Security Stability in Somalia
Since their indirect elections on September 12, 2012, and despite the fragile regional security situation of the Horn of Africa, Somalia has continued to experience significant and sustained progress towards security stability in their country. In order for Somalia to succeed as viable and trusted state, the United States (US) as well as the International Community should not allow another security stability failure in Somalia. The US and the International Community must focus on helping to sustain Somalia’s efforts against the fight of the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization, help to counter piracy, and to help build capacity and capability in the Somali government and its institutions. While at the same time provide the support to attend Somali basic humanitarian aid needs and financial assistance.
First, one of the reasons why the general security conditions in Somalia keep on improving is principally thanks to the sustained operations carried out against the Jihadist organization Al-Shabaab by the Somali national security forces in conjunction with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and with other associates and allied militias of the government. These operations are currently successful in managing to achieve the retreat of the Islamist radicals from some of the main cities of the south and center of the country. The sustainment of these operations will deteriorate Al-Shabaab operations capacity as a military force, promote the desertion of some of its members, and will keep them from gaining support from the general population. The purpose of this strategy against the Al-Shabaab terror group is to decrease popular support in the civil population by emphasizing and exposing the groups hampering of humanitarian aid, and its brutal and indiscriminate use of terror methods.
The improvement and sustainment of the security situation will allow an increased international presence in Somalia. The effects of the security focus are currently starting to show up. For example, the counter piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia have caused a drop in piracy activities according to US Department of State figures (Kelly, 2012). This drop in piracy activities is mainly due to an effective international military pressure from the sea, and a less tolerant attitude towards the pirates from the authorities in land. That, in conjunction with a feverish construction activity, an economic recovery unknown for decades, and the realization of initiatives of cooperation is starting to create some optimism about the future of Somalia (Richter, 2013). According to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “for the first time in more than two decades, Somali people spoke of new hopes, optimism and confidence, as well as strong faith in the new developments in the country even though still facing daunting challenges” (UNSC, 2013). These developments, as well as other developments in political stability, have some people in the US and the International Community talking about Somalia, not as a failed state but as a fragile state with the potential to be a viable state.
In effect, after the long process of political transition in Somalia successfully reached last autumn, the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) feels provided with a new legitimacy, and already does not want direction from the exterior. The newly elected FGS wants to be the one to direct the process of progressive consolidation of Somalia as a viable state. “We are the Somali Government, and we will be the ones who determine the type of assistance that we want, and where and when we want it”, said President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the newly elected president of Somalia (Mohamud P. H., 2013). This perception of legitimacy, based in the fact that the government of Somalia is already not a transition mechanism, but a sovereign and representative government, prompted the formal recognition of the Government of Somalia on the part of the US. The US made the announcement last January 17, 2013 during a press conference between then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Somalia’s new President Mohamud. This recognition is important because allow the FGS to participate in certain assistance programs, to include military training and financing (Watkins, 2013).
President Mohamud acknowledges that there is still external dependence on foreign aid and assistance. Therefore, the President wants to articulate the international efforts within the framework of his “six pillars” strategy. This strategy will try to establish the mechanisms for success in the following order: achieve the stability of the country; accelerate the economic recovery; construct the peace and exile the main causes of conflict; improve the capacity of the government to answer the needs of its people and provide the required services; strengthen the bonds of friendship with international associates, nearby countries and friends of Somalia; and finally, achieve the unity of Somalia (Mohamud H. S., 2012).
The security to stabilize the country is clearly the pillar priority, and the essential requirement to develop the rest of the pillars. Now, this does not mean that the different players in the International Community extend their presence in Somalia indefinitely to consolidate the achievements made so far in the field of security; but that the Somali security sector must be fully develop as soon as possible to extend the authority of the state through the whole territory effectively and self-sufficiently. President Mohamud emphasized the previous point while addressing a delegation of the United Nations Review Mission: “If you don’t start treating us as a viable State, we will never become one” (Clercq, 2012).
The solution to achieve security stability lies in one absolute priority: the definitive defeat of the Al-Shabaab organization. The defeat of the Al-Shabaab terror group is very important and a difficult task for the FGS. The positive implications of such success will benefit the country in the way ahead. By achieving this important objective, the FGS will be able to impose the authority through the length and breadth of the Somali territory. It will be able to fight more effectively against the various criminal organizations and, in a special way, it may eradicate the piracy, which has its foundations inland. That is why a continuous and sustained effort against diminishing or eradicating the Al-Shabaab organization must be supported by the US and International Community. With this idea, the FGS wants to concentrate all available resources in this important struggle against the radical Islamist organization Al-Shabaab, and absolutely positioned itself against dispersing their efforts toward other fronts. For example, the FGS has repeatedly expressed its opposition to a maritime component within AMISOM, claiming that Al-Shabaab only operates on land (UNSC, 2013).
Now, some think the FGS is unwilling to deal with social reconciliation issues at this stage of the security stabilization process and may end up hampering the security stabilization recovery efforts. Social reconciliation is a pivotal element in restoring trust after a detracted civil war particularly when the memories of such war are still fresh in the minds of the society. An honest reconciliation can mend the spirit of forgiveness allowing the return of harmonious social re-integration (Bahal, 2013). If the FGS wants to truly embrace change in Somali they must incorporate social reconciliation programs within their main pillars strategy for successful recovery and become a viable state.
In any case, there is still a whole lot of work to do before Somalia can have an autonomous and effective security instrument. Despite the progress, the fragility of the situation in the country is still evident. Al-Shabaab continues to maintain control over an important part of the territory in the center and south of the country. It is moving under pressure to the North, and although its military strength is severely impaired, still maintains the capacity to carry out asymmetric actions, taking advantage of the vulnerability of an increasingly stretched AMISOM and Government forces. The Al-Shabaab organization also improved its ability to use improvised explosive devices (IED) to attack throughout the territory, including in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital city. For example, the attack on March 18, 2013 near the Presidential Palace in the capital killed a dozen of civilians (UN News Centre, 2013).
As a result, the involvement of the US and the International Community still essential to consolidate the progress achieved so far, so it may not be reversible. In this context, the historic UN Resolution 2093 (Council, 2013), from the Security Council of United Nations (UNSC), written by the United Kingdom and adopted unanimously last March 6, 2013 can be considered as an ambitious and opportune text, which sends a clear message of support from the International Community to the new FGS. The resolution is important because: allows to extend for one year the mandate of AMISOM; partially lifts the arms embargo for the benefit of the Somali Government; reorders the United Nations activities in the country and deal with other issues such as human rights and the protection of civilians.
The resolution is also relevant because implies a shift of the supervision efforts of building peace in Somalia from the regional level to the global level, through the United Nations, and gives specific guidelines to the International Community for its activities within the country. The resolution also suggests that the various international players assisting Somalia must improve coordination among them and with the FGS by showing respect for Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and unity of the country. This is important for the US since the US is Somalia’s largest financial supporter. Over the past two years, the US assistance to Somalia totaled 360 million USD, which helped end the famine conditions and helped to support the transition to the new Somali Government. Currently the US continue to assists the Somali Government with building capacity and capability in their government to provide services, making financial management transparent, procuring services and infrastructure support and helping the FGS to achieve self-sufficiency (US Virtual Presence Post, Somalia, 2013). This necessity of ownership by the Somali authorities is also a focus of the United Nations resolution.
It is very evident that Somalia is progressing, although very slowly, from a failed state status to an extremely fragile state, which still requires important international support for its security stabilization. The resolution 2093 of the UNSC responds to those needs and provides a clear message of support to the FGS at this critical moment. The United Nations also takes an essential role in the coordination of the diverse international efforts, among which remains fundamental the involvement of the US and the International Community.
However, in a complex scenario as is Somalia, with so many and so diverse interests, it will not be an easy task to support these international efforts and align them with the ambitious strategic framework designed by the FGS. If we wish for Somalia to be a viable state, there is no other option than to support the new Somali initiatives for security stabilization as long as they follow the International Community guidelines. Once again, the US and the International Community cannot afford another failure in Somalia and must help sustain the security achievements already reached. The Somali people desperately deserve another chance to look at the future with hope and an opportunity for progress.

Appendix A
Structured Analytical Techniques
During the course of my research towards writing my critical reasoning paper about Somalia’s security stabilization issues and implications, I used the following structure analytical techniques: brainstorming, quality of information check, and indicators or signposts of change. The following paragraphs will explain how I utilized each of the techniques.
Brainstorming
Almost every time I want to write a paper about a topic, I utilize brainstorming. It helps me puts all my ideas for a topic on paper to a point that I start focusing on a specific topic. During the search of my topic for this paper, I started focusing on security issues in the Horn of Africa to then just focus on Somalia’s security stabilization efforts. Realizing that most people nowadays focus on the negative aspects of the efforts in Somalia, I concluded to focus my research on the positive implications of the security efforts, and what Somalia, the United States, and the International Community should do, or keep doing to assure security stability in Somalia. Once I figured out my topic, I developed my thesis statement.
Quality of Information Check After I selected the topic and developed my thesis, I proceeded to utilize quality of information check to evaluate completeness and validity of available information separately from the main source. The technique helped me gain insight into the validity, strengths, and weakness of the information gathered. It definitively helped me to avoid errors in interpretations of main players on the issue. This was a fact when citing sources statements from the Somali president, United States officials, and United Nations statements. The technique allowed me to make sure that those statements were not taken out of context. It also helped me to select only that information written objectively for the most part. To that effect, I came up with many references or sources of information to make sure each point of view was valid and clear.
Indicators or Signposts of Change Indicators or signposts of change helped me to identify mainly the major point when things started to get better for the Somali people. In the same way, it helped me establish what other factors needed or will need to happen in order to sustain and improve Somalia’s security stability. The main reason why I choose this technique was to give me a starting point or indicator, and to help me find out what happened or needed to happened to not stop the sustain slow progress towards security stability in Somalia.
Conclusion
Utilizing these techniques helped me to focus my research in Somalia’s security issues. Once I validated the sources of information for clarity, validity, and errors in interpretations, I decided to focus on security stability as a main problem or issue in the area. Once I identified the problem, I decided to focus on the positive implications for Somalia and the rest of the world. While stressing the fact of what is working and needed to keep happening in order for the Somali people to achieve security stability and not to lose faith and hope in their future.

References

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