CHUA, John Moses A. | PHLO 195 – T | Philosophy of Language | UPLB On Denoting the Use ‘The King of France is bald.’ This proposition had been very famous and a very good example for describing theories if we are to discern on how we can or should recognize if a proposition consisting a non-existent subject be true or false, or how meaningful these kinds may be. This paper should aim to defend Russell’s On Denotation and Descriptions against Strawson’s On Referring. This should go through on how Strawson may have failed to prove that Russell’s theory of denoting and theory of descriptions is incorrect and hence should be abandoned. But first, what is Russell’s theory of descriptions? In this theory, the instance that a concept is used in a proposition as such it would have description was classified into two types; the definite and the indefinite descriptions. Definite descriptions are concepts used in a proposition that has certain meaning or certain denotation as it was used in the sentence. One example would be: The shape square has four sides. Here, the square is regarded as belonging to the set shape and thus it is definite that the square that is a shape has four sides–for it really is. Though, tapping much into definite descriptions will not be of any use because what became controversial, at least for Strawson, was Russell’s recognizing of the indefinite descriptions. So what are these indefinite descriptions? This kind of description has descriptions that are vague, not clearly defined, not decided, or not known. An example for this kind of description is: The king of France is bald. This proposition entails the subject–king of France–which by the way does not exist if we are to refer the king of France as the literal living human king of France.[1] For Russell that is a problem; problem that which a subject that does not exist was used as something to have description. This problem was figured out by Russell when he posed his theory of denoting. In this theory subjects or concepts within a proposition is presupposed to have no meaning; but can only have when equipped with denoting phrases. Now what are these denoting phrases? These denoting phrases are the ones that have meaning and have the ability to produce and equate meaning with relation to the proposition. Now applying this theory of denoting to the proposition, ‘The king of France is bald’. The exact reference of the subject king of France must be distinguished to distinguish the exact and accurate denoting phrase for it. Let us consider someone as the king of France that is bald and let that be x. It can be that: ‘X is the king of France and x is bald, such that x does not exist (for there is no king of France)’ is always true.[2] This kind of theory have been sufficient for the problem of vagueness or ambiguity that concerns any subject or focus of a proposition, as far as Russell is concerned though he was still aware that intellectual developments or some other intellectual creation can refute or modify his work.[3] Bertrand Russell did not fail to anticipate problems for in 1950 Sir Peter Frederick Strawson produced a paper, also in Mind magazine aiming to debunk Russell’s work. How? Simply, Strawson pointed out that Russell failed to recognize what constitutes the meaning in a proposition. Strawson[4] proposed that expressions such that it is to “mention or refer to some individual person or single object... in the course of... making a statement about that person [or object]......”–which is parallel with Russell’s when Russell points the truthfulness or falsity of a proposition–does not constitute meaning. For Strawson, aside from ‘expression’, there is also the ‘use’. It is the use, not the expression that is ‘uniquely referring’. In fact, Strawson went to a point where he determined that expressions do not refer at all and thus must have no meaning but it is the use that must have. Strawson included in his work the truth-value gaps that which is ignored by Russell when discussing Frege.[5] These truth-value gaps are those that cause some propositions to be neither true nor false; and one very good example is the case of ‘king of France’; for the reason that the king of France does not exist and thus we must accord its use before distinguishing its truth or falsity. He goes on to introduce two concepts within propositions: sentence-type and sentence token. Sentence-type is the ‘sentence’ itself which according to Strawson this is what Russell pertains to and thus have meaning; while sentence token is what Strawson means by the ‘use of a sentence’ that which is for him has the meaning.[6] There are problems in Strawson’s work that lead him to fail on debunking Russell’s work. This is when he also failed to clearly understand what is Russell pertaining. Strawson may have a point in the eyes of the ordinary language theorist that the use is necessary to understand a language but if he means to debunk Russell’s work, his proofs were very insufficient. How? In accordance with Russell’s, he did not include in his work the use of a sentence, which by the way was tapped by Frege when he is pertaining to his ‘nominatum’ or reference in a sentence. I may have to let Russell pass with this seemingly incomplete framework because it is already explicit in Frege’s work. Russell’s real issue when pertaining to his theory of denoting is the problem when we cannot distinguish the use of a proposition or that when it is not stated. The proposition: ‘The king of France is bald.’ is just a mere proposition that can be taken literally or not literally. For Russell, his denoting phrases are the ones that distinguishes the use of the subject on whether what or who is ‘the king of France’, or what other properties does ‘the king of France’ has that is not stated in the proposition. There is actually also a problem within Strawson’s ‘uses’. This ‘use of sentence’ always needs a context. If there is none, then this use is inconsiderable, unknowable per se. This is what Russell considered first and what Strawson failed to when reading Russell. In Russell’s paper[7], addressing Strawson regarding this matter, he said that if he put ‘in 1950’ in ‘the king of France is bald’; Strawson would have failed to produce his paper; explicitly because this ‘in 1950’ gives the ‘use’ or the context of the proposition. Contexts are not always explicit in propositions and to determine a context by implicit means is absurd and irrelevant; indeterminate. Russell provided this context through his denoting phrases. Strawson had the problem with Russell classifying proposition constituting non-existent subject into being false. For him, proposition that includes these kinds of subjects or concepts–non-existent–are not false but meaningful and neither true nor false. Here is what Russell has to say to that. “This is a mere question of verbal convenience. He considers that the word ‘false’ has an unalterable meaning which it would be sinful to regard as adjustable, though he prudently avoids telling us what this meaning is. For my part, I find it more convenient to define the word ‘false’ so that every significant sentence is either true or false.”[8] Here we can see that Strawson’s recognition is insufficient still to falsify Russell’s claims. His concept ‘meaningful’ is insufficient in it. How meaningful is meaningful and what does it comprise when it is meaningful? Still, we shall return to a Fregean sense. That proposition all have sense, or meaning if we are to put it close to Strawson’s, and these constitute ‘nominatum’ or reference. And, these references can only be two: True or False. What is the reference of a meaningful sentence? It can only be either true or false. This is in line with the law of excluded middle; which is also an aim of Russell’s theory–to avoid the seeming paradox conflicting with the basic principles logic has that subsists when such propositions exists constituting indefinite descriptions. It had been clear that Strawson had many failures in debunking Russell’s theory. Strawson had failed for the sole reason that he had wrong presuppositions in understanding the whole of argument. Russell even pointed out that what Strawson had proposed was not even new; it was an old argument. Strawson’s strategy to show that Russell’s account of descriptions is incorrect, and hence should be abandoned is not successful because he failed to fully apply the principle of charity in reading Russell’s; that Russell pertains to proposition standing only in their selves without context, and that those propositions needed theory of denoting to denote its context; that is the focus.

References Bertrand Russell, On Denoting in Mind Magazine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1905), 14, pp. 479-493. Bertrand Russell, “Descriptions” in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919), pp. 167-180. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Strawson on Referring in Mind Magazine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 1957), New Series 66, 263, pp. 385-389. Marc Cohen, Strawson: “On Referring” (2008), pdf. P.F. Strawson, On Referring in Mind Magazine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 59, pp. 320-344.