On July 17th, 1955, Walt Disney opened a theme park in Anaheim, California with the intention of creating an experience like no other. He would later be quoted saying “Disneyland will never be completed. It will continue to grow as long as there is imagination left in the world.” And with that mindset he would grow his brand into one of the most successful in the world (Dill, K., 2016). The 244 acre park would be the largest business and tax payer in the city, employing 20,000 workers and generating half of the city’s tax income. The city of Anaheim, which strongly supported Disney’s operations, would later designate two square miles of land adjacent to the Disneyland as a resort district to help increase Disney’s operation size (Lawrence & Weber, 2014). In 2005 a local developer named SunCal proposed a 26 acre housing development in the resort district in order to build 1,300 condominiums and 225 rental units as affordable housing (Bernstein, F. A., 2007). Given the median income of the Disney employee’s, $60,000, the lack of affordable housing in the immediate area surrounding Disneyland made it difficult for many employees to be city residents (Lawrence & Weber, 2014). Disney would take issue with the development citing that “If one developer is allowed to build residential in the resort area, others will follow.” (Bernstein, F. A., 2007). Disney would ultimately exercise its political power and capital to defeat SunCal’s efforts to obtain a permit in the resort district.
If I were the CEO of Walt Disney, I would have taken a different approach to the residential housing plans brought up by SunCal. By recognizing the overlap between Disney and SunCal’s nonmarket stakeholders, namely the Disney employees and Unions supporting SunCal’s affordable housing as well as affordable housing advocates in the region, Disney could have addressed the issues of SunCal’s nonmarket stakeholders without creating a public image of being inconsiderate towards its own employees (Bernstein, F. A., 2007). By creating a housing allowance package for its employees, Disney would not only satisfy the needs of SunCal’s nonmarket shareholders, but it would also provide additional benefits to its own market stakeholders as the new city residents would be paying rent and shopping within the resort district. This course of action would also coincide with the stakeholder theory of the firm which is more considerate to the needs of the Disney’s employees, customers and the city of Anaheim (Lawrence & Weber, 2014).

References:
• Lawrence, A. T., & Weber, J. (2014). Business and Society: Stakeholders, Ethics, Public Policy (14th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
• Bernstein, F. (2007, May 20). Housing Plans that turn Disney Grumpy. Retrieved May 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/yourmoney/20natreal.html?_r=0
• Dill, K. (2016, February 18). Disney Tops Global Ranking Of The Most Powerful Brands In 2016. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathryndill/2016/02/18/disney-tops-global-ranking-of-the-most-powerful-brands-in-2016/#5381f3ec7181