Revolution to Civil War
By Maya Bhardwaj Abstract: social movements and regime change across the Middle East and North Africa. While interconnected, uprisings in each nation took different forms and reached out distinctions and interactions between uprisings, revolution, and civil war. standing scholarly debate. The presence or absence of civil war is examined in examinations of civil war: the nature of the governmental regime, territoriality

complete understanding of what constitutes civil war and provides a framework

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Introduction the Middle East, authoritarian regimes thought invulnerable to protest and impossible to oust began to cede to massive protest. Attacks on governmental institutions and elite leaders ensconced from public opinion developed divergently in each nation, employing tailored strategies to mobilize the public and reap key support. This paper focuses on the nature and development of these Arab Spring

further use these distinctions to illuminate the conceptual, instrumental, and semantic nature of civil war in general. -

exacerbated the grievances felt by rebel forces and smoothed over ethnic, religious, and tribal ten-

trastingly, in Syria, instances of mild reform under Bashar al-Assad, popular concerns for security, kept civil war at bay.

Conceptual Isolation of Civil War presence or absence of civil war. However, the scholarly distinction between civil war and other insurgency and counter-insurgency, uprisings, genocide or genocidal actions, and general loss of internal monopoly over the legitimate use of force.1 confuses the framework of responses and semantically politicizes actions by regional and international players. Thus, in order to explore the causal factors in reaching civil war, the instrumental and

The constitutive dimensions of civil war are conceptually under debate. The majority of However,
1

See Max Weber on authority and state sovereignty, Politics as a Vocation, 1919. Singer, David, and Small, Melvin, et al. The Correlates of War Project. Current leadership, Paul Diehl. Founded

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3

First, civil wars must be -

tinguishing civil war from border disputes and separatist uprisings. actors, functioning as an armed entity whose motive is to continue its control over resources, force, political mobilization, and self-determination. As statehood is determined through constitutions or its political documents, troop deployment, and popular appeal. However, the breakdown between ers can make pro-government forces less coherent.5 Instrumentally, the player in power in the years leading up to civil war constitutes the government side and struggles to maintain sovereignty through military and political control. The opposition forces must also be delineated. Delineation is contentious: some rebel forces may be more loosely tied together than others, having multiple agendas, ethnic compositions, and territorial alliances. However, the rebel group must use violence to achieve a political and ideological agenda whose end goal is state control. The clarity of these objectives, whether for broader mobilized in their bid for legitimate authority and recognition. Rebel groups must also be able to regions: thus, rebels in a civil war are distinct from terrorists, insurgents, and other more delocalized shared objectives for political control rather than just desire for resources or economic exploitation.6 and ideological struggles like jihadism that are not limited by state sovereignty. Indicators of these nated documents, and recognition of the rebels by international players and the government as an opposing force.6 7

Nicholas Sambanis instead

meet the 1000 threshold, as have instances of insurgency, genocide, and other civilian-targeted violence.8 Thus, a dimension for death count on the government side is crucial. The threshold generally used is 100 deaths per year on both sides, thus necessitating active resistance on both sides and
3

ity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review Resort to arms: International and civil war, 1816-1980. Beverly The New York Times,
5 6

Policy Research Working Paper 2355,

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7 8

government forces, rebels must have a level of military mobilization that conceptually narrows civil war. This threshold need not be overly strict, but in being sensitive to government and rebel action subdued.9 Table 1: Instrumental Constitutive Dimensions of Civil War Constitutive Dimension Indicator Data Internality state Government actor Government is major actor, seeks to maintain political control in supOpposition actor Rebels are organized under leadership and party platform, command territory and local recruitment, bid for national control

Creating a conceptual framework of civil war is important not only in operational terms but also in semantic terms. Rhetoric in media coverage bi-directionally interacts with the instrumental dimensions of civil war: rhetoric is fed and changed by policy reports, and in turn conversely pub-

Contrastingly, characterizing Iraq as insurgency rather than civil war highlighted sectarian tensions and fragmented control, and removed the issue of breached domestic sovereignty from continued US troop involvement.11 The semantics
10

actors, sovereignty and domestic autonomy, often allowing self-interested players to defer to realist concerns.13 Dichotomies between a just side and an injust side are often reduced through the label of

-

action. Thus, the politics of naming bi-directionally shapes the conceptual framework of civil war.

Research Framework for Civil War
Overall, the conceptual framing of civil war used in this research is sensitive to both instru-

9 10 11 13

Sambanis. Mamdani, Mahmood. “The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency.” London Review of Books,

Survival 35 (1)

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and consolidated within an internationally recognized state’s territorial boundaries. Both must have articulated political and ideological agendas that inhere desire for state control and sovereignty through force, economic resources, legal authority, and popular support. The government side must represent the current political order, and must mobilize troops to counter rebel forces. The rebel forces must be locally derived, organized under a common platform, and cohesive leadership. Both sides mobilize politically and militarily, and must both suffer casualties of at least 100 individuals tic civil war.

Causality and Independent Variables war. These independent variables are exhaustive of the political, social, and economic conditions so as to control for confounds and better establish causality. They are also internally enumerated to allow qualitative, rather than merely dichotomous, analysis. Five independent variables are implicated The nature and actions of the previous regime, including rise to power, makeup of the , or the division of the state into government- and rebel-conMilitarization of government and rebel forces, including the loss of monopoly of force by the government and the ability and willingness of the rebel forces to arm and train its members , in the form of state, international organization, and NGO approval, and Regional players, including the approval of bordering nations, regional organizations, and These independent variables are causal rather than descriptive: they do not address the motivations or grievances that sparked protests and caused them to spread. Rather, they explain the

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Method and Case Selection
James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond

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reaching high casualty rates and strong dissent against the al-Assad regime, has not yet been denoted a civil war. The case studies employ Mill’s methods and process-tracing to identify trends concernof agreement, the research is carried out under the assumption that an independent variable is not necessary if it is fully present in both cases, as the presence of civil war is only being examined in

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independent variable to create a hierarchy of independent variables and to establish causal mechanisms from independent variable to civil war. The established constitutive dimensions of civil war and the posited semantic equation, but also in a qualitative sense through primary- and secondarysource historical, political, social, and economic data.17

Case 1: Libya – Recognized Civil War
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The National Transitional Council, a coalition body of antith to consolidate resistance efforts nation-wide. As the NTC
19

15

A Rhetoric of Argument
16 17 18 19

Ragin. International Crisis Group. Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Policy

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1) Nature of Regime terized by an underlying monopoly of processes by his cult of personality. The Green Book and other the essence of a state closed to popular participation. This system of control, while bestowed with leaving his agenda unresponsive to popular will. 1973 rhetoric of dissenters as “stray dogs” to describe challengers in Benghazi as “rats” and “cockroaches” was to assume the defensive, rallying supporters and refusing to cede control at any price. This actions, denied human rights abuses, and deployed security forces for violent scorched earth policies to rout out dissent. its illegitimacy. Though the NTC responded in bloody fashion to loyalist troops who did rally and unwavering attacks. Regime crackdowns provided the underlying grievances for uprisings and then acted as the proximate cause for NTC militarization by increasing its platform strength. Harsh

largely inevitable. 2) Territoriality hazi, and NTC control extended to incorporate other tribal and rural areas. This exploitation of tribal versus Tripoli allowed the NTC to mobilize forces nationwide. While pre-existing tribal divisions

Middle East Journal Middle East Quarterly Eljahmi. The Guardian CNN World, September 1, The Telegraph Al Jazeera Beckons.” The Economist Brookings Institution

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different sects based on shared anti-elite grievance strongly expanded the NTC’s territorial scope. Shared agenda facilitated wide NTC home bases with popular support that deeply reduced loyalist Finally, areas under loyalist control were rather centralized in areas with personal problem and required harsher control for military gains, solidifying the development of protests into civil war.30 3) Militarization After the NTC’s consolidation in ideology and territorial control, arms access and training Council approval31 provided air strikes, weapons, and military training to rebel forces, facilitating violent development of the NTC. Arms trade and mercenaries from regional allies such as Qatar and transnational businesses created mass militarization that tipped the balance from peaceful protest to armed civil war. While rebels were initially portrayed as unproven and incapable in war, foreign training and aid reduced risks of dissolved control and enforced shared NTC identity through similar troop experience.33 The ensuing lack of government monopoly over violence thus crucially allowed the NTC to militarize to counter bloody loyalist crackdowns. Militia formation and exploitation of tribal arms access allowed forces united by grievances to functionally achieve violence rather than being immediately subdued by loyalist military and security troops.35

Strongly favorable media coverage of the NTC36

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justi38 ,

NTC violence. Such rhetoric was echoed in policy briefs and lobbyist statements39 that ultimately led sponsibility to Protect to prevent “widespread and systematic attacks against civilian populations”. of the NTC as well as its anti-regime, pro-democracy identity. persuaded US government policy and rhetoric

Caryl, Christian. “Mogadishu on the Mediterranean?” Foreign Policy
30 31 33 35 36 37 38 39 th Al Jazeera. Foreign Affairs The Atlantic Spencer. Rolling Stone Woodrow Wilson Center, Middle East Program. Hastings.

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to act in favor of intervention to support the NTC due to fears of regime-led “massacres” , overwhelming tenuous public support. NTC legitimacy and NATO military support, Thus, the underly-

proximate NTC-biased rhetoric and subsequent instrumental and legal support from NATO, the UN, and individual states, provided the causal mechanism that, following harsh regime crackdowns and war. 5) Regional Players African world due to his support of despots, bizarre foreign policy, and general disrepute, regional nations did not have to consider a delicate balance of power in supporting the NTC. Instead, the and Tunisia 50 and Egypt’s interim governments to support liberalization with little political risk. Additionally, 51 lowed more removed Gulf nations like Qatar to donate troops and arms to the NTC , and caused international intervention. causal mechanism for civil war by privileging neighboring military and political support of the NTC: it also meant that there were no alliances to be lost or harsh perceptions to incur if loyalist reprisals were especially harsh, thereby eliminating political costs of harsh backlash.53 reduced fears of civil war spillover, and caused regional players to support the NTC both politically -

Case 2: Syria – Fears of Future Civil War th -

solidated uprising on March 15 opposition forces have suffered over 9,000 casualties since the beginning of protests, violence, and th Al Jazeera. Harris.

The Washington Post.
50 51

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53

Al Jazeera. Zenko. Harris.

army involvement. Egypt, Syrian protestors have demanded an overarching campaign of regime change.55 While civil even earlier,56 Despite a harsh and repressive regime under Bashar al-Assad, the existence of small concessions for regime reform, the decentralized quality of violence due to high ethnic heterogeneity, incomplete militarization and mobilization
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civil war. 1) Nature of Regime Syria’s sultanistic system of control, characterized by leader monopoly of governmental and engagement in the political process and transition of power. However, succession by Bashar al58 Syria’s history of 59 ty , and loyalty to the regime was further bought with side-payments in the form of social programs and welfare.60 Additionally, al-Assad’s government countered its reliance on Alawite minority by attempting to integrate Syria’s heterogeneous population through elite representation of both Alawite and Sunni sects.61 Although the regime remained largely repressive and not amenable to dissent, political prisoners were released and popular debate was initially allowed in the beginning of al-Assad’s “Damascus Spring.” However, the regime remained fairly dysfunctional and schizophrenic, engaging in cycles of “escalating protests and repression” and eventually cracking down after small reforms failed to satisfy the public.63 Similarly, Al-Assad referred to the outbreak of the Arab Spring as a “foreign conspiracy” while concurrently discussing lifting Syria’s state of emergency, but denied a hand in the unrest when his forces crushed dissent. While al-Assad’s initial popularity prevented continue and heighten.65 Thus, the government’s consolidation and military mobilization against civilians and opposition forces meets that dimension of civil war. However, while protestors see

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

“Iraq’s PM warns of civil war if Syrian government fails.” Tehran Times New York Times Middle East Quarterly New York Times Abdulrahim, Raja. “Syria unrest: a popular uprising or civil war?” LA Times Goldstone.

“Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East: The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide.” International Crisis Group 63 Ibid Al-Assad, Bashar. “Syria Transcript: President Assad’s Speech ‘Full Transparency With the Citizens.’” Enduring America Worldview 65 ICG, “Syria.” Barnard and Gladstone.

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2) Territoriality Syria’s second-largest city. Government forces attempted to regain control of Homs from majority Sunni armed rebels, as they had previously completed in Hama and other large towns. Massive resisment and opposition forces and shared casualties acted as a microcosm for a potential civil war.66 more decentralized. Neither rebels nor government forces have amassed large tracts of territory to serve as home bases, and ethnic heterogeneity prevented rebels from controlling and exploiting regions for military gains.67 could develop into civil war, and such harsh government action may incite wider public support of rebels’ decentralized and heterogeneous nature.68 to become more territorialized, the status quo lack of divided regions prevents the rebel forces from consolidating and combating governmental forces to a degree that meets the standards of internal military mobilization and recruitment for civil war. 3) Militarization Non-consolidation of multiple rebel groups also prevented the tactical military deployment and arms access necessary to cause civil war. Contrary to biased international media reports that indicate no armament of rebel forces69 protestors against regime forces.70 However, overall the Syrian rebel forces lack arms, training, and centralization. Rebels are split between the Turkey-based Syrian National Council, the Damascusbased National Council of Coordination, and the Syrian Free Army: the three disagree on the use of violence and the scope of negotiations with Assad, with none representing overarching public desires.71 Though the Syrian Free Army is made up of professionally trained defecting soldiers from the government army , the rebel forces lack coherence in both political and military mobilization and fail to command a wide base of troops.73 Sunni protestors, as in the case of Alawite shabiha against Sunni protestors in Homs.75 While loyalist forces command access to heavy weaponry and tanks, rebel forces are unable to attain major access to weaponry or training and thus cannot complete wide-scale resistance against the regime.76

66 67 68 69

Bloomberg.

Gulf News

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venting a Syrian Civil War.” New York Times
70 71 73

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75 76

Debieuve. Abdulrahim. Ibid. ICG, “Syria.”

and uncertain. Media sources and scholars have alternately been favorable to government-persecuted Institute indicates, simply, that it is “kind of a civil war”77 while additional scholars warn of the convention78, allowing the international community to “wash [their] hands”79 as accused by Arab press. may happen in Syria”80 and Secretary of State Clinton echoed civil war fears81, actors remain largely disinterested in aiding regime change or consolidating civil war sides. Generally, in conjunction with the Syrian’s Foreign Minister’s desire to prevent “internationalization”83 100 an disinterest and international paralysis solidate rebel capacities and cause civil war. The international community throughout the spring of in a decision on April 1st to approve limited rebel support. The “Friends of Syria” coalition members the US has pledged non-arms based communication equipment to facilitate rebel cohesiveness and mobilization.85 This decision signals a shift towards international reinvigoration, a move that, while war. 5) Regional Players Ethnic and religious heterogeneity and sectarian ties within Syria have divided already antagonistic actors and confused regional action overall.86 Individual states have recently denounced Assad’s reregime unsustainable87, Iraq’s Prime Minister al-Maliki denounced the regime and warned of Syria’s “spring” turning into a “winter” civil war88, and Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan went as far as to call Assad “someone who has fought until the death against his own people, [like]…Hitler”.89 These

77 78 79 80

Ibid. Ibid. Choucair, Walid. “The West doesn’t mind a civil war.” Al Arabiya Pillay, Navi. “Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Open Debate of the Security . 9 NoAbdulrahim. BBC News Debieuve. Myers, Steven. “US Joins Effort to Equip and Pay Rebels in Syria.” New York Times Al-Assad, Ribal. “The Struggle for Syria.” ABC Religion and Ethics Weymouth. Tehran Times. Telegraph

81 83 85 86 87 88 89

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not halt its violent repression90 and then to approve unprecedented economic and political sanctions in a 19:3 vote.91 groups, it did not call for intervention, about spillover of Syrian instability, and the balance of power between Iran support and Saudi Arabian support of Sunni rebels made cohesive Gulf action impossible.93 The “Friends of Syria” cohort, however, has further pushed Arab nations towards military and non-military aid of rebels, approvimprove rebel mobilization and military capacity. However, barring an explicit rebel strategy, it is while the recent approval of sanctions signal increasing Syrian isolation in the Gulf and increasing regional consolidation against Assad, and Arab states’ approval of explicit foreign aid to Syrian reb-

Comparison Summary and Implications
The difference in each independent variable for both cases is portrayed in the table below. major opposition groups disagree on strategy and utilize separate leadership and mobilization systems, and thus do not harness public support. As such, the Syrian case did not meet the constitutional meets two out of the three constitutive dimensions.

Nature of Regime Territoriality Militarization

Harsh, isolated, no reform

Syria Harsh, but some reform

Yes: Arms, training, casualties on Weak: Death count met, but little both sides, coalition force rebel arms access Strong: UN recognition of NTC, Weak: international refusal to act, NATO intervention, media favorable to rebels

90 91

The New York Times BBC News, “Syria Unrest.” Zenko. Myers.

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Civil War?

Qatar forces, arms, training Yes

but regional Gulf allies Not currently, but questionable

Syria’s decentralized and fragmented rebellion can thus be traced back through the mechaexisted in both cases, and while Assad made toothless promises for reform, this was not enough eiregime reactions increased violence: the area of concern then is what prevented high militarization regional networks under the NTC coalition, Syrian uprisings began small and did not bridge gaps of ies, preventing adequate home base advantage and popular support to house and refurbish troops and carry out civil war. Next, such disjointed opposition and fragmented territories made militarization near impossible. Except for defectors from the army, most troops were poorly trained and poorly armed, as arms and the viability of violence against the Assad regime versus negotiation again meant that mass militarization could not be carried out. Even if small victories were won in control of individual cities, violence was generally initiated by government forces due to the lack of means on the rebel side. the government in any sustainable way. This lack of military aid can be traced even further back to the lack of international and

ing has recently been approved by Arab nations and the US, such funding is labeled as non-lethal war concerns allowed international organizations to stay removed, as there was no clearly identiorganizations could use the semantic uncertainty of civil war to defer to Syrian sovereignty and well, due to complicated sectarian tensions and the need to maintain a balance of power in the Gulf. Syria’s ethnic makeup and ties with neighbors meant that one framework of action by bordering it articulates these sanctions as a way to prevent international involvement in stark contrast to the Syrian rebels have been allotted discursively towards salaries and non-lethal support, again toeing for Syrian instability to spill over, Assad’s history of providing security, and an uncertain balance of power means that regional players will not offer any sort of military or political aid that could favor one side or another. In the short-term, instead of attempting to nurture the Arab Spring in a way that could spark all-out civil war, the neighboring states prefer to wait to see which side’s victory can

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the opposition’s offense.

Conclusion
Two main conclusions derive from this article’s tests of causal mechanisms and independent ing calls for political and military control. In the months-long war, casualties vastly exceeded 3500 centered loyalist forces and tribally-linked, internationally supported, and regionally and internationand regime change. Second, the Syrian case currently fails to meet the threshold of opposition consolidation and ment forces are mobilized, having waged reprisals against protestors that met the death count threshold, Syria’s opposition lacks cohesive rebel leadership, agenda, political strategy, or military mobireform prevented popular grievances from yielding one rebel identity. Such fragmentation caused of the delicate balance in Syria, though paralysis has been challenged by recent UN, Arab, and US decisions for limited rebel support. war, as has been seen in Syria, can focus tensions on civilian control and allow rebels to more efon unarmed civilians may win out when weighed against international fears of bog-down. As consible decision to eschew inaction and sovereignty concerns in favor of security and stability. As the international community does move towards increased engagement, decisions supporting limited or into question the assumption that civil war is necessarily the worst outcome, and posits that perhaps a civil war that ends quickly is more favorable from a security as well as human rights standpoint to drawn-out mass governmental violence against its citizens. Tactical intervention under the frameshortened civil wars in the hopes of toppling autocracies, consolidating rebel allies, and fundamentally reshaping the political and strategic makeup of a new Middle East.

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