NJ Transit Paper Many tactics have changed in the twenty-first century we all know that the competitive landscape has almost completely changed. We have amazing leadership examples that have been left behind to help the present day remain successful business empires. This implies that there will always be traditional remnants of competitive advantage. When the economies advertising used to tip the scales and have a greater advantage over competitors in the past. It simply isn’t that way anymore and even the “little man” can afford amazing advertisement campaigns with little expensive out of their revenue. So has for NJ transits predecessors advertising was key for them in order to succeed as well as it was in order for NJ Transit making large advertising budget not nearly has an effective competitive weapons an effective weapon in the past. As the weapons of them game seem to rapidly change and seem to be almost completely unpredictable at times this new competitive advantage makes companies even larger ones adopt new ways of thinking. The new competitive mind set must value flexibility, speed, innovation, integration, and the challenges that evolve from constantly changing conditions (Chapter Notes). A term often used to describe the new realities of competition is hyper competition, a condition that results from the dynamics of strategic moves and countermoves among innovative, global firms: a condition of rapidly escalating competition that is based on price-quality positioning, efforts to create new know-how and achieve first-mover advantage, and battles to protect or to invade established product or geographic markets (Chapter 1).
“In 1979 NJ TRANSIT was created and now is New Jersey's public transportation corporation is massively used every single day for common user as well as non-jersey residents. Its mission is to provide safe, reliable, convenient and cost-effective transit service with a skilled team of employees, dedicated to our customers' needs and committed to excellence. The total area that is covered by NJ transportation services covers an area of approximately 5,400 square miles. Now for us that live in NJ can proudly say that we have the nation's third largest provider of bus, rail and light rail transit, linking major points in New Jersey, New York and Philadelphia” (NJ transit). A quick history of how the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) was formed in 1966 as the first State DOT. Despite the popular belief that the NJ Transit just started up one day out of the pockets of the tax payer is a false belief. There was a long line or merging and acquisitions that eventually led to the massively used public transportation system today. Starting it all seemed to begin around 1967 with the Erie Lackawanna and the Central RR of New Jersey, both were running in constant battles with each other until one day some of the upper management said let’s stop all of this fighting and form a single group to benefit everyone.(Hoboken terminal) “That around the timeframe when the NJ Department of Transportation assumed the operation of commuter trains in New Jersey ran by the Erie Lackawanna, Central RR of NJ, Penn Central, and the Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines” (history). One of the first and smartest decisions was to buy new train engines for the daily use of NJDOT's operations. On the Erie Lackawanna lines, they ordered the top of the line locomotives. These locomotives were somewhere between the ears of 1970-1973 (Chapter 6 notes). Most managers tend to take a positive and strategic route that leads to a positive result in the businesses profitability inflows and outflows of liquid and other assets. This leads to a main contributing factor in the strategic competitiveness of the direction of the business such as NJ Transit cooperate management has taken in the past and plans on for the future as well. firm. In addition to the internal and external governance mechanisms discussed, managers also may be provided with incentives to limit firm diversification to optimal levels by a concern for their personal reputations in the labor market and the related market for managerial talent (Chapter 6 notes).
“In the mid to late 1970s, new "Jersey Arrow" cars arrived from General Electric for the Northeast Corridor and North Jersey Coast Line. On April 1, 1976, the Consolidated Rail Corporation, or ConRail, was created by the government merging the financially troubled Penn Central, Erie Lackawanna, Central RR of New Jersey, Lehigh Valley, Lehigh & Hudson River, Reading, and Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines; and CR operated Commuter Railroad service under contract from NJDOT. On January 1, 1980, the New Jersey Transit Corporation was formed as the "operating arm" of the NJDOT. Conrail continued to operate Commuter rail service under contract from NJT until January 1, 1983 when New Jersey Transit Rail Operations assumed operation of all commuter rail service in New Jersey” (history).
Everybody in the leadership roles were well aware of the threat of new competition and if they continued to not merge and get along other companies would eventually rise up and take seize opportunities during the bickering of the major companies that are listed above. Even though the company was still ironing out after the merger and NJ Transit was in existence, and bring the threat of new products which in NJ such as arrow too the northeast corridor. They took the best product that was available and the public loved it. So with the love of the new locomotives came the ability to raise the fares higher with the public having the idea of a luxurious way of travel. A form of valuing neutral influences over the competitive rivalries that was at power in this beginning time frame. The management knew they had to set themselves apart and make the public want what, they simply preformed at amazing standards and the profits blossomed from there. Such as the time when NJ transit moved too continue and make strategic influential management changeovers to improve their transportation empire more and more, such as the following: “At an early morning meeting, the agency's board appointed Richard Sarles to succeed George Warrington as executive director -- three days after Warrington ended his public service career to start his own transportation consulting firm. Sarles, 62, NJ Transit assistant executive director of capital programs and planning, received a five-year contract and a first- year salary of $252,000 to run the country's largest statewide public transportation system. About 40 people had applied for the job” (Rife, Judy).
Kris Kolluri, the board's chairman and the state's transportation commissioner, described Sarles as "the silent architect" behind NJ Transit's $7.2 billion project known as Access to the Region's Core, or ARC. The project includes construction of a second rail tunnel between New Jersey and New York as well as a new station adjacent to Pennsylvania Station (Rife, Judy).
It’s these types of managers that are sought out and brought in that are the game changers that I find so fascinating , this man brilliant mind and ideas literally helped direct the future of NJ transit to how the company is still ran till this day. With this type of constant corporate level strategy they are constantly changing in order to succeed not only for themselves but for the good of the mass public transportation for the common working man. He worked diligently with the uncertainty that was regarding the assessment of the future of NJ Transit and where they planned on generally going and proceeding within the industry environments, corporate and production assessments, and predictability of competitive actions to remain profitable, and customer preferences always remaining on top to the best of the management’s abilities. Sarles also approached the defined issue of complexity regarding the nature of any interrelatedness of the causes of change in the environment and how the environments are perceived, especially regarding decisions as to which of the firm’s resources and capabilities might serve as the foundation for competitive advantage. As well has the difficult and stressful ability to handle intraorganizational conflicts among managers that dealt with an extreme amount of time handling the NJ Transit managers and making decisions about which core competencies are to be nurtured and about how the nurturing should take place, in needed at all. (Chapter 3 notes)
I’ll give you a little more information on this manager Richard Sarles. “A native of New Jersey, Sarles, who has a bachelor's degree in engineering and a master's in business administration, spent 28 years at the Port Authority in construction, project management and project planning. When Warrington left NJ Transit to become president of Amtrak in 1996, he lured Sarles to Washington, D.C., as vice-president of its high-speed rail program, a program that brought the Acela on line and upgraded the Northeast Corridor” (NJ.com) When companies comes across these unique historical conditions can make not only the site work for their advantage it seems to attract the public even more when they have this setting. NJ Transit has many sites and stations that have a rich history and chock full interesting touristy information that keep the income coming in different ways and form. For example, establishing the Hoboken faired to Liberty Island and Ellis Island, which was one of the very first train stations that was commonly used in the starting NJ transit history. You can still go and see the sight and visit and buy all type of tour tidy items. That is just one of many ways that these historical and unique sites have greatly benefited the income of the company and it was great planning by the management staff that created such a success out of it. It is in these key locations that can change the competition when no other locations have similar value-related characteristics such has the historical impact of a certain site cannot be replaced in any way, shape or form, there is only place the originally site can be and reproduction sites usually end in failure. So trying to develop these types of a unique organizational culture in the early stages of the organization's life may not be cheap, but since NJ Transit already owned many of these forms of sites they just invested in restoration and reaped in the profits and tourist from all over the world are attracted to many of the sites that are historically attached to NJ Transit.
And then he brought Sarles back to NJ Transit with him in 2002 as one of the agency's 10 key executives, but the one who ran the $1.3 billion capital program that has fueled a record expansion of service and now is poised to build ARC and double commuter rail capacity to Midtown. "Rich is a good guy, very low-key, very unflappable," said Jeff Zupan, the transportation expert at the Regional Plan Association.
"He's the right man at the right time in terms of ARC but he also knows the system and the region. The advantage he no doubt had over other candidates is that there will be no learning curve." Sarles headed New Jersey Transit from 2007 until January when Gov. Chris Christie took office and appointed a transit executive. He spent 20 years at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (NJ COM). Using His years of experience was a successful strategic gain for the financial status of then. These are some of the most detailed actions that can be taken in order to gain a competitive advantage in the transportation world, that’s why they needed this sort of experience. Also, through the selection process and training it would have taken to get someone with the same exact experience would of cost around the same amount yet the management decided that with the variety and mix of businesses competing in within the industry. When they did this they conquered many of their “Primary concerns” of corporate-level strategies (Chapter 7).
Below is some of the example of where the money went during the reign of this management team. They strongly believed is that taxpayers have the right to know what exactly it was that NJ Transit was up too in the upcoming future, knowing that it directly affected many of them on their daily routes too work. Also, that the agencies need to have the ability to commutate to the public with this sort of information. By using technology and allowing them to have a common knowledge of the strategic inputs and puts that were being executed by the Management of NJ transit. Updated at regular intervals, NJ Transit is committed to holding up the Scorecard as the standard by which we get measured by the people who use our system every day. We previously did not have a system in place that made it easy to accomplish this. They did this hoping to appease the general environment is composed of dimensions in the broader society that influence an industry and the firms within it.(blackboard). Developing an organizational structure that effectively supports the firm’s strategy is difficult, especially because of the uncertainty in cause-effect relationships in the global economy’s rapidly changing, dynamic competitive environments. Structure facilitates effective implementation of a firm’s strategies when elements of that structure are properly aligned with one another. Thus, organizational structure is a critical component of effective strategy implementation processes(chapter 11). Structure specifies the work to be done and how to do it by specifying the processes that are to be used to complete organizational tasks. Effective structures provide the stability the firm needs to rely on its current competitive advantages to successfully implement today’s strategies while providing the flexibility required to develop competitive advantages that will be needed to use future strategies; thus, an effective organizational structure allows the firm to exploit current competitive advantages while developing new ones (Chapter 11).
Listed below is just a small example of the expansion of the budget that NJ transit needed in order to expand and meet the public’s needs to which were being requested from NJ transit services. This was around there 1995 era and was the best example that I could find through all the databases with the most accurate filings from the financial department from the NJ Transit financial offices.$10.7 million for right-of-way acquisition for the Newark-Elizabeth Rail Link (NERL) light rail line. $49.53 million for continuing work on the Secaucus Transfer station, which will allow commuters on NJ Transit’s northernmost lines (which terminate in Hoboken) to transfer to Northeast Corridor trains bound for Manhattan. $2.2 million for completion of the Kearny Connection, which will link NJ Transit’s Morris and Essex Lines with the Northeast Corridor. $15.58 million for improvements at New York Penn Station to handle an expected influx of passengers generated by the Secaucus and Kearny projects. $26.2 million for final design and land acquisition for the Hudson River Waterfront Transportation System LRT. $51.08 million for rehabilitation of 70 Arrow II electric multiple-unit railcars, and other rolling stock upgrades. $25 million to purchase 25 new railcars. $96.44 million for track, bridge, tunnel, C&S, and other infrastructure projects. $17.2 million for facility improvements associated with Americans with Disabilities Act compliance (Kaske). We can all see that with the consumer markets there are the following: Demographic factors, socioeconomic factors, Geographic factors, Psychological factors, Consumption pattern, and Perceptual factors. Also, with the industrial market End-use segments, Product segments, Geographic segments, Common buying factor segments, Customer size segments which we can easily see that NJ transit deals with all of these on a daily bases being a large public transportation company (Chapter 4). That’s why the business-level strategy is so effective, the management saw the needs of the customers and open many different railways that lead all over Jersey, As well has buses, etc co there’s not much that NJ Transit needs to be concerned with since this business firm’s position in an industry, is dominating to many of its competitors. “Firms are challenged to select business-level strategies to position themselves favorably by performing activities differently or performing different activities as compared to its rivals. Thus, the firm’s business-level strategy is a deliberate choice about how it will perform the value chain’s primary and support activities in ways that create unique value” (Chapter 4 Notes). Why do I say they have suck a dramatic advantage over many other competitors: “That of course is a dramatic different from today’s standards The budget also includes $587.3 million of state and federal reimbursement funds, a decrease of $54.3 million over the prior year's budget due to fewer funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. NJ Transit is the nation's third-largest mass-transit system, providing 223 million passenger trips annually. The agency oversees more than 200 bus routes and 11 rail lines, and connects New Jersey to New York and Philadelphia” (Kaske). There is an interesting perspective I took when reading chapter 5 again and seeing NJ Transit in a different light setting. There are dangers or and strong disadvantages to being a first mover. It is incredibly difficult to attempt and try to estimate the revenue returns that they hoped would be earned from the transportation industry. They knew people needed to get around, but they saw that there were many other competitive ways to get around as well. The trolley was still highly valued, cars were cheaper and more readily available to the working man leaving transportation pricing to be limited, making it hard to have a great source of income. The first mover’s to form the industries and business direction effective can be incredibly risky, NJ Transit even though a merged and newly formed company lacked the full risk of a first time mover (Chapter 5). This ended up reducing the investments that they would need in order to carry on with future endeavors, such as buying new locomotives adding train stations and higher successful business tycoons to help trail blaze their emerging company. Lack of product acceptance over the course of the competitor’s innovations may indicate less willingness in the future to accept the risks of being a first mover (chapter 5). As for being a second mover NJ Transit pretty much was 85% in this boat as they avoid much cost (not all) of trying the pioneering expenditures, that had much of the market feedback already in play, but where to build and where the new rail road lines/tracks needed to be built was another adventure that was toyed with, some led to success other were abandoned and never looked at again (Chapter 5). NJ Transit is companies I could write a whole book on there were so many twist and turns. They had many downfalls and successful stories, management fell into the same category. It was a amazing company to explore and has a rich full of history of many of the examples spoken about with this class throughout the semester. They have succeeded in the long run and still continue to grow and expand till this day even as I finish this paper.

WORK CITED
Book and Notes
"NJ TRANSIT - A Quick History." NJ TRANSIT - A Quick History. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Sept. 2012. <http://www.hobokenterminal.com/quickhistory.html>.
"New Jersey Transit." New Jersey Transit. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Sept. 2012. <http://www.njtransit.com/tm/tm_servlet.srv?hdnPageAction=CareersTo>
Rife, Judy. "NJ Transit Appoints New Executive Director." McClatchy - Tribune Business News: 1. Apr 02 2007. ProQuest Central. Web. 1 Sep. 2012
"Former NJ Transit Chief Gets Post with Washington D.C. Metro | NJ.com." The Star-Ledger. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Sept. 2012. <http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/03/former_nj_transit_chief_gets_p.html>.
Kaske, Michelle. "NJ Transit Approves Budgets." Bond Buyer: 1. Jul 15 2010. ProQuest Central. Web. 2 Sep. 2012 .