WWII Submarine Warfare

Germany’s surrender and agreement not to retain any submarines due to the Armstice terms in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles was short-lived. Britain was not ready for Hitler’s initiation 20 years later. After building up his submarine stock since 1935, his initiative to intercept merchant ships in the Atlantic commenced in 1939. The directive was to sink more supply line ships than the Allies could replace to force a surrender through starvation and lack of supplies. This initiative created what was known as the Battle of the Atlantic. Known as the longest continuous campaign of World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic mostly involved the Allies protecting the shipping routes across the Atlantic which were constantly being intercepted by German U-boats. The Nazi’s submarines, referred to by most as U-boats, were more like submersible ships than submarines at the time. They ran on diesel engines for their surface time and battery for their submersed. They dove beneath the water only when they were attacked or for torpedo strikes during the day. More often attacks were made on the surface at night. This was extremely effective in the early years of the war as they were virtually untraceable due to the lack of sonar technologies at the time. This time was known to Germans as “die gluckliche Zeit” or “the happy time”. Many classes of U-boats were made, but the most prominent of them were Type VII, the workhorse (700 active), Type IX, larger with operations involving the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, Type XIV, known as the Elektroboot developed to perform best while submerged. Concerning the successful type IX, detailed description included a double hull construction, with a torpedo count of twenty two, with six tubes for firing. Anti-aircraft guns were outfitted on the deck along with other deck guns. Twin shafts were set on either side of the hull, each with a three bladed propeller. A snorkel let the diesel engine charge the batteries used while under shallow water. Torpedoes could usually be replaced with mines that could be shot from the torpedo tubes. Combined could become a formidable enemy of Allied Power’s merchant ships. Before the Fall of France, the German U Boat fleet operated out of north German bases. They soon used bases on the west coast of France to attain sectors in the Atlantic. They ranged in number from South America, the west and southern coasts of Africa, as well as north of Iceland and throughout the mid-Atlantic. Tactics such as the “wolfpack”, moving in close knit groups at night to surprise and destroy Allie resource ships in one emerging, swift motion, were used often with great success. Karl Donitz, German chief of the U-boats, knew that the numbers were the main asset to controlling the Atlantic. In the beginning of the war, 46 operational U-boats were initiated. A gap of 1700 miles across the Atlantic was initially left for merchant ships to navigate solely, and for U-boats to openly overtake. By 1941 full convoys to protect the merchant ships across the Atlantic were established, but by 1942, 100 U-boats in the waters overpowered some of these groups by sheer number. The U-boats soon began to lose significant numbers in 1943 as Allied anti-submarine warfare improved with the cracking of the German enigma code and other antisubmarine tactics were initiated. U-boat operations could then easily anticipated U-boat operations along with more advanced anti-submarine weapons, long-range aircraft (Liberator) with radar functionality posed serious threats to the German’s success. By April 1943 the destruction of German submarines escalated. In the next few months 43 of the German’s U-boat fleet were destroyed and Donitz soon decided to stop U-boat operations dating the 23 of May 1943. It is arguable that if the communications intelligence was not compromised and Germans succeeded in developing their Type XXI and XXIII submarines, the battle of the Atlantic might have ended differently.