In claiming that argument 1 is a proof as part of a premise, Moore defends this by way of his Central argument. Moore’s central argument consists of three parts, two premises and a conclusion. In his first premise, [P1], he states that argument 1 is a proof that there are material objects external to our minds and because of this, one who gives that argument in the way we just did is justified in believing its conclusion. His second premise, [P2], is that one cannot prove that he is not being deceived by an evil genius in the manner that the skeptic demands. These two premises lead to his conclusion, [C], that the skeptic’s second premise is false. Which states, from the skeptics argument, we are justified in believing that there are material objects external to our minds only if we can prove that we are not being deceived by an evil genius and we can do so in a manner that does not presuppose any claim that we are only justified in believing on the basis of our perceptual experience. Moore’s response to the skeptic, in which the skeptic states that argument 1 does not constitute a proof, is backed by Moore’s standards of proof. The standards of a proof of an argument are (1), its conclusion is different from each of its premises, (2), its conclusion follows its premises, and (3), each of its premises are known to be true. Moore’s argument 1 satisfies the first standard of a proof. Since we know that [P1] and [P2] are true, and [P3] follows from the other premises, then argument 1 also satisfies the 2nd and 3rd condition of Moore’s standards of a proof. Moore also states that proof is not required for knowledge. This leads to Moore’s second argument. Moore states the premise [P1] ‘here is a hand.’ Premise [P1] cannot be proved, and premise [P1] is known, therefore proof is not required for knowledge. The skeptic replies with premise [P1] cannot be proved, and proof is required for knowledge, therefore premise [P1] is not known. This would seem like a stalemate. The difference lies within the proof, for Moore it is that the secondary proof is proof that is of its conclusion, where as the skeptics proof is not a proof of its conclusion. For the skeptics argument to be a proof of its conclusion, then his argument must satisfy Moore’s 3 standards of proof. The skeptic satisfies the first two conditions. None of the skeptics premises are the same as his conclusion, and the conlcusion does follow from his premises. It is within the third condition which leaves something to be desired. For the skeptics second premise that proof is required for knowledge, the skeptic cannot say that the premise is known. If it was known then it would be true, and if it were true, there would be a proof of it. By the skeptics standards on what is needed for knowledge, which is shown by the skeptics second premise, then the skeptics argument does not show a proof of its conclusion that Moore’s initial premise is unknown. Moore has then provided himself to be put into a position where he has proved that proof s not required for knowledge, unlike the skeptic who has not proved that proof is required for knowledge. It is for these reasons that Moore has proved knowledge without proof, that the skeptic cannot then deny Moore his proof of the existence of external things. Moore’s overall response to the skeptic is succesful in a way that he uses the skeptics tatics to not necessarily beat the skeptic, but allow for the skeptic to beat himself. Moore’s attempt to prove the existence of external things leaves a lot left to bedesired, there are just simply holes within the argument itself, but he does a great job in not going out and proving what is there but allowing others to not be able to prove what is there, which in turns makes his argument valid.