position in the rear of the battle lost him numerous opportunities. His commanders frequently complacently waited for direction while Lee’s leaders flexibly adapted to changing conditions. McClellan failed in this regard prior to the battle when he delayed contact in order to personally develop the enemy situation. Having knowledge of Lee’s plan from the intercepted general order, a hasty assault on Lee’s position on 15 September would have prevented Jackson and Hill’s forces from ever reinforcing the battle. This would have ensured a handy victory by the Union. McClellan spent copious time developing the situation, showing hesitancy to offload any tasks on staff or subordinate commanders. In McClellan’s reports, he wrote that he spent …show more content…
In addition to providing detailed information on Confederate composition and disposition, this would have prevented Hooker’s decisive engagement on the northern flank. This error heavily impeded his decision-making throughout the battle, as his assumption that he was outnumbered by the Confederate forces by about 30,000 remained unchecked. His thought trap informed all his tactical decisions, and by not exercising reconnaissance and planning efforts across his formation, he never received a competing perspective. As such, McClellan needlessly threw most of his combat power into fighting a phantom force. As the battle continued, McClellan had progressively less control over his forces. Corps commanders had neither the authority nor the knowledge required to make independent decisions or to properly react to changing conditions. Couriers continuously streamed from forward lines to the rear, slowing decision making and halting progress at …show more content…
Throughout the Maryland campaign, McClellan developed a reputation for exaggerating the size of adversary forces to needle Washington for reinforcements. Lincoln characterized him as a “chief alarmist and grand marplot of the Army.” During the Battle of Antietam, his refusal to commit his reserve may have been due to outside political objectives. Having recently regained command of the Army of Potomac, General McClellan saw a tactical draw as the minimum necessary end state required to solidify his standing as a key figure in Washington. The only thing his reputation couldn’t withstand was a decisive loss; all he had to do was just enough to force Lee’s retreat. While McClellan was habitually risk-averse, this may inform some of his underlying motives. McClellan, with an overwhelming force, failed to mass his forces in a deliberate, coordinated assault. His inability to accept prudent risk also undercut the audacity and tempo of his offensive operations. In delaying his attack two days before the battle, he gave Lee every opportunity to fortify defensive positions and to conduct counter-intelligence. Although the plan was imperfect, had he executed it boldly he could have achieved a decisive victory. Instead, he retained a reserve of more than half of his force, which he tasked in a piecemeal fashion to maintain ground already seized. Likewise, hesitating to