Realism and Liberalism Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives, the operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion – between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment. Realism is a theory within international relations which predicts states will act in their own national interest in defiance of moral consideration. In general, this belief results from an observation of human nature and the perception of people as selfish and fiercely competitive. Realism regards the international arena as anarchic, governed by no authority overriding sovereign states. International institutions such as the United Nations are not afforded significant credibility from a realist perspective. Rather, influence is perceived to be held predominately by major powers such as the United States, whose dominance is a product of military and economic strength. Realists hold the primary interest of a state is survival, toward that goal states compete for available resources (Bacevich, 2005). Realism is a perspective dominated by cynicism, perhaps best exemplified in the tenants of pragmatism and amorality. Realists place each state in the position of having to closely observe the actions of neighbors to resolve problems effectively without regard to moral concerns. It is believed by realists that the creep of morality into international relations handicaps players from adapting to new conditions. Realism can be further broken down into composite elements which are distinguished in various ways. However, for the sake of simplicity this discussion will reference realism in general. Likewise, many of the international relations theories which complete with realism may be considered variations of liberalism. Yet, for the sake of simplicity, liberalism will also be discussed generally. Though it may be an oversimplification, one could argue liberalism’s chief distinction is its assertion that peace is possible and can result from interdependence. Liberalism asserts that the preferences of states, as manifest in their cultural, economic, and political entities, determine their actions on the international stage. Therefore, presumably, if two or more states share preferences, their aligned interests may result in absolute gains from cooperation. Realists, on the other hand, do not believe in the concept of absolute gains, instead viewing the international contest as a zero-sum game. For one player to win, another must lose (Bacevich, 2005). As the label implies, realists believe foreign policy must deal with the world as it really is, instead of relying on wishful thinking or ideological dogmas. Realism sees the international system as a competitive arena where states have to provide security for themselves. Realists know that states get into trouble if they are too trusting, but that problems also arise when states exaggerate external dangers, misjudge priorities or engage in foolish foreign adventures. Thus, realists keep a keen eye on the balance of power and oppose squandering blood or treasure on needless military buildups or ideological crusades. They know military force is the ultimate guarantor of security, but they recognize that it is also a blunt instrument whose effects are unpredictable. Realists are therefore skeptical of grandiose plans for global social engineering and believe that force should be used only when vital interests are at stake. Realists appreciate the power of nationalism and understand that other states usually resist outside interference and defend their own interest vigorously. Thus realists discount the possibility that adversaries will form a tightly unified monolith and favor undermining opponents through “divide and conquer” strategies. Realists also recognize that successful diplomacy requires give and take and that the pursuit of U.S. interests sometimes required cooperating with regimes whose values we find objectionable. In short, realists know that successful statecraft requires strength, cold eyed calculation, flexibility and a keen sense of the limits of power. Yet realists are neither moral relativists nor disinterested in values. Realists are aware that all great powers tend to think that spreading their own values will be good for others, and that this sort of hubris can lead even well intentioned democracies into morally dubious ventures. Realists do cherish America’s democratic traditions and commitment to individual liberty, but they believe these principles are best exported by the force of America’s example and not by military adventures. They also know that prolonged overseas meddling is likely to trigger a hostile backlash abroad and force us to compromise freedoms at home. Finally, realists were among the most visible opponents for the misadventure in Iraq, and their warnings were strikingly prophetic. Liberalism’s optimistic view of international politics is based on three core beliefs, which are common to almost all of the theories in the paradigm. First, liberals consider states to be the main actors in international politics. Second, they emphasize that the international characteristics of states vary considerably, and that these differences have profound effects on state behavior. Furthermore, liberal theorists often believe that some internal arrangements (e.g., democracy) are inherently preferable to others (e.g., dictatorship). For liberals, therefore, there are “good” and “bad” states in the international system. Good states pursue cooperative policies and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad states cause conflicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their way. Thus, the key to peace is to populate the world with good states. Third, liberals believe that calculations about power matter little for explaining the behavior of good states. Other kinds of political and economic calculations matter more, although the form of those calculations varies from theory to theory. Bad states might be motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other states, but that is only because they are misguided. In an ideal world, where there are only good states, power would be largely irrelevant. In contrast to liberals, realists are pessimists when it comes to international politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. Creating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it is not a practical one. This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars. Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers in influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all sates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government. It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. In the case of the invasion of Iraq, both realism and liberalism seemingly can explain why the invasion was pursued. Generally speaking, the realism approach would understand the U.S. invasion as a natural behavior of any great power politics. On the other hand, liberalism believes that ideas can change the world, and ideas of democracy, peace, and order should be brought about in the international order. My paper would argue that even if we follow realist or liberal explanations, we would find that the Iraq war is a failure project either way. While to realism a great power politics should seek to accumulate its power and domination, I would argue that the invasion of Iraq decreased the U.S. power instead. Rather than enhancing its power in the international stage, the invasion has simply put the U.S. in a very difficult position. In cases where the U.S. is supposed to have more bargaining power, it cannot do what it needs to do. On the other hand, if liberalism is all about spreading democracy, Iraqis and Americans as will have to pay too expense a price for this ideology. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, seen from Mearsheimer’s offensive Realism, is very understandable. According to Mearsheimer, great powers concerned with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each other. The great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. In this way, the ultimate goal of a state is to be hegemon in the system. The invasion of Iraq, therefore, is just one measure to promote The U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. At that time The U.S. knew that behind the international embargo, the Russian and France companies took an advantage in the business of Iraqi oil. American companies could not join the party because their state prohibited them from doing business with a state that promotes terrorism. From the point of view of The U.S., it also threatened The U.S. hegemony in the region. Therefore, the invasion is necessary for the ultimate goal of The U.S.’s hegemony. The invasion of Iraq, a realist would say, is the way to accumulate power politics. The invasion was at the outset clearly framed and campaigned in realist way. The reason to fight against Saddam Hussein was that he had developed WMD and reactivated their nuclear program. A realist approach would urge the great powers to use its military power to defend itself from such a threat and outside aggressor. According to Mearsheimer, if the calculation supports military action, the great power will be more than willing to use military power to change the balance and accumulate their power. War against Iraq would not risk The U.S. internationally and it would win the war easily. The U.S., seen from the realist perspective, did what a great power should do. To some analysts, indeed it is the very liberal ideas of making democratic world that drives the administration to invade Iraq; particularly, the liberal idea that has been developed in its neoconservative version. George Pecker in his The Assassin’s Gate, for instance, clearly elaborates the genealogy of this war and its relation with the neoconservative ideas. To neocons, like Kagan, the United States is a liberal society and as a great power The U.S. has to use its power to advance the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order. Iraq is a nail in the field of liberal civilization. For one with hammer like the United States, it is his moral obligation to save the liberal world by striking this nail down. We can understand too the invasion from Huntley’s argument. To Huntley, repeating many other supporters of the democratic peace theory of Immanuel Kant, a democracy would not kill its own subjects and likewise fight other democracies. Democracy is the best strategy to stop wars and democide. But why is it a war against Iraq to reach peace? Not answering directly to this question, however, he said, “To get peace and preserve freedom, however, they must be prepared to go to war and to stop aggressive dictatorship, because these breed wars.” Pre-invasion Iraq, viewed from this point of view, was the best case to be made. Saddam Hussein was a dictator who killed his subjects, gassed the Kurds in the north, and massacred many others. His totalitarian state was also a danger to his neighboring states. He waged a war for years against Iran. Then, he invaded Kuwait in 1990. He at least also had bombed Saudi Arabia during his invasion of Kuwait. In addition, the most important rationale for many Americans, Saddam was a threat for America’s closest ally in the Middle East, Israel, whom The U.S. seemingly would do anything to defend. In many senses, Iraq was more than eligible to be struck down and transformed into a democracy. If Iraq can be transformed into a democracy, as the Bush administration frequently boasts, it would not kill Kurds, Shiite, or then Sunni. Accordingly, it would bring about peace in the Middle East because Iraq, as a democracy, would not fight other democracy. Ultimately, the invasion would save Israel from evil state in its next door. Let us now evaluate the invasion from both Liberalism and Realism. After Saddam Hussein was removed from his reign, Iraqis have been left in chaos. It has been three years and what we see in Iraq is not a democracy, rather a messed-up state vulnerable of civil war. A democracy would not kill its citizens, but the citizens could kill their fellow. Democracy is ideas, culture, and institution. An election, a parliamentary government, and political parties are not enough for a state to be democratic. Even though the new government has been elected, Iraq is still far away from a democracy. The most intolerable aspect of this coerced democracy is the cost of lives of Iraqi and of American soldier as well. The incidence of suicide bombings has increased dramatically since the occupation to the point where these bombings are daily events. Religious-ethno conflicts arose too as the ethno and religious groups compete to fill the vacuum of power in the post-Saddam Iraq. If democracy worth to be fought for, Iraqis and Americans have to pay quite a bit for this ideology. From the realist perspective, the invasion has weakened American position in at least two cases I can make. The first case is the international row caused by the publication of the prophetic cartoons in Denmark. In this case, it sounds odd that the champion of liberty and freedom of expression has to take a side of the angry Muslims while even some Muslims, and the Danish government as well, take a side of the Danish cartoonist’s right. The Bush administration was in the difficult position because of its problematic Iraqi invasion and occupation. The U.S. is not able to defend its traditional allies in the continent because it really needs Muslim support for Iraq. The second case is the Iranian nuclear. Not as Kagan suggests, this guy with hammer in hand now has to think twice and more to strike down the nail Iran. First, The U.S. can not handle the smaller Iraq with an appropriate way and it has been necessarily not well done. Second, the invasion of Iraq has proven that transforming a rough state into friendly state is a gambling expensive to pay. The new elected government, dominated by Shiite, is not as friendly to The U.S. as it is hoped. They are very possible to be a second Iran in the Middle East, closer to Iranian mullah than to the U.S. The Bush administration is far from being powerful to prevent Iranian nuclear program and its competitors, the ex-superpower Russia and the emerging superpower China, have received more power values from the U.S.’s lost since. Still, from the realist perspective, the liberal idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East is, as Bush must realized it after the Iraqi election, not a good idea for this time and place. The democratized Middle East only gives a way for the fundamentalist to take over the power democratically. As in the Palestinian case, and would be the case of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, democracy is a powerful and legitimate tool for the political Islam to win the public support amid oppressed citizens under the current authoritarian and American-friend regimes. The invasion of Iraq, therefore, seen from both liberal and realist theories, is “understandable” and “explainable”; however, the result of the invasion, seen from either way, is not “justifiable”.
Works Cited
Bacevich, Andrew. (November 6, 2005). “The Realist Persuasion,” The Boston Globe. Retrieved from http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/araticles/2005/11/06/the_realist_persuasion/
Huntley, James Robert. (1998) Pax Democratica: A Strategy for the 21st Century, New York: St. Martin Press.
Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.
Mearsheimer, John J. (January/February 2003). “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York and London: Norton.
Mandelbaum, Michael. (2005). The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st Century, New York: Public Affairs.
Packer, George. (2005). The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq, New York: FSG.
Scowcroft, Brent (August 15, 2002). “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal.
Walt, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Walt, Stephen M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.