Explain the difference between what Williams calls internal reasons and external reasons. Do you agree with Williams that there is no such thing as an external reason? Bernard Williams Started a long running well spoken about debate, about the nature of reasons in his seminal paper 'Internal and External Reasons' (Williams 1980) and the following publication 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame' (Williams 1989). Williams famously argued that all reasons behind our actions are internal, and further proclaimed that there are no external reasons, which is in direct contrast with internal reasons as he has defined them in his literature. On close examination, his external reason claims turn out to be disguised claims about what would be good for someone to do, not claims about what they have reason to do. I will be describing Internal and External reasons according to Williams and discuss the merits of his claims and my beliefs towards them I have based my arguments on Goldsteins work as it a far more complete argument and analysis of internal and external reasons.
Williams has defined two sets of reasoning which are in the world and that we can experience, one is an internal reason and the other being an external reason. He describes an internal reason as something that one has in light of one's own "subjective motivational set"- one's own commitments, desires (or wants) and goals
Opposite to this is an external reason, which is one that which occurs independently of one's subjective motivational set.
To explain the difference between these two, a more in depth look at the rationale must be done I will use some examples as well to clarify, the distinction between them depends on what kind of rational authority (normativity, validity) the reasons claim. If you possess an internal reason for performing some action, then it applies to you, or is rationally binding or authoritative over you, in virtue of the particular contents of your subjective motivational set. The rational authority of an external reason, on the other hand, does not depend on what is currently in your motivational set.
For example, when using a vending machine, the consideration that a drink would quench my thirst provides me with a reason to put money in the machine in virtue of my desire to quench my thirst. That consideration therefore provides me with an internal reason to quench my thirst.
An example of a possible external reason would be undertaking an action such as a charitable act would require no significant sacrifice on your behalf and would effectively be able satisfy someone else’s basic needs. You could claim that this in fact provides you with a reason in favor of making a contribution in which its validity is independent of what you have in your current motivational set. Hence being an external reason. The main idea that is made by Williams is that external reasons cannot exist since reasons for actions are motivating, and that a person cannot be motivated by something that is external to him, unless he already possesses a disposition for it in his S. If, by sound discussion, the person happens to acknowledge a motivation for an action that he previously did not have a motivation to perform, the newly discovered motivation is found by reevaluating and reconfiguring some elements from S and hence is internal. If S was lacking the ability of re-evaluation it would be impossible for them to gain this new motivation. In Goldstein’s literature he notes that the notion of discussion offered by Williams is objective in a way that the contents of S are not, since we are able to distinguish between what is appropriate and faulty deliberative reasoning. Goldstein comes to this conclusion following Williams’ idea that “a member of S, D, will not give A a reason for φ-ing if either the existence of D is dependent on false belief, or A’s belief in the relevance of φ-ing to the satisfaction of D is false.” (1981; 103) This reasoning is examined and further explained by Williams’ famous gin and tonic example: The person believes what is in front of them is gin, when it is actually petrol. He wants a gin and tonic. Has he a reason to mix this stuff with tonic and drink it? Surely, he is motivated to drink the liquid; somehow surprisingly however, according to Williams he has no reason to drink it since this motivation rises from the false belief that the liquid is in fact gin. If we assume that the agent is rational, Williams’s claims, he cannot have a reason to drink the liquid since if he knew that it were petrol he would lose his initial motivation through sound deliberation. Here I would like to suggest that William was wrong about the morale to draw from the gin and tonic example. If the agent wishes to drink gin and tonic and sees a bottle of what he believes to be Gin in front of him, he has a reason to drink it. He desires a gin and tonic, and all available evidence points to the conclusion that the liquid in front of his is in fact gin. If a friend of the agent in question walks in the room in the moment that A is pouring the liquid in a glass and warns him that it is in fact petrol the situation changes drastically, and is just then that A can lose his initial motivation due to new information For example, the bottle can be placed among other bottles containing alcoholic beverages, or it can even be labeled as gin.

And to a possible, very simple and subconscious deliberation, that since the liquid is petrol he has no reason to drink it - it would harm his health and it does not even taste like gin. The two described scenarios are significantly different – in the first one, A has a reason to drink the liquid, in the second he does not. We could present the situation as follows: The internal reason the agent has is to drink the liquid he believes to be gin because he wants a gin and tonic. The external “reason” is that he should not drink it because it would be a serious threat to his health. This kind of reason is external to the agent since he cannot come to realize it following a sound deliberative route since, in the present situation, not all necessary information is available to him. Potential reasons are the ones of an “if…then…” form. If he knew that the liquid was not in fact gin he would not drink it since he would know (let’s assume that he is rational and sane) that this kind of action is dangerous and would not even satisfy his desire. But potential reasons are not actual reasons. The agent can consider this hypothetical situation and agree that he would not have any reason to drink the liquid if it were not gin, but nevertheless drink the liquid in front of him since he is oblivious of the fact that the liquid is petrol. We can apply this line of thought to Scanlon’s counterexample (as presented by Goldstein) to Williams. The counterexample is roughly as follows: Mr. Jones enjoys Following this premise, of the four propositions which Williams presents as true of internal reason statements, we should accept the first and the fourth one (1. An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate element from S, 4. Internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning) and reject the second and the third (2. A member of S, D, will not give A a reason for φ-ing if either the existence of D is dependent on false belief, or A’s belief in the relevance of φ-ing to the satisfaction of D is false, 3. a) A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself, b) A may not know some true internal reason statement about himself). In this case the external reason would be internalized if the agent were informed about the true nature of the liquid.
I do not find what Williams says to be true, the fact that his main argument can be presented in multiple ways leading to many significantly outcomes, I can not support his argument, and whilst I can accept the points that he presents, I can also accept many other opinions about the topic, hence not supporting or agreeing with his argument.