Chapter Title: 3 The Theory of Stare Decisis Book Title: The Sources of Hong Kong Law Book Author(s): Peter Wesley-Smith Published by: Hong Kong University Press, (October 1994) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jc134 .
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The Theory of Stare Decisis

GENERAL THEORY Introduction
The essential idea behind stare decisis is that a judge is required - thus has no discretion to refuse - to follow certain previous decisions. This obligation arises when a prior case A yields a proposition of law in circumstances which are indistinguishable from those confronting the judge in case B, and by a formal rule the judge in case B stands in an inferior relationship to the court which decided case A. Stare decisis requires three conditions: (1) an earlier case, and thus an element of 'priorness' or 'pastness', (2) factual similarity, and (3) a particular relationship between the decision-making authorities. We should also note that the doctrine looks both backwards and forwards: not only is a judge bound by decisions taken earlier, but his own decision is potentially binding on judges