STARHUB SUBMISSION
ON THE IDA SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT FOR
THE Proposed Code of Practice for Competition in the Provision of Telecommunication Services

Description of the commenting party and its interest in the proceeding

1 Description

StarHub Pte Ltd and StarHub Mobile Pte Ltd were awarded a Public Basic Telecommunication Services (PBTS) licence and a Public Cellular Mobile Telephone Services (PCMTS) Licence in Singapore on 5 May 1998.

StarHub launched its commercial PBTS and PCMTS services on 1 April 2000. StarHub acquired CyberWay (now StarHub Internet) for the provision of Public Internet Access Services in Singapore on 21 January 1999.

This response to IDA’s Second Consultation Paper on the Proposed Code of Practice for Competition in the Provision of Telecommunication Services ("Code") represents the views of the StarHub group of companies, namely, StarHub Pte Ltd, StarHub Mobile Pte Ltd and StarHub Internet Pte Ltd.

2 Interest in the Proceedings

StarHub has been dealing with the incumbent, SingTel, for about two years and is in a unique position to comment on the problems it faced and still faces as a new entrant to the local telecommunications market. StarHub supports appropriate regulatory intervention to achieve efficient, competitive provision of services in the telecommunication market in Singapore, as policy intends.

summary of the commenting party's position

StarHub welcomes the opportunity to comment on the revised draft Code. Its high quality clearly reflects the considerable efforts of the IDA and its consultants. StarHub thanks the IDA for providing feedback from the first consultation and the opportunity to raise further questions at the second public forum.

StarHub applauds the IDA for producing a Code that will clearly facilitate the IDA in its objectives to develop info-comms for the benefit of Singapore. In this submission, StarHub would like to propose some modifications that we consider will help further strengthen the Code.

StarHub recommends that the maximum monetary sanction that IDA may impose for anti-competitive conduct be made a function of the gross revenue of the defaulting Licensee. StarHub is also of the view of that a defaulting Licensee should be made to compensate the innocent Licensee for losses it suffered arising from the anti-competitive conduct of the defaulting Licensee. As Singapore’s laws do not provide for clear causes of action for anti-competitive conduct and unfair trade practices, innocent Licensees will have little or no redress against the defaulting Licensee. StarHub thus proposes changes, not to the Code, but to the Telecommunications Act, to empower innocent Licensees with this right of redress against the defaulting Licensee.

General comments

StarHub affirms its support of the framework proposed by IDA and the regulatory principles that it has outlined. StarHub suggests that there are a few changes to key areas of the draft Code that are worth considering.

3.1 Classification of Licensees

StarHub applauds the IDA for its continued recognition of the need for regulation of a Dominant Licensee. However, StarHub suggests that the revised definition of dominance is quite narrow.

StarHub suggests some amendments to the revised test and respectfully repeats its request that the IDA publishes its reasons for its initial findings. Please see our comments on Section 2 Classification of Licensees.

3.2 Enforcement of the Code

In light of the new competition law framework that IDA is putting into place via the Code, StarHub proposes that changes be made to the Telecommunications Act to give the innocent Licensee who has been grievously harmed by the anti-competitive conduct of the defaulting Licensee a right to seek compensation from the defaulting Licensee. This, coupled with a review of the maximum monetary penalty that IDA may award, will give the Code real and effective teeth. Please see our comments on Section 10 Enforcement of the Competition Code.

views regarding specific provisions of the proposed Code

Our detailed comments in relation to specific Sections of the Code are as follows. We have also marked up our suggested amendments to specific Sections.

Section 2 – Classification of Licensees

2.2.2 Dominant Licensees

StarHub recognises that the definition of dominance is a difficult issue and that the IDA wishes to adopt a definition that fulfils the sound regulatory principles that it has set out.

StarHub supports the revised test, which is now based on dominance in physical access facilities. StarHub recognises that this is a key issue in the Singapore telecommunication market and commends the innovative approach of the IDA. However, StarHub has a major concern that by addressing access to physical facilities only, the test is cast too narrowly and would not allow the IDA to find dominance in other areas.

We have suggested an amendment to the test as presently drafted in the Code, together with several supplementary amendments that broaden the test, which we believe that IDA would find helpful.

2.2.2 (i) "Direct physical connection" is inconsistent with platform neutrality

A literal reading of the term "direct physical connection to end-users" suggests the use of a physical medium such as copper or optic fibre to establish a connection to end-users. However, it is not clear that this term would include a radio (mobile) connection. The term would seem to exclude a mobile operator from being classified as dominant, which may not be what is intended. Further, the concept is not in keeping with the broadband environment, which is not necessarily premised on the existence of a direct, point-to-point connection to end-users. A broadband facilities provider, which provides backbone facilities, could argue that as it does not provide a direct physical connection between end users, it does not fall within the test of dominance.

As this ambiguity would give rise to dispute, we suggest that the term be clarified. Accordingly, we also suggest that this restriction should be deleted, in keeping with the IDA's regulatory principle of platform neutrality.

General Comments on Approach and Suggested Supplementary Test

StarHub suggests that in addition to the test already set out in Section 2.2.2, a supplementary test, based on the concept that an undertaking is dominant if it is able to act appreciably independently of its customers and competitors, as explained below.

Firstly, dominance should relate to a specific market. It is widely accepted that in order to establish dominance, one must define the market, either by reference to products or services, or to customers. Once the market has been defined, the question of dominance can then be addressed by considering a number of demand and supply side factors (for example, market share and barriers to entry).

An objective and certain definition of dominance would be one based on Article 82 of the EC Treaty (previously Article 86), which has been the subject of nearly 40 years of precedent and has been applied directly by the European Commission in telecommunications markets (the European Commission has produced a notice on the application of EU competition rules to such markets). This test is also applied widely under domestic competition law in many EU member states, including in the UK under the new Competition Act 1998.

The established test for dominance under EC competition law, which takes account of all the various competitive constraints that may be faced by a firm, is that an undertaking is dominant if it is able to act appreciably independently of its customers and competitors. Please refer to our suggested amendment, which adopts elements of this established test.

As currently drafted, this test assumes that dominance in a relevant economic market arises solely from the control of physical access facilities. However, dominance can result from any factor that creates barriers to entry and expansion, with the consequence that the leading supplier or suppliers in a market do not face effective competition from smaller suppliers or potential entrants. Accordingly, our suggested amendments would broaden the test.

2.2.2 (ii) There are many forms of abuse of market power

The test also assumes that the only forms of market power abuse which can emerge, if there is insufficient competition from existing operators, is that a Dominant Licensee can restrict output and is free to maintain prices above the competitive level. Although these are perhaps two of the most obvious ways, there is a large number of other ways in which market power could be abused.

As such abuse can take many forms, StarHub suggests that it is not necessary for the Code actually to refer to the particular abuses that it is seeking to prevent. It should be sufficient to establish dominance, and if an operator is dominant, it should comply with the ex ante competition rules to prevent any abuse of its position. If the Code did seek to specify particular forms of abuse, a lot of anti-competitive and exploitative behaviour may fall outside its scope, making the Section unworkable.

Accordingly, we have suggested that test is broadened, by referring to effective competition.

2.2.2(ii)(b) Replicating facilities is only one barrier to entry

Section 2.2.2 (ii) (b) considers whether dominance might be constrained by new entry, and it focuses on the cost or difficulty of replicating facilities. This is far too narrow and again, is only one of the barriers to entry that needs to be considered in assessing dominance.

In many cases, the barriers to entry and expansion faced by smaller players are not limited to physical production facilities. They also relate to other factors such as incumbents' responses to new entry and the difficulty of attracting customers. (For example, incumbent suppliers typically enjoy the "first mover advantage" of having an established customer base, which will often only switch supplier if new suppliers are materially cheaper, due to inertia or because existing suppliers are "tried and tested". This places such new suppliers at a disadvantage).

Considering the impact of potential new entry in more general terms, the likelihood of new entry will constrain prices and market conduct only if such new entry would be:

• timely (that is, could be accomplished within a short period of time); • likely (that is, entry is expected on normal commercial terms, so as to pre-empt existing suppliers' conduct); and • sufficient (limited small scale entry may impose very little competitive constraint).

Accordingly, we have suggested that this part of the test should include a test to determine whether there is effective potential competition and which refers to the factors set out in the paragraph above.

Suggested Amendment:

2.2.2 Dominant Licensees

A Licensee will be classified as dominant if it

(A) controls facilities that:

(i) provide a direct physical connection to end-users within Singapore; and

(ii) (a) are not subject to sufficient competition to prevent the Licensee from using its control over those facilities to restrict output or raise prices for telecommunication services provided to end-users above competitive levels; or

(b) are sufficiently costly or difficult to replicate that requiring new entrants to do so would create a significant barrier to rapid and successful entry by an efficient competitor; or.

B) has the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers because it:

(a) is not subject to effective competition from other suppliers already active in the market; or

(b) is not subject to effective potential competition, which requires that new entry would be timely, likely and sufficient to constrain the prices and conduct of the Licensee.

Further, all the guidance on how markets will be defined and assessed is now included in Section 9 (Consolidations). However, it also remains relevant to the classification of Dominant Licensees and should be appropriately cross-referenced.

2.3 Initial Designation of Dominant Licensees

StarHub supports and agrees with the current classifications of Dominant Licensees, namely Singapore Telecommunications Ltd; Singapore CableVision Ltd; and 1-Net Singapore Pte Ltd.

StarHub requests that the IDA specifies which separately licensed subsidiaries are excluded from the initial designation. In any case, StarHub considers that the IDA should remove this qualification. If a Licensee is designated as Dominant, then this should apply to all other companies that it controls. Otherwise, by acting through, or in conjunction with, its non-dominant subsidiary (which is not subject to the competition rules), the Dominant Licensee also effectively avoids such competition rules. For example, the non-dominant subsidiary can "bundle" its service offerings with those of the Dominant Licensee. In such a case, Section 3.3.5 Duty to Provide Unbundled Service may not apply, as it prohibits conduct by the Dominant Licensee, not the subsidiary.

StarHub also requests that IDA consider making public the terms of the relevant licences.

As set out above, StarHub considers that the definition of dominance should be widened, to be consistent with more commonly used methods of defining dominance. Using any of the established tests, SingTel Mobile would be designated as dominant in the market for mobile services, for the reasons outlined in StarHub's Initial Submission.

StarHub also seeks confirmation that SingTel Internet Exchange is not a separately licensed subsidiary of SingTel. Otherwise, StarHub considers that SingTel Internet Exchange should also be designated as dominant, for the reasons outlined in StarHub's Initial Submission, briefly that SingTel Internet Exchange has significant control of international bandwidth and connectivity.

StarHub considers that regulatory guidance will be needed for broadband telecommunications networks. As the market for broadband services is not yet fully developed, it is difficult to specify what form of regulatory controls should be in place. StarHub suggests that the IDA undertake periodic consultations as the market develops.

Section 3 – Duty of Licensees to End-Users

3.2.6.2 Restrictions on Use

StarHub considers it potentially anti-competitive, and therefore unacceptable, to provide that a Dominant Licensee's customer may consent to CSUI being passed to the Dominant Licensee's affiliates or third parties.

Having obtained such consent, the Dominant Licensee would be in a position to use CSUI on a discriminatory basis, by choosing to which affiliates or third parties it will pass such CSUI. It is unlikely that the Dominant Licensee would pass CSUI to a competitor.

In the UK, OFTEL has suggested contractual terms to prevent misuse of information. Where BT obtains valuable information on the identity and consumption patterns of, say, a service provider's customers as a result of providing services or facilities to that service provider (for example, a billing service), OFTEL recommends that BT should be prohibited from giving this information to any other part of its business, or making any use of the information for purposes other than those purposes for which the service provider has made it expressly available to BT.

Accordingly, we have suggested an amendment that specifically deals with information obtained in the provision of indirect access.

One of OFTEL's key recommendations for the future promotion of fair competition concerns the confidentiality of customer information. BT has specific licence obligations requiring it to draw up Codes of Practice relating to use of confidential customer information, preventing this information from being passed to other parts of its business without customer's consent. This is particularly important when customer information is passed from its wholesale to its retail divisions.

StarHub considers that this Section should contain similar restrictions, as set out below. StarHub also suggests that the IDA clarify the definition of "customer", particularly whether this includes retail and wholesale customers. Clearly, the use of wholesale customer information also needs to be addressed. Please refer to our comments on Section 4.2.6.

Suggested Amendment:

3.2.6.2 Restriction on Use Other than the necessary CSUI required to be forwarded to other Licensees for purposes of interconnection/inter-operability, unless the customer has provided authorisation as provided for in Section 3.2.6.3 of this Code, the Licensee may use CSUI only for the purposes of: network planning, provisioning and billing a telecommunication service provided by the Licensee; managing bad debt and preventing fraud; or providing assistance to law enforcement or other government agencies. Licensees shall adopt appropriate procedures to ensure that, unless the customer has provided authorisation, neither they nor their affiliates may use CSUI for the development or marketing of other goods or services, and that this information is not be provided to its affiliates or third parties. A Dominant Licensee may not use CSUI obtained either directly, or through provision of indirect access services, for marketing of goods and services and may not pass such information to its affilates or third parties, or different divisions within its own company, even if the customer gives approval or requests information to be passed, for any purpose other than technical reasons necessary to provide the services.

3.3.3 Duty to Provide Service on a Non-discriminatory Basis

StarHub suggests that the exception "on the need to meet a bona fide offer by a competing Licensee" should be deleted. If a Dominant Licensee is permitted to price exceptionally to meet competing offers, than there is little point in the requirement to file tariffs.

3.3.4 Duty to File Tariffs

In order to promote competitive pricing, StarHub suggests that a Dominant Licensee should be required to file publicly its retail prices (including discounts or special offers) 28 days before they come into effect. This time period could be shortened as competition develops.

At the time of tariff filing, the Dominant Licensee should demonstrate to the IDA that the prices are competitive, by providing appropriate supporting financial information. The IDA should then make the tariff and supporting financial information available to other Licensees, which will have 7 days to comment. 21 days after this, the tariff will come into effect.

Section 4 – Required Co-operation Among Facilities-Based Licensees to Promote Competition

4.2.6 Duty to Preserve Confidential Information Provided by Other Licensees

In general, new entrants will require the Dominant Licensee to provide interconnection services. The Dominant Licensee will be in a position to misuse interconnection information in marketing and promotions, particularly at launch time. Such information gives the Dominant Licensee an advantage over other Licensees and potential new entrants, to which the information is not accessible.

StarHub considers that Licensees, particularly the Dominant Licensee, should introduce safeguards to ensure that confidential information is only disclosed to those parts of the company involved in making interconnection agreements and ensure that the information is not used for anti-competitive purposes. The new protections set out in Section 3.2.6.2 regarding CSUI do not necessarily address this issue, as it is not clear that they apply to wholesale customers.

Suggested Amendment:

4.2.6 Duty to Preserve Confidential Information Provided by Other Licensees Each Licensee has a duty to protect from disclosure any confidential or proprietary information provided by another Licensee in the course of negotiating or carrying-out an Interconnection Agreement. Each Licensee may use such information only for the purpose of providing the specific interconnection services and shall adopt appropriate procedures to ensure that the information is not used for the development or marketing of other goods or services. A Dominant Licensee may not use such information for marketing of goods and services and may not pass such information to its affilates or third parties, or different divisions within its own company, for any purpose other than technical reasons necessary to provide the services.

4.2.10 Duty to Reject Discriminatory Preferences

StarHub suggests that this obligation should apply only to Dominant Licensees, as it would otherwise act as a significant disincentive to infrastructure investment.

4.3.2 IDA Conciliation

StarHub assumes that if the commercial negotiation between two non-dominant licensees does not result in a concluded agreement, then the requesting party can look to the Dominant Licensee to provide interconnection services.

Section 5 – Co-operative Duties of Dominant Licensees

5.3.2 Contents of the Offer

StarHub fully supports the publication of the RIO, with prices, as proposed by the IDA. The RIO will promote greater transparency and competition by stimulating market entry.

Charges

StarHub proposes that the charges set out in the RIO should be stated as complete, so that there are no "hidden" charges. We also suggest that the Dominant Licensee should not be permitted to impose any additional charges to those described in the RIO.

For example, a 1800 service requires the use of an origination service and an 'IN-dip' to route the call to the correct operator. While the origination charge would fall into the O/T/T category, the "IN-dip" charge may be regarded by a Dominant Licensee as an additional service not covered by the RIO. Such a situation is not acceptable and somewhat defeats the purpose of the RIO.

Details of Services

Clarity and comprehensiveness of the RIO is a fundamental requirement for its purpose as a 'default' Interconnection Agreement, which supports the IDA's objective of rapidly securing interconnection agreements.

The RIO should contain basic interconnection related services (for example, O/T/T, ESF). However, it should also contain descriptions of services organised around the retail call type and include all call types, such as:

• SingTel 1800 Call origination service; • SingTel 1900 Call origination service; • SingTel IDD Call origination service; and • SingTel Payphone access service.

Under each service type offered, the arrangements for billing, responsibility, availability and all other conditions should be described.

StarHub has reviewed a number of reference interconnection offers provided by other carriers, as well as those already listed on IDA's website and suggests that the format and layout of the Dutch operator KPN provides a good example of a RIO.

(Please refer to http://www.kpn-telecom.nl/9267249/standard_documents/documents/sd.pdf).

Additional Items

StarHub also suggests that the RIO should set out the prices, terms and conditions under which the following services will be provided:

1) New access codes

2) Payphones

In keeping with IRS pricing principles, prices should be cost based on a LRAIC/FLEC basis. A high payphone access charge, for indirect access to payphones, makes provision of services such as IDD and toll free commercially unviable for other operators. The Dominant Licensee has already installed payphones in 'prime' locations and installation of alternative payphones will be either economically impractical, not possible because of planning constraints or unnecessary duplication. Payphone users should also have the right to benefit from competition and choice of services.

(3) Billing Service

The IDA should also consider adding the provision of a retail billing service for other operators using indirect access codes. In general, any new operator requiring indirect access will need to provide some form of registration of the customer prior to using the service. For customers, registration or pre-registration is an additional barrier to switch service providers and results in multiple bills.

5.3.2 (g)

This sub-Section refers to number portability. We assume that the Dominant Licensee will be required to support Fixed, Mobile and Paging number portability

The Dominant Licensee should be required to state all prices (for example, so-called 'IN dip fees'), terms and conditions for providing this service, such as requirements to rent space in the Dominant Licensee's IN database.

In keeping with interconnect pricing principles, all relevant charges should be LRAIC/FLEC based.

Placing an obligation on the Dominant Licensee to provide portability places a similar obligation on non-dominant Licensees. The RIO should also describe how necessary routing information, that is, number mapping, will be made available to non-dominant Licensees to enable them to implement their own solutions.

5.3.2 (h)

The wording of this sub-Section appears to be reversed. The Requesting Licensee will compensate the Dominant Licensee for providing services.

5.3.3 Model Confidentiality Agreement

StarHub suggests that the confidentiality agreement should contain a clause preventing the Dominant Licensee from revealing details of the interconnection arrangements to its affiliates or other internal operating divisions, such as marketing, before any details are made publicly available. The only exceptions should be where the information is needed for interconnection related purposes, such as network operations.

Specifically, it is important that details such as capacity, launch dates or traffic routes are not used anti-competitively by the Dominant Licensee. This information is not accessible to other non-dominant Licensees or potential new entrants and should not be used to benefit the Dominant Licensee. Please refer to our comments on Sections 3.2.6.2 and 4.2.6.

5.3.5.5 Provision of Wholesale Services

When the Dominant Licensee launches a new retail service, for which the IDA has determined a wholesale service should be made available, then such wholesale service should be made available at the same time as the Dominant Licensee launches the retail service. (This should include any trial periods or pre-launch testing).

Additionally, the Dominant Licensee should make available any technical and commercial details and interface specifications sufficiently in advance, so that the Requesting Licensee can make the network modifications needed to use the service on the launch date. Any time delays may give the Dominant Licensee an unfair 'first mover' advantage. The Requesting Licensee should also be able to resell the wholesale service to any customer or operator without restriction.

The pricing of wholesale services should be subject to the competition rules of Section 7 and available at the time the Dominant Licensee launches retail services. In particular, the Dominant Licensee should be required to tariff the relevant wholesale and retail rates at the same time.

We propose the following minor change for clarity:

Suggested Amendment:

5.3.5.5 Provision of Wholesale Services The Dominant Licensee must offer to allow Requesting Licensees to purchase, at wholesale rates, any telecommunication service designated by IDA that the Licensee provides to end-users at retail rates. The services designated are specified, but not limited to, those set out in Appendix Two.

5.3.5.6.1: Physical Co-location, Where Feasible

StarHub seeks clarification of the meaning of ‘virtual co-location’ and the terms and conditions on which it will be provided. Will the relevant prices, terms and conditions be set out in the RIO?

6. Publication of Interconnection Agreements

StarHub suggests that IDA clarifies that this requirement applies only to Interconnect Agreements entered into under the Code, as follows.

Suggested Amendment:

5.6 Publication of Interconnection Agreements All Interconnection Agreements entered into under this Code involving Dominant Licensees, whether arrived at voluntarily or through the Dispute Resolution Procedure, shall be published by IDA. However, IDA – on its own motion or at the request of either of the Licensees – may withhold from publication any portion of an agreement that IDA determines contains proprietary or commercially sensitive information.

5.7 Status of Agreements Entered Into Prior to the Effective Date of the Code

StarHub recommends that IDA provides specific guidance on appropriate transitional arrangements regarding agreements entered into prior to the effective date of the Code and that do not comply with its provisions, particularly the minimum duties outlined in Section 4.2 and the minimum requirements specified in Section 5.3.5 in relation to the RIO.

StarHub suggests that such guidance could include:

• the requirements to initiate the modification process (on request of either party or at the IDA's initiative);

• the timetable for the negotiation of modifications, the period in which they must be concluded and the date upon which they will take effect;

• appropriate transitional arrangements to safeguard the interests of parties to the existing non-compliant agreements;

• the extent of modifications contemplated, including rights to modify clauses that are inconsistent with the RIO and otherwise retain commercially negotiated clauses of the existing agreements.

Accordingly, StarHub proposes the following amendments.

Suggested Amendment:

5.7 Status of Agreements Entered Into Prior to the Effective Date of the Code Any Interconnection Agreement entered into and approved by IDA prior to the effective date of this Code shall remain in force, notwithstanding the provisions of this Code, unless expressly modified by IDA or the parties to the agreement. The parties shall negotiate such modifications in good faith and in accordance with the procedures set out in Sections 5.5.2 to 5.5 and IDA may issue such directions in relation to the modifications or the process that it thinks fit.

StarHub also assumes that Licensees that have entered into such agreements will be able to rely fully upon the opt-in rights set out in Section 5.4.

Section 6 –Infrastructure Sharing

6.6.3: Compensation for Sharing

StarHub reserves its position in relation to cost until the IDA has released details of the fully allocated cost methodology in Appendix 3. StarHub also expects the opportunity to participate in a further consultation upon this important issue and to provide comments about its position at that stage.

Section 7 – Unfair Methods of Competition

StarHub welcomes the IDA's clarification that the examples of anti-competitive conduct are illustrative rather than exhaustive. StarHub considers that there are several improvements that could be made to strengthen the rules.

As currently drafted, the examples of anti-competitive conduct (predatory pricing, price squeeze and cross subsidisation) are difficult to prove. StarHub suggests that in some cases, there should be a presumption that the pricing is predatory, discriminatory or may lead to a price squeeze.

It should then be up to the Dominant Licensee to prove otherwise, by submitting the relevant data, especially as it will be the party best placed to provide such data. The Code should also address principles relating to recording and storing data and the information that should be made available by Dominant Licensees.

7.2.1 Pricing Abuses

StarHub is unclear as to whether the IDA is seeking to implement a "de minimis" requirement, that is, there must be a restriction of competition which is more than just minor. If this is the case, StarHub suggests that the word 'unreasonably' should be defined and a more detailed explanation be provided.

7.2.1.2 Price Squeezes

Determining that a price squeeze has taken place can be difficult and requires careful analysis of disaggregation of costs and charges. For example, a Dominant Licensee's time of day pricing may vary in such a way that its affiliates are able to make an overall profit, yet at certain times of the day the service may be non-profitable. In such case, it could restrict the use of the service to certain market segments.

Suggested Amendment:

7.2.1.2 Price Squeezes A Dominant Licensee that provides an input used by “down-stream” entities, including an affiliate of the Licensee, must not sell the input at a price that is so high that the Licensee’s down-stream affiliate could not profitably sell its product if it were required to pass on to its customers the full retail price of the input. For example, a Dominant Licensee that provides xDSL service could not price its xDSL service at a level so high that, if its affiliated Internet Service Provider were required to pass the full retail price on to its customers, the affiliated Internet Service Provider could not profitably compete against non-affiliated Internet Service Providers. Similarly, a Licensee that uses input provided by an upstream affiliate that has market power may not agree to purchase the input at a price that is so high that efficient competing non-affiliated Licensees could not profitably sell their end-product if they are required to purchase the input at the same price as the Licensee. A Dominant Licensee must provide to the IDA the costs and prices of wholesale services in sufficient level of desegregation.

StarHub also suggests that other forms of pricing abuse, such as excessive pricing, bundling and tying should be included in the list of examples provided.

Section 8 – Agreements Involving Licensees That Unreasonably Restrict Competition

8.2 Determining the Existence of an Agreement

All the guidance on how markets will be defined and assessed is now in included in Section 9 (Consolidations). StarHub suggests that it is also relevant here and to the classification of Dominant Licensees in Section 2 and should be appropriately cross-referenced.

StarHub also suggests that this Section should also refer to the co-ordination of market behaviour generally.

8.4 Agreements Between Competing Licensees That Will be Assessed Based on Competitive Effects and 8.5 Agreements Between Licensees and Entities at Different Levels in the Supply Chain

In relation to the provision that "Licensees may not enter into agreements that unreasonably restrict competition", even though there is some guidance on how this will be assessed, in legal terms, this is quite an imprecise test and provides limited guidance for an operator on when an action, or course of conduct, may breach this Section. In this respect, the Section is not sufficiently transparent.

StarHub suggests that this Section would merit some reorganisation, as it deals with both prohibitions on Dominant Licensees and agreements between non-dominant undertakings. These stem from fundamentally different competition law concerns. The first is based on abuse of market power and the second on collusive behaviour between undertakings. Different factors will therefore be taken into account in assessing them.

In particular, we have the following suggestions and queries:

• There should be a de minimis safeguard, otherwise every agreement falling within Section 8.3 will be caught, no matter how small the operators and how insignificant the effect on competition.

• Section 8.3 contains an absolute prohibition and Section 8.3.5 contains an exception to Section 8.3. However, Section 8.4 then states there is no permissibility of agreements falling within Section 8.3 – this somewhat contradictory and should be amended.

• Section 8.4 states that IDA will assess "most" agreements – please clarify what this means?

• Section 8.5 – StarHub queries whether these agreements are illegal per se or can they be subject of an exemption? Further, how do they relate to the agreements prohibited in Section 8.3?

Section 9 – Consolidations by Licensees That Are Likely to Unreasonably Restrict Competition

StarHub suggests that there should be supplementary guidelines issued on what constitutes an "unreasonable restriction of competition", otherwise there can be no certainty for industry as to what consolidations are likely to be acceptable. There also appears to be a different test set out in Section 9.4.2 ("heightened risk"). Such guidelines would help clarify the correct test and how it is to be applied.

Section 10 – Enforcement of the Competition Code

StarHub recognises that the Code and the Telecommunications Act 1999 provide for monetary sanctions to be imposed by IDA against the defaulting Licensee for breaches of the Code. However, neither the Code nor the Telecommunications Act 1999 to contain any mechanism for compensating the loss suffered by innocent Licensees that arise from the defaulting Licensee’s breaches of the Code.

During the IDA Forum on 6 July 2000, when this point was raised by StarHub, IDA responded that it was always open to an innocent Licensee to pursue its remedies against the defaulting Licensee.

Unfortunately, under Singapore law, there is no clear private right or cause of action against a defaulting Licensee for anti-competitive conduct. This point was recently affirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of Lifestyle 1.99 Private Ltd v S$1.99 Pte Ltd (unreported), where the learned judges said, at paragraph 47 of the judgment, that “there is no tort of unfair competition”.

Once a competition Code of Practice is set up, it is a necessary corollary that defaulting Licensees will want to seek redress against the defaulting Licensee. This is because the defaulting Licensee must not acquire the impression that the cost of contravening the Code is only the cost of the penalty (offset by its economic gains from behaving anti-competitively), and does not include the cost of the harm that it has caused to the innocent Licensee.

StarHub would therefore propose the inclusion of the following provision in the Telecommunications Act 1999:

(1) Any telecommunications licensee that contravenes the provisions of any codes of practice that regulate fair and effective conduct and market competition in connection with the provision of telecommunications services shall, in addition to any financial penalty for which it is liable under this Act or any codes of practice or any other piece of legislation, be liable to pay compensation for any loss suffered by any aggrieved telecommunications licensee arising out of the contravention of the codes of practice and the compensation shall be recoverable by civil action or suit before any court of competent jurisdiction.

(2) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded, the court may have regard to all relevant matters, including: a) the nature and extent of the contravention; b) the nature and extent of any loss damage suffered by the aggrieved telecommunications licensee and the nature and extent of any gain acquired by the contravening telecommunications licensee as a result of the contravention; c) the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and d) any ruling or findings by the Authority in relation to that contravention of the codes of practice by the contravening telecommunications licensee.

Such statutory recognition of a private party’s right to compensation in addition to IDA’s penalty is not uncommon in Singapore. In fact, a similar provision exists in Section 50 of the Telecommunications Act 1999, under which a person who damages an installation or plant used for telecommunications shall, in addition to any penalty, be liable to pay compensation to aggrieved parties.

On a separate but related matter of monetary sanctions that may be imposed by IDA, in order for the sanction as a penalty to be effective, StarHub recommends that it be made a function of the revenue of the contravening Licensee. This is consistent with the approach adopted in other jurisdictions, for example, the United Kingdom and the European Union, where the fine for anti-competitive behaviour or abuse of dominant position may be up to 10% of the gross revenue of the contravening Licensee.

Appendix 1 – Interconnection in A Fully Liberalised and Convergent Environment

2 Approach to Interconnection

2.5

StarHub welcomes a three year duration for prices as this provides a period of stability in which to plan investment in infrastructure. However, is unlikely that in a three year period, any Licensee will have acquired sufficient market power to negotiate interconnection terms with a Dominant Licensee without regulatory intervention. It is likely that regulatory intervention for interconnection will still be needed for many years after the initial three years of price controls. We request that the IDA consider extending the price regime to five years.

We also suggest that there should be some scope for amendment or review within the three year period, otherwise existing deals could fall behind best market practice. Further, StarHub requests that the IDA implement a continual review/monitoring process for the interconnection regime in the future, which will enable the IDA to respond to market developments quickly.

4 Rights and Obligations of Licensees

4.2

StarHub supports the position outlined and agrees that Services Based Operators, in general, will not require access to ESFs and UNEs. To avoid confusion, we suggest that the term 'virtual interconnection' should be defined.

5 Charging Standards

StarHub suggests that it would be useful to have reference to benchmarking against best international standards, to ensure consistency of Singapore's interconnection prices.

5.1.1

StarHub supports the IDA's decision to use FLEC/LRAIC for IRS, but suggests that this should be applied universally, rather than limited to "where possible". In general, this approach sends the correct build/buy economic signals to the industry and provides the basis for examining anti-competitive behaviour.

5.1.4

StarHub seeks clarification regarding how frequently the IDA will review the interpretation of FLEC due to the ‘best in use’ technology and in which particular circumstances CRC will be implemented.

6 Responsibility for Charges

6.1.4

The central issue is the time scale required by the Dominant Licensee to install additional capacity. In a rapidly changing environment, the procedure to request capacity should be as flexible as possible. We suggest that the IDA, in conjunction with the Dominant Licensee and other operators, determines a practical time scale for the installation of additional capacity. This would help to reduce the risk to all parties of unused or shortages of capacity.

When demand for interconnection capacity is slowly increasing, it is appropriate to require existing capacity to be used before additional capacity can be requested. However, some operators may require very large increases in capacity on a short time scale. In such case, waiting until the existing capacity is utilised would lead to overloads and lost calls if additional capacity can not be installed quickly. The requesting mechanism should support all reasonable requests for capacity. The Dominant Licensee's need for long capacity forecasts is more often to cause delays to other operators to restrict their business growth rather than internal network issues.

6.2.1

If the two operators are interconnected through a transit operator, it is not clear which operator bears the responsibility for the transit charges. StarHub would welcome clarification as to the responsibility for payment of transit charges for origination and termination services.

6.2.4

It is unclear if the reference to 'retail price' of a call is to the retail price of a fixed call or mobile call.

The first sentence of this Section refers to call origination charges, yet the description of the interconnect charges refers only to termination charges. We ask that this issue is clarified to avoid confusion.

In addition, StarHub seeks clarification that a call originating from a Mobile network to another Mobile network is to be included in the new interconnect regime.

Further, there is no mention of transit charges. StarHub considers that charges for transit calls should be set out, as transit will pose as a significant part of the interconnect traffic under the fully liberalized regime.

StarHub assumes that the charges referred to in this Section are same as those in Part 1 of Appendix 2 (Interconnection Related Services).

7 Structure of the Charges

StarHub supports the cost structure for IRS that mirrors the underlying cost of the provision of those services or components. This is essential to prevent anti competitive practices.

StarHub also supports the use of symmetrical interconnection charges based on the Dominant Licensee's network costs and volumes. This method of determining interconnect charges is generally simple to administer and practical to implement.

Appendix 2 - Interconnection related services

Physical Interconnection

StarHub seeks clarification on the meaning of “co-location tariffs”, including whether such tariffs will be set by IDA.

StarHub assumes that “virtual co-location” with SBOs will be based on commercial negotiation. StarHub also seeks clarification on the meaning of "virtual interconnection" as ‘virtual’ is a broad term.

Origination/Transit/Termination

1. PSTN Voice:

As set out above, the transit charge call is based upon the Dominant Licensee’s cost. StarHub seeks clarification on the methodology of calculating the Dominant Licensee’s cost of the transit charge. StarHub assumes that the cost for transit calls should be significantly lower then the cost incurred for a normal call termination cost.

For some toll-free call types, where a call origination payment is needed, the Dominant Licensee also requires a so-called 'IN-dip' payment for determining the geographic number and operator of the service provider. As the "IN-dip" is fundamental to the provision of these services, its cost should not be left to commercial negotiations. StarHub requests that the IDA to determine what charge, if any, is applicable to this function and include it in this section.

Further, in other countries, the Dominant Licensee uses a different approach to routing toll-free calls such as a routing table in the switch. Accordingly, there are no additional routing fees. If the Dominant Licensee has chosen a particular technical solution that is more costly to implement, other operators should not be required to subsidise it. Accordingly, the cost of the functionality should be based on the most efficient technical solution on an FLEC/LRAIC basis.

StarHub welcomes the IDA's decision to mandate interconnection at local exchanges. Local exchange interconnection will allow operators greater flexibility in handing over traffic.

StarHub is unclear as to the meaning of the term 'local wire line call rate' and asks that the IDA clarify this term. We would expect that all the IRS services described in Parts 1 and 2 would be provided on a LRAIC cost basis, in keeping with the IDA policy on interconnection. If the 'local wireline rate' refers to the Dominant Licensee's retail local access charge, StarHub would like to express its grave concern over this choice of costing for IRS.

Essential Support Facilities:

StarHub seeks clarification on “the cost of preparing co-location space” as it is stated that this cost is paid by the Dominant Licensee then recovered via “cost based regular recurring payments”. This term should also be defined.

Unbundled Network Elements ("UNE")

General Comments:

StarHub supports IDA’s intention to unbundle SingTel’s and SCV's local loop. Without regulatory intervention, there is no incentive for the Dominant Licensees to co-operate with new entrants and to give access to the local loop. The unbundling of the local loop will ensure greater competition and service innovation in the industry, especially for the provision of broadband services.

Technical Procedures and Quality Issues for Lease of UNEs

During IDA’s Public Forum on 6 July 2000, IDA requested industry comments on technical procedures and quality issues for the lease of network elements (local loop/sub-loops).

On the issue of quality, StarHub considers that Dominant Licensees should be made to lease the local loop to other service providers on a non-discriminatory basis, and at a Quality of Service that the Dominant Licensee provides to itself, its subsidiaries and affiliates.

Non-discriminatory treatment by the Dominant Licensee is especially important in the handling of incidences when a fault or interference occurs. In such situations, the infrastructure owner/provider must be non-discriminatory in the restoration of services.

The infrastructure owner should also be made to ensure that the quality of the circuit after restoration could be used for the provision of services that the new entrant requires and for which it has been using such infrastructure.

For example, if the service provider is providing ADSL services over the ULL, should there be any incidence of fault, the infrastructure owner cannot be allowed to restore the new entrant’s services to “voice” grade if “ADSL” grade is required. Similarly, the infrastructure owner should not be allowed to discriminate in restoring its own circuits to “ADSL” grade for its affiliates or subsidiary companies providing such services over its ULL.

Unbundled Elements of SCV's Network:

The advancement of telephony technologies such as VoIP and various ‘voice-over-packet’, accelerates the position of the cable TV operator (SCV) to the position of a Dominant Licensee in the provision of telephony and data services in Singapore. This is especially the case since SCV has been awarded the nation’s third Public Telecommunications License (PTL), having wired up an estimated 950,000 homes in Singapore for its CATV services.

SCV will also commence trial on its voice services by end 2000 [Straits Times 13 June 2000], providing local and international phone and fax, Internet and bundled CATV services. Although this provides an alternative service to the consumers, the unbundling of SCV’s Network Elements is essential to ensure that new entrants can provide competitive telecommunication services over a Hybrid-Coaxial Fibre Cable (HFC) network.

Due to the difference in nature between a traditional copper and HFC network, the UNEs have to be defined separately. In the HFC network, which adopts a ‘tree and branch’ methodology, the unbundling the physical cable is insufficient and should include the unbundling of the frequency spectrum in which the network currently operates. With an allocation of a segment of the frequency, other operators will then be able to provide a similar suite of telecommunication services to the consumers over the HFC network. In addition, cross bundling of CATV services with the suite of telecommunication services by other licensees should only be allowed using the HFC network to provide services.

Experience in the US and Canada has shown that a well-executed broadband access offering can attract a high proportion of Internet users. Rogers and Shaw cable have achieved high penetration rates (~16%) for cable modem service in parts of Canada. America On Line (AOL), which dismissed broadband access as a waste of effort and money in 1997, has mounted a costly and highly visible campaign to get access to cable modems for its own service, as well as signing highly publicized deals for ADSL from US local phone companies.

StarHub requests that IDA mandates the unbundling of SCV’s HFC last mile for the provision of competitive broadband services to the homes.

1 Copper loops
2 Sub-loops

There should be no restrictions placed on the buyer of UNE by the Dominant Licensee as to customers or operators to which the UNE may be resold. For example, if an operator purchases copper local loop and upgrades with a xDSL for resale to other FBOs or SBOs, there should be no restrictions placed on this by the Dominant Licensee.

3 Distribution Frame Access

The Dominant Licensee should have the process for allocating pins outlined in details by the time the RIO comes into effect.

4 Dark Fibre

StarHub does not consider it appropriate to include Dark Fibre in the list of UNEs.

The requirement to provide Dark Fibre as an UNE at cost based prices (FLEC) will discourage new Licensees from investing in infrastructure and new technology. This would be inconsistent with the IDA's policy of encouraging investment in order to upgrade existing facilities and to create diversity in networks.

In relation to international traffic, such an effect may jeopardise Singapore's goal of being a telecoms hub for the region. Dark Fibre is not treated as an UNE in other jurisdictions, for example, the US and Hong Kong.

In particular, a Dominant Licensee should not be required to make international Dark Fibre available, as it may in fact be contractually unable to fulfil such an obligation under the terms of its cable agreements.

Further, as most cables are owned by consortia, sharing will only be possible on a limited number of routes, notably over the causeway to Malaysia. This is likely to result in heavy usage of one route and unused capacity on others. Accordingly, mandating access to Dark Fibre on one route is likely to have potentially damaging effects on the commercial viability of the other routes.

StarHub therefore considers that Dominant Licensees should not be required to make Dark Fibre available as an Unbundled Network Element as such a requirement would be potentially very damaging for the provision of new international capacity.

Unbundled Network Services

StarHub welcomes the incorporation of UNS in the RIO and considers that the following list of services, based on call types, should be included in the RIO:

• SingTel PSTN terminating access service; • SingTel PSTN originating access service; • SingTel PSTN 1800 call origination service; • SingTel PSTN 1900 call origination service; • SingTel PSTN 3,4 digit (IDD) call origination service; • SingTel PSTN 1900 billing service; • SingTel PSTN short code (16xx) origination; • SingTel PSTN Emergency service; • SingTel PSTN IDD billing service; and • SingTel payphone access service (1800,IDD,16XX).

Similar services should be available for ISDN.

APPENDIX A

1. StarHub’s Proposal for a new Disclosure Regime

In this Appendix, we would like draw upon some of the financial reporting practices that are being adopted across the EU for the purposes of supporting regulatory requirements restricting anti-competitive behaviour of Dominant Licensees. These practices are best developed in the UK, where the regulator OFTEL imposes financial reporting on BT. StarHub would like to suggest that the IDA consider adopting the methods outlined in this section.

We would also like to emphasis that the regulatory requirement for disclosure of information should not be imposed on non-Dominant Licensees. In general, small rapidly growing new operators have a cost structure that is difficult to characterise in any meaningful way.

Financial Statements about Businesses.

StarHub believes that the Dominant Licensee should be required to disclose information about the following 5 businesses:

1. Wholesale: providing network services to the other divisions and to other operators in a non-discriminatory fashion.

2. Retail: offering retail PSTN services to end customers

3. Mobile: offering mobile services to end customers (but not including calls from fixed line to mobile customers)

4. Internet Access (ISP): providing retail ISP services to end customers

5. Other

The financial statements should include information about the transfer charges between these divisions. For example, data should be provided about the network components and exchange lines that the retail business buys from the wholesale business. Similarly, data should be provided on the network components that the ISP business buys from the wholesale business.

There should be a further disaggregation of the Wholesale and Retail businesses.

The Wholesale business must provide information about the split of costs between traffic sensitive and non-traffic sensitive costs. This will support the transparency of interconnection pricing and support transfer pricing from the wholesale business to the retail business. In addition it will help to set elements of the price for local loop unbundling.

A set of network and exchange line components probably best provides this split. The final list of components defined will depend on the structure of Dominant Licensee's network. The components defined by eircom’s and BT’s separated accounts form a good starting point.

The Retail business should disclose information about several of the key prescribed services that Dominant Licensee provides. These should include as a minimum:

• Local services (exchange lines and local calls separately for business customers or together for residential customers); • International calls; • Calls to mobile phones; • Payphones; • Directory Enquiries; • Internet Access; • Customer premises equipment; and • Other retail services.

1.2 Disclosure about Prescribed Services.

StarHub believe that as a minimum:

• the Dominant Licensee should be required to disclose information about tariff changes and changes to contract terms and conditions for the main prescribed services before they are implemented;

• the Dominant Licensee should have to disclose information about all of their discount schemes; and

• the Dominant Licensee should have to submit evidence that their discount schemes—taken separately and, if appropriate, together—are above costs, before launch. StarHub believes that the UK Stack test provides a simple model that could be adopted quite readily within Singapore. The US net revenue test provides an alternative model.

1.3 Desirable attributes of a disclosure regime

Regulators across the world have recognised the importance of information disclosure. There is agreement that there is a need to address the information asymmetry between incumbents and the rest of the industry, including governments and regulators. In general, information disclosure regimes are required to support three main applications or objectives:

1. To be able to prove Transparency.
2. To be able to test for and prove non-discrimination.
3. To be able to test for Anti-Competitive Pricing.

In addition, since information disclosed under most regimes is provided by the Dominant Licensee there is also a requirement for some independent audit or check.

Transparency in the telecommunications industry usually relates to interconnection and other wholesale tariffs. There is a general requirement on the incumbent to demonstrate that its interconnection tariffs are cost based and that other operators are only being charged for the services that they use.

This transparency objective is usually accompanied with a requirement to unbundle tariffs into different building blocks –known as network components.

Non-discrimination in the telecommunications industry means that the vertically integrated Dominant Licensee is not treating its downstream businesses in a preferential manner, i.e. that it is treating other operators in exactly the same way as it is treating itself. The key disclosure requirements are therefore that the incumbent needs to demonstrate that its wholesale (upstream) business is charging its retail business in exactly the same way as it is charging other operators for, for example, interconnection services.

To meet this objective the network (i.e. wholesale) costs of providing different retail services need to be identified, together with some evidence that these costs have been calculated in a similar way to that used to set interconnection prices. These together with sets of usage factors can then show how the wholesale costs of retail services are built up from network component unit costs and that these component unit costs are the same as those used to calculate charges—such as interconnection tariffs—to other operators.

Given that unfair pricing of wholesale services has mainly been covered by the previous two attributes of transparency and non-discrimination, here the requirement focuses on the “fairness” of retail tariffs charged by the dominant, vertically integrated operator. There are many different forms that this unfair pricing can take. Economists talk about unfair cross-subsidy, price squeeze, illegal discounting and predatory pricing. But whatever the form, testing for fairness requires the costs and revenues for the retail service under investigation.

2. The EU

The key legislation affecting disclosure in the EU is the Interconnection Directive. This Directive lays down the key rules that must be implemented by Member States. [1]

Under this Directive, interconnection tariffs in the EU have to be:

• Transparent and cost-orientated (see, for example Clause 2, Article 7) • Unbundled (clauses 3 and 4, Article 7), and • Non-discriminatory (see, for example, Article 6).

Article 8 of the Directive covers Accounting Separation and Financial Reports:

• Clause 1 has a requirement for dominant carriers to keep separated accounts.

• Clause 2 requires a wholesale/retail split to be maintained —“activities related to interconnection–covering both interconnection services provided internally and interconnection services provided to others—and on the other hand, other activities”

• Clause 3 requires that National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) should have access to these accounts and that NRAs may publish such information as would contribute to an open and competitive market, while taking account of commercial confidentiality”.

• Clause 4 requires the separated accounts to be subject to an independent audit.

Subsequently, in October 1997, the EU published an independent report that it commissioned from Arthur Andersen, “Accounting Separation in the Context of Open Network Provision”[2].

This report gave guidelines for an appropriate framework for Separated Accounts. The first key recommendation is that the approach to accounting separation should be based on the following “businesses”:

• A Local Access-Network business

• A Core Network business

• A retail business

• “Other activities”

Note that this is a vertical separation of businesses, which is common with all the disclosure regimes described below, with the exception of the US. The access/core network split provides the basic division between traffic sensitive and non-traffic sensitive costs.

The report also suggests methods of allocating both operating and capital costs, suggests some reporting formats for each of the businesses and discusses current cost accounting adjustments which are required if a forward looking view of costs is required.

4. The UK

BT has published separated accounts in various forms since 1994/95. In 1999 BT published results both on a historic and current cost basis, with cost floors and ceilings also calculated on a LRIC basis for parts of the Network Business to comply with the Network Charge Regime that was introduced in October 1997. At present no other operators in the UK have to publish separated accounts.

The 1999 reports are separated into 5 main businesses, each of which had separate Profit and Loss and balance sheet accounts:

• Access; • Network; • Retail Systems Business; • Apparatus Supply Business; and • Supplemental Systems Business.

The 2000 report will also require Cellnet, BT’s mobile operation in the UK, to be separately identified. Cellnet became a fully owned BT subsidiary during 1999/2000. Again the access/network split provides the separation of traffic sensitive from non-traffic sensitive costs.

The schedules entitled “Statements of costs and charges for Standard Services” provide the basic transparency of interconnection charges. They give route factors which when combined with the unit costs defined in the network “statement of costs” show how interconnection prices can be determined/justified.

Note 8 within the current cost statements shows how the network costs of retail services are constructed from the standard services defined in the previous schedules. This provides proof of non-discrimination.

The above has outlined the key statements within the BT separated accounts. BT actually has to provide far more information both publicly and to Oftel. For example, BT also has to publish the following documents:

• Accounting Documents • Detailed Attribution Methods • Detailed Valuation Methodology • Long Run Incremental Cost Model: Relationships and Parameters

In addition to these powers, Oftel has also introduced a series of tests that allow it to determine whether the incumbent’s (BT’s) general prices are fair and all such prices must be demonstrated to “pass” these tests. No other carriers’ tariffs have to pass this test. These are often referred to as Stack Tests as they compare the revenue for a service (after discounts) against a “stack of costs” made up of Network and Retail costs and, where appropriate, Outpayments to other Operators. The key point about Stack tests is that they are ex-ante tests of BT’s prices: BT has to satisfy Oftel before it can change prices or introduce new discount schemes.

1. Stack Tests: Overview

Oftel uses the “stack test” defined in BT’s Licence Condition 71 (formerly 24F) to stop BT pricing its services unfairly. This prohibits BT from reducing tariffs on products in competitive market segments below an economic rate while, at the same time, cross-subsidising these products from profits in less competitive segments.

Condition 71 makes BT show that each of its major retail tariffs is high enough to recover costs. Before BT introduces a new retail tariff or discount scheme, it has to show that the new tariff will earn an economic return by submitting to Oftel:

• the “true” average retail tariff of the product—reflecting discounts if appropriate;

• the retail costs of providing that product; and

• the wholesale (network) costs of providing that product, calculated using the same network component prices that are used to derive interconnection rates. .

Oftel will normally allow the new tariff if it is higher than these costs. If it does not cover these costs then BT must offer a remedy. In practice, this means BT has to reduce interconnection charges so that the new tariff then passes the test using a “revised” set of network charges. This prevents BT from discriminating against other competitors by, in effect, offering network components to its Retail division at a lower price than it charges other operators.

An overview of the test is given in the diagram below:

[pic]

This simple test is very powerful. It checks that

• BT’s prices are above costs.

• BT is acting in a non-discriminatory manner—i.e. it charges itself on the same basis as it charges other operators.

It is difficult to argue that the tariffs for established services of a Dominant Licensee should not have to pass this quite simple test. StarHub believes that SingTel as the Dominant Licensee in Singapore should be subject to similar tests.

Condition 71 applies to the general prices that BT has to charge. However in practice all BT retail services have to be capable of passing a similar test. Condition 78.12 of BT’s licence prevents BT from “unfairly subsidising or unfairly cross-subsidising … any part of parts of the Businesses other than the Residual Business”. If Oftel believes that unfair (cross) subsidy is taking place then the Director General of Oftel can direct BT to take steps to remedy the situation.

2. Stack tests in More Detail

The above discussion has outlined the tests that BT’s general retail prices have to pass. In practice BT has to submit 2 sets of information to Oftel to show that its retail tariffs pass these tests. Both sets have to be submitted and Oftel’s agreement obtained before BT can change its prices and/or launch a new discount scheme.

2.1 Price Control Notices (PCNs)

BT has to provide Price Control Notices (PCNs) before it changes what are called general prices. In practice BT has to provide information on:

• International Calls on a route by route basis; and

• 9 Inland PCNS: one each for Local, Regional and National by each of the 3 times of day (day, evening and weekend).

Previously BT had to provide information on all international routes. This requirement has recently been relaxed following Oftel’s determination that BT was no longer dominant on a certain number of routes. BT still however has to supply information on international routes where Oftel believes it is still dominant.

PCNs provide information on the proposed average tariff, and the retail and network costs associated with the product. The tariffs relate to non-discounted prices. The outputs from the PCNs are margins for each tariff type. BT’s PCNs are in the public domain. An example of a PCN is given below.

[pic]

2.2 Maximum Relevant Discount (MRD) Calculations

As noted above PCNs cover non-discounted prices, but BT also has to demonstrate that its discount schemes are “fair”, again before launch. BT achieves this through a second submission to Oftel that is called the Maximum Relevant Discount calculation (MRD). The MRD submission is not in the public domain though, effectively the net result of the calculation is, as Oftel use this to justify why they have allowed BT to launch a specific discount schemes.

The MRD calculates the maximum available discount under the scheme and compares the results against the margins given on the PCN submissions. Tariffs with negative margins will therefore be regarded as having failed the test.

The test starts from a typical billed revenue mix for the customer group at whom the discount scheme is targeted. So, for example residential customer discount schemes are considered separately from those targeted at business customers.

An example of an MRD calculation is given in the table on the next page. This MRD example has the same logic as that used in Oftel submissions but for regulatory and commercial reasons has been populated with fictitious numbers. The grey shaded cells are the input data.

[pic]

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[1] This is available on the EU’s Information Society Project Office website at:

http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/d1-en.htm

[2] This is also available from ISPO web-site at: http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-en.htm

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