. Its width has been stretched further by using the word nature along with it. That is even those suits are cognizable which are not only civil but are even of civil nature….
The word ‘nature’ has defined as ‘the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character, sort; kind; character’. It is thus wider in content. The word ‘civil nature’ is wider that the word ‘civil proceeding’. The section would, therefore, be available in every case where the dispute was of the characteristics of affecting one’s rights which are not only civil but of civil nature.”

Test: a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of a question as to religious rites or ceremonies.

Suits of civil nature: illustrations- the following are suits of a civil nature:

* Suits relating to rights to property; * Suits relating to rights of worship; * Suits relating to taking out of religious procession; * Suits relating to right to share in offerings; * Suits for damages for civil wrongs; * Suits for specific performance of contracts or for damages for breach of contracts; * Suits for specific relief’s; * Suits for restitution of conjugal rights; * Suits for dissolution of marriages; * Suits for rent; * Suits for or on account; * Suits for rights of franchise; * Suits for rights to hereditary offices; * Suits for rights to Yajmanvritis; Suits against wrongful dismissal from service and for salaries, etc. Suits not of civil nature: Illustrations: - the following are not suits of a civil nature:

* Suits involving principally caste questions; * Suits involving purely religious rites or ceremonies; * Suits for upholding mere dignity or honor; * Suits for recovery of voluntary payments or offerings; * Suits against expulsions from caste, etc.
4.1.2. Cognizance not barred: as stated above, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit unless its cognizance is barred, either expressly or impliedly. * Suits expressly barred: A suit is said to be ‘expressly barred’ when it is barred by any enactment for the time being in force. It is open to a competent legislature to bar jurisdiction of civil courts with respect to a particular class of suits of a civil nature, provided that, in doing so, it keeps itself within the field of legislation conferred on it and does not contravene any provision of the constitution.
But every presumption should be made in favor of the jurisdiction of a civil court and the provision of exclusion of jurisdiction of a court must be strictly construed. If there is any doubt about the ousting of jurisdiction of a civil court, the court will lean to an interpretation which would maintain the jurisdiction. Thus, matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts or under the code of criminal procedure or matters dealt with by special tribunals under the relevant statutes, e.g. by industrial tribunal, income tax tribunal, revenue tribunal, electronic tribunal, rent tribunal, cooperative tribunal, motor accident claims tribunal, etc. or by domestic tribunals, e.g. Bar Council, Medical Council, university, club etc. are expressly barred from the cognizance of a civil court. But if the remedy provided by a statute is not adequate and all questions cannot be decided by a special tribunal, the jurisdiction of a civil court is not barred. Similarly, when a court of limited jurisdiction prima facie and incidentally states something, the jurisdiction of a civil court to finally decide the time is not ousted. * Suits impliedly barred:
A suit is said to be impliedly barred when it is barred by general principles of law.
Where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form than that given by the statute. Where an act creates an obligation and enforces its performance in a specified manner, that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner.
Similarly, certain suits, though of a civil nature, are barred from thee cognizance of a civil court on the ground of public policy. “The principle underlying is that a court ought not to countenance matters which are injurious to and against the public weal.” Thus, no suit shall lie for recovery of costs incurred in criminal prosecution or for enforcement of a right upon a contract hit by section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; or against any judge for acts done in the course of his duties. Likewise, political questions belong to the domain of public administrative law and are outside the jurisdiction of civil courts. A civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes of a political nature.
4.2. Who may decide: It is well settled that a civil court has inherited power to decide its own jurisdiction.
4.3. Presumption as to jurisdiction: In dealing with the question whether a civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind that every presumption should be made in favor of the jurisdiction of a civil court. The exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain civil causes should not be readily inferred unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of the nature.
4.4. Burden of proof: It is well- settled that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil court to establish it. It is equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed. Where such a contention is raised, it has to be determined in the light of the words used in the statute, the scheme of the relevant provisions and the object and purpose of the enactment. In the case of a doubt as to jurisdiction, the court should lean towards the assumption of jurisdiction. A civil court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction; although as a result of such inquiry it may turn out that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

4.5. Exclusion of jurisdiction: limitations:
A litigation having a grievance of a civil nature has, independent of any statute, a right to institute a suit in a civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly sbarred. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be clear.
Again, even when the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred, either expressly or by necessary implication, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction is altogether excluded. A court has jurisdiction to examine whether the provisions of the act and the rules made there under have or have not been complied with, or the order is contrary to law, malafide, ultra vires, perverse, arbitrary, ‘purported’, violative of the principles of natural justice, or is based on ‘no evidence’ and so on. In all these cases, the order cannot be said to be under the act but is de hors the act and the jurisdiction of a civil court is not ousted. In the leading decision of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., the Privy Council rightly observed:
“It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well established that even if jurisdiction is so excluded the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.”
It is respectfully submitted that the following observations of Subba Rao, J.(as he then was) in the leading case of Radha Kishan v. Ludhiyana Municipality lay down the correct legal position regarding jurisdiction of civil courts and require to be produced:
“Under section 9 of the civil procedure code the court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary implication can bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts. The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had. Even in such cases, the civil court’s jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A suit in a civil court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the act but in violation of its provisions.”
4.6. Exclusion of Jurisdiction of Civil Court: Principles: From the above discussion it is clear that the jurisdiction of civil courts is all- embracing except to the extent it is excluded by law or by clear intendment arising from such law.
In the classic decision of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. after considering a number of cases, Hidyatullah, C.J. summarized the following principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts: * Where a statute gives finality to orders of special tribunals, the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of a particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

* Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of a court, an examination of the scheme of a particular act to find the adequate or sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but this is not decisive for sustaining the jurisdiction of a civil court.

* Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of a particular act to find out the intendment become necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.

* Challenge to the provisions of a particular act as ultra vires cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under that act. Even the high court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from decisions of tribunals.

* When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provisions is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the limitation act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

* Where the particular act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or is illegally collected, a suit lies.

* Questions of the correctness of an assessment, apart from its constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorized and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in a particular act. In either case, the scheme of a particular act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.

* An exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. The above principles enunciated are relevant in deciding the correctness or otherwise of assessment orders made under taxing statutes.
In Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke, the supreme court laid down the following principles as applicable to the jurisdiction of a civil court in relation to industrial disputes: * If a dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the act, the remedy lies only in a civil court.

* If a dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the act, the jurisdiction of a civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of a suitor or person concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

* If an industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the act, then the only remedy available to suitor is to get adjudication under the act.

* If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the act such as chapter V- A, then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be again, in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Krishna Kant, after considering various leading decisions on the point, the Supreme Court summarized the principles applicable to industrial disputes thus:

* Where a dispute arises from the general law of contract, i.e., where relief’s are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in a civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of section 2 (k) or section 2-A of the industrial Dispute Act, 1947. * Where, however, a dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the industrial Dispute Act, the only remedy is to approach the famous created by the said act. * Similarly, where a dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments, like the industrial employment (standing order) act, 1946- which can be called “sister enactments’ to the industrial dispute act- and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the industrial dispute act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of section 2(k) and section 2-A of the industrial dispute act or where such enactments says that such dispute shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the industrial disputes act. Otherwise, recourse to a civil court is open. * It is not correct to say that remedies provided by the industrial disputes act are not equally effective for the reason that access to a forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence is not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting adjudication. * Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to parliament and state legislature to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the labor court- i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the government- in case of industrial dispute covered by section 2-A of the industrial disputes act. This would go a long way in removing the misgiving with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the industrial disputes act. * The certified standing orders framed in accordance with the industrial dispute act and its sister enactment is to provide an alternative dispute- resolution mechanism to workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of courts and tribunals under the industrial disputes act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.

Very recently, in Chandrakant Tukaram v. Municipla Corporation of Ahmadabad, the supreme court reiterated the principles laid down in earlier decisions and stated:

“it cannot be disputed that the procedure followed by civil courts are too lengthy and, consequently, are not an efficacious forum for resolving the industrial disputes speedily. The power of the industrial courts also is wide and such forums are empowered to grant adequate relief as they just and appropriate. It is in the interest of the workmen that their disputes, including the dispute of illegal termination, are adjudicated upon by an industrial forum.”
4.7. General principles: From various decisions of the Supreme Court, the following general principles relating to jurisdiction of a civil court emerge:

4.7.1. A civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance is barred either expressly or impliedly. Consent can neither confer nor take away jurisdiction of a court.

4.7.2. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the validity thereof can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, in execution proceedings or even in collateral proceedings.

4.7.3. There is a distinction between want of jurisdiction and irregular exercise thereof.

4.7.4. Every court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction.

4.7.5. Jurisdiction of a court depends upon the averments made in a plaint and not upon the defense in a written statement.

4.7.6. For deciding jurisdiction of a court, substance of a matter and not its form is important.

4.7.7. Every presumption should be made in favor of jurisdiction of a civil court.

4.7.8. A statute ousting jurisdiction of a court must be strictly construed.

4.7.9. Burden of proof of exclusion of jurisdiction of a court is on the party who asserts it.
4.7.10. Even where jurisdiction of a civil court is barred, it can still decide whether the provisions of an act have been complied with or whether an order was passed de hors the provisions of law.

CHAPTER-5
Effect on a Decree passed by the court having no jurisdiction
In section 2 of Civil Procedure Code, defines ‘decree’ as under: Meaning:
“Decree” means the formal expression of adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question under section 144, but shall not include: * Any adjudication from which an appeal from an order, or * Any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.”
5.1. Essentials of a decree:
In an order that a decision of a court may be a ‘decree’, the following elements must be present :
5.1.1. There must be adjudication.
5.1.2. Such adjudication must be done in a suit.
5.1.3. It must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit.
5.1.4. Such determinations must be of a conclusive nature
5.1.5. There must be a formal expression of such adjudication.
5.1.1. Adjudication: There must be formal expression of adjudication, i.e. the granting or refusing any relief claimed in the suit or appeal or other proceedings which may conform to the decision of suit and embodied in a formal declaration of a court.
In the case of Deep Chand v. Land Acquisition Officer, the essentials requirement s of a decree was dealt in detail. The apex court opined that to constitute a decision of a court to be a decree, it must contain either of the following characteristics: * There must be an adjudication meaning thereby a judicial determination of the matter in dispute; * Decision on a matter of administrative nature is not a decree; * An order dismissing a suit for default of appearance of parties is not a decree; * Dismissal on a appeal for want of prosecution is not a decree; * Any judicial determination can only be called a decree when it is passed by a court; * Any order passed by an officer below the rank of a court is not a decree.

5.1.2. Suit: The adjudication must have been given in the suit before a court. There can be no decree unless there was a suit; the decree is logical conclusion of the suit and bears the fruit of litigation. Suit though not defined in the code may be taken to mean civil, revenue or other proceedings which may be instituted by presentation of a plaint or application which may amount to plaint.
5.1.3. Rights of parties in controversy: The adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit .an order of the suit for detail of appearance, an order dismissing an execution case for non-prosecution, an order amending an execution-petition, refusal to leave to sue in forma pauperis decision on an application by a person to be added as a party to suit on the grounds of his interests in the subject matter of the suit, an order directing assessment of mesne profits are not decrees because they do not determine the rights of the parties with regard to any matter in controversy in the suit. Gajraj Mati v. Shami Nath.but an order dismissing the suit on account for failure of the plaintiff to furnish better particulars as ordered, amounts to a decree. Madhya Pradesh state Cooperative Land development Bank Ltd., Bhopal v. J.l. Choksey.
5.1.4. Conclusive determination: Such adjudications must be conclusive, i.e., there must be complete and final as regards the court which passed it. Decree may conclusively determine the rights of the parties although it does not completely dispose of the suit. Srijib v. Dandi Swami Juggannath Ashram,
An award passed by Motor Accidental Claims Tribunals is not a ‘decree’; Oriental Isurance Co. sLtd. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, the order made under Rule.58 (3) of Order.21 of the amended code has only the status of ‘deemed decree’ and not a ‘decree’ by itself and such order are not covered by definition under section 2(2); B. Nookaraju v. M.S.N. Chanties. Also the contention proceeding for grant or refusal of probate and letters of the administration is not a suit in substance and the orders in the said proceeding is a ‘decree’, as it does not fulfil the ingredients of a decree as defined under the code; Sidharth Bharti v. Jai Narayan Bharti.
5.1.4. Formal expression: There must be a formal expression of such adjudication. All the requirements of form must be compiled with. The formal expression must be deliberate and given in manner provided by law. The decree follows the judgment and must be drawn up separately. Thus, if the decree is not formally drawn up in terms of the judgment, no appeal lies from that judgment. But the decree need not be in a particular form. Thus, a Misdescription of a decision as an order which amounts to a decree does not make it less than a decree.
Illustrations: Decisions which are decrees: * Order of the abetment of suit; * Dismissal of appeal as time barred; * Dismissal of a suit or appeal for want of evidence of proof; * Rejection of a plaint for a non- payment of court fees; * Granting or refusing to grant installments; * Modifications for schemes under section 92 of the code. * Order holding appeal non- maintainable.
Illustrations: decisions which are not decrees: * Dismissal of appeal for default; * Appointment of commissioners to take accounts; * Order of remand; * Order granting interim relief; * Return of plaint for presentation to proper court; * Dismissal of suit under Order 23 Rule 1 ; * Refusing to wind up a company.
5.2. Kinds of decrees:
5.2.1. Preliminary decree;
5.2.2. Final decree;
5.2.3. Partly preliminary and partly final decree.
5.2.1. Preliminary decree: where adjudication decides the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, but does not completely disposes of the suit, it is a preliminary decree. A preliminary decree is passed in those cases in which the court has first to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has then to stay its hands for the time being, until it is in a position in working out the rights of the parties which are to be finally adjudicated by a final decree. Till then the suit continues,
The code provides for passing of decree in the following suits: * Suits for possession and mesne profits Or. 20, R. 12 * Adminitration Suits Or. 20, R. 13 * Suits for pre-emption Or. 20, R. 14 * Suits for dissolution of partnership Or. 20, R. 15 * Suits for accounts between Principle and Agent Or. 20, R. 16 * Suits for partition and separate possession Or. 20, R. 18 * Suits for foreclosure of a mortgage Or. 34, R. 2-3 * Suits for sale of mortgaged property Or. 34, R. 4-7 * Suit for redemption of a mortgage Or. 34, R. 7-8
The above list is however, not exhaustive and a court may pass a preliminary dcree in cases not expressely provided for in the code.
5.2.2. Final decree:
A decree may be said to be final in two ways: * When within the prescribed period no appeal is filed against the decree or the matter has been decided by the decree of the highest court * When the decree so far is regards the court passing it completely disposes of the suit
It si in the later sense that the words final decree are used here
A final decree is a one which completely disposes of the suit and finally settles all the questions in the controversy between parties and nothing further reminds to be decided thereafter thus, in a suit for recovery of the money if the amount found due to the deree holder is declared in the manner in which the amount which has to be paid also being laid down the decree is a final decree. simmilarly, a decree passed for a sum representing past mesne profits and future mesne profits at a particular rate without directing any further inquiry is a final decree, thus, a decree passed by a special court did not contemplate any other further proceedings the decree even though described as a preliminary dcecree in substance was a final decree.
5.2.3. Partly preliminary and partly final decree:
A decree may be partly preliminary and partly final e.g. in a suit for possession of a immovable property with mesne profit where the court * Decrees possession of property * Directs an inquiry into the mesne profits.
The former parts of the decree is final while the later part is only preliminary because the final decree of mesne profits can be drawn only after inquiry and amount due is ascertained in such a case even though the decree is only one it is partly preliminary and partly final
5.3. Place of Suing:
The provisions of the civil procedure relating to the place of suing may be explained by the following chart: Nature of suit 1 Every suit 1. Suit for: (i) Recovery of; (ii) Partition of charge upon; (iii) Foreclosure, sale or redemption of mortgage of or charge upon; (iv) Determination of any other right to or interest in; (v) Compensation for wrong to immovable property. 2. Recovery of immovable property under actual distraint or attachment. 3. (i) Relief respecting; or (ii) compensation for wrong –to immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant; where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience- 4. (i) relief respecting; or (ii) compensation for wrong to-immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of different courts- 5. Where it is uncertain that jurisdiction of which of two or more courts any immovable property is situate- 6. Compensation for wrong to- (i) Person, or (ii) Movable property- If the wrong is done within the jurisdiction of one court and the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of another court 7. Any other suit- * | Place of suing 1. Court of the lowest grade competent to try it(section 15) 2. Court within whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate [section 16(a) to (e)] 3. Court within whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate [section 16(f)] 4. Court within whose jurisdiction- (i) The property is stituate; or (ii) The defendant resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain(proviso to section 16) 5. Courts within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate, provided that the entire claim is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of such court (section 17). 6. Any of those courts, provided that the court has pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction regards the subject matter of the suit (section 18) 7. In either of the courts at the option of plaintiff (section 19) 8. (i) where the cause of action wholly or partly arises; or(ii) The defendant resides, carries on business or personally works for gains; or (iii) Where there are two or more defendants, where any of them resides, carries on business or personally works for gain provided that- (a) Either the leave of the court is obtained; or (b) The defendants, who do not reside, carries on business or personally works for gain acquiesce (section 20). |

5.4. Objection to Jurisdiction of a decree passed by a court: section 21
5.4.1. General:
As stated above, it is a fundamental rule that a decree of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Halsbury rightly states:
“Where by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular action or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled.
…Where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing.”
This does no, however apply to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, inasmuch as objections to such jurisdiction are regarded by the code as merely technical and unless raised at the earliest possible opportunity they will not be entertained in appeal or revision for the first time.

5.4.2. Object:
The object underlying section 21 is to protect honest litigants and to avoid harassment to the plaintiffs who have bona fide and in good faith initiated proceedings in a court which is later on found to be wanting in jurisdiction. Dishonest litigants cannot take advantage of this jurisdiction.
Objection as to territorial jurisdiction:
It is well settled that the objection as to local or territorial jurisdiction of a court (place of suing) does not stand on the same footing of a court to try the case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very roots of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction, on the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been recognized by section 21 of the code.
Thus, in Hira lal v. kali Nath, where the suit which ought to have been filed in an Agra court was filed in Bombay High court with the leave of court, was held that the objection to such jurisdiction falls within section 21 of the code
Under section 21(1) no objection as to the place of suing will be allowed by an appellate or revision court unless the following three conditions are satisfied: * The objection was taken in the court of first instance; * It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled at or before settlement of issues and ; * There had been a consequent failure of justice.
All these conditions must coexist.
Reasons are obvious. It well settled that neither concerned nor waiver nor acquisance can confer jurisdiction upon a court otherwise incompetent to try a suit however it is equally well settkled that the objection as to the local jurisdiction of a coiurt does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case.competence of acourt to try a case goes to the very rioot of the jurisdiction, and where is lacking. It’s a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived.
[policy underlying section 21 has been succinctly explained by the supreme court in ‘ Kiran singh v. Chaman Paswan’ wherein therelordship observed,
In a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered it should not be liable to be resolved purely on technical grounds unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislation has been to treat objections to both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court unless there has been a prejudiced on merits.
Objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction:
As discussed above as a general rule it’s the plaintiff’s valuation in the plaint that reminds the jurisdiction of the court and not amount for which ultimately the decree may be passed by the court. But if the defendant disputes valuation put by the plaintiff it is the duty of the trial court to enquire into it and to pass on the appropriate order but no objection as to over evaluation or under evaluation will be allowed by any appellate or revision court, unless the following three condition exist: * The objection was taken in the court of first instance * It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled at a before settlement of issues and * There has been a consequent failure of justice.
All three must coexist.
Thus in Kiran Singh v. chaman Paswan, negativing the contention of the appellant that a mere change or forum can be said to have caused prejudiced to him, the Supreme Court rightly observed:
“if the fact of an appeal being heard by a subordinate court or district court where the appellant would have laid to the high court if the correct valuation has been given is itself a matter of prejudice then the decree passed by the subordinate court without or more be liable to set aside and the words, ‘unless the over valuation or under valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits’ would became wholly useless, these words clearly shoes that that decree is passed in such a cases or liable to be interfere within an appellate court not in all cases and as a matter of court such as mentioned in the section results and prejudiced envisaged by that section therefore, must be something other than appeal being heard in a different forum.”
Objection as to subject matter jurisdiction:
A court cannot adjudicate upon a subject matter which does not fall within its province as limited or defined by law, a jurisdiction as to the subject matter of suit is regarded as essential for jurisdiction over the subject matter is a condition precedent or a sine qua non to the acquisition of authority over the parties and the matter and if the court does not possess the jurisdiction. A judgment given, order made or decree passed is absolutely null and void. This may be set aside in appeal its validity can be challenged even in collateral proceedings.

CHAPTER-6
Conclusion
From the above contents of my project it can be concluded that section 9 at ‘the threshold of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) primarily deals with the question of civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain a cause. It lays down that subject to what are contained in section 2, 9, etc., civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit of civil nature except when its cognizance is expressly barred or barred by necessary implication. Civil court has jurisdiction to decide the question of its jurisdiction although as a result of the enquiry it may eventually turn out that it has no jurisdiction over the matter. Civil court has jurisdiction to examine whether tribunal and quasi- judicial bodies or statutory authority acted within their jurisdiction. But once it is found that such authority, e.g., certificate officer had initial jurisdiction, then any erroneous order by him is not open to collateral attack in a suit. Because there is an essential and marked distinction between the cases in which courts lack jurisdiction to try cases and where jurisdiction is irregularly exercised by courts.

Bibliography
Books:
1. Sarkar Sudipto, 5th Edt., Civil Procedure Code, 10th edn., Vol.1, Wadwa Company, Nagpur, 2002. 2. Takwani C.K., Civil Procedure, 5th edn., Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2003., Civil Procedure, 5th edn., Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2003 3. Saha A.N., The code of civil procedure, 5th edn., Premier Publishing Company, Delhi. 4. Mani, The civil jurisdiction,6th edn., Kamal Publishers, New Delhi

Case laws: 1. Abdul waheed khan v. bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 (1719); brij lal v. lakshman, AIR 1961 SC 149 (152) 2. Ganga bai v. vijay kumar,(1974) 2 SCC 393 (397) 3. Raja soap factory v. S.P Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449; (1965) 2 SCR 800. 4. Chief justice, A.P. v. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 (42) 5. Vasudev dhanjibai modi v. rajabhai, (1970) 1 SCC 670. 6. Sushil kumar v. gobind ram, (1990) 1 SCC 193 (205) 7. Hakam singh v. gammon (india) ltd., (1971) SCC 286. 8. Ujjam bai v. State of U.P. , AIR 1962 SC 1621 (1629) 9. Malkarjun v. Narhari, (1900) 27 IA 216(225). 10. Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907 (910). 11. Narayan v. Ishwarlal, AIR 1965 SC 1818. 12. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma, 1995 SCC 226 (318-19) 13. Sinha v. Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja, AIR 1961 SC 1720 14. Umrao Singh v. Bhagwan Singh, AIR 1956 SC 15: 1956 SCR 62. 15. State of V.P. v. Mordhwaj Singh, AIR (1960) SC 796: (1960) 3 SCR 106. 16. State of T.N. v. Ramalinga, (1985) 4 SCC 10 : AIR 1986 SC 794 17. L.I.C. v. India Automobiles, (1990) 4 SCC 286: AIR 1991 SC 884. 18. Indian Airlines v. Sukhdeo Rai, 1971 2 SCC 192. 19. Union of India v. Ram Chand, AIR 1955 punj 166 (169) 20. Bhatia Coop. Housing Society v. D.C.Patel, AIR 1953 SC 16 (19); 21. A.R. Antullay v. R.S.Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 (701) 22. Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Dev, AIR 1955 SC 576 (581); 23. kamala Mills v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 24. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78: (1968) 3 SCR 6

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[ 2 ]. Abdul waheed khan v. bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 (1719); brij lal v. lakshman, AIR 1961 SC 149 (152)
[ 3 ]. Ganga bai v. vijay kumar,(1974) 2 SCC 393 (397)
[ 4 ]. C.K.Takwani, Civil Procedure, 5th edn., Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2003, pp 42.
[ 5 ]. Raja soap factory v. S.P Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449; (1965) 2 SCR 800.
[ 6 ]. AIR 1969 SC 823: (1969) 3 SCR 92.
[ 7 ]. Chief justice, A.P. v. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 (42)
[ 8 ]. Vasudev dhanjibai modi v. rajabhai, (1970) 1 SCC 670.
[ 9 ]. Sushil kumar v. gobind ram, (1990) 1 SCC 193 (205)
[ 10 ]. AIR 1954 SC 340: (1955) 1SCR 117.
[ 11 ]. Hakam singh v. gammon (india) ltd., (1971) SCC 286.
[ 12 ]. Retrieved from< http://legalservicesindia.com/article/article/jurisdiction-of-civil-court-under-civil-procedure-code-508-1.html> 3rd November,2011, IST 22:08.
[ 13 ]. Ujjam bai v. State of U.P. , AIR 1962 SC 1621 (1629)
[ 14 ]. Malkarjun v. Narhari, (1900) 27 IA 216(225).
[ 15 ]. AIR 1964 SC 907: (1964) 1 SCR 495.
[ 16 ]. Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907 (910).
[ 17 ]. (1972) 2 SCC 427 (435).
[ 18 ]. (1972) 2 SCC 427 (435).
[ 19 ]. Narayan v. Ishwarlal, AIR 1965 SC 1818.
[ 20 ]. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma, 1995 SCC 226 (318-19)
[ 21 ]. Sinha v. Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja, AIR 1961 SC 1720
[ 22 ]. 1995 SCC 226; AIR 1995 SC 2001.
[ 23 ]. Umrao Singh v. Bhagwan Singh, AIR 1956 SC 15: 1956 SCR 62.
[ 24 ]. State of V.P. v. Mordhwaj Singh, AIR (1960) SC 796: (1960) 3 SCR 106.
[ 25 ]. State of T.N. v. Ramalinga, (1985) 4 SCC 10 : AIR 1986 SC 794
[ 26 ]. L.I.C. v. India Automobiles, (1990) 4 SCC 286: AIR 1991 SC 884.
[ 27 ]. Indian Airlines v. Sukhdeo Rai, 1971 2 SCC 192.
[ 28 ]. Union of India v. Ram Chand, AIR 1955 punj 166 (169)
[ 29 ]. Bhatia Coop. Housing Society v. D.C.Patel, AIR 1953 SC 16 (19); A.R. Antullay v. R.S.Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 (701)
[ 30 ]. Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Dev, AIR 1955 SC 576 (581); kamala Mills v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 (1950-51): 91966) 1 SCR 64.
[ 31 ]. Bhatia coop. Housing Society v. D.C.Patel, AIR 1953 SCR 185
[ 32 ]. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78: (1968) 3 SCR 6
[ 33 ]. AIR 1940 PC 105: 67 IA 222.
[ 34 ]. AIR 1963 SC 1547 : (1964) 2 SCR 273.
[ 35 ]. AIR 1969 SC 78: (1968) 3 SCR 662.
[ 36 ]. (1976) 1 SCC 496:
[ 37 ]. (1995) 5 SCC 75; AIR 1995 SC 1715.
[ 38 ]. (2002)2 SCC 542.
[ 39 ]. AIR 1994 SC 1901.
[ 40 ]. (1916) 39 AII 13:36 IC 307.
[ 41 ]. AIR 1980, MP 204.
[ 42 ]. 73 CLJ 532(536), (41) AC 618, 199 IC.
[ 43 ]. AIR 1994 Raj 44 (DB).
[ 44 ]. AIR 1994 AP 344 (DB).
[ 45 ]. AIR 1994 part 144 (DB)
[ 46 ]. Shakuntala devi v. kuntal kumara, AIR 1969 SC 575.
[ 47 ]. Mool chand v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1995) 5 SCC 631.
[ 48 ]. Narayanan v. laxmi narayana, AIR 1953 TC 220.
[ 49 ]. Lucy v. mariappa, AIR 1979 SC 1214
[ 50 ]. Ewing v. Ewing, (1883) 9 AC 34 (40).
[ 51 ]. U.C.O. Bank v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 (237)
[ 52 ]. Hira lal v. kali nath (infra)
[ 53 ]. O.N.G.C. v. Utpal Kumar, (1994) 3 SCC 711 (723)
[ 54 ]. AIR 1962 SC 199 (201).
[ 55 ]. AIR 1954 SC 340 (342).
[ 56 ]. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 (342).
[ 57 ]. Pathuma v. Kutty, AIR 1981 SC 1683.
[ 58 ]. Hrieday nath v. Ramachandra,AIR 1921 CAL 24 (1921)