Friedrich Nietzsche conveys his view on freedom in short, provocative

statements dispersed throughout his writings. In this essay, I will discuss

Nietzsche’s conception of freedom as presented in two of his works: The

Genealogy of Morals and The Gay Science.

To begin, in Section 12 from The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche

introduces to us the term, “will to power” (GM, pg 78) with which he uses

synonymously with the term, “instinct for freedom” in latter sections of the essay.

Although Nietzsche never clearly defines what he means when he says, “will to

power,” he provides the reader a depiction of this concept through the origin of

punishment.

According to Nietzsche, the concept of punishment contains an aspect

that is enduring and an aspect that is fluid (GM, pg 79). In other words, the

act of punishing remains the same, but the meaning of the act changes radically

over time. For example, while the barbarians of ancient time may have used

punishment as a “festival, namely as the rape and mockery of a finally defeated

enemy,” modern morality uses punishment as “a means of rendering harmless, or

preventing further harm” or even “as the isolation of a disturbance of equilibrium

(GM, pg 80). Thus, Nietzsche shows that the significance of punishment is

not the act itself, but the meaning that we attach to it. Because the meaning of

punishment is independent of the act itself, we can essentially understand the

word “punishment” as meaning anything we want, according to Nietzsche’s logic.

With this, Nietzsche shows us that various interpretations, meanings, and

purposes have been given to any concept that existed for any length of time which

were always imposed by the different powers and authorities that master them.

Therefore, Nietzsche suggests that when something has a purpose or utility, it is

simply a sign that a "will to power" is acting upon it.

In relation to the “will to power” that was first mentioned in this essay, we

can come to understand it as the fundamental drive that motivates all discourses

and actions in life. This can be said because, as we have seen according to

Nietzsche, things do not have inherent purposes, but they are only given purposes

when a force or will acts upon them. Nietzsche also further supports this claim

when he states that the “will to power” is the “essence of life” (GM, pg 79).

One may argue that this suggestion contrasts with the more familiar

notion that humanity’s fundamental drive is the will to life—or in other words—

the will to pursue self-preservation. However, there are reasons to believe why

the will to power might be more imperative than the will to life. Take for example,

a martyr who willing risks his or her life for a cause. In essence, this martyr

establishes that he or she is strong enough to resist any physical threats by the

oppressor. This thereby demonstrates that the martyr values his or her power of

independence even over life itself.

Such an example provides clarity as to why Nietzsche would equate the

“will to power” with the “instinct for freedom.” A person who harbors a powerful

will is one who cannot be dominated or controlled by others. If one consistently

obeys whatever other demands of him or her, then one is not powerful because

one’s will is subject to another’s whim. However, if not even the threat of torture

of even death is enough to shake the person’s behavior, then surely one must

have a strong will capable of resisting domination. Here, we begin to see that part

of Nietzsche’s conception of freedom consists in the idea of resisting domination

and expressing one’s “will to power.”

To further understand this notion, we turn towards Nietzsche’s idea of bad

conscience. One might wonder, “What is bad conscience, and where did it come

from?” On page 177 from The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explicitly defines

bad conscience as he states, "This instinct for freedom forcibly made latent…

this instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and

finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what

the bad conscience is in its beginnings." (GM, pg 177). Although we do not get

a clear depiction of bad conscience, here, we can see that Nietzsche once again

brings forth the term “instinct for freedom,” and we understand that Nietzsche

believes that whatever freedom consists in, it is inconsistent with bad conscience.

In the latter half of his second essay from The Genealogy Morals,

Nietzsche offers his own hypothesis on the origin of bad conscience, in which

we attain a better depiction of what it entails. He postulates that the concept

of having a “bad conscience” originated when humanity transitioned from the

hunter-gatherer societies to permanent settlements. He theorizes that when

people started living in more peaceful societies, violence became increasingly

marginalized (GM, pg 174). In turn, all of our old animal instincts that

characterized our prehistoric lives—such as the inclinations toward revenge,

hostility, cruelty, and destruction—were unable to be expressed outward. Such

instincts had to be suppressed when we entered into modern society in order

to maintain cohesiveness within the group. Since these instincts could not go

extinct, Nietzsche claims, society redirected those animalistic instincts toward

our own selves. In doing so we developed an interiority of the self; we became

more conscious of the self and developed an inner life. This inner life is what led

to the concept of “bad conscience,” upon which the feelings of guilt and shame

are the manifestations of our old instinct for cruelty being expressed back at

oneself. Therefore, guilt and shame are, in essence, the result of a one person self

torture, which one could call the antithesis of freedom.

Throughout the rest of the second essay, Nietzsche consistently speaks

of bad conscience as an “illness” as he refers to it as “man’s suffering of man,

of himself” (GM, pg 85). Nietzsche believes that our inner life is a constant

struggle since the “will to power” is turned inward instead of being expressed

outwardly. Therefore, he wants us to win this struggle in order to attain freedom

by overcoming our bad conscience. However, it important to point out here that

Nietzsche’s condemnation of bad conscience in society is not a solicitation for

society to return back to a primeval way of life. Instead, Nietzsche wants society

to overcome the struggle of bad conscience so that we can win the struggle within

ourselves. Freedom can only be attained if we are not tied down by the guilt

or shame that arises from our bad conscience that makes us tame, timid, and

mediocre. In an excerpt from Book Three of The Gay Science, Nietzsche explicitly

capitalizes on this concept as he writes:

“Whom do you call bad? –He who always wants to put people to shame.

What is most human to you? – To spare someone shame.

What is the seal of having become free? –No longer to be ashamed before

oneself.” (GS, pg 152-153)

According to this passage from Nietzsche, freedom consists in affirming ourselves

in who we are as individuals, by not having to feel guilty or ashamed. We must

see ourselves as powerful beings, and not as creatures who have sins that need to

be atoned for. Nietzsche thereby suggests that those old instincts for cruelty we

once had—even the old instincts to take joy in cruelty—is the instinct for freedom,

and they are ones that we should not be ashamed about. Only by living a life of

self-affirmation can we declare ourselves as individuals, and free.

In the following part of this essay, I will segue into The Gay Science, where

we will see that Nietzsche presents a different model for his conception of

freedom that centralizes on a view appealing to creativity, originality,

uniqueness, and newness. However, as we will also see, this new conception of

freedom and the previous conception can be linked through Nietzsche’s emphasis

on individuality.

One of the fundamental tenants in understanding Nietzsche’s new

conception of freedom in The Gay Science is that Nietzsche has a strong

penchant for creativity and uniqueness. We can see this in Book Three, Section

255 where he says, “I don’t want people to imitate me; I want everyone to set his

own example…” (GS, pg 150). In addition to this, Nietzsche continually urges for

more creation to bring about newness. When something is new, then it cannot

already exist; in that sense, what is new is unique and one of a kind. Nietzsche

thinks that to be new is to be a unique, and that in order to be a self in the most

fully realized sense is to be unique. Thus, he suggests that we need to create and

be new by making ourselves unlike anyone else. But what is it that he calls us to

create exactly? Nietzsche provides us an indication of the answer in the following

passage from Book Three, Section 143 where he talks about “The advantages of

polytheism”:

“…In polytheism, the free-spiritedness and many spiritedness of humanity

receives preliminary form–the power to create for ourselves our own eyes

and ever again new eyes that are ever more our own—so that for humans

alone among the animals there are no eternal horizons and perspectives”

(GS, pg 128).

In this passage, Nietzsche demonstrates his interest for different perspectives.

He uses the “eye” as a metaphor for perspectives, which are the constellation of

values that allow us to interpret the world around us. He purports that human

beings do not have one single perspective, but that we have the power to create

our own perspectives because there are no universal perspectives or absolute

truths. Furthermore, this passage emphasizes Nietzsche’s belief that human

beings have the power to create ever-new perspectives, and therefore, we can

create new eyes.

Thus, when we create new eyes, we also create our own individuality

because we attain a new perspective—a new constellation of values. This new

constellation of values is important according to Nietzsche because it sets us

apart from other individuals, and because it allows us to assess our own lives

according to our standards. When we create a new constellation of values

according to which we assess our own lives, we learn “to be a self, to estimate

oneself according to one’s own measure and weight” (GS, pg 115). We become

immune to the “praise and blame” (GS, pg 163) of old constellations of values—

the old thoughts and convention, piety, and articles of faith.

This idea of creation provides a clear view into Nietzsche’s conception of

freedom as it capitalizes on the fact that we free ourselves from the constraints

and demands of others when we learn to make ourselves new and unique. When

we create a new constellation of values and apply it to our interpretation of our

own lives, we affirm our own individuality. This therefore shows that this new

model of freedom that consists in a life of creativity and originality can easily be

viewed as consistent with the previous model in which freedom consists in a life

of self-affirmation without guilt and shame. This is true because when we create

and apply our own constellation of values to our own lives, the constellation of

values of others becomes irrelevant and therefore, we have nothing to feel guilty

or shameful about. In this way, Nietzsche believes we become the “poets of our

own lives” (GS, pg 169).

In evaluating the attractiveness of Nietzsche’s conception of freedom, I

find some parts more attractive than others. For one matter, I agree with the idea

that in order to be free, a person should be self-affirming in their individuality.

If one consistently lives under the constraints, expectation, or demands of

others, then one cannot truly be called free because one is not living one’s life in

accordance to one’s own constellation of values, which is not living for oneself. If

one does not live for oneself, then one is like a mere puppet on a string, confined

to always moving to the motions set forth by others.

In contrast, however, what I find dubious in Nietzsche’s argument is

that I question the utility and practicality of living a life where no individual

exhibits any sense of bad conscience, guilt, or shame. In theory, if we were to go

by Nietzsche’s model and each individual were to impose his or her own “will

to power” unto others, then what would prevent any individual from causing

harm to other individuals? Additionally, what would motivate everyone from

controlling themselves from wrong doings?

Although I recognize that Nietzsche does not call us to revert back to our

primeval ways, I question what Nietzsche would say to a person of a sadistic

nature who desires to induce harm onto others because that is his or her “will

to power.” Would Nietzsche commend the person for expressing of his or her

freedom or condemn the person for his or her action? Acknowledging the fact

that Nietzsche believes in the idea that there are no inherent moral laws or

universal truths, I do not believe the assumption that Nietzsche would find it

acceptable to disregard all sense of morality so long as individuals maintain their

freedom implausible. If such is the case, then I fail to see the utility of completely

abandoning one’s bad conscience —if possible—seeing as how a society could not

exist in cohesion without some form of moral law.

On a final point, the reason as to why I raise the question of practicality

in abandoning one’s own feeling of bad conscience is due to a qualm I have

regarding Nietzsche’s presentation of his arguments. I find that in many cases,

he oversimplifies his theories, such as when he explains that bad conscience is a

result of the “will to power” turned back onto oneself. Nietzsche makes it appear

as though such a phenomena carried a genetic trait, explaining that simply

because our ancestors did it, this emotional feeling was somehow passed along

onto our genes and manifested itself across generations. I do not believe this is

the case because people do not feel emotions due to their genetics, but rather, due

to the interactions with their surroundings.

All in all, I imagine that much of Nietzsche’s argument would have more

clarity and credibility, at least to me, if his writings provided more historical

evidence instead of being painted with a tone of indignation and contempt

against the Christian-Judeo faith as it often appears.

Works Cited:

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Cambridge University Press. 2001.

Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. Random House, Inc.

1967. Print.