Who are the Citizens of the Philippines?

A Filipino citizen may be considered natural-born or naturalized citizen. Both statuses bestow upon the individual certain privileges and exclusive rights such as the rights to vote, to run for public, etc. which may be denied the foreigner.

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO Art. IV, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines the NATURAL-BORN Filipino citizens as:

1. “Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this (1987) Constitution”

2. “those whose fathers OR mothers are citizens of the Philippines” and

3. “those born before January 7, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Even if the child is born to an alien father and a Filipino mother, the Filipino citizenship of the mother will bestow natural-born Philippine citizenship upon the child PROVIDED his birth occurred on or after January 17, 1973 (date of ratification of the 1973 Constitution), otherwise he followed the citizenship of the alien father and acquired at best only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon attaining majority age. EXCEPT if he is born out of lawful wedlock, in which case, he will be considered a Filipino by virtue of his mother’s citizenship. In addition, only natural-born citizens are allowed to hold constitutional offices such as the office of the President; Senators; Members of the House of Representatives; Members of the Supreme Court; and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service Commission, COMELEC and the Commission on Audit).

NATURALIZED FILIPINO Naturalization takes place either voluntarily by complying both the substantive and procedural requirements of the general naturalization law or by operation of law. This process may be direct or derivative.

Under the Commonwealth Act 473, a foreigner who is not married to a Filipino but seeks to acquire Philippine citizenship is required to have lived in the Philippines for a continuous period of NOT LESS than ten (10) years. The said period shall be reduced to five (5) years if he is being married to a Filipino. Other prescribed qualifications pertain to the age, moral, occupational, language and educational qualifications of the petitioner.

However, naturalization shall be subject to the Rule of Reciprocity, hence, the alien petitioner must prove by evidence that the laws of his country grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]). Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided…xxx

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

CITIZENSHIP § Art. IV, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

SECTION 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

§ Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] [Jus sanguinis principle; renunciation of Philippine citizenship; Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues] ---- 3. loss and reacquisition of citizenship – art IV, sec 3; CA 63
r.a.no. 8171

Jus sanguinis principle

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Renunciation of Philippine citizenship

The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues [c. naturalized citizens]

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

§ Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999, En Banc [Kapunan] [Failure to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority] --- [loss and reacquisition of citizenship]

Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. xxx

The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. xxx

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervour, enthusiasm and promptitude.

§ Bengzon, III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan] [Natural-born Philippine citizenship; Effect of Repatriation; Naturalization and Repatriation] --- [loss and reacquisition of citizenship]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the x x x Constitution, natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.”

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530

…xxx

To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies (Section 1, R.A. 530).

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

…xxx

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]). Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided…xxx

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

§ Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug] [Repatriation under R.A. 8171]
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

An application for repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members.

§ Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza] [Dual citizenship and dual allegiance]

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition…xxx

Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, x x x, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Instances when a Philippine citizen may possess dual citizenship:

1- Those born of parents whose country adopts the jus sanguinis principle in fereign countries which follows thejus soli principle.

2- Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and an alien father, if by the laws of their father’s country such children are citizens of that country.

3- Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country, the former are considered citizens, unless, by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

* “ The royal prerogative of dishonesty ”

§ Sec, 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

§ Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Basis of the Doctrine of State Immunity
Ethical
Practical

As to a local state
As to a foreign state

"There can be no "Par in parem non The state will be legal right against habet imperium" busy defending the authority that Doctrine of sovereign itself from lawsuits makes the law on equality of all states which the right depends" CASE DIGESTS

NO CASE DIGEST FOR:

roseller de guzman vs comelec g.r. no.180048, june 19,2009 and Jocelyn sy limkaichong vs comelec g.r. no. 179120, april 1, 2009

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration (GR L-21289, 4 October 1971)

En Banc, Barredo (J): 4 concur, 1 reserves right to file separate concurring opinion, 1 concurs except as the interpretation accorded some American decisions as to which he is not fully persuaded, 1 dissents in separate opinion

Facts: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

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Burca vs. Republic

An exception to the above rule was laid by thisCourt in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248[1973]), viz:We declare it to be a sound rule that where thecitizenship of a party in a case is definitelyresolved by a court or by an administrativeagency, as a material issue in the controversy,after a full-blown hearing with the activeparticipation of the Solicitor General or hisauthorized representative, and this finding orthe citizenship of the party is affirmed by thisCourt, the decision on the matter shallconstitute conclusive proof of such party'scitizenship in any other case or proceeding. Butit is made clear that in no instance will adecision on the question of citizenship in suchcases be considered conclusive or binding inany other case or proceeding, unless obtainedin accordance with the procedure hereinstated. Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicatamay be applied in cases of citizenship, thefollowing must be present: 1) a person'scitizenship must be raised as a material issuein a controversy where said person is a party;2) the Solicitor General or his authorizedrepresentative took active part in theresolution thereof, and 3) the finding orcitizenship is affirmed by this Court.

VALES VS COMELEC

This is a petition forcertiora ri under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. She ran for governor. Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case for disqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued an alien certificate of registration; there was an application for an immigrant certificate of residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.

HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship.
DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental.No pronouncement as to costs.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

CO VS. HRET
Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident ofLaoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the

Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.For the elections of 1984 and

1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements.

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999.
Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar.

ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship.

RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen.

BENGZON VS. HRET
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen ofthe Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

ALTAREJOS VS. COMELEC

Facts: Ciceron P. Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections. On 15 January 2004, Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Altajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that “[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.” Almiñe, et. al. alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration E139507 issued on 3 November 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. On 26 January 2004, Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as 17 December 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act 8171. Thus, Altajeros claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought the dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of the case, recommended that Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections; on the ground that Altajeros failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship inasmuch as he has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. On 25 March 2004, Altajeros filed a motion for reconsideration. On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit. On 10 May 2004, the election day itself, Altajeros filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Altajeros is eligible to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in light of his repatriation under RA 8171.

Held: Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of Allegiance on 17 December 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years or on 18 February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on 1 March 2004. Altajeros, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court’s ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one’s application for repatriation subsists. Accordingly, Altajeros’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the 10 May 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying Altajeros to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. However, considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation,as he submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of the present case.

Tecson vs. Comelec

Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.(FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy forthe position of President of the Republicof the Philippines

under the Koalisyon ngNagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be anatural-born citizen of the Philippines,stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be20 August 1939 and his place of birth tobe Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the Commissionon Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and todeny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made amaterial misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacy by claiming to bea natural-born Filipino citizen when intruth, according to Fornier, his parentswere foreigners; his mother, Bessie KelleyPoe, was an American, and his father,Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, beingthe son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanishsubject. And even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipinocitizen, he could not have transmitted hisFilipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornierbased the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poecontracted a prior marriage to a certain PaulitaGomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelleyand, (2) even if no such prior marriage hadexisted, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly onlya year after the birth of FPJ.Issue:Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as tobe allowed to run for the offcie of the Presidentof the Philippines.Held:Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from thepresumption that having died in 1954 at 84years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when thePhilippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residencebefore death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill hadeffected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would therebyextend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.

The 1935 Constitution,during which regime respondent FPJ has seenfirst light, confers citizenship to all personswhose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

VELEZ VS. POE AND FOURNIER VS COMELEC
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel hiscertificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before hismarriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriagehad existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on theFilipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

AAJS, CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of thePhilippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in thePhilippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

CORODORA VS COMELEC the supreme court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an american father and filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an oath of allegiance and executing a renunciation of foreign citizenship under the citizenship retention and reacquisition act (ra 9225) before citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the phils. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA NO. 9225 do not apply to him."

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007, who eventually emerged as the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez (American citizen), hence, ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of
Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman.
COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition forcertiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

RULING: SC dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his
Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.(Em phasis added) Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.

Under the law, for the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. JACOT VS COMELEC
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

JAPZON VS COMELEC

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|RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION LAW OF 2000” |

|Section 1. Special Committee on Naturalization. – The Special Committee on Naturalization, hereinafter referred to as the “Committee”, shall be composed|
|of: (1) the Solicitor-General, as Chairman; (2) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his duly authorized representative; and (3) the National Security |
|Adviser, as members. The Committee shall have its principal office at the Office of the Solicitor-General. The Committee shall meet, as often as |
|practicable, to consider applications for naturalization. |
|Section 2. Secretariat of the Committee; Functions. – Immediately upon the effectivity of these Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Committee shall |
|meet in order to establish a Secretariat which shall have the following functions: (a) to receive all papers filed with the Committee and cause the |
|publication of those matters required by law; (b) to receive all fees paid by applicants; (c) to record all the proceedings of the Committee; (d) to |
|keep and maintain all the books necessary for the recording of such papers and documents; (e) to notify applicants of the progress of their applications|
|and such other developments as may arise in the course of the evaluation; and (f) to perform such other functions as may be required by the Committee. |
|Section 3. Power to Approve, Deny or Reject Applications; Unanimous Vote Required. – The Committee shall have the power to approve, deny or reject |
|applications for naturalization as provided in R. A. No. 9139, hereinafter referred to as the “Act”. To approve petitions for naturalization, the vote |
|of all three (3) members shall be required. In meeting to consider petitions for naturalization, however, the presence of two (2) members shall |
|constitute a quorum. When only two (2) members were present in the meeting, the following are required in order to consider the petition for |
|naturalization approved: |
|(1) the affirmative vote of the two (2) members present during the meeting; and |
|(2) the submission of the written affirmative vote of the absent member, accompanied by his certification that he has considered and reviewed the |
|minutes of the meeting wherein the pertinent petition was considered, together with all relevant and material information. The written affirmative vote |
|and certification shall be submitted by the absent member within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the minutes of the pertinent meeting. |
|Section 4. Strict Construction. – These rules shall be strictly construed against an |
|application for naturalization. |
|Section 5. Where Filed; Processing Fee. – Any person who has all of the qualifications under Section 3 of the Act and none of the disqualifications |
|under Section 4 thereof may file a petition for naturalization with the Secretariat of the Committee, upon the payment of the processing fee of Forty |
|thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number. |
|Section 6. Number of Copies of Petition. – The petition for naturalization shall be filed in five (5) copies, signed, thumbmarked on each and every page|
|and verified by the petitioner, legibly typed, and with the latter’s passport size photograph (colored with white background) attached to each copy of |
|the petition. |
|Section 7. Contents of Petition for Naturalization. – The petition for naturalization shall set forth the following: |
|(a) The petitioner’s name, surname, middle name, nickname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is known; |
|(b) The petitioner’s present and all former places of residences, if any; |
|(c) The petitioner’s place and date of birth, the complete names and citizenship of his/her parents, both natural and adopting, if any, and their |
|residences; |
|(d) The petitioner’s trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse, and children, if any; |
|(e) The petitioner’s civil status, whether single, married, legally separated, or widowed. If married or widowed, petitioner shall state the date and |
|place of marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship, and residence of the spouse. If petitioner is legally separated or the marriage|
|was annulled, the date of the decree of legal separation or annulment, and the court which granted the same. If petitioner is widowed, the date and |
|place of death of his/her spouse; |
|(f) If petitioner has a child/children, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted, the name/s, date/s of birth, birthplace/s, residence/s, and |
|school/s where such child/children received primary and secondary education; |
|(g) A declaration specifying in detail that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the Act; |
|(h) A declaration that petitioner shall never be a public charge; and |
|(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner’s true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever any |
|prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the country of which the petitioner is a subject. |
|Section 8. Accompanying Documents. – The petition for naturalization shall be accompanied by the following documents attached to the petition as annexes|
|thereof: |
|a) The duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner’s birth certificate; |
|b) The duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner’s alien certificate of registration and native-born certificate of residence; |
|c) The duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner’s marriage certificate, if married, or the death certificate of his/her spouse, if |
|widowed, or the court decree annulling his/her marriage or granting legal separation, if such was the fact; |
|d) The duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien certificates of registration or native-born certificates of residence, |
|if any, of petitioner’s minor children, if any; |
|e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, duly supported by bank certifications, passbooks, stock certificates, or proof of ownership of |
|other properties; |
|f) Affidavits of at least two (2) credible witnesses who must be Filipino citizens of good reputation in petitioner’s place of residence, attesting to |
|the following: (a) the good moral character of petitioner; (b) that they have personally known petitioner for a period of at least ten (10) years; and |
|(c) that in their opinion, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines, and not |
|in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Act; |
|g) A medical certificate that petitioner is not suffering from mental alienation or a user of prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and that |
|he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), or any incurable contagious disease; |
|h) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the school/s he or she attended in the Philippines. Should the petitioner have minor |
|children, a certification that his or her children are enrolled in private or public school/s duly recognized by the Department of Education, Culture |
|and Sports (“DECS”), where Philippines history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum, and enrollment in said|
|school/s is not limited to any race or nationality; and |
|i) If gainfully employed, petitioner’s income tax returns for the past three (3) years. |
|Section 9. Determination of Sufficiency of Petition. – Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine whether the |
|petition is complete in form and in substance. If the petition is found to be wanting in form and substance, particularly with the requirement as to |
|the allegation of all of the qualifications and none of the same, upon the payment of the processing fee. |
|Section 10. Mandatory Publication and Posting Requirements. – If the petition is complete, the Committee shall inform petitioner of such fact. |
|Thereafter, the Committee, upon receipt from the petitioner of the amount necessary to pay for the publication expenses, shall immediately cause the |
|publication of pertinent portions of the petition, indicating the name, qualifications, and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week, |
|for three (3) consecutive weeks in a duly accredited newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the entire petition posted in any public or |
|conspicuous area. |
|The Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (“DFA”), the Bureau of Immigration (“BI”), the civil registrar of the of the |
|petitioner’s place of residence, and the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”) with copies of the petition and its supporting documents. These |
|agencies shall have the copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within |
|thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a report stating the following: |
|(a) The Compliance with the posting requirement under the Act; and |
|(b) The presence or absence of any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information which might adversely affect petitioner’s |
|application for citizenship. |
|Section 11. Review of Petition. – Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the reports of the agencies which are required to be furnished a copy of the |
|petition, or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes later, the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material |
|information it has received pertaining to the petition. |
|Section 12. Interview. – The Committee may call the petitioner and/or his witnesses for an interview to ascertain petitioner’s identity, the |
|authenticity of the petition and its annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes.|
|If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall advise petitioner of said information and allow the |
|petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information under oath in writing within the period prescribed by the Committee. |
|Section 13. Decision of the Committee. – After the review of the petition or the conduct of the interview, the Committee, based on the facts and |
|documents before it, shall approve or disapprove the petition, and henceforth notify the petitioner of its decision. |
|Section 14. Disapproval of Petition. – If the Committee disapproves the petition, it shall set forth the factual and/or legal bases for the disapproval,|
|and notify petitioner thereof. |
|Section 15. Approval of Petition; Payment of Naturalization Fee. – Within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of approval of the petition, the |
|petitioner shall pay the Committee, through its Secretariat, a naturalization fee in the amount of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), which may |
|be paid in full or as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) within the aforesaid thirty-day period. |
|Within sixty (60) days from approval of the petition and full payment of the naturalization fee, the petitioner shall take his or her oath of allegiance|
|to the Republic of the Philippines. After petitioner takes his oath, the Committee shall forthwith issue a Certificate of Naturalization and the oath of|
|allegiance. The Committee shall immediately furnish the BI with a copy of the petitioner’s oath of allegiance. A copy of his oath will be kept in the |
|records of the Committee. |
|Should the applicant fail to take his oath of allegiance within the time provided herein, the approval of the petition for naturalization shall be |
|deemed abandoned. |
|Section 16. Duty of the Secretariat. – Within five (5) days after the issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization, the Secretariat shall forward a |
|copy of the Certificate of Naturalization to the BI and to the proper local civil registrar. |
|Section 17. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. – After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization and cancellation of |
|petitioner’s alien certificate of registration, petitioner’s alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for the cancellation of their |
|alien certificates of registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization |
|fee or Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) for each individual payable as follows: Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon taking the oath of allegiance |
|to the Republic of the Philippines. |
|Section 18. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. – If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative |
|naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of |
|registration with the BI subject to the payment of the fees prescribed in Section 17 hereof. |
|Section 19. Revocation of the Certificate of Naturalization. – The Committee may revoke or cancel the Certificate of Naturalization issued under the |
|Act, motu proprio or upon complaint by any person, after due notice and summary hearing, in the following cases: |
|(a) If the Committee finds that the naturalization person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or misrepresentation or |
|committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition for naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine |
|citizenship fraudulently or illegally; |
|(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any of his minor children who acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of his naturalization shall, |
|within five (5) years next following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence in a foreign country, that individual’s |
|certificate of naturalization or acquired Philippine citizenship shall be revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person’s remaining for more than one |
|(1) year in his country of origin, or two (2) years in any foreign country, shall be consideredprima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside |
|herein; |
|(c) If the naturalized person or his wife who acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or|
|legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of any right, franchise or privilege; and |
|(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child who acquired Philippine citizenship commits any act inimical to national security. |
|Section 20. Renunciation of Hereditary Title or Membership in any Order of Nobility. – In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or |
|belongs to any order of nobility, he shall make an express renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Committee or its|
|duly authorized representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the records of his application for citizenship. |
|Section 21. Special Circumstances. – Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar may, within |
|two (2) years from the effectivity of the Act, file a petition for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, subject to the requirements under the Act |
|and these implementing rules and regulations. |
|Section 22. Effectivity Clause. – These rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2) |
|newspapers of general circulation. |