During the 1950s America became more and more drawn in to the conflict in Vietnam. Eisenhower was immediately put under pressure not to lose Vietnam to communism in the same way that Truman was perceived to have lost China before him - the American fear of a communist conspiracy was a major factor in the country’s continual support for the containment of it in Asia, regardless of the costs. Other factors that lead to an increase in American involvement in South East Asia included their support of the French in Indo-China until 1954, their response to the Geneva Accords 1954 and the formation of SEATO also in 1954. Arguably the most important reason for the US becoming increasingly involved in South-East Asia during the ‘50s was the perceived threat that communism posed. There was a widespread fear in America that there was a global threat of communism, which would destroy capitalist American values, being orchestrated from Moscow. This fear was worsened by the 12 year long conflict in Malaya between Britain and communist forces which started in 1948. This anti-communist sentiment was collated into the “Domino Theory” which suggested if one nation fell to communism, others would follow – Vice President Nixon visited Vietnam in 1953 and announced in a national TV broadcast upon his return that “If Indo-China goes under communist domination the whole of South East Asia will be threatened”, thus confirming the public’s fears and compelling greater US involvement in South East Asia in order to prevent this from happening.

Another crucial reason for the increasing US involvement in South East Asia was their response to the Geneva Accords in July 1954 and their consequential support of Diem. The US did not sign the accords and were suspicious that the elections to be carried out in 1956 would result in Ho Chi Minh, the communist leader of North Vietnam, gaining